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A b s t r a c t
This thesis deals with the role of land markets in the redistribution of
land and agrarian reform in South Africa, a capitalist economy which is
uniquely marked by the legacy o f  institutionalised racism and in which the
land question is intimately bound up with both reparation and liberation.
The first chapters provide the political, h istorical, and theoretical 
context. I exam ine the evolution o f  diverse , rac ia lly  separated  tenure 
systems, some marketable, others not. I review Classical, Marxist, and neo­
classical theory o f  land and rents and methods of calculating the productive 
value which may diverge from the market price of  land. A comparison of
international compensation practice in land reforms separates the issue of
price  to the outgoing land owner from  that o f  a ffo rdab ili ty  to the
b e n e f i c i a r i e s .
An analysis o f agricultural restructuring and class stratification in 
white commercial farming and the black rural areas draws attention to the 
influential role of the state. A lack of economic or ecological sustainability
is evident. A discussion of scale and productivity concludes that there are 
widely differing production functions affected by racial access to capital 
and skills and also by the communal inheritance of land use. It is impossible 
to identify an average rate  o f profit as pertains in neoclassical discussions
on land prices. The commercial land market is unstable and influenced by 
the political climate as well as fiscal policies.
I conclude that effective land redistribution depends on the strength 
of political organisation. The state's role is to facilitate an enduring process 
o f land reform through a conducive legal and economic framework. This 
must accommodate various categories of beneficiaries providing differing
conditions of access. Neither a unitary free land m arket nor its opposite, 
nationalisation, can respond effectively to redistributive demands and social
needs. Diverse land ownership systems should continue in parallel: a non- 
marketable component for the marginalised, conditional subsidised access to
m arketable land and the "open" market for entrepreneurs would continue 
with m easures to prom ote redistribution. Tenure flexibility  responds to 
social demands and can enhance land use; new form s which prom ote 
dem ocratic m anagem ent should be prom oted. W hile petty com m odity 
producers can im prove their productive base through cooperation these 
will not succeed without democratic management and state support.
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Glossary
'black' is often used to refer to "non-whites", people of colour who 
suffer racial oppression. The current popular use of "black" in South 
Africa more generally refers to those black South Africans who 
descend from the continent's indigenous people and who are the most 
oppressed victims of institutionalised apartheid
platteland' is the name given to white commercial farming areas, 
particularly those highveld area where more Afrikaner people live. 
The term carries a somewhat derogatory connotation of white 
tribalism  and parocialism .
Conversion
morgen a unit of area measurement. A morgen is 2.116 hectares.
V l l
Preface
South Africa is the last of the southern African countries to proceed 
towards gaining franchise for the black m ajority. In the neighbouring 
states formal independence was followed by the installation of new black 
governments. Many freedom fighters expected that redistribution of lands 
appropriated by the colonisers would be carried out by the new state. 
Nationalisation and repossession is a symbolic undertaking for many for 
whom it represents the kernel of political power and nationhood.
N eighbouring states have pursued d ifferen t strateg ies. Zam bia 
nationalised land as a natural resource but provided for the marketable 
transfer of land improvements. Mozambique nationalised land and in the 
first years following its independence began to implement a development 
strategy which aimed to socialise agriculture; form er colonial enterprises 
would becom e state farm s and production cooperatives would provide 
peasants with the opportunity to operate on a different level of scale and 
technology and achieve a higher standard of living. In Zimbabwe the 
capitalist farming sector remains in place; some black entrepreneurs have 
jo ined  the previously  w hite-only sector. The governm ent has also 
purchased land as it has come up for sale in order to implement settlement 
schemes. Beneficiaries enjoy usuA-uct rights to the land. The resettlem ent 
schemes were initially a means of widening the resource base available to 
targeted poor producers from the former tribal trust areas.
The South African debate on what is to be done is wide-ranging. For 
some all that is needed is the abolition of apartheid laws, thus ending 
institutionalised racial discrimination. Others regard land redistribution as 
unnecessary because for them the real issue is the urbanisation of migrants 
who were forced to m aintain rural homesteads. In a similar vein it is 
som etim es argued that land dispossession and pro le tarian isa tion  have 
historically proceeded to the point where there is no substantial peasantry 
and that land redistribution to the unskilled landless is expensive and 
backward looking. For others the prime concern is to correct past injustice; 
those who, within living memory, have been wrongfully dispossessed or 
removed by the apartheid state should have recourse to a land claims court 
to regain their land or equivalent land. For yet another group land 
red istribu tion  is socially  desirable as long as the beneficiaries are 
entrepreneurs who can pay for the land albeit at subsidised prices.
V l l l
W idening access to land through increasing black tenancy is another
m arke t-based  proposal des igned  to p rom ote  econom ic  e ff ic iency  as 
producers will have to produce enough to pay rentals or lose th e i r . access.
My own rationale  for supporting fa r-reach ing  land red istr ibu tion  
and agrarian reform is based on my perspective on overall macro-economic 
development strategy. Rural disintegration is a fact in South Africa. The 
rural population lives off wages to buy food; they do not produce it. Urban 
employment dynamics are, therefore, the determining factor in both urban
and rural poverty. And yet I do not anticipate that increased urbanisation 
and employment can proceed with sufficient pace to absorb rural migrants. 
M oreover many m igran ts  have invested  conside rab le  life  savings in
housing investments in rural areas. My expectation is that innumerable
families with an insecure foothold into the urban economy will, as a
survival strategy, choose to continue straddling the urban-rural nexus that 
has been termed oseillating migration.
But the resource base of black South African rural communities at 
present is extremely weak. Land availability is minimal and the supply of 
natu ra l resou rces e ssen tia l to com m unities is p reca rio u s  -hence 
com m unities are ne ither econom ically  nor eco log ica lly  sustainable. 
Com m ercial farm ing is sim ilarly problem atic for a strata o f several
thousand  w hite com m ercia l fa rm ers w hose in ap p ro p ria te  farm ing  
technology jeopardises their sustainability and who face bankruptcy.
Economic policy choices offer various destinies for people as a 
reshaping of the agricultural economy takes place. Rural m igration may 
proceed unabated but the expanding (through dem ographic grow th) 
m arginalised communities will require social w elfare expenditure creamed 
o ff from surpluses gained through a urban m anufacturing growth path. 
A lternatively the state can choose a different character for its growth 
strategy in which rural communities participate in and contribute to a 
m acro-econom ic growth path. Rural demand for m anufactured producer 
goods and consumer durables could enhance the growth strategy. A labour 
absorption strategy in agriculture which leads to more jobs or more self- 
em ploym ent could lead to increased  on-farm  food p roduction  and 
consumption. This could reduce the demand for total marketed produce but, 
more im portantly, reduce the current and grow ing burden o f those 
unemployed who depend on waged members of their extended families for
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their survival. A pursuit of a growth strategy of this type requires a state- 
induced ag ra rian  refo rm  w hich em braces both w hite com m ercial 
agricu lture and the black rural areas. Reform would include land 
red istribu tion , technological innovation, new cropping and livestock 
production patterns, and the institutional support for providing credit and 
training. Moreover the diverse inheritance, whether of strata of producers
or landless rural people as well as tenure forms, demands a flexible land and 
agrarian reform  approach.
While this m acro-econom ic perspective provides the context and 
informs my rationale for land redistribution and agrarian reform it is not
the main focus of this thesis. My concern is more specifically with 
widening the resource base through increasing access to additional land as 
well as the conditions o f future land transferability. I review the role 
played by the state in creating conditions and supporting the establishment 
o f white com mercial farm ers many of whom were originally penniless
immigrants. 1 examine changes in their organisation of production; scale, 
technology and organisation of production and land prices. I similarly
examine stratification and organisation of production, or lack of it, among 
black rural households. Finally I explore what should be the conditions of 
tenure , access p rice  and conditions o f fu tu re m arketab ility  for
beneficiaries of land redistribution.
The original objective o f this research was to concentrate on the
economics of agricultural production and examine the notion of a "fair land 
price" in relation to land redistribution strategy. This was motivated by the
retrospective debate on Zimbabwe's Lancaster House agreem ent in which 
the liberation movement conceded that land acquisition for redistribution 
would be purchased by government on a willing seller/willing buyer basis. 
Many felt that Rhodesian landowners had always enjoyed the fruits of their 
gross explo itation  o f b lack w orkers and that they should not be
compensated. It was also argued that land values did not reflect productivity 
value. The perception therefore took root that Zimbabwe’s new government
would overpay white farmers.
My inclination was to favour nationalisation of land - not only as an 
essential pre-condition to socialisation - but because it did not seem feasible
to effect land redistribution in a market situation in which the intended
beneficiaries have no capital and will tend to consume produce rather than
market it to pay off a land mortgage. Hence the productivity assessment of 
commercial farmland was aligned to a conception of "fair" compensation if 
the prevailing balance o f forces indicated that com pensation payments 
would he made. My land redistribution scheme, envisaged at this early stage 
of thesis research, included the abolition of the land market. The state would
then purchase land at a price in accordance with its productivity valuation 
and then avail it to beneficiaries on the basis of inheritable state leaseholds. 
Beneficia/ies would then voluntarily socialise their production as and when 
ready. This perspective was inform ed by my field  experience in 
Mozambique as well as the debates over socialisation o f production in 
contrast to nationalised enterprises in which the element of democratic
participatory management is lacking.
I abandoned this approach for a number of reasons. Critics pointed
out that the scheme would require an extensive, expensive bureaucracy.
Moreover gaining access to land through bureaucratic procedure was 
conducive to bribery and corruption. I concluded that it would be better to
examine how visible market transactions might be controlled rather than
abolishing the market.
But to achieve redistribution and social transform ation in South 
Africa within a market economy poses a number of other problems. The 
average price of land in the white commercial farming sector has been 
double its average assessed productive value for decades: hence many
producers acquiring additional land are unable to pay for it out o f the
income from that land. The land is paid for from other sources generated 
from the rest of the farming activity or of non agricultural origin.
Sweden's practice seemed to supply a possible positive alternative; 
county land boards assess the proposed transfer price between seller and
buyer with regard to the productivity assessm ent of the land and an
economic assessment o f the buyer. The average norm of production on a 
particular catgegory o f land will generate an average income from which 
bond repayments are to be made. The linkage -average production-income- 
repaym ent capacity provides the basis o f the land valuation/ land price 
assessment. Zimbabwe used a different, strategy to bypass any difficulties
arising out o f the divergence between productivity value and purchase 
price in relation to its land redistribution beneficiaries; she simply 
continued a dual system of communal tenure and privately titled marketable 
lan d .
xi
In South Africa, partly as a riposte to institutionalised racism - a
unitary approach appears politically desirable: a unitary tenure system and
a unitary land market. Hence I arrived at a midstream intention to focus 
primarily on the economics of agriculture and land valuation as the basis
on which to discuss approaches to, and conditions of, land valuation,
marketability and redistribution within a unitary system. This proved to be 
too narrow.
An understanding of the diverse theoretical approaches to land 
economics had to be complemented with a historical review of the evolution
of tenure towards current day practice. Were the informal "illegal" markets 
so advanced that freehold titling would be a mere formality as a prelude to a 
unitary but regulated land market? What were the social attitudes towards
tenure among black rural communities?
Another essential component is an examination of stratification of
production  am ong w hite en trepreneurs and the influence o f class 
differentiation on the organisation of production (or lack of it) among the 
black rural population. How applicable was the idea of a unitary regulated
market? In Sweden it might be possible to discuss the notion of an average 
social norm of production among farming enterprises, but in South Africa 
institutionalised racism  has affected the conditions and organisation of 
production and denies the possible existence of or approximation to any 
average social norm of production.
' The research aims to integrate an analysis of social and economic 
conditions and contribute to a debate on rural redistribution in a market
economy with a black rural populace whose lives are dom inated by
m igrancy and urban-rural interlinkages. For many black rural dwellers 
the abandonment of calls for nationalisation is interpreted as a betrayal of 
their aspirations. Other "freedom fighters" are reeling from the collapse of 
the socialist bloc and espousing free m arket capitalism  with some
"affirm ative action" as the only efficient development route. I hope that 
this research contributes to furthering the exploration of the alternative- a 
committed redistributive approach within a market economy. The ability of 
state policy to influence the changing character and economic conditions 
faced by producers is a continuous and underlying sub-theme throughout 
the thesis; hopefully a new dem ocratic state can intervene to achieve
rather different social and economic objectives than those pursued and 
attained by the apartheid state.
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C h a p te r  O ne. L and  R e d is tr ib u tio n : th e  value co n u n d ru m  and  
p o l i t ic a l  d iv e rg e n c e .
A nticipation o f land red istribu tion  generally  re flec ts  a changing
balance of power and is basically a political issue. Land reforms, in favour of
the landless and poor, take place as a result of (or fear of) popular struggle 
leading to active state intervention. The view that "radical land reforms are 
contrary to natural justice and unconstitutional" only holds for as long as a 
particular set of power relations are in place. For power relations in any 
country are "dependent on the specific histories and the developm ent of 
particular legal systems." As a result specific property rules remain applicable 
for as long as there is a certain status quo in power relations. ^
A review of land reform practice indicates that there is little chance of 
effective land redistribution unless a well organised rural population working 
with democratised local government structures exerts its claims either for land 
or improved working conditions and wages.^ Popular struggle can be assisted 
through policy design and legal facilitation which are in keeping with long 
term objectives. The first section elaborates com parative practices for land 
acquisition and compensation ( l .i .)  in sub-Saharan Africa and ( l . i i)  elsewhere. 
Section (l.iii.)  links the issue of just compensation with that of land valuation
and affordability .
The entire discussion is circumscribed by an acceptance of the continued
m arketability  o f land and paym ent o f com pensation. I do not review  
experiences w here the state opted to nationalise land (w ith or w ithout 
com pensation) and to abolish the land market. I exclude this experience 
because none o f the major South African political actors contem plates this 
option as a possibility in the foreseeable future. Although the African National 
Congress, the major force of South Africa's liberation movement, has reserved 
for itself the right to nationalise productive assets in the public interest it is 
unlikely that a wholesale nationalisation of agricultural land would occur. For 
example the ANC's draft o f a justiciable Bill o f Rights for a democratic South 
A frica makes provision for the protection o f property. (A rticle 11) W hile
 ^ Harrison, F. 1983, pl4.
 ^ Brazilian laws are favourable to land redistribution. However it is the bourgeoisie which 
has been most organised to gain the greatest advantage from these laws, rather than the 
nominally intended beneficiaries -the poor, landless, marginalised.
property may be taken on "grounds of public interest or public utility,
including the objectives of the Constitution" articles 11(8) and 11(9) provide 
that just compensation shall be paid, "taking into account the need to establish 
an equitable balance between the public interest and the interest o f those 
a ffec ted ."^
I devote the second section of this chapter to a review of the differences 
between the major political contestants in the South A frican Land Reform
debate. The ANC, for example, does not expect to be able to achieve an effective 
reversal of apartheid legacy without intervening in the free market situation.
One o f its primary concerns is to explore what legal framework and economic
mechanisms a new state will be able to use to facilitate a land distribution and 
agrarian reform . M eanwhile the N ationalist Party Government is using its 
swansong period o f government to pass bills entrenching white interests. The 
1991 White Paper on Land Reform, while proposing that all racial restrictions 
on access to land and ownership should be abolished, also proposes that there 
be no restoration of land to victims of forced removals and has recently sold off 
land it has held in trust for decades.
In South Africa the property status of land in the new constitution will
be the result of political negotiation. The outgoing white government wants
land to have the same status as any other property and that constitutional 
dispensation should perm it the redistribution o f land whether by confiscation,
nationalisation or expropriation. The ANC draft B ill o f Rights provides for 
restitution and for land redistribution with "just compensation which shall be 
determ ined according to the principle o f equitable balance betw een public 
interest and the interest of those whose existing titles might be affected."^
The issue o f access to land, (i.e.. affordable land) is very real to the 
m ajority  o f South A fricans. D isparity  among the politic ians representing 
different class interests is a further reality. This chapter is a prelude to a
deeper exploration o f South Africa's apartheid inheritance and the possibilities 
and constraints on transform ation in the agrarian economy.
3 ANC, 1990c, p24
 ^ ANC (1990c) Draft Bill of Rights, p.29.Aiticie 11, The Economy, Land and Property.
1.1. The legal fram ew o rk s: com pensa tion  an d  v a lu a tio n .
 C onstitm lopal Reform and Land re-acqu isition  and com pensation
practices in some British ex-colonies of sub-Saharan Africa.
The Sub Saharan countries which gained independence from Britain in 
the post war period have only tackled the issue of regaining settler lands. Land 
as a means to a livelihood for the landless unemployed is a more recent issue. 
Hunt^, writing on Kenya describes T he Emerging Crisis in Kenya: the Need for 
a Second Land Reform.'
Furtherm ore, the independence processes o f these sub-Saharan African 
states did not provide for compensation demands of dispossessed individuals and 
communities which is likely to occur in South Africa. Thus, the special
conditions for re-appropriation o f settler lands provided for in the various 
constitutions give only a limited comparison for South Africa.
There have been land expropriation laws in the post colonial era of four 
central and southern African countries: Botswana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia.^
N g'ong'ola notes that, in spite o f the pre-em inence of the land issue',
independence was in alm ost every case secured on terms requiring severe 
compromises on land redistribution. The British Government was able to impose 
legal and constitu tional constrain ts on post colonial re-acqu isition  and 
redistribution of "settler land".^
The European Convention on Human Rights provided a model for Bills of
R ight in B ritish  C olonial A frica beginning w ith N igeria in 1959/60.
Fundamental rights and freedoms include rights to life, personal liberty and
privacy, protection from  slavery, forced labour, d iscrim ination, protection 
against arbitrary search or entry and the freedom s o f conscience, assembly,
expression, association and religion. The constraints on land re-aquisition by 
the newly independent states was defined as the protection from deprivation of
 ^ Hunt, D. 1984.
 ^ See Ng'ong'ola, C. 1990 for a compfehensive review. 
 ^ ibid.
property clause.'^; property was understood as all kinds of property and land 
was not attributed any exceptional status.
Thus the 1963 Kenyan bill o f rights provided that "No property of any 
description shall be com pulsorily taken possession o f  except if certain  
conditions were to be satisfied: that the taking is necessary to the public 
in terest and ju s tifies  any ensuing hardship . Prom pt paym ent o f full 
compensation' free of taxes with guaranteed repatriation rights was a second 
condition. And finally the expropriatee was ensured access, if necessary, to the 
high court to deal with any disputes arising.^
There was little variation in the subsequent bills of right in the regions' 
other newly independent countries. The rights of foreigners to convert assets 
into transferable currency to be exported out of the country (found in the 
Kenya, Botswana, Malawi and Swaziland constitutions) reflected the ' expatriate 
nature o f property ow nership and control. O ccasionally  the form ula on 
com pensation  p rov ided  for adequa te ' ra th e r than  fu ll ' com pensation . 
Adequate compensation', as exem plified by Botswana's legislation, may take 
into account a number of factors: the market value of the property at the date 
o f notice o f acquisition as if it were a transaction between a willing buyer and 
willing seller, the change in value to any adjoining property as a result o f the 
new use o f the acquired land, damages sustained by the severance o f land, 
expenses incidental to any change o f premises forced upon the expropriatee as 
a result of acquisition, loss of rents and profits from the date of possession to 
the date o f award of compensation. Prompt compensation payment is considered 
as payment on registration of the conveyance o f title.
Only Tanzania succeeded in resisting the imposition of a Bill o f Rights
during the independence process. The fact that diey did not have a large settler 
land problem obviously facilitated this success. Nyrere's line o f argument was 
that a bill o f rights creates in advance the judicial limitations which may be in 
conflict with policies chosen by the electorate. For instance, it was noted that
Tanzania's dynamic plans for economic development could not be implemented 
w ithou t revo lu tionary  changes in the social s truc tu re ; that decisions
concerning the extent w hich individual rights m ust give way to w ider
 ^ ibid p2 citing J.SJRead, 'Bills of Right in "The Third World.”, Some Commonwealth 
Experiences, (1973) Verfassung Und Recht in Ubersee, pp23-24.
^ ibid, p4.
considerations of social progress are not properly jud icial decisions but 
political decisions.
The first constitutional reform  of most A frican states deleted the
provisions for the repatriation of compensation. As Ng'ong'ola observes, It is
d ifficu lt to justify  the reten tion  o f the repatria tio n  provision in an 
independent country concerned with the localisation o f property ownership as
well as problems of financial viability.'^ ^
Zambia quite quickly effected significant revisions to its inherited
constitutional constraints. The government right to compulsory acquisition of
property in the public interest was generally understood as referring  to
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and 
country planning, m ineral resources developm ent and the developm ent and 
u tilisa tion  o f  property  generally  for the public benefit.' The Zam bian 
constitutional reform  afforded the governm ent the right to acquire, take 
possession o f abandoned, unoccupied, unutilised or undeveloped land and the
forfeiture or confiscation of property o f any person who left Zambia for the
purpose o f defeating the ends o f j u s t i c e ; a n d  acquisition   for the
im plem entation o f a com prehensive land policy .' Furtherm ore an Act of 
parliam ent would spell out the principles on which compensation is to be 
determined by the National Assembly whose decision was to be incontestable.
The changes in Zambian constitutional law were m otivated by the 
negative econom ic consequences o f acqu isition  taking place under the
constraints of the inherited constitutional law.^^ In  both M alawi and Zambia 
the constitutional changes went hand-in-hand with substantial revisions to 
land acquisition legislation. The revisions created new principles to be used for 
the assessment of compensation in order to lower the costs of land acquisition. 
The revised Malawian Act stipulated that an assessment of compensation should 
be arrived a t by adding together (a) the consideration which the person 
entitled to the land paid in acquiring it; (b) the value o f unexhausted
ibid. citing Read, J.S, 1973 pp29-30 based on the "Report of the Presidential 
Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State” (Dar Es Salaam,
Government Printer, 196S, pp30-33.
ibid, citing Read, p6.
This would affect ZLambian political exiles.
13 Ng'ong'ola citing G. Care, 'Zambia' in Rubin and Cotran (eds.) Annual Survey of African 
Law. Vol nr. 1969. (London 1973) p. 160
improvements to the land made at the expense of the person entitled thereto 
since the date of his acquisition and (c) any other appreciation in the value of 
the land since the date of such acquisition.' But the last provision would not 
apply to absentee owners or if there has been a failure "to develop the land,
cultivate it or supervise it satisfactorily.' Furtherm ore if the land had been 
acquired as a gift or by inheritance, the assessment of compensation would be 
on the basis of previous financial acquisition of the land plus the value of 
unexhausted improvements carried out after that date.
A further retreat from the exigency o f so called adequate' and prompt 
payment' of money compensation has been made in Malawi, by a law which
provides that the Minister may in his discretion, direct that any compensation
. . .  be paid either in one lump sum; or (b) in such instalments, at such times, 
and at such rates of interest on outstanding balances as he may specify.'
The modifications to Zambian law are of a similar intent to the Malawian 
changes. However they are more far-reaching in relation to under developed 
land and absentee ow nership. 'No com pensation is payable in respect to 
undeveloped or unutilised land.' Rural agricultural land will be considered as
undeveloped if 'such land has not been used for cultivation or pasturage . . .  at 
any time during the period of two years immediately preceding the publication 
of the notice to yield up possession. Undeveloped may also be taken to mean 
that the exploitation o f the land is not in accordance with good estate 
m a n a g e m e n t. '
Ng'ong'ola notes that the legislation on these key concepts fails in its 
precision and is wide open to potential litigation and conflic t He commends 
how ever, the basic principle underlying the reform s, i.e. that com pensation 
on the basis o f m arket value should not be available for Under-developed 
land...especially  for independent A frican countries confronted with the so- 
called  settler-land ' problem .
However, whatever the new strictures may be on land valuation away 
from the m arketplace, it is im portant to take note that the m arket for 
'im proved' land or so called land improvements' wholly and fulsomely exists 
and as such replicates capital's normal barriers to entry o f ownership of
Ng'ong'ola, pl9.
15 ibid p21.
com mercial agricultural land. Zambian businesses entering the com m ercial 
agricultural sector of the economy will find they require substantial capital to 
purchase the 'land improvements' ; the absence of value attributable to virgin 
land is of negligible importance.
There has been some progress in post colonial African countries in their 
attempts to revise inherited constitutional restrictions. The intention was to 
lower the cost to the state of land acquisition. Even so these revisions are fairly 
unsubstantial when compared to Latin American or Asian experience o f land 
acquisition and com pensation.
l.l .( i i) .  Land Acquisition and com pensation practices: some non-African post 
World War II experiences.
Japan's first post war land reform bill was drafted in late 1945 under 
General Douglas MacArthur. The Diet (legislature) came up with a revised bill
passed in 1946 which took four years to implement. All farm lands were subject 
to compulsory acquisition by the government allowing only a retention limit, 
for resident landowners only, of 12 cho (about 12 hectares) in the region of 
Hokkaido and 3 cho for the rest of Japan. Absentee landlords were not allowed to 
retain any land. By 1950 over 1.9 million hectares (80% of all tenanted lands) 
had been sold.
Land price was computed on the basis o f farm earnings in yen in 1945 
and fixed for the four years of implementation irrespective of inflation. The 
beneficiaries paid as much as the government paid the landlords. This worked 
out to only 2.5% of the estimated 'free market' value.
The military government in South Korea began to implement a land 
reform programme in 1948. They feared popular support for communism and 
used land reform as part of their strategy to draw away support from and pre­
empt communist insurgency. The military government, in 1948, confiscated 504
900 hectares of rice land and 153 100 hectares o f dry cropland. They offered 
these lands for sale on the basis of 15 years of amortizations to be paid in kind 
( r ic e ) .
In 1949 a new Land Reform Law of the Public of Korea' was drafted, 
adopted in 1950 and almost completely implemented by February 1952. The law
allowed the government to purchase all agricultural lands larger than three 
hectares. The government bought the land at 1.5 times the average annual 
harvest of the main crop but compensation also included payments for land 
reclam ation, drainage and other improvements.
The government offered the land for sale to tenants at the same price it 
had paid to the landowner with payments to be made within five years. This 
offer was not economically viable for most of the tenants. Poor support services 
to the peasantry contributed to the situation in which the income remaining 
a fte r  m eeting  p roduction  costs and household  incom e needs proved 
insufficient. Ex-tenants who attempted to buy land either could not make the 
payments or resorted to selling a part o f their land in order to retain a smaller 
portion. The people found that the land reform did not in the end meet the
expectations based on government's past promises.
The Taiwanese land reform is generally regarded as a success story in 
terms o f making land available and achieving productivity increases. The land 
reform  was carried out in phases over several years. The first reform steps 
taken in 1959 dealt with lowering the rents paid by peasants to landlords. The 
prevailing rent payment of 50% of the standing harvest was set at a limit o f
37,5%. The next reform  steps, undertaken in 1951, allow ed tenants on 
government owned land to buy it. The price was 250% of the average yearly 
harvest. Over ten years, 96% per cent of government lands, some 96 000 
hectares, were privatised in this way. The last phase was the governm ent's 
compulsory purchase of land from landlords to be resold to tenants. Landlords 
had the right to retain ownership of as much land as they were actually tilling 
through (untenanted) family labour, or a maximum retention limit o f three to 
six chia (One chia is approximately one hectare) depending on the land quality.
Exceptions were made for religious institutions; they were allowed double the 
norm al retention limit.
The land valuation for the governm ent's compulsory purchase was at
250% of the average main crop. The payment to outgoing landlords was in the 
form o f (a) land bonds equal to seventy per cent of the value and (b) shares of 
stock in government controlled corporations (thirty per cent). The ex-tenants 
repaid the government for their purchase of the land at the same landlords'
Phillipine Peasant Institute, 1989, p3.
price to be paid in 20 equal annual installments but with the addition of a 4%
interest rate. In terms of scale the reform programme resulted in 106 049
landlords being forced to sell a portion of their land. As a result the ownership
of land by actual tillers was raised from the 1949 level of 380 936 farm families 
owning land (61%) to 687 642 farm owning families in 1961 (81%). The agrarian 
reform  program m e was supported with expanded extension services and 
considerable subsidies.
In contrast Philippine land reform has been far from successful. There 
have been several reform attempts in 1946, 1955, 1963, 1971, 1972. Reforms are 
still ongoing and are the subject of bitter contest. The 1946 Tenant Rice Share
Law limited rent to not more than thirty percent of the crop. The 1955 Land
Reform Act (R.A. 1400) established a Land Tenure Administration empowered to 
confiscate and distribute tenanted lands. But retention limits were set at 300
h ectares  fo r ind iv iduals, 600 h ec tares  for co rpo ra te  ow ned estates.
Furtherm ore, the law required that compulsory acquisition should only take 
place on petition o f the majority of the tenants. Landlord intimidation of the
peasantry and the latter's fear o f eviction, combined with a lack of government
funds, resulted in the purchase and distribution of only 41 of 300 haciendas in
seven years. The 1963 reform (R.A. 3844) set the rent limits at 25% o f the crop
and retention lim its to landlords of 75 hectares for both individual and 
corporate land owners. But after nine years only 4 500 farm ers actually 
received any land.^^
Under the M arcos governm ent land reform  took on a M achiavellian 
character. On the one hand, the land reform programme appeared to take some 
progressive steps. A law am endm ent to R .A .3844 autom atically  converted 
sharecropping arrangements to leasehold and lowered the retention limit to 24 
hectares. In 1972 the Tenants Em ancipation Act (P .D .27) ordered the 
distribution o f tenanted rice and com  lands. However these changes to the 
reform laws proved cosmetic and failed to lead to any real structural changes. 
The law dealing only with rice and com lands exempted 88% of the land. And
according to the M arcos criteria  only 0.5 m illion peasants qualified as 
beneficiaries, but o f these a mere one percent received emancipation patents. 
Of the total confiscated lands only 0.2 percent were actually distributed and die 
high am ortization rates resulted in debt crises for those farm ers trying to
17 Phüdra, 1988
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purchase land. In contrast, steps were taken to strengthen the role of business 
in agriculture including permission for local and foreign corporations to buy 
or lease rice and com  lands. Landlord declared tenanted farms as corporate 
farms and registered their tenants as farm workers. The landlords were then 
able to sell or lease their estates and as a result many peasant tillers were 
evicted from their lands.
Mrs Aquino's popular election was in part due to land reform promises. 
However, the 1987 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARL) is the 
subject of controversy and peasants marching to denounce CARL have been 
attacked by the military. 1®
It is estimated that an effective Philippine land reform would need to 
distribute at least 2.4 million hectares to 1.5 million rural families. Mrs Aquino's 
reforms are, however, couched by so many conditions that this is unlikely to 
happen . P riv a te  com m erc ia l fa rm s d ea lin g  w ith  liv es to ck , p o u ltry , 
horticulture, and cocoa, coffee and rubber plantations have been given ten
years exemption from the land reform programme. On the remaining land the 
reten tion  lim it is relatively  high com pared to other Asian countries (an 
average 11 hectares). The Aquino reform 's self-imposed strictures mean it only 
contemplates a distribution of 10.3 million hectares to only 43% of the needy 1.5 
m illion fam ilies.
Further controversy is due to the conditions of payment provided for in 
the new Aquino law (R.A. 6657). The valuation of the land is taken as its market 
value rather than on its productivity value whereas up to now successful land
reform in Asia has depended on the productivity o f the land being the major 
factor in its valuation. M arket value is claimed by the government for the
landowners as just compensation' but the peasant m o v e m e n t i s  quick to point 
out that anything above productivity value is unfair' and that there has been
scandalous abuse o f  the m arket valuation proposal.^^ The supporters o f
IB Philippine Peasant Institute, 1989. In January 1987 the Mendiola Bridge massacre 
occurred. 19 peasants were killed as soldiers and plain clothes' gunmen fired on a 
peaceful demonstration near the Presidential palace demanding action on agrarian 
reform.
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Philifunas (KMP) i.e. Peasant Movement of the Philif^ines.
Peasant Movement of the Hiilii^ines (KMP) 1989, p i. In 1989 the 'Oarchitorena land 
scandal' hit the news headlines. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was to bi^ to 
property from Alex Lina of Sharp International for P62.7 million or P33 000 per 
hectare. Peasants in the hilly unirrigated area say that the land can be bought for about
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redistributive reform on the Constitutional Committee actually proposed the 
payment of "fair and progressive compensation' The rationale of fair and 
progressive compensation' is that small landowners would be compensated at a 
higher rate than large landowners. This sliding scale o f compensation would
discrim inate between large landowners with other sources o f  income and 
wealth who are not (morally) seen as entitled to the same level of compensation 
as smaller owners who depend on their land for their sole source of income.
This d ifferentiation  is seen as the cornerstone of an affordable  land 
redistribution policy in the Philippines.
De Janvry reviewed The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin 
America.' His definition of "reform" is one in which there is a redistribution of
land without any fundam ental alteration o f productive relations.^^ He notes 
that most o f the Latin Am erican reform s were undertaken with com plete 
compensation. Partial expropriation took place in Chile and Guatemala and 
complete expropriation of some lands was undertaken in Mexico in the 1930s 
and Peru in the 1970s. But these reforms affected huge estates and the retention
limits were so high^^ that the major effect of the reform was to revamp the 
capitalist enterprise. The land owner amassed the movable assets on the best 
lands; the worst lands became available for redistribution. According to de 
Janvry 's analysis land reform  has been o f little econom ic benefit to the 
peasantry of Latin America. Rather he describes it as a refined system of labour 
explo itation  as ru ral fam ilies send o ff  fam ily m em bers to find urban 
employment and the extended family straddles the urban/rural divide in search 
o f a household survival strategy.
Rigoberto Santoval, head o f FAO's Land Reform Division reviewed land 
acquisitions in Latin America in com parative d e t a i l ^ 3  g g j  suggested certain 
innovations for designing a land reform. He noted the following different
PI 000 per hectare. Sharp bought the land two months earlier from the United Coconut 
Planters Bank for only P3 million. The deal was approved by the state but apparently 
halted D i^en the Land Bank president refused to sign the cheque and called for miquiry. 
Subsequent investigations revealed other anomalous land deals involving the sale of 
ovwvalued marginal lands. Kilusang Magbubukid ng Philipinas, 1989, p i.
Thus Cuba falls outside of de Janvry s assessment of ” reform and reformism" as 
agrarian restructuring was undertaken as part of the programme of transition to 
socialism and not as a rearrangement within continuing relations of production.
22 jg Janvry , 1981, p206, The retentions lim its varied from 200 hectares in Mexico to 
1500 in Peru to 50 000 in Bolivia to no limit at all in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and 
the Dominican republic.
23 Author's notes of personal interview, FAO Rome, November 1989.
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methods of land acquisition which had been used in various Latin American 
countries: (a) FAO defines market value as the price at which a seller and a
buyer are willing to trade, assuming that the former is willing to sell at a fair 
price and that the latter is willing to buy at a fair price and that both have 
canvassed the market value and have a reasonable knowledge of facts,^^ (b) the 
declared value of the lands by the landowner for tax purposes, (c) a value of 
compensation negotiated between the state and the owner which may or not 
differ from market value, (d) expropriation of land above a certain land area 
wherein the landowner hag a right to retention limits of the best land and 
compensation on the expropriated land according to the Torrens system o f soil 
quality and type, im provements and location assessm ent, (e) uncom pensated 
conAscation as in Cuba, and the Somoza lands in Nicaragua.
Santoval suggests that the "social function o f land use" is another factor
which should be considered in any valuation assessm ent for determ ining
compensation. 'Social fu nction '. is defined as the benefît to society due to the
actual manner of use o f the property. This would, for example, include an
assessment o f employment provided as a result of the land exploitation and the
working conditions. A m oral assessm ent is also argued for; the better the
conditions o f work, the level o f salary, the quality o f housing provision, the
access to health facilities and education, the higher the valuation. The reverse
would hold; the poorest social conditions, the grossest conditions o f labour 
exploitation should m erit the lowest valuation. This social valuation is quite 
independent o f and would supercede consideration o f soil type, quality and 
location. Santoval notes the mention of the social function concept of valuation 
in Brazilian, Venezuelan and Honduran law. However, he remains sceptical o f 
the possibility of Latin American land reform  succeeding simply through the
passing of laws. He notes that lawyers and executive councils prepare laws 
which are often ignored by parliamentarians who are themselves landlords.
Santoval's defence o f a moral assessment o f the social function o f land
ca rrie s  through to h is view s on form s o f  com pensation  paym ents. 
Compensation payments have historically taken the form  o f (a) paym ents in 
cash, (b) payment in part cash and part bonds and (c) payment only in bonds. 
The payment in bonds has not been under uniform conditions. There have been
different modalities in terms of time period to maturity and interest rate levels.
24 FAO/UNDP (1983)PHI/79/012 pp xiv.
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Venezuela and Honduras have, how ever, given different kinds o f bonds
according to the efficiency of the land use at time of expropriation. Again the 
rationale has been that the greater the efficiency of land use, the higher the 
value of bond security irrespective of land quality, location or market value 
assessm en t.
l. l .f iii )  ."Just compensation”, affordabilitv. and macro economic considerations
Two issues em erge from this review o f land reform  practice which 
require separation. The first is about what the outgoing landowners receive in
compensation. The second is about the economic conditions under which the
incoming beneAciaries get the land. Both issues have in common the question 
of affordability but are not necessarily related.
On the first issue the difference in possible approach is enormous 
ranging from market assessments to a tempered social valuation assessment to 
no compensation at all. The very fact that the issue o f reform arises at all must 
be due to a shift in power relations which challenge the actual status quo of 
la n d -o w n e rs h ip .
The arguments against any market valuation compensation payment go
beyond Santoval's social valuation assessment. As pointed out in a critique of 
Philippine land reform  proposals the value o f land, and any increased value 
due to land improvements, is not due to the individual landowners efforts alone.
Several social factors will have influenced value such as population growth and 
landlessness leading to increased demand for land. Infrastructural expenditure 
on roads or irrigation networks which have been undertaken out o f public 
funds will also affect land value.2^ Furtherm ore from a historical perspective
the landowners capacity to carry out land improvement investments is due in 
part to underpayment o f any minimum wage to farm workers.
A nother relevant factor which should perhaps influence com pensation 
payments below m arket value is a discrepancy between that valuation o f land 
for taxation purposes and valuation o f land for com pensation payments. The 
obvious question is why should governm ent adopt a h igher basis for
compensating land owners while the latter have been using a lower basis for
25 Utchfield, N. (1964) p 66
paying taxes. A fair conclusion would seem to be 'the basis for society's
compensation to landlords should be the same basis used by landowners in
paying their land tax contribution to society. Hence, the assessed value used for
tax purposes by the landowners should also be the same value used for
com pensation by the governm ent .'25
A further consideration is the method of paym ent rather than the
amount of payment. It is self-evident that land transfer in itself does not
involve the creation of new goods and services. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
project that cash payments alone, particularly if carried out within a short
space o f time, will contribute to an inflationary situation. There is a strong 
social and economic argument to be made for compensation to be made through 
the transfer of bonds instead of cash payment. Taiwan provides one example 
w here landlords w ere given stock ow nership in government corporations
(thus prom oting privatisation and industrialisation) and land bonds over a
longer maturation period to minimise inflationary pressures.
This provokes yet a further consideration about the landowners' rural 
cap ita l which is being freed  up' through land reform  com pensation
p a y m e n ts .27 if  society is to give landlords compensation 28 seems correct that 
society should then have some rights to determine the nature of compensation 
payments. In the Taiwanese example landlords received compensatory bonds 
tied to selected industries whose development was a counterpart o f the agrarian 
refo rm  program m e.
In the final analysis the rationale and method actually chosen (or to be
chosen) depends on the question  o f pow er re la tionsh ips tem pered by 
considerations of affordability. The ex-British colonies in Africa, in their first
constitutions, all accepted a re-acquisition of settler land on a market valuation 
basis and did not consider at all the compensation to Africans who had been 
deprived of their lands for several decades. However many AAican states later
26 Phildra. (1988) p9.
27 ibid. p 10.
28 Krickler, J. 1987, p 15 notes that a South African land reform of substantial scale, if
compensated at market valuation would,'bind the working class to paying an indemnity
to their present exploiters in perpetuity, in effect ensuring that capitalist exploitation
continued by another route. Wages would be held down and the reinvestments required 
to replenish agrarian means of production would disappear into dividends paid in
conq>ensation for assets that workers had already bought' by way of promts extracted 
from them over generations.'
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changed the rules on state land acquisition due to reasons of affordability. 
As has become very clear in Zimbabwe, an example which will be examined in 
more detail later in this chapter, a crucial issue is the financing of land reform 
and resettlement, if indeed a financial re-acquisition of land is contemplated.
The issue of what beneficiaries pay, is also problematic. Assuming most 
beneficiaries do not have capital, they may or may not be able to afford to make 
the payments for the land from their annual production income. There is of 
course always the possib ili^  o f the state donating the land to the beneficiary. 
But this is a rare occurrence because (excepting countries which * have opted 
for state land ownership) of a concern that land should be marketable and that
it should have a collateral value on which banks can give production credit.
The affordability of land on the basis of annual income will depend on 
w hether the net production incom e is sufficien t to pay the am ortization
payments (after discounting all direct production costs plus the farm er's own 
remuneration). This will in turn depend on the initial valuation o f the land for 
mortgage purposes and the rate o f  interest. The demand that farmers should 
pay the equivalent o f compensation given to the landlord, within a five year 
period, contributed to the failure o f the South Korean land reform. Farmers 
could not meet these conditions. The Philippine Peasant Movement's demand is 
that the amount paid by the beneficiary should be based on the productivity
value assessment of the land and that 'amortization payment should be set at 
10% of net harvest if land is to be truly affordable.'2^
These considerations have a special relevance to the South Aft’ican 
context. The ruling National Party is itse lf concerned with the divergence
between the Land Bank's productivity assessm ent valuation o f  land and the 
actual m arket value (See Chapter 6). Furthermore interest rates are at an all 
time high o f 21 per cent. Any new entrant to the farming economy who does 
not have capital reserves would find it difficult to pay the interest on the loan 
out o f the net production income o f the farming activity. The obvious land 
reform beneficiaries such as labour tenants and the landless unemployed who 
have no capital at all would be doomed if the reforms were to take place under 
such conditions.
29 Phildrm, (1988) p8.
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The discrepancy between market value and productive value has major 
long term implications for any society and has been rarely tackled, excepting
where land has been nationalised. Sweden is one country in which a land
market has prevailed but with careful regulation to avoid speculation and value 
d iscrepancies.^®
In the Swedish constitution landed property has a unique status. The
regulatory power over the land market is achieved through Statutes which 
include a Land Acquisition Act.^^ The Swedish land regulation in place until 
r e c e n t l y ^2 was the outcome of rural struggles in the 19th century. Sweden has 
23 million hectares of forestry land and only 3 to 4 million hectares of arable 
land. During the latter part o f the 19th century there was an increase in 
company purchase o f land and an opening up of company sawmills. Farmers
felt threatened; they feared that the entire rural community was headed for 
rapid extinction. Com panies, they argued, had a d ifferen t financial and
investm ent basis and different tax considerations com pared to the ordinary
farm er and would, thus, withstand the financial strains of poor harvest years 
more easily. All in all, companies represented unfair competition to the family 
farm. The political lobby was powerful enough for them to win support in 1906 
for legislation which included, (a) no company ownership o f arable land;
companies could only own tim ber land and (b) foreign ownership o f any
Swedish land whether arable or timber land was prohibited.
Further legislation regulating access to land was passed in the 1930s 
during the depression. In order to secure better land use, higher yield levels 
and therefore higher farm  income levels the governm ent passed legislation 
requiring that anyone buying agricultural land should have both a certain
2® The following section is based  on in terview s w ith rep resen ta tives of the Sw edish 
Ministry of Agriculture, Birgitta Hansson, Ulf Larsson and Ounnar Rosquvist and with Bo 
Genfbrs of the Farmers Union all of whom patiently answered my many questions. The 
responsibility of interpretation is mine.
Swedish Government, (1979) The Land Acquisition Act, SFS 1979: 230 is the most 
interesting in the terms it sets out for conditions on who has the right to acquire land 
and under what valuation conditions.
22 Swedish National Board of Agriculture (1988) Modifications to the Land Acquisition Act 
were passed in December 1988 which reflect changes in power relations. The prohibition 
of agricultural landholding by foreigners has been dropped. The overt national concern 
is portrayed as out of keeping with a political climate of a European economic community 
sp irit.
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educational level and a proven farm ing ab ility .22 Legislation passed in 
subsequent years was concerned with the maintenance of the rural community 
to g e th e r w ith farm  e ffic ien cy  and farm  en largem en t. A g ricu ltu ra l 
restructuring policy informed the legislation which governed the conditions of 
sale of agricultural land. Land for sale had Arst to be offered to neighbouring
farmers. If the neighbouring farmers' hesitation to acquire the additional land 
was due to financial considerations the state could step in, assess the farmer's
ability to use the additional land effectively, and make an offer of financial 
a s s is ta n c e .
Government regulations which controlled who had the right to buy land 
were further extended to regulate the price at which land changed hands. Any 
agreement between the seller and potential buyer on a price for the farmland 
was subject to state scrutiny. The concern here was (a) to avoid land nuirket 
speculation and (b) to ensure that the land price was econom ically viable,
enabling new owner to cover the land purchase without running into liquidity
problems. Thus County Agricultural Boards employed land valuers who carried 
out independent assessm ent in the field and by com parative reference. The
field assessm ent reviewed the yield value o f the land and transform ed the
average yield value to economic terms. Valuations tables which graded land and 
indicated average yield expectations were an additional reference tool.
Defendants o f Swedish land policy note that it provided socially desirable 
long term rural community continuity. This is indeed a stark contrast to the
'ghost towns' o f the white platteland o f the disintegrating South African rural 
co m m u n itie s .
The im portance o f the Swedish exam ple is its concern for (a) a 
productivity valuation o f land (b) the liquidity assessm ent o f the prospective
buyer (c) an evaluation o f the purchaser's farming ability and (d) a state 
capacity to give financial assistance for restructuring. These considerations 
may be relevant to all land reform situations but are perhaps more especially 
relevant to the South African situation in which the gap between m arket and 
productive value needs to be resolved.
22 The legislation made it extremely difficult for anyone to buy land who is not already 
involved in agriculture. For example a person who has made money out of a non- 
agricultural business venture w ould  have great difficulty in diversifying business 
interests to include farming.
1 8
1.2. C onflic ts  of in te res ts ; the po litical deb a te  in South  A frica
In South Africa there are several contestants in the political arena of 
land struggles. They are not always engaged in open confrontation with each 
other. But they represent the interests o f d ifferent constituencies and a 
considerable amount of lobbying is underway. Some communities, especially 
the vulnerable labour tenants, continue to fight evictions, w hile others 
dem onstrate against the privatisation o f trust land. Indebted white farm ers 
have demonstrated on the streets. The government promises to m aintain the 
property rights of white farmers even when they have reached the stage of
bankruptcy; the state continues to give them substantial s u b s id ie s ^ ^  The 
Development Bank of Southern Africa, critical o f white farming efficiency, is
backing a black entrepreneurial approach to South African farm ing. It is 
devoting considerable energies to lobbying the governm ent, the business 
sector, and the ANC itself. It engages in regular discussion meetings with the 
ANC Land Commission which itself continues a prolonged debate at various 
levels of its structures.
In this section I review in greater detail the positions o f the various 
protagonists namely: (i) the ruling National Party governm ent, (ii) white
farming groups, (iii) community groups, (iv) the ANC debate (v) the DBSA as a 
reform -supporting institution and finally (f) assess the im plications o f these
p o s itio n s .
1.2.(i) The National Fartv Government.
In recent years the government began to renege on the regulatory 
econom ic interventions which protected white farm ing interests. Opening the
24 PexBonal notes, author observation. DBSA/ANC Land Ccnnmission Meeting, October 1990. 
In 1990 and 1991 the government appeared to  respond to  public and businesB sector 
criticism of the farm budget through cutting subsidies. However, as pointed out by Van 
Zyl (Professor, Univeesity of Pretoria) at the meeting, the extent of cuts is overestimated 
because the government while refusing some interest rate subsidies has agreed to act as 
guarantor. Thus in 1991 an estimated R460 million will be required by the bank to cover 
mqwdd loans and in 1992 an estimated R700 - 800 m illion . However, in 1992, the 
Government's (see ref RSA Government 1992) so-called drought relief programme for 
summer rainfall grain farmers includes extensive debt write-off beyond that incurred 
only in the 1991-1992 season, (see Farm Workers' Research Project memorandum, 1992, 
mimeograph.) Earlier interest rate subsidies were granted after the banks ascertained 
the future viability of the farming unit but the most reçoit May 1992 package does not 
discrim inate.
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August 1990 Agricultural Summit conference in Pretoria, the state president Mr 
de Klerk re affirmed the Government's commitment to private property and a 
free m arket economy. "The recent developm ents in Eastern Europe have 
confirmed that there is no alternative to private initiative and an efficient 
m arket system." The ANC contends that the w hites, having used state 
in terven tion  (ex p rop ria tion , n a tio n a lisa tio n , subsid ies) to c rea te  w hite 
economic hegemony, are now changing their tune (a) to protect their property
interests and (b) to ensure that a fu ture dem ocratically elected (black) 
government will not have the same powCTS as they had. This strategy is clear in 
the proposals regarding minority rights in a new constitution which the 
government has advanced at the negotiating table. The government's 12 point 
blueprint to protect minority rights include the following: (Point 4) the free
m arket system must be m aintained, (Point 8) property righ ts should be 
respected and any expropriation must be accepted by proper compensation and
(Point 11) private property and a free market system should not be "ruined" by
an "unjust system of taxation". These proposals are designed to freeze existing
property distribution and to limit the future possibilities to redistribute even 
through such mechanisms as taxation.
De Klerk's opening remarks at the 1990 Agricultural Summit Conference
included reassurances to white farm ers, "The G overnm ent understands your 
concern in the agricultural sector about the question o f land ownership in a 
new constitutional dispensation in South Africa. 1 want to give you as a fhrming 
community the assurance that we are not prepared to negotiate about your land 
- your title deeds are safe. "25 There are two riders to this statement, firstly, "Of 
course, we shall also have to ensure that the opportunity for private ownership 
o f land will be extended to all South Africans without prejudicing vested
rights," and that factors that hampered the efficient operation o f the market
system would have to be elim inated.26 The professed aim was unfettered 
capitalism and the government started the process o f dismantling its extensive
regulatory intervention to the dismay of many white farmers.
Since the beginning o f 1990 the M inister o f A griculture announced 
several policy c h a n g e s .2 7  The restrictive powers o f the W heat Marketing Board
vis-a-v is m illers and confectioners have been stopped and those o f the Meat
25 Saturday Star, August 25, 1990.
26 ibid. President F W de Kletk.
27 Chnstodoulou, N.T & N Vink, 1990, pp. 32-33.
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M arketing Board are under review; the Karukui Board is abolished. Egg 
production control has been abolished. Quantity import controls have been 
abolished on several foodstuff products. Restrictions limiting the geographical 
transfer of meat have been modified. Steps are being taken towards "market 
orientated price formation" i.e.. that internal prices should be on par with the 
international price. Single channel m arketing schem es which operate for 
several products are to be discontinued. The bread subsidy was also to end in 
1990. Restrictions on the erection of bulk storage facilities have been scrapped,
However, in May 1992 the government forestalled on its commitment to a 
free-m arket s y s t e m . 2 8  Several thousand farm ers technically fu lfill financial 
conditions according to which they should be declared bankrupt and 
sequestrated. However, in the first instance the banks themselves stopped short 
o f foreclosing the debtors. After auctioning a few properties and finding the 
bids to be far below the book and debt value there were fears of provoking a 
crash in the land m arket and underm ining white farm ing confidence still 
further. The governm ent has now interfered with free-m arket consequences 
in a manner which goes far beyond debt relief. The May 1992 government 
relief package to summer grain farmers not only compensates farmers for this 
season's production losses but is sufficiently generous to write off capital and 
interest debts to allow thousands of burners to attain a debt level which will be 
manageable for the next few years. Hence the May 1992 so-called drought relief 
package provides the means to support land prices and maintain the status quo 
in land ownership.
Similarly the governm ent, having spent decades trying to create self- 
governing territories now needs to dismantle the bantustans. W ith regard to 
the fu ture o f black com munally owned land the governm ent has initiated 
privatisation attempts. "The 1913 and 1936 legislation cut both ways. . . It
prevented black people from obtaining land outside those territories, but . . . 
also prevented whites from obtaining land inside those territories. . . The areas
were protected by this. . . That is a question we shall have to answer. . . There is
no sense in saying that there is certain  privately  owned land and that
communal-owned land should be excluded from this. If  we open up the land, we 
must open up all the land, not so?"29 The future o f land tenure arrangements 
were discussed between President, F W de Klerk, Constitutional Development
28 RSA Government, (1992)
29 ibid.
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minister Viljpen and cabinet ministers from the homelands.4® Land Bills are 
being processed by the legislative bodies of KwaZulu, Qwaqwa and Ciskei. They 
all provide for the sale and subdivision o f communal land and give powers to 
chiefs to carry out transactions.41
In March 1991 the government released its White Paper on Land Reform
claiming the document to be the "result o f extensive consultation, deliberation 
and negotiation" President De Klerk hailed the paper as "a historic turning 
point" whose objective i s , "to do justice to all the citizens of our country" 
However its starting point is that "to build a new future the past must be 
forgotten." "The Government is o f the opinion that a programm e for the 
restoration of land to individuals and communities who were forced to give up 
their land on account o f past policies or other historical reasons would not be
feasible" The W hite Paper constantly afOrms governm ent support to white 
farm ers, protection o f their property rights and a com mitment to fostering 
freehold marketable title throughout the new South African state.
The basic principles of the White Paper set out are that42 (a) all racial 
restrictions on access to land and ownership be abolished, (b) that a non-racial 
free market system based on private title and individual ownership be fostered,
(c) large scale com m ercial agricu lture be encouraged, (d) there be no 
restoration o f land to victims o f forced removals, (e) there be no redistribution 
of agricultural land (f) forms of tenure considered inferior to that of freehold 
be upgraded (g) a "tribe” which buys land may not use it communally unless 
perm ission  is g ran ted . H ence (h) in the  case  o f com m unal land 
unchallengeable, discretionary powers are given to officials to adm inister land 
rights o f black people, (i) For those with individual freehold title any state 
directives concerning the m anner in which land is used can be judicially
challenged. Widespread criticism of the White Paper has led to the setting up of
a commission to examine community land claims as well as a moratorium on the 
sale o f state land although this has not been respected by the civil service.
4® Citizen 3 October 1990, Busineu Day, 3 October 1990.
41 Lund, S. (1990) p 8.
42 See the excellent overview of the White Paper and Draft Bills provided by National Land 
Committee in 'Land Update” No 7. 1991.
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1.2. (ii) White farmers.
White farmers are not a homogeneous group. The diversity of approach
to farming and manner of land holding are reflected in the political stance 
taken by different groups. Companies who have farming interests have not
been vocal about their expectations. The most vocal farmers have been those
who feel not only uncertain about their fate in a post apartheid South Africa 
but also in many cases feel that their very existence is threatened by current 
government intentions to cut subsidies and accelerate deregulation.
The South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) is officially considered as
the white farmers' mouthpiece to government. It is a federation of about 2000 
farm ers associations claiming to represent 75% of all farmers. Its afA liates 
include the provincial unions, nine central commodity cooperatives, the Wool 
Growers Association, the Sugar Growers association and the Poultry Breeders
A ssocia tion .
SAAU has taken a conciliatory approach to a non-racial land market 
based on voluntary buying and se lling ,42 is prepared to consider opening
membership to black farmers. It has also taken a positive attitude to proposed
farm worker labour legislation. But many o f its positions have not received
support especially from  the Transvaal A gricultural Union (TAU) and the
Orange Free State Agricultural Union (QFSAU). In addition the forestry and 
fruit sectors o f SAAU consider its bias towards debt-ridden t im e r s  leads to a 
fa ilu re  to rep resen t the la rge -sca le  p ro fitab le  farm ers and com panies
e f fe c tiv e ly .
TAU has become the central antagonist of land and agrarian reform. In 
June 1990 the regional Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) held a referendum 
among farmers on the opening of "white" agricultural areas to people o f other 
race groups. 95 percent of the 12 000 farm ers who participated in the
referendum voted against the repeal o f the Land Acts. TAU has delivered a
petition to the State president's office calling for a written undertaking by the 
Government guaranteeing white l a n d - o w n e r s h ip .4 4  On 24 October 1990, 200 
khaki-clad farm ers from the debt stricken Springbok Flats area and W estern 
Transvaal disrupted the SAAU annual congress. Their demands included: a
42 The Citizen, 2nd August 1990. 
44 Saturday Star 6 Oct 199Ç
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written undertaking by SAAU that white-owned agricultural land will remain 
in white hands, d irect governm ent subsidising o f interest on agricultural 
loans, the writing off of debts, and that the Land Bank will cease all pending 
sequestrations.45 The government's "relief" measures announced in May 1992 
meet most of these demands.
TAU thereafter convened a national meeting, in direct challenge to the
SAAU to discuss both the economic crisis faced by some sectors of agriculture 
and the political changes proposed in the Governments Land Reform White 
Paper released in M arch 1991. Decisions taken at this TAU conference
included**:
* investigating the establishm ent o f closed corporations or sim ilar 
institutions as a way o f retaining land in white hands and,
* establishing an alternative agricultural union to replace SAAU
^establishing a security network in white farm ing regions.
Differing attitudes among the provincial unions are a barometer o f the 
economic health o f its members. TAU and OFSAU have many debt-ridden 
farmers and are the most resistant of any change in land or labour legislation.
They also oppose the reduction o f subsidies to farm ing as part o f the
government's move towards a more free market economy. Natal Agricultural 
Union (NAU) says it wants to "keep politics out o f  agriculture".*7 The Western 
Cape Agricultural Union (WCAU) with many members from the profitable wine 
and fruit sectors supports a free and non-discriminatory land market and thé 
proposed labour legislation. The Eastern Cape Agricultural Union (ECAU) at its 
1990 congress voted to support legislation "to open land to all races as long as it 
is according to Free Market practices, squatting is prevented and that nothing 
is done to damage the productive potential of agriculture.”*^
*5 The Star, 25 Oct 1990.
*6 Farm workers' Research and Resource Project. 1991.pl8.
*7 ibid.
*8 ibid.pl9.
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1 ,2 , ( i i i )  C Q m piw nU y srQ w ps
"We are the children of Africa 
We ciy for our land 
Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho,
Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho unite
We are mad over the Land Act
A torible law that allows sojoumere
To deny us our land
Crying that we the people
Should pay to get our land back
We cry for the children of our fathers
Who roam around the world without a home
Even in the land of their forefathers.”
Song about the Land Act when it  was in t r o d u c e d .*9
Africans did not only lose their land to settlers they also lost their
country to a settler state. In the process of capitalist colonisation and the 
creation of a settler state, Africans experienced a dual process o f class and 
national formation' and a colonial bourgeois land nationalisation'.^®
Thus, Mbongwa says, "The agrarian question in modem South Africa, 
unlike in most other industrialised countries, is concerned with more than food  
and fa rm  problems." This immediately poses the question of the meaning of
land nationalisation for community groups. The popular understanding o f land 
nationalisation was expressed by community leaders and rural activists^ ^  at the
ANC's land workshop in October 1990.
"The whites came and nationalised the land and then shared it between
themselves, now the blacks must also nationalise the land and give it back to the 
people" Thus in its popular perception, land nationalisation involves a return of 
the land to blacks; the interpretation on the ground o f the Freedom Charter
clause: The Land shall be shared by those who work i t '
*9 Human Awareness Programme, 1989. pC3
50 Mbongwa, M. 1990. p3-4.
51 Source: Author's participant observation notes.
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The ANC's workshop package, however, presented the theoretical and 
economic im plications of land nationalisation com bined with a review  of 
advantages and disadvantages. In a panel discussion on land reform s and
agrarian restructuring in Tanzania, M ozambique, Zimbabwe, Canada and the 
Philippines, the speaker on Mozambique made the point that the day after land
nationalisation takes place, whoever was farming on the land the day before is 
still there. Mozambican peasants who had earlier lost their land to settlers did 
not get their land back; the state kept abandoned settler land primarily for 
state farm production.
The workshop concluded that what land nationalisation can achieve is 
an end to any land speculation as a result of the abolition o f the land market. 
However the option (as part of an across the board nationalisation programme) 
would require a strategy to overcome the effects o f likely financial crashes 
and capital flight. The Land Bank would face the possibility of a collapse as its 
bond payments would be cancelled. The action o f nationalisation would alter 
the status of assets and liabilities and provoke retaliatory action. But, in any 
case, although nationalisation can be a step in the land redistribution process 
it does not of itself effect a change as to who is in charge of production on the 
fa rm s .
It is proving d ifficu lt to bridge the gap betw een the popular 
understanding o f grass roots activ ists and "intellectuals". There is patent 
mistrust o f an assertion that land nationalisation, per se, does not ensure a
return o f the land and that it is necessary to canvas other ideas on how to
achieve this. Communities have a deep-seated fear that alternative proposals to
nationalisation are part o f a ploy to cheat them.
For some communities the current issue is not to regain land but to
prevent dispossession o f their current land holdings. Struggles to prevent 
eviction o f labour tenants continue. This is connected with the struggle against
p r iv a t i s a t io n .5 2  For example, the M ier community in the Kalahari, who have 
held their land communally since 1896, resisted the decisions o f the House of
Representatives that the reserve should be privatised. The land was to be 
divided into units, sold to those who could afford to buy. Only an estimated 10 
per cent o f the current population would remain. Land degradation is the
52 National Land Committee, 'Land Update', No 2, June 1990
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supposed rationale for the division into units; but this is contested by
conservationists who say that communal farming is the best approach for the
area. So far dem onstrations and lobbying have been successful enough to
prevent the division and sale taking place.
Other communities are struggling to prevent the government selling off
state land to white farmers, land to which the black community has a claim. For 
example in the Western Transvaal, the state currently holds land expropriated
from black freehold communities which has now been vacant for fifteen years. 
The sale of this land to white farmers would undermine the communities' claim
for a return to their land. Community protest in this case succeeded and the
government promised that "no agricultural land which previously belonged to 
black communities and had been expropriated at an earlier stage in accordance 
with consolidation policies will be sold henceforth."53
This does not rule out the possibility o f other lands being privatised. In 
some of the bantustans discussions have been underway for the privatisation of 
state trust land and communally held tribal lands. And while the abolition of 
the Land Acts is a necessary part of dismantling apartheid, there is concern 
that the process o f repeal should be undertaken in a way which will not
undermine existing de facto rights which people and/or communities presently 
have to land.5* Claassens notes that, Tn most instances black property rights 
are not reflected in legal documents like title deeds. . . While the land may be
nominally owned by the South AAican Developm ent Trust, or a homeland 
government or a chief, it is in fact occupied by millions o f individual families 
and communities. In many cases these people have rights to particular pieces
o f  land- w hether by g ran ts, ce rtif ic a te s  o f occupation , pu rchase  or 
inheritance. The fact that these rights are not registered on title deeds is a 
result o f the bizarre and com plicated maze of regulations, reservations and
overlapping trusts that the state has imposed on black a r e a s . '5 5
In rela tion  to the governm ent's W hite Paper com m unities have had
several concerns and have been vociferous in their response:^*
52 ibid.
5* Lund, S. 1990, p.2.
55 Weekly Mail, 12 Oct 1990.
56 The National Committee, (a non governmental service organisation) working with
regional affdiates who in turn work with oommunitioc who are resisting dispoaoeeoion or 
organising to make claims for repossession) organised a series of workshops with
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(a) They were angered over the lack of consultation and dismissed the 
G overnm ent's claim  that the re  had been ex tensive  consu lta tion  and 
negotiation. "We are outraged that the governm ent dared introduce such 
reform s with such far reach ing  consequences in advance o f national 
negotiations w ithout having consulted with us the black p e o p l e .5? "The 
government did not consult the affected people, therefore this paper only
represents the governm ent's in terests." Com m enting on the W hite Paper 
communities said, "Let the whites keep their paper. It's just a p a r th e id ."58
(b) Communities expect restitution in the name o f national conciliation. 
Between 1960 and 1982 over three and a half million people were forcibly 
removed due to apartheid policy. Of this number over 600 000 belonged to
communities who owned their land. W hile the W hite Paper, in response to 
white fears, confirms its highest regard and respect for the integrity of title,
there has never been respect for the integrity  o f  A frican title  deeds. 
Communities claim that whereas the White Paper says that land restoration will 
cause conflict unless there is re troactive respect o f  A frican title  and 
restoration there is bound to be even greater conflict.
(c) Communities fear that the implementation o f "The Upgrading of Land 
Tenure Rights Bill" which provides for "the rationalisation o f land registration 
systems and the upgrading o f lower-order land tenure r i ^ t s  to full ownership" 
will actually denude some people o f their existing land rights. As a result of 
adm inistrative failures in the past, many people who hold land rights have
never received documentation. For example in the Border corridor 2 percent o f 
households have quit-rent title59, about 40 percent have C ertifica tes o f 
Occupation, but the majority have no formal rights at all.
rB pieseniativeB  o f  con im tttiilies to oiuure that community view# would be included in the  
NLC iubmisnon to the I^iriismentary Select Committee which was set up as a result of 
the immediately expressed opposition to the Land Bills from diverse groups.
57 Reprreentation from the Border region. NLC 1991, p3
58 ibid. 13 Removed Communities.
59 Marcus, T. (1989b) p20 defines Quit-rent tenure "whme land is held tlmiugh payment 
of an atwiiial quit-rent. . . The terms of access differ only in detail from that of communal 
tenure, in that lots can be transferred or sold with the permission of the administration. 
Allotments cannot be subdivided . . Women lose their rights to the field if they divorce 
or remarry on becoming widowed . . The land . . can be only inherited according to a 
table of succession based on male primogeniture."
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(d) Communities also fear that "The Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights 
Bill" will interfere with communal tenure - a system which in the past afforded 
them some guaranteed land rights and security. They furthermore claim that in 
some agro-pastoral areas communal land use may be the most appropriate 
system of land management ecologically.
(e) Communities are similarly angry at the provision in the bills to limit 
the expansion of communal tenure. Buying land collectively has been the only
way that Africans were able to find the purchase price. They also insist that 
they should be allow ed to choose their own land m anagem ent system
dem ocratically and not be subject to M inisterial perm ission. They dismiss 
suggestions tha t com m unal fa rm ing  n ecessa rily  causes en v ironm en ta l 
degradation. They see the real problem as connected with overcrowding rather 
than farm ing method. They claim too that commercial freehold farm ers are
guilty o f degradation through m onocropping with heavy use o f chem ical 
f e r t i l is e r s .
(f) Communities also realise that if their access to land depends on 
purchase on the free m arket, then their u n d erca p ita lised  status w ill in
practice preclude them from access to land. In any case "y%y should we buy 
the land that was stolen from us in the first place? Apartheid has made us poor, 
we cannot affi)rd to buy the land. "6® "The land was taken away from us, and 
with it our power and source of livelihood and income. We fear that out poverty 
under a free market will mean that we will lose the little land we have left. "61
l.2 .av) The African National Congress (ANC) .
The ANC is in debate over land policy. The Centre for Development 
Studies62 (CDS) sponsored a meeting in Harare in May 1989 which brought 
together community leaders, service organisation activists and ANC exiles. In 
November 1989 the South A frican Economic Research and Training project 
(SAERT)62 convened some forty Southern African academics to exchange views 
on the land question. There were three major discussions in 1990 and a further
6® 18 Transvaal Communities. NLC 1991, p6.
61 10 Border Conununities.
62 CDS was an internationally sponsored research project whose principle aim was to carry 
out research with community participation in South Africa.
62 SAERT was an Amsterdam based project which provided a research based for several 
South African exiled academics.
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workshop in May 1991 in preparation for the ANC Congress. In February 1990, a 
week after the ANC was unbanned, exile members held a workshop on land
issues. The ANC-COSATU meeting in Harare in April 1990 provided a second
major discussion forum. The third workshop was held in October 1990. The 
workshop was attended by experts from other countries with diverse land
reform  experiences.6*
In this review I highlight only some major aspects of a complex and 
detailed debate. For exam ple, four outstanding points em erged from  the 
February workshop. Firstly, it opened up, within ANC ranks, the controversial 
debate on land nationalisation. Up to then the Freedom Charter statement, "The 
Land shall be shared among those who work it!" was, for many cadres,
synonym ous w ith  land  n a tio n a lis a tio n .65 T h is  w as ch a llen g ed . A 
recommendation emerged that the ANC should form a Land Commission. This 
began to be implemented in June 1990 both at regional and national level. 
Emerging out of a discussion o f Zimbabwe's handling of land squatting came 
the recommendation that the ANC should set up Land Claims Commissions to
provide a process for people to get their land back. Resulting from an extended 
"post apartheid" sim ulation exercise (designed by m yself as a workshop 
facilitator- see Appendix l66) came the realisation o f the need to assess the
balance o f forces between different groups with conflicting interests and their
varying strength in the fight for their interests.67 There was an awareness
that a new governm ent can corner itse lf into a precarious position in 
attempting to balance conflicting demands from different interest groups. The 
sim ulation exercise also served to highlight the absolute necessity o f a 
consultation process as integral to policy making.68
64 Source: Author's p«rticq>ant observation notes from all five of these workshops and 
seminars.
65 See Marcus, T.(1986), (1989b), (1989c) Mbongwa, (1984) p. 108, Mbongwa (1989) Dolny
(1989)
66 DolnyJI. 1990a "Strategising for Traiufonnation: Conflicts of Interest in Maize Fanning 
in Western Transvaal" drafted in consultation with Njobe, B and B Thomas. See Appendix 
A.
67 Jq (be debriefing which followed the role play when this simulation exercise was used a 
second time, the banks revealed that in their terms the workers and unenq>loyed had not 
exerted their full pressure-as the bank devised fall-back positions on land 
redistribution is^ch they did not need to use.
68 In one run of the simulation exercise the transitional government arrived with a 
preconceived position and although it carried through a formal consultation it did not 
alter its original position. The response from the role groups was hostile as they 
conq>lained that they had a chance to speak -but were not heard.
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The papers presented to the H arare, w orkshop focussed on land 
acquisition and forms of production in a mixed e c o n o m y .69 There were several 
areas of consensus: the return of land to those removed from black freehold 
farms, legal recognition o f land holding rights o f certain labour tenants, 
w om en's rights and the ir special needs and the need for a radical 
environm ental p o l ic y .  7® The discussants' contributions on ownership reform s 
were diverse. Three trains of thought predominated. The first option would be 
to leave present land ownership undisturbed and to guarantee property rights 
constitutionally. Under this option land could be made accessible to blacks 
through (a) increased tenancy opportunities including sharecropping and 
labour tenancy arrangem ents and (b) a land taxation policy designed to 
encourage less productive land holders to sell. The second option rejected what 
was described as backward, exploitative forms of tenancy and saw them as part 
o f an apartheid legacy which should be eradicated. Those who want land for 
production or living space should be given a constitutional right to purchase 
their own private freeholds. The state would facilitate this process through 
buying land from white owners and redistributing it, or by creating the 
conditions for easy land purchase by blacks within a non-racial free market. 
The third option was based on the concept that the state is the guardian' of all 
land having historically issued farmers with state leaseholds which would be 
hereditary and marketable. The state should therefore have powers to regulate 
the land market and decide to whom the leasehold may be transferred in order 
to influence the rural social structure: a model practised in Sweden. This 
proposal rejects nationalisation and the abolition o f the land market as too 
cumbersome, resulting in a large bureaucracy, possibly promoting illegal land 
dealings and losing the advantages o f a regulated  m arketability that can 
promote both land care and efficiency o f resource use.
The October 1990 workshop provided quite a different discussion forum 
(Lusaka, February 1990 had only exile participants; Harare May 1990 had only 
social scientists). There were delegates from most o f ANC regions, community 
leaders from rural areas, specialists in land-related  issues nationally and 
internationally. Participants with a long history o f land struggles related their 
personal experiences. A panel discussion focussed on the experiences o f 
Z im babw e, M ozam bique, the NUM (N ationa l U nion o f M inew orkers)
69 The papers were by de Klerk (1990[a]) (Option 1), Dolny (1990 [b])(Option 3), Mbongwa 
and Nhlapo-Lewis (1990)(Option 2), and Sangweni(1990).
79 ANC/CQSATU (IWO) Harare Reconmrendations, Report from Working Group [D] p.l
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experiences^! in Lesotho, Swaziland and the Transkei, Tanzania, Canada.
Economics and biological sustainability were two further major topics.
A range of transformation issues were discussed: the need to satisfy land 
hunger, provide employment; for a mechanism through which land claims can 
be adjudicated, for labour legislation to protect all rural workers, for a 
restructuring o f agriculture to make it more equitable, economically viable and 
sustainable. The participants were divided into five working groups: (I)
Communal Land, (II) Land Claims, (III) Land Acquisition and Compensation, 
(IV) Labour and Gender Issues, (V) Forms of Production and Economic Policy. 
The sixth topic, land nationalisation, was considered by all groups.
The summary report which provides an overview o f the workshop 
debates was used as a contribution to launch a consultation process and
distributed to ANC branches for membership commentary. Thus several more 
months of response contributed to the recommendations drafted for the ANC 
policy conference which took place in mid year 1991. Workshop participants 
differed in their views on nationalisation, compensation and so on. But several 
points indicate some new directions in ANC land policy thinking. ?2
Land d is tr ib u tio n  was co n sid ered  m ore im portan t than  land 
n a t io n a l i s a t io n .7 3  ^  was felt that the state had to play the principal role in
effec ting  n m ajor red istribu tion  and that an unregulated land m arket would 
lead to a failtu'e of any serious land reform strategy. Some participants felt that 
legal state ownership (involving the abolition o f the land market) is the only 
way for the state to exert effective control over land redistribution; others felt 
that this could be achieved through different means including: (a) state control 
over access to land; (b) a strongly managed and regulated land market; (c) state 
acquisition in the public interest with the use o f state leaseholds and land 
grants; and (d) a progressive land tax as a means of preventing holdings of 
unused land.
71 Following the large scale retrenchment of miners after the 1988 strike, the National 
Union of Minewoikers began a pilot programme of job creation through the formation of 
cooperatives.
72 ANC, 1990 (b) p.5.
73 ibid. p. S. "Two different understandings of land nationalisation were identified. (I) A
dominant popular impression that nationalisation refers to the process of state
expropriation of land i.e. land acquisition, and not the ownership of land. (2) A minority
understanding that it refers to continued state ownership of the land. Another group 
discussed the need to distinguish between intervention and nationalisation."
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The summary report shows a dominant disposition towards selective 
nationalisation in a mixed economy, the issue of land grants rather than credit 
facilities for purchase, and tenure forms which include the continuation of 
community ownership when this is the preference of the majority of its 
m e m b e rs .
The working group on communal lands noted the need for legally 
recognised communal title deeds; the need to dism antle all legislation and 
paym ents relating to chiefs; the need for communities to elect their own 
members democratically; the need for innovative financial schemes in the case 
of bank refusal to allow land to be used as collateral because of its communal 
status. The land claims working group identified categories o f people whose 
land claims should he considered, identified reasons for disputes and claims to 
the same piece of land and discussed criteria for arbitrating claims.
The group working on land acquisition and compensation contextualised 
their discussion assuming (i) a mixed economy and (ii) the existence of a new 
adm in istrative bureaucracy dealing with land reform . The group fu rther 
assumed that land reform should be based on a demand-led approach (i.e.. the 
state should not acquire land unless there is a demand for it)7* In response to 
demand, the state's acquisition should be guided by productivity factors and
social considerations (eg., whether land is underutilised or if the farm er has
violated human rights). The introduction o f a land ceiling as a means of land 
available for redistribution was felt to be problematic because o f the enormous
variance in land quality. A suggested alternative was to adopt a principle of one 
person  one farm.75 C om pensation was considered  generally  essential^^
(although some people remained opposed) in the assumed context of a mixed
7* This point of view is informed by various experiences and considerations, (i) The state 
should not acquire land unless there is an demand for it in that location, (ii) People with 
specific land claims may be expected to pursue these actively but beyond that there is 
the issue o f the millions of unemployed. In neighbouring states a forced "back to the 
land' policy has been tried. (See Hanlon, 1984, pp. 244 -249) It is felt that this is 
unacceptable. It was felt that the ecrmomic terms of trade and living conditions in die 
rural areas needed to prove themselves attractive and then the state should facilitate 
land acquisition.
75 The term farm here refers to a single productive unit, not the numbw of title deeds 
incorporated into the farm.
76 ANC. 1990b, p. 13.There were certain circumstances where compensation would not be 
given: unused, underutilised, or abandoned land, abused land, farms on which there have 
been human rights violations or violation of labour laws.
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economy. However the proposal was for a "tied compensation" i.e if society is to 
pay then the form should be determined by society's best interest.77 The 
proposal was made of 25% in cash, 25% in government bonds and 50% in 
industrial bonds.
The workshop also considered the prom otion o f different forms of 
production which would co-exist in a mixed economy. State farms are not seen
as an easy option bearing in mind the experiences of other countries and South
A frica's apartheid heritage o f unskilled farm workers. W hile cooperatives
should receive favourable consideration, there is awareness that their success 
depends on a com bination of organisational, technical and political skills
which are not always present. It was also felt that agricultural policy as a whole 
should be geared towards the benefit of individual and community farms above 
company farms. In discussing corporate farms, the following were suggested as 
measures to be used to improve their contribution to society: corporate land 
holdings should not expand, a land tax should be used to pressure corporate
farms to relinquish land, tax incentives should be used to encourage worker
partic ipa tion , corporate farm s should be p ressu rised  to partic ip a te  in 
com m unity developm ent program m es as a condition o f the ir continued 
o p e ra tio n .
The ANC land reform debate has moved beyond pure rhetoric towards the 
creation o f a viable rural future. The fact that South African agriculture is not 
the m ajor earning sector in the economy provides greater flexibility  to a 
rem odelling p f o c e s s .7 8  in  summary, the economic working group concluded, 
"South Africa's human profrle requires a strategy for land and people, for food 
sustenance, creating an em ployment base in rural com munities with viable 
in c o m e s ."79 A question continuously raised at the workshop was, "What's the 
use of getting the land back if you're going to be bankrupt in five years time?”
Land redistribution on its own is insufficient; it must be linked to a holistic
policy embracing economics, education, and services as integral components to 
restructure ru ral conditions.
77 The post war strategies pursued by such capitalist government's as Taiwan and South 
Kwea inform this view.
78 This opinion is informed by a discussion on other African countries. Reviewing 
Tanzania's experience, for example, it was noted that Tanzanian agriculture is the major 
production sector. After independence everything depended on agricultural earnings: 
the budget to build up infrastructure; the foreign exchange earnings to import capital 
goods etc. This is not the South African case.
79 ANC, 1990, p 16.
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1.2.(v) The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).
The DBSA is a parastatal institution. According to Brand, the recently late 
(1992) Chief Executive and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the DBSA, the 
South A frican governm ent, "is the m ajor shareholder and provides the
majority of funding, and can exercise greatest control in DBSA's affairs. . . But. . 
It's modelled on other regional banks in the world. It has a decision making 
process far removed from that of typical bureaucracies. . .we have not slavishly
followed the South African government. We do not operate like a department of 
g o v e r n m e n t . ”80 DBSA employees are said to have influence on the current 
N ational Party governm ent. The DBSA may have an im portant ro le  in
implementing land reform policy in the post apartheid era.
The DBSA is fully  supportive o f the governm ent's approach o f 
deregulating white farming. Appraising the policy reform s introduced by the 
government this year key DBSA employees noted. The positive trends in white
agriculture'  ^ can to a large degree be attributed to the budgetary impact and 
policy changes introduced by the state in its efforts to free up the agricultural 
market mechanism. This confirms the postulation that the market mechanism 
can be used as an efficient instrument to allocate resources optimally as long as 
all are entitled access and are empowered to participate.” 81
DBSA also advocates that within a deregulated market economy, skilled 
black sm allholders/entrepreneurs should ffnd an effective, profitable role for 
themselves. Hence, Brand maintained that a relaxation o f land restrictions and
black access to inputs will not have a negative effect on production, ”We have
to get the fictitious argument (that smaller farms would mean less efficient 
production) out o f the w a y . " ^ 2  T h i s  statement requires qualification and is
explored in Chapter Seven. The view that land ownership patterns could be 
substantially altered without necessarily leading to production losses has been 
further supported by the Private Sector Council's W orking Group on Rural 
Development.82 Research carried out by DBSA employees has been highly
80 Simon Bnmd, "The Role of the DBSA" interview published in "Development: A Survey." 
Supplement to Finsncinl Meil, November 13, 1987.
81 Christodoulou, N.T. & N Vink, 1990, p33.
82 The Star, 14 February 1990
83 Urban Foundation (1988) Private Sector Council on Urbanisation, Woridng Group on 
Rural Development. Resource Document, March 1988, pp 76. (Question: "Would the entry
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critical of white farm ing inefficiency and has shown that black farm ers
operating  w ithin severe constrain ts have effic ien tly  used their lim ited
resources. Furthermore, their analysis of white farming shows a greater land 
use intensity on sm aller farm s and a larger number of em ployees per 
hectare.8* In general they support a black small holder farming policy because 
of its potential for economically effective farming and employment creation.
Their approach is based on a number of assumptions and pro-active steps
which would have to be taken to give effect to their strategy. Firstly, they
assume a shift in political lobbying power which will substantially alter black 
access to state support. Secondly, they assume that South Africa's inflation rate 
will fall and that this will bring down the price o f land to a more affordable 
level. They recommend: (i) changes in resource allocation to ensure that
emergent black farmers can market their produce, (ii) availability o f finance 
to black farmers for land purchase, (iii) new specialised institutions to provide 
access to credit for purchasing inputs, (iv) extension o f research and training,
(v) the representation o f black farm er interests on marketing boards and
m arketing and supply cooperatives, (vi) change in the perm it and quota 
systems to include black farm ers (vii) the introduction o f a land tax to
encourage productive land use and bringing m arket values o f land closer to 
production values.
The DBSA is critical of farmer settlement programm es'^ as a direct result 
o f their experiences. Instead they argue for farm er support programmes. Their 
past settlem ent projects involved land acquisition , extensive infrastructural 
investm ent, extension, dem onstration, research, provision o f inputs, training, 
management and the project operated as an corporate entity disconnected from 
the surrounding socio-economic environm ent.86 Support programm es focus on 
farmers who have already obtained rights to land (and it assumes that the state
of non-white farmers to white farming areas have a disastrous inquiet on agricultunil 
production?” Answer "Some farms are likely to be farmed worse and some b^ter by 
non-whites . . .  if 10% of the currem while fanned land taken out all over the coumry 
disappeared from farming entirely it would have no signifrcance as far as the 
availability of sufficient food is concerned . . an many parts of the country . . . white 
operated farms are only producing a percentage of what could be produced under top 
management."
8* Table 15, "Factor Intensities in Agricnltme, 1988" Information presented by the DBSA 
at a consultation meeting 26 October 1990 between the ANC Land Commission 
Secr^ariat and DBSA.
85 Fenyes, T.I., CJ. van Rooyen and N Vink. ( 1989)"Budg^ary Implications of Affirmative 
Action in South African Agriculture." mimeograph.
86 ibid p3.
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has not incurred land purchase expenses)87 and advises a modest establishment 
support for fencing and buildings. The greater emphasis is on setting up the 
services so people can buy inputs, rent machines and market their produce. 
The policy focuses on providing "equality of opportunity" (wherein) "Access to 
opportunity via resources must include the provision of goods by means of
public capital in which citizens have entitlem ents."88
The DBSA policy is therefore a cost cutting policy. It supports user
charges and aims at a financial replicability o f a sort that it could not itself 
achieve when pursuing the farmer settlement programme. One of the policy 
proposals weaknesses is that it chooses to ignore the major constraint identified
analyses of why land is unused i.e. no money to purchase inputs and labour (see 
Chapter 5.3.). Setting up "equality o f access” can be meaningless when people 
have no money: currently rural fam ilies use rem ittances to buy inputs and 
consume most o f what they produce. Credit availability, producing for sale, and 
credit repayment are among the major issues not discussed.
In relation to access by black farmers to land, the DBSA rejects large 
scale state acquisition of land for redistribution as too c o s tly 8 9  and proposes
several alternative ideas.^® (A) State land: Small farmers could buy their own
portion of the 2 million hectares o f SADT land which has not be distributed.
DBSA suggest that prices should be adjusted to reflect the production potential 
and the shortfall should be written off. (B) Sequestrated land: if the debts of the
white farmers are called in.9l Again the DBSA suggest that mortgage bonds be
87 ibid. The comparative budgets drawn up omit land jmrchase expenses for farmer support 
programmes. It is assumed that farmers will have obtained land via a separate process 
presumably (subsidised) land purchase. The programmes also implicitly deals with the 
emergent black entrepreneur rather than household production/small marketable 
surplus farmers.
88 ilnd p.l.
89 Christodoulou, N.T and N Vink, (1990) p23, "Official estimates of the value of farmland 
in South Africa (excluding the homelands) came to R44 billion in 1988 although this is 
widely recognised as an underestimation. DBSA's own estim ate of the value is in the 
order of RICO billion, including Axed improvements. Experience with the Trust Land 
transfer programme also shows that when the state starts buying land, the land values 
increase. Transferring 25 per cent of the land in three years will cost between R ll  
billion and R25 billion depending on whose estimate is accepted. It is hard to believe 
that either of these amounts can be regarded as a practical possibility in the short 
term."
9® see Lund S, (1990) p 14.
91 Christodoulou N. T. and N. Vink, (1990) p24."DBSA's own estimate is of 1 000 fanners 
in arrears to the Department of Agricultural Development (including the Agricultural 
Credit Board)." Similar guestimates are made in relation to debt owned to the
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made available for black farmers, the assumption being that blacks will either
farm more profitably or they will accept a low personal income in order to pay 
off the bond. (C) Church land: the suggestion is that the church integrates
farming communities onto its land. This assumes a church disposition which is
not yet manifest. (D) State land/Historical land claims: this is really the same 
land as in (A) i.e. where the state is still in possession of land which it obtained 
through forced removals (eg.. Western Transvaal) the land should be returned 
to the people. But Government sales of this land to white commercial farmers 
after the 1991 White Paper on Land Reform shows an unfavourable disposition
towards this idea. (E) Urban areas: 850 000 hectares is zoned as smallholding 
land for whites around urban areas. The DBSA noted that small holder market 
gardening is a realistic option and imply that these areas should be targeted for 
black settlement. How the blacks are to get the land is not discussed. (F) While 
the DBSA recognises that the opening up of tribal land for purchase is complex, 
the privatisation o f tribal land should amount to a long term goal. Experience
w ith farm er support program m es shows tha t as p roduction  becom es
commercial an informal market develops. (G) black purchase of former white 
land in an open, non-racial market. Problems associated with this option are 
not seriously explored.^^ "The extension, to include black farm ers, o f the 
financing facilities o f the Land Bank and Agricultural credit Board probably 
represents the most soimd approach to affirmative action for those who wish to
buy land. Experience had shown that the constraint lies in the access to finance 
for land purchase rather than in its costs." What is glossed over is the issue of 
solvency. Is the DBSA envisaging 100% bond schemes and if so what about their 
own analysis o f solvency problem s which suggest that farm ers them selves
need to put down high portions of the capital outlay for farm purchase (70% 
cited for arable farmers, higher for livestock)
Lund in assessing the DBSA proposals writes, "The DBSA concludes that 
the im plem entation o f all the transfer models proposed (excluding bantustan 
restructuring and the w illing buyer/w illing seller m arket), w ill im m ediately 
make at least 8 million hectares available for transfer at a cost to the state of 
between R1 000 - R2 (X)0 million." However my own comment is that (a) the 8 
million hectares is mostly not additional land for blacks but signiAes a paper
commercial banks. But I think these land quantity estimates may be severely over­
estimated as the median farmsize is only 500 hectares. The high average is due to 
extensive grazing farms. Many of the indebted farmers are arable farmers.
Christodoulou N. Tjmd N Vink, (1990) p. 18.
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transfer of ownership: the ratio of black to white owned land would not change
significantly., and (b) only the area from sequestrated whites is significantly 
new but is overestimated. Vink and Christodoulou have used an average farm
size of 1280 ha to estimate the amount of sequestrated land to be made available 
from 2000 sequestrated farmers. But they elsewhere point out that the median 
farm size is 500 ha; the average is influenced by the extensive pastoral farms.^^ 
As many indebted farmers are grain farmers I argue that it would be more 
realistic to use the median rather than the average farin size. This makes a 1.5
m illion hectare difference!
The DBSA logic is ultimately as follows, a + b + c= d , where:
(a) "white agriculture is unsustainable and traditionally inflexible"^^
+
(b) "There is sufflcient evidence that this (subsistence) farming sy stem
is neither efflcient, equitable, nor sustainable. "*5
+
(c) " . . . market orientated farmer support programmes (which)
highlighted the ability o f black smallholder farmers to efficiently use
agricultural resources. . . provided with a package of (appropriate) 
support services. . . are at least as efficient as their white counterparts, 
and that their potential to provide job opportunities and optimally utilise 
labour is encouraging."^^
(d) a selective black commercial farmer approach.
The term  "smallholder" used by Christodoulou and Vink is therefore 
misleading. Many use the term "smallholder" to include m illions o f women
cultivating their small plots to contribute to family food needs. This is a far cry
from  the selective black, principally male, entrepreneurial approach described
by the DBSA managers. The DBSA papers do not adequately address what is to
happen to the millions o f cultivators and aspirant landless who fall into the
"subsistence farmer" category. This is a key issue and marks the crucial point 
o f difference with the policy preoccupation of the ANC.
ibid, p6.
^4 ibid, pp. 27-28. 
ibid, pp. 13-14. 
ibid, p. 28.
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l.2.(iv) The implications of the Government. DBSA and ANC proposals.
The National Party line supports a flee market policy in keeping with 
the dominant thrust o f the international financial institutions and domestic
strateg ies in m ost o f the N orthern w orld econom ies. The governm ent
privatisation policy is consistent with this economic strategy and the 1990 
attempts to privatise trust land and communally held land indicate the slender 
com mitment to economic transform ation involving real redistribution. Their 
goals are a political reform  which annuls the civilised' world's horror of 
institutionalised apartheid, seen as an anachronism in the final decade of the 
twentieth century, and to establish privatisation to the extent that a neo 
apartheid economy will persist in which white capital interests remain intact.
The limitation o f the DBSA approach is that it fails to spell out the 
tensions and contradictions o f a land distribution policy in an agrarian 
economy which may continue to be dominated by agribusiness capital. It does 
not adequately address the issue o f m illions o f . subsistence farm ers and 
unemployed. It assumes that black commercial farmers will farm a smaller land 
area than their outgoing white counterparts and be satisfied with a lower 
personal income.
The National Party government might itself, on the terms suggested by 
DBSA, welcome black commercial takeover o f some 40 thousand less profitable 
white farming units. It would cure one of the regim es' major political and 
econom ic headaches i.e. the pressure to support white farm ing incomes.
Furthermore the proposals carry minimum state costs, the implications are that 
black farm ers entering the sector w ill obtain com m ercial loans (possibly 
subsidised) to buy out the whites. This is even cheaper than the implementation 
of the Zimbabwe Lancaster House agreement in which the state incurred heavy 
costs buying out whites at a willing buyer/willing seller basis to be able to 
make land available for resettlement.
A preview  o f the possible scenario w hich m ight resu lt from  the 
restructured agrarian capitalism implicit in the state and parastatal proposals is 
that o f a dualist economy in which there is:
4 0
* a continuation and consolidated domination of agribusiness farming. 
The trend towards bankruptcy of small scale com m ercial farm ers would
continue although its pace might be slowed down by a strata of black farmers
who accept a lower living standard than their white predecessors.
* a continuation and m ultiplication o f sm allholding production in 
w h ic h :
(a) sm allholders can produce certain  food and raw m aterials for
industries of better quality or more cheaply than large complexes. Attention is
drawn to small holding sugar production organised by the South African Sugar
Association ( S A S A ) . 9 7
(b) small holders can produce cheap food for industrial workers and
therefore subsidise the production costs o f industrial capitalists by keeping
down the price of workers' food. This could lead to the Latin American model in 
which rural producers, receive low prices for their produce and as a result are
forced to go in for super "self-exploitation" as they work excessive hours on 
poor land to maximise their total income.9&
Land Reform within this fram ework cannot respond to the demands
made by the people o f South Africa for economic justice. It has been called 
" r e f o r m is m "99 as in essence capital is simply realigning its strategy for greater
efficiency and profit. An "affirmative action" agricultural policy, such as that 
proposed by the DBSA, does not adequately define what the role should be of 
black producers in a future South Africa. Neighbouring states and especially
Latin American countries provide examples o f land distribution "reforms" in
97 Cooper, D. (1990) p.lS describes the scheme as "probably the most successful stimulus 
to peasant agriculture"; SASA "made available rinance to (some 8000) peasant growers,
encouraged sugar mills to provide the necessary infrastructure . . . flexible labour 
damandu accommodate migrancy and there was . . .  an assmed mark^".
99 De Janvry, A. (1981) provides an extensive analysis of not only how Latin America
small holder producers subsidise foreign and domestic cxq)ital in Latin America but also 
how commercial farming exports cheaply imported into the "North" are an exanq>le of 
Southern domination by more powerful capital. See especially pp32-40 the sectirm on the 
"Contradictions of Accumulation in Disarticulated Economies."
99 ibid. de Janvry points out that in Latin American "radical" refonns where for example a 
ceiling was placed on the amount of land held b y . an enterprise then the subsequent
enterprise rearrangement led to an obligatory and effective modernisation process as all 
means of production were then centered on the remaining best lands. Peasant
beneficiaries received the remaining less productive lands where they could continue 
their own super self exploitation eking out produce through long hours of family labour.
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which rural dwellers become second class "discarded people" in their urban 
industrially biased economy.
The DBSA policy indicates a concern with agricultural efficiency and 
market orientated agriculture within a deregulated market setting. It however, 
recognises that many potential efficient producers, especially blacks, do not 
have access to land and means of production. As bankers, concerned with 
assessing rates of return for financial investment, they are critical o f the 
agricultural project settlement models which they, in the past pursued in the 
bantustans. Their alternative proposal is a "promotionar approach to create an 
"equality of opportunity. . . which must include the provision of goods by 
means of public capital." The DBSA, therefore, acknowledge the necessity for 
some corrective  in terven tion  to correct "fu rther in e ffic ien c ies  through 
market failure where the initial distribution of assets is highly skewed, as is the
case at present. "^^0
The DBSA is cognisant of policies in neighbouring states. It is aware of
Zimbabwe's own review of its settlement programme which is criticised for 
having targeted the landless, the disadvantaged, the unemployed and therefore
cannot be expected to perform  well econom ically. Zim babw e is now 
increasing its efforts to a farmer support approach which identifies the market 
o rien ta ted  en trep reneu rs.
The DBSA similarly aims to put in place farmer support projects either in 
existing black rural areas or for new farmers on new land'. The DBSA proposal 
does not envisage m ajor state assisted land red istribution; blacks should
gradually obtain land, either individual title through privatisation o f land in 
the bantustan or through sales and auctions o f what is now white' land. Thus 
the challenge is to create opportunities for black small scale entrepreneurs to 
operate effectively. This policy thrust is also weighted by economic and social 
considerations, (i) o f the em ploym ent role o f agriculture in the economy 
especially when all backward and forward linkages are included and (ii) the
fact that smaller producers farm land more intensively and use more labour.
The ANC proposal is ambitious as befits a liberation m ovem ent The 
proposal envisages a long term transformation o f the countryside. It does not
Feynes, T.I., C. J. Van Rooyen & N Vink, 1989. p.l 
101 Cuaworth. J, & J, Walker, 1988.
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envisage dramatic transformation overnight. The ANC's Land Commission does 
not envisage the state becoming the major land-owner by taking over large
numbers of white farm and turning them into state farms and cooperatives. The 
current discussion d o c u m e n t  102 sets out an "arbitration/inducem ent” policy; it 
intends to set in motion a process to correct historical injustices and advance a 
series o f economic policies which favour small holder producers, cooperatives 
and jo in t enterprises. Companies will be pressured to change both their
managerial practice and their social development contribution. The ANC cannot 
afford politically to support a land reform programme which is limited to a
NAFCOC (N ational A frican Federated Chambers o f Comm erce) 1®^  type of 
approach to assist black entrepreneurs. This would be inconsistent with the 
espoused philosophy from which it draws its popular support. The ANC has to 
take on board an all embracing programme which provides opportunities for 
the most disadvantaged; the women, the landless unemployed as well as the 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s .
The im plem entation of successful land reform  requires adm inistrative 
and flnancial replicability. The government and DBSA proposals assume much
the same institutional infrastructure as exists at present, with some additional 
budgeting for affirm ative action and possibly some reallocation o f resources. . 
.i.e.. the savings from cuts in subsidies to white farmers could be transferred to 
farm er support programm es. Administratively the ANC proposal requires the 
fo llo w in g :
(i) the existence o f a skilled bureaucracy supportive o f the proposed 
tran sfo rm ativ e  changes.
(ii) the establishm ent o f criteria for making difficult decisions. Recent 
innovative work has developed a matrix o f degree o f ownership and identity of 
ownership as a guide to defining land rights.
(iii) I f  the m easure o f  the productive value o f land em erges as a 
regulatory  tool for a non-speculative agricu ltu ra l land m arket, valuation  
technicians will be needed. The Land Bank has some persoimel but the problem
102 ANC 1990 (b).
103 NAFCOC, a strong groufnng of black businessmen, some of vriiom are now joining the 
ANC. For an insight into their history and politics. See Z P. Jordan, "The African Petty 
Bourgeoisie: A Case Study of NAFCOC 1964.1984 "
104 Budlender. G, & Latsky, J,(1990)
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arises of the professional integrity of a bureaucracy trained in another 
political era. The Philippines, for example, has experienced several outrageous 
valuation scandals within the land reform programme. If F AO/UNDP assistance 
programmes are developed in a post apartheid future, a training programme in 
valuations (following the Swedish experience) could be of vital importance.
(iv) A land reform policy requires considerable financial investment if 
it is to be effective. Although some people may acquire land through credit 
arrangem ents / others may have to depend on a state land grant for which 
finance will have to be found since the ANC favours compensation for outgoing 
f a r m e r s .  1^6 Further finance is required to ensure that land reallocation is 
effective; it may be unproductive unless accom panied  by a train ing 
programme, investment in infrastructure to serve small scale farmers together 
with a m odifled. marketing system.
ANC (1992) The policy guidelines adopted favour "just compensation”
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C h a p te r  Two. A g ric u ltu ra l L and  V aluation ; T h eo ry . M ethods 
an d  D ebate .
For centuries attitudes to land, and payment for its use, have been
fiercely debated. Diverse attitudes to the nature of land and rent are the 
basis for differing land policies. For example the perception of land as "a
gift of nature" or a "factor of production" or as a manifestation of the social 
relations of production is of special relevance to countries in which the
current status quo of land ownership is challenged. The scarcity of land as
an endowment in fixed supply provides, for some, a justification for 
government, intervention to control land access and land p r i c e s .  106
Land natio n alisa tio n  in Southern  A frican  coun tries popularly  
symbolises a radical change in the balance of power on achieving majority 
rule. Black rural communities in South Africa advocate agricultural land 
nationalisation not so much in terms of abolition of the land market but
rather in terms of dispossession by the colonisers and repossession by black 
indigenous peoples. This does not always have a great deal to do with 
transform ing relations o f production; aspirant black entrepreneurs might 
expect to benefit most from such nationalisation.
Land nationalisation in Zambia has had a different rationale and
applicability . Zam bia nationalised the natural properties o f agricultural 
land. This stems from an attitude that land owners should not profit 
through their monopoly o f a "god-given" resource. However once the 
virgin land is developed it becomes acceptable to trade in improved land and 
land valuation firms are used to assess the value o f the improvements.
Land nationalisation  in M ozam bique, follow ing the tradition o f 
measures taken by the Soviet Union, the Eastern European block, China and
Cuba, was intended as a prelude to the transform ation of productive 
relations. Land rentals and markets were understood as m anifestations of
capitalist social relations o f productions and detrim ental to a progressive
development of society free of such exploitative economic relations.
1 ^  This point of view is informed by various experiences and considerations, (i) The
state should not acquire land unless thwe is an demand for it in that location, (ii)
People with specirie land claims may be expected to actively pursue these but
beyond that there is the issue of million of unemployed. In neighbouring states a
forced "back to the land' policy has been tried. (See Hanlon, 1984, pp. 244 -249) It 
is felt that this is unacceptable. It was felt that the economic terms of trade and 
living conditions in the rural areas needed to prove themselves attractive and then 
the state should facilitate land acquisition
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But even countries which do not have radical attitudes towards 
transforming relations of production, for example Canada and Sweden, have 
given land a constitutional status different from that enjoyed by other
forms of productive property. Some activists in South Africa are similarly 
arguing for a special status for land and for expropriated land owners to 
receive a negotiated land price reflecting "just compensation" rather than 
the market price of la n d . Advocates of this position indicate that they 
find the productivity valuation of land (as assessed by the Land Bank) as an 
acceptable basis for negotiating c o m p e n s a t io n .
Different attitudes towards land nationalisation, land price and its 
constitu tional status o f landed property can he linked to d ifferen t 
theoretical schools o f economic thought. Many economic theoreticians 
have supported agricultural land nationalisation or taxation on rent. Marx's 
position on nationalisation is well known; it represents a challenge to
private land ownership and exploitative capitalist relations of production. 
But Ricardo and many classical economists including M arshall, an early
N eo c la ss ic is t, also  d iscussed  in te rv en tio n s  w hich  w ould d ecrease  
landowners' earnings from rental income in the larger interests of society.
The first section of this chapter reviews the contributions of Ricardo, 
Marx and M arshall who, from differing theoretical perspectives, conclude 
that rent is an appropriation of surplus to the detriment of the larger
society. Various elem ents are contested in different concepts o f rent: ren t as 
Stemming from monopoly ownership, or from natural properties or as 
deriving from the differential quality o f land and differential levels o f
investment. In the second section I review  the neoclassical econom ists' 
approach to rent as an expression of the reward o f a factor of production 
and the d ifferent methods of productivity valuation which they have
devised to assess marginal productivity for comparison to actual rentals.
2.1. R en t th eo ry : m ain  e lem ents in d iffe re n t concep ts of r e n t
Ricardo, Marx and Marshall while sharing a general view o f rent as
surplus appropriated by the landowners to the detrim ent o f society, differ 
in their approach to the concept of rent and the location o f the surplus 
from which rent derives. Section (i) examines their different conceptual 
approach to rent, (ii) their differing ideas on the source of rent. I then (iii)
ANC. 1990c. p24. "just compensation" involves the concept of seeking a balance 
between private and public interests.
^^ 9 King, H. 1990. plO. as well as personal communication with Klug, Law Faculty 
Witwatersnmd University and member of the ANC Land Commission Secretariat.
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examine in more detail their discussion on rent deriving from differing 
land quality as well as (iv) Marshall and Marx's acknowledgment of rent 
also deriving from land improvements. I then review why each of these 
major economists supported intervention in the status quo of land rents
and/or ownership of land.
2.1. (i'l Perceptions towards land and rent
The classical economists, Ricardo, Mill et al., treat agricultural land 
as an extraordinary component of the production process. Land, for them, is 
a "free gift o f nature" in fixed supply and distinct from capital items such as
m anufactured  means o f production . M arshall, an early neoclassical
econom ist, a lso  trea ted  land as having q u a lities  d iffe re n t from 
manufactured capital. He agreed with Ricardo that no surplus can be reaped 
from the ownership of those of nature's gifts which are (practically) in
unlimited supply such as air and water. It would not be possible to charge 
for land use if it were in unlimited, equally fertile and equally accessible 
supply. . It is land's limited quantity and variable quality which makes a rent
levy possible.
For Marx rent is a manifestation of landed property relations in, for 
example, a capitalist economy. Marx thus treats the "rent levy" as resulting 
from social causes rather than land's natural, differential quality and finite 
supply. He calls attention to privatisation of property as the social process 
which perm its rentals and land markets to evolve. The appropriation of 
land by individuals is historically accompanied by a legal process which 
enshrines private property rights to land. Land for capitalists becomes a 
commodity and "the legal view itself only means that the landowner can do 
w ith his land what every ow ner o f com m odities can do with his
com m odities."l^^For Marx "rent (is). . . the economic realisation of landed 
property, o f legal fiction  by grace o f which certain  individuals have 
exclusive right to certain parts o f our planet. .
Land can earn a rent only because it is owned and is a condition of 
production. Private ownership o f land, "landed property" is the result o f a 
h istorical process and an initial prerequisite for establishing the social 
relations o f production necessary to the developm ent o f capitalism  in 
agriculture. Ownership o f land whether by landlords, business enterprises,
109 Marshall A,1988, pp 120-121. Book IV, Chapter 2.
110 Marx, K.1962, "Capital" Vol 3, p 616
111 Marx, K.1962, "Capital" Vol 3, p.634.
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institutions or owner occupiers permits the levy of rent for the use of land. 
Rent, therefore, is an economic expression of specific social relations and 
quite unlike the non-Marxist concept of rent as a return based on the 
monopolisation of a commodity.
"The fact that capitalised ground rent appears like the price or value 
of land, so that land, therefore is bought and sold like any other
commodity, serves some apologists as a justification for landed property
since the buyer pays an equivalent for it, the same as for other
commodities; and the major portion of landed property has changed hands
in this way. The same reason in that case would justify slavery, since the 
returns from the labour of the slave, whom foe slave holder has bought, 
merely represent the interest on the capital invested in this purchase. To 
derive a justification for foe existence of ground rent from its sale and 
purchase means in general to justify its existence by its existence.”^
Marx thus describes the process of reification of land value, wherein 
land (which is valueless in foe absence of any embodied labour) attains a 
m onetary value through privatisation and a legal status of inviolable
p r o p e r ty .
2.1. (ii) Rent - differing ideas over source.
Ricardo's speciflc conception of rent is that it is foe payment for foe 
use of natural quality of foe land. He excludes foe return on any investment 
in land improvements. "Rent is that portion of the produce o f the earth 
which is paid to foe landlord for foe use of the original and indestructible 
powers o f foe soil. It is often, however, confounded with foe interest and 
profit o f capital, and, in popular language, foe term is applied to whatever 
is annually paid by a farmer to his landlord."
M arshall's concept o f rent is more embracing, and he takes full
account o f improvements to land in his theorisation of rent. For Marshall 
those "free gifts of nature which Ricardo classified as foe inherent' and 
'indestructible' properties o f foe soil, have been largely m odified; partly 
im poverished and partly enriched by the work o f many generations of 
men.^^^ Full rent must fowefore consist o f rent d r iv e d  from foe "inherent 
properties which land derives from nature, and foe artific ial properties
which i t  owes to human a c t io n .  Marshall distinguished these two rental
components and referred to them as (true) rent and "quasi-rent"; "foe 
income (or quasi-rent) derived from those im provem ents, together with
112 Marx,K. 1962, "Capital" Vol 3, p624
113 Ricardo, D.1949, p33
114 Marshall,A. 1988, pl22.
115 ibid. pl23
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that due to the original qualities of the soil constitutes the producer's 
surplus or rent. "
Ricardo places a further limitation on what he considers as rental 
source when he takes the position that the landowner cannot command rent 
from the last dose of capital invested including from the tenant organising 
agricultural production on the "worst soil." He is of the opinion that "When, 
in the progress of society, land of the second degree of fertility is taken into 
cultivation, rent immediately commences on that of the first quality, and 
the amount will depend on the difference in the quality of these two 
portions of land." 116 considers three qualities of land No. 1, 2, 3, which
are supposed "to yield with an equal employment of capital and labour, a net 
produce on 100, 90 and 80 quarters of corn." Ricardo explains that, in his 
view, if N o.l, is in abundance there will be no rent, as soon as it is necessary 
to cultivate No. 2, then a rent of ten quarters will begin on N o.l, with No. 2 
paying no rent. "In the same manner it might be shown that when No 3 is 
brought into cultivation, the rent of No 2 must be ten quarters, or the value 
of ten quarters, while the rent of No 1 would rise to twenty quarters. This is 
because there must be the same rate of profit on agricultural capital; "the
cultivator of No. 3, would have the same profits whether he paid twenty 
quarters for the rent of N o.l, ten quarters for the rent of No.2, or cultivated
No. 3, free of all rent"^^^
For Marx rent has composite features due to m onopoly, differing land 
quality and varying levels o f  investment. But essentially rent represents 
the appropriation of surplus. Hence Marx agrees with Ricardo that one 
source of landowners' surplus derives from differing land quality and also 
with M arshall that land improvements are also reflected in rental levels. 
But the areas of divergence are considerable. Firstly Marx disputes Ricardo's 
position that landlords will not be able to command a rent from producers 
operating on the worst quality soils. Marx makes the obvious point that if 
the tenant is not prepared to pay a rent then the landowner has no 
incentive to enter into a contract to permit the land to be used. This primary 
element of the rental composite is described by him as absolute rent.
Marx considers the situation of the "worst soil" type on which it 
would be possible for a capitalist tenant farmer to achieve an average profit 
on his investment if no rent payment were to be made. However as Marx 
points out, this "is by no means a basis for the landlord to lend his land
116 Ricardo,D. 1949, p35 
11  ^ ibid. p36.
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gratis to the farmer and to become so philanthropic as to grant credit
gratuit for the sake of a business f r i e n d s h i p " . ! ^9 Therefore before any land
is brought into production a rental payment must he obtainable and this
requires the establishment of a surplus profit which can be appropriated
by the landowner distinct from a differential rent which arises from the
difference in fertility of various categories of soil.
But Marx's major divergence from Ricardo and M arshall is his
approach to the concept of rental origin. Both Ricardo and M arshall
identify rent as deriving from the land; the form er considers only the
o rig ina l soil p roperties the la tte r also takes into account land
im provem ents. For Marx how ever com prehends a process o f ren ta l 
extraction which is part of a process connected with the struggles inherent
in capitalist social relations o f production which them selves influence 
rentals. Obviously capitalist tenant farmers will expect to receive at least
the average rate of profit on their capital otherwise they will invest 
elsewhere, mobility of capital and skills permitting. The landowner expects 
to appropriate the excess surplus value produced as a result of differing
land conditions.
Marx examines rent as the landowners' combined appropriation of
surplus which may even include average profits. M arx cites instances 
within the context of the capitalist mode of production where the extraction
of rent would lower the sum shared between profits and wages which would, 
therefore fall below their real average. He states that the link between
wages and rents is described by capitalist farmers themselves at points in 
farm ing history when landowners have increased their rental share. For 
exam ple, capitalist tenant farm ers in the first part o f the nineteenth 
century complained that it would be impossible to raise agricultural wages 
unless ground rent were reduced at the same time. For Marx, "therein lies 
the confession that under the head of ground rent there is a deduction of 
the labourers' wages which is handed over to the l a n d l o r d s . " ! !9 ]n  1865
Fawcett, the Cambridge professor of political economy, made the point at the 
Social Science Conference in Gt Britain, "The labourers were beginning to 
emigrate, and farmers were beginning to complain that they would not be 
able to pay such high rents as they have become accustomed to pay because 
labour is becom ing dearer in consequence of e m i g r a t i o n .  " ! 2 0  M arx's 
concludes, "Here, then, high ground rent is directly identified with low
!!9 Maix,K. 1962, "Capital.Volume III", p750 
! ! 9  ibid, p  628 
120 ib id , p .629
5 0
wages. And in so far as the level of land prices is determined by this 
circumstance increasing rent, a rise in the value of land is identical with a 
depreciation of labour, the high price of land is identical with the low price 
of labour. 121 M arxist propositions are confirm ed in various neoclassical
studies (See Part 2.2(ii) of this chapter which compares tenants' low net 
income, below the logarithmic calculation of their productivity, because of 
the expense of high rentals. This reality  which is inconsistent with 
neoclassical theory is explained by its protagonists as orig inating in
"m arket im perfections".
Discussing farm ers' acceptance of a lower average profit due to 
rental payments Marx draws on Morton, a real estate agent and agricultural 
mechanic. Morton refers to leaseholds of 30-34 hectares which are not large 
enough to use a horse and plough and where, unless the capitalist tenant
farmer "works with his own hands as laboriously as any labourer, his farm
will not keep him. If  he entrusts the performance of work to workmen
while he continues merely to observe them, the chances are, that at no 
distant period, he will find he is unable to pay his r e n t . " ! 22
Marx then develops the idea that this payment of "lease money"
should not be considered as "real rent";
If the farmer pays "lease money" which constitutes a deduction from
the normal wages of his labourers, or from his normal average profit, he
does not pay rent, i.e. an independent component o f the price of his
commodities distinct from wages and profits. We have already indicated that
this continually takes place in practice. . . however, no real rent is paid in 
spite o f the fact that lease money is paid."
"Real rent" appropriated by landed property is. in principle, taken
from surplus profits. If  rent is obtained by forcing the rate o f profit for
capital invested on land below the normal rate of return for capital, the
cap ita lis t tenan t farm er w ill, m obility  perm itting , take his cap ital
elsewhere. Similarly, if the wage is below normal, wage labour will seek
alternative employment. But conditions of mobility are not perfectly fluid.
Farm ers have specific knowledge o f deployment o f capital in agriculture 
which may not be applicable to another industry. Workers may not have
alternative  em ploym ent possib ilities; on the other hand farm -w orkers '
organisation may result in their winning a wage increase. Conditions of
class strugg le are also there fo re  a determ inant o f the level of
r e m u n e r a t io n .
!21 ibid, p.629 
122 ibid, p.630
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2.1. (iii) Rent: derived from differential quality of land.
The Ricardian model developed the theory of differential rent. He 
compared the application of units of capital and labour to differing qualities
of land. He related his study to a situation of increasing demand for food in a 
closed dom estic econom y which would gradually  necessitate farm ing 
relatively less fertile soils. His tenet was that rent can only exist if land is in
scarce s u p p ly ;  123 the amount of rent accruing to the landlord depends both
on the price of the produce and the quality of land. Ricardo therefore does
not treat rent as a "cost" affecting the price of the product. He states, "Com
is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because com  is
high." 124 He illustrates his point by discussing demand for com in relation
to land of three difrerent qualities. For example these three land qualities 1,
2, and 3 can yield "with an equal employment of capital and labour, a net
produce of 100, 90, and 80 quarters of c o m .  "125 Ricardo assumes that units 
of capital and labour will be applied to fulfill an equalisation of the common 
rate of profit by the tenant farmer. However, the differential output, due to 
the differential land quality, will be claimed by the landlord. 126
The differential land principle was then combined with the principle
of diminishing marginal return. W est explained, "Each additional quantity 
o f work bestowed on agriculture yields an actually dim inished marginal
r e t u r n .  "127 The "additional quantity of work" actually refers to a single
hom ogeneous quantity o f capital and labour" as applied to land in
successive increm ents. The theory of d ifferen tia l ren t rests on the
phenomenon o f diminishing returns: as the use o f an input is increased
while holding the quantities o f other inputs constant, the average and
m arginal y ield  o f the additional input must eventually fall. R icardo
considers the application o f unit-doses of capital-labour equivalent to £1000 
being employed in agriculture with varying land quality. He makes the 
point that before capital is applied to land of inferior quality it must not be
123 Ricardo,D. 1949. p34.
124 ibid.p38.
125 ibid. p35.
126 ibid. p36, ". . .rent is always the difrerence between the produce obtained by the 
employment of two equal quantities of capital and labour. If, with a capital of £1000 
a tenant obtains 100 quarters of wheat from his land, »nd by the employment of the 
second capital he obtain a further return of eighty-five, his landlord would have the 
power, at the expiration of his lease, of obliging h i m  to pay fifteen quarters or an 
equivalent value for additional rent; for there cannot be two rates of profit."
127 A lesser known economist, Anderson, first wrote about the marginal principle but 
it was only after 1815 when West and others produced pam|dilets that the discussion 
gained a widespread exposure.
52
able to be employed more productively on those lands which are already in 
cultivation. "It may perhaps be found that by doubling the original capital 
employed on No. 1, though the produce will not be doubled, will not be 
increased by 100 quarters, it may be increased by eighty-five quarters, and 
that this quality exceeds what could be obtained by employing the same 
capital on land N o . 3."128
The classical model is therefore developed combining capital and 
labour as one factor and discussing its increased application to society's 
fixed supply of land. However as land differs in its quality the return to 
investments of capital and labour will differ. The first "dose" of capital and 
labour applied to the most fertile piece of land is referred to as the 
"intensive" yield (or m argin). The investm ent on successively inferior 
pieces of soil is referred to as the "extensive" yield (or margin).
Mobility of capital and the process of com petition are assumed to 
ensure that the yield of the last unit of investment on each piece of land 
will be equalised. Farmers, therefore, will be willing to pay a higher rent to 
landlords whose land produces a higher yield up to the point where all units 
are providing the same net return. Stated otherwise, assume the cost to the 
investor of a unit o f capital (including normal profit) and labour is X. 
Investments will be made wherever the yield, Y, to each unit of investment 
applied is greater than X. However the law of diminishing marginal returns 
itself implies that the additional yield resulting from each additional "dose" 
will itself decline. The investor will stop applying "doses" of capital and 
labour a t the point where the additional incremental yield is equal to the 
cost X. The generated surplus will be divided between landowner, farm er 
and workers. The portion obtained by the landlord will be based bn 
differential quality o f land and hence the d ifferential (and dim inishing) 
return to incremental "doses" o f capital and labour.
Marx analyses the actual rent payment as a composite o f different 
kinds o f rent and maintains that thm’e will be several influencing factors. 
Any change in these factors will effect a change in rent levels. Marx 
identifies three kinds o f rent, differential rent I, differential rent II and 
absolute rent.
He reasserts the existence of absolute rent as preceding rent derived 
from differing land quality. This demand for rent as a precondition for land 
use has been interpreted as a monopoly rent. But for Marx all rent is in fact
128 Ricardo, 1949, p36.
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monopoly rent in the sense that without monopoly of land ownership there 
would be no rents.". . . differential rent presupposes the existence of a 
monopoly in land ownership, landed property as a limitation to capital, for
without it surplus profit would not be transformed into ground rent nor fall 
to the share of the landlord instead of the f a r m e r .  "129
My concern here therefore is to distinguish the nature of absolute 
rent from differential rent I and differential rent II in Marx's rent theory.
". . . differential rent has the peculiarity that landed property merely 
intercepts the surplus-profit which would otherwise flow into the pocket of 
the farmer. Landed property is not the cause which creates this portion of 
price, or the rise in the price upon which this portion is premised. Landed 
property is here merely the cause for transferrmg this portion of the price 
from one person to another, from the capitalist to the landlord."
Marx's differential rent I is essentially the same as M arshall's "true 
rent" and Ricardo's identification of rental source in so far as both describe 
the variability of land rents as determined by the quality and situation of
the farmland. The supposition is that if equal amounts of capital are applied
to equal plots o f land differing in quality than landowners will charge rent
according to the differential productive capacity of the land.
M arx illustrates his point by com paring the production o f a 
commodity using steam power produced by coal com pared to production 
using energy provided by harnessing the natural properties o f a waterfall. 
The average capital used across the industry generally using steam power 
technology is 100 and the average rate of profit is 15% giving the price of 
production o f 115. However the capital used up by the capitalist using the 
waterfall is only 90. So the owner of the waterfall can take 10 for rental use 
of the waterfall with the average profit of the capitalist still remaining at 
1 5 %.!30 Marx describes this phenomena as the ability of landowners to reap 
the beneflts o f surplus profits which are due to natural properties o f the 
soil. They are of a different order to the surplus profits accruing to the first 
users of technical innovations who achieve only temporary surplus profits 
for the limited period that it takes for the new technology to be adopted 
throughout the industry. Marx reaffirm s that although agricultural rent is 
taken from surplus profits such profits are not themselves the origin of 
rent, the origin is the existence of landed property;
129 Marx, K. Vol IE, p 751.
130 Marx, K. Vol lU, p 641.
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"The natural force is not the source of surplus profit, but only its 
natural basis because. this natural basis permits an exceptional increase in 
the productiveness of labour. . . This surplus profit would also exist if landed 
property did not exist. . . landed property does not create the portion of 
value which is transform ed into surplus profit, but merely enables the 
landowner. . . to coax this surplus profit out of the pocket of the
manufacturer and into his ow n."!3l
For Marx the precondition for this type of rent is merely the
inequality of different kinds of soil and not necessarily the movement 
towards worse and worse soil assumed by the classicists. The worst soil does 
not literally mean the least productive soil available; it means the land 
offering the minimum conditions for the crop to be produced while earning 
average profits. If the price of a product were to fall, the worst land could 
well be withdrawn from production or an alternative use sought for it. 
Hence the definition o f "worst land" will change according to changing
prices and profitability of production of various agricultural products.
2 .1 .(iv) Rent; incorporating differing levels û f inYASW W  and land
im p ro v e m e n ts .
Marshall's concept of full rent is made up of income deriving from 
the original properties of the soil as . well as from improvements. In his 
discussion o f land valuation (see 2.3.) he argues that the value of land 
reflects the human labour invested in it to bring it to its present productive
condition. His view of land value implies that the greater part o f land rent 
is probably due to improvements.
Marx's differential rent I I  addresses the issue of different rates of 
accum ulation on land, o f capital investm ent and technical innovation 
leading to an im proved productive capacity . M arx never separates 
differential rent I and differential rent I I  except for analytical purposes. I t  
would be a fruitless attem pt to try to quantify the components of rental 
com posite, "fertility, although an objective property o f the soil, always 
im plies an economic relation, a relation to the existing chem ical and 
mechanical level of d e v e lo p m e n t . " ! 32 But some appreciation of the effects 
of different applications o f capital on rent is possible.
!3l ibid, p 647 
!32 ibid, p.651.
The rent paid by a tenant farmer will be a composite based on land
fertility  and investments which have increased productive capacity. To 
distinguish between these two rent sources a hypothetical situation may be 
considered of unequal amounts of capital being invested in two farms of
equal land size and fertility. The greater investment on the one piece of
land leads to an increased yield and a new level of surplus profit is obtained.
The new higher level of farming profitability due to the different 
rate of accumulation on the farm employing increased amounts of capital 
permits the landlord to demand an increased rental payment. The capitalist
tenants of the two farms of equal fertility but differential productivity will
not pay the same rent. Thus while the capitalist tenant farm er is ever 
compelled to search for changes in the productive process which may lower 
the unit costs and give him/her temporary competitive edge, at the same
time he/she is also compelled to share a part of the surplus profits with the
la n d lo rd .
Surplus profits due to increased capital investment is therefore a 
temporary occurrence. Among those who are first to adopt cost saving 
technology above-average p rofits w ill only accrue until the new 
technology has become the generalised method of production.
W hen making this investm ent the farm er has to calculate that
additional investment on a given piece o f land will have a greater yield
than the spread of the same capital over additional land. Marx's point in 
discussing additional capital investm ent was also that the consideration 
here is not the calculation of the additional increment in output accruing to 
the last added unit of capital but rather the concept o f capital size and the 
fact the product of two units of capital can be greater than when they are 
invested separately. It leads Marx to consider capital growth and the 
manner in which the norms of "minimal capital" will change as capitalist
development takes place. For instance combine harvesting technology may 
reduce reaping costs to the extent that the farm er who is unable to
purchase this technology and relies on hand labour will no longer be able
to produce com petitively at the prevailing price. Technical improvements 
become consolidated in the norm.
But although this source of surplus profits only accrues to the tenant 
farm er during the period until a new general norm is established, the 
landlord may receive a permanent benefit. Marx argues that the whole of
this source o f surplus profit need not be eroded away but nay be
consolidated into a new level of rent. The greater productivity of capital on
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better lands permanently increases the level of surplus profits above those 
produced at a lower level of capital accumulation. New norms develop of
m inim um  capital investm ent and farm  size. The gains from  the
accumulation process are long term and are capitalised into rents and the 
land price. The clearest example of this is provided by improvements on the 
lan d .
" . . .  The landowner. . . adds the interest for capital incorporated into 
the land to the ground rent itself. And he does this whether he now leases 
the land to the capitalist farmer who made these improvements or to some
other farmer. His rent is thus inflated; and should he wish to sell his land, . . 
. its value is now higher, he sells not merely the land but the improved land, 
the capital incorporated into the land for which he paid nothing. Quite aside 
from the movements of ground rent itself, here lies one of the secrets of the 
increasing enrichm ent of landowners, the continuous inflation o f their 
rents, and the constantly growing money value of their estates along with
progress in economic development. Thus they pocket a product of their 
social development created without their help. . . this at the same time
creates one o f the g reatest obstacles to a rational developm ent of 
agriculture, for the tenant farmer avoids all improvements and outlays for 
which he cannot expect complete returns during the term of his l e a s e . " ! 33
In Marx's view, therefore, land improvements will be capitalised into
the land price,
"Capital may be fixed in the land, incorporated in it either in a 
transito ry  m anner, as through im provem ents o f a chem ical nature, 
fertilisation, etc. or more perm anently, as in drainage canals, irrigation
works, leveling, farm buildings, etc. Elsewhere I have called the capital
thus applied to land la terre capital. It belongs to the category of fixed
cap ital. The in terest on cap ita l incorporated  in the land and the 
improvements thus made in it as an instrument of production can constitute
a part of the rent paid by the capitalist farmer to the landowner but does not 
constitute the actual ground rent, which is paid for the use of land as such."
M ore generally , the process o f accum ulation , associa ted  with 
increasing levels os minimum capital required to be a capitalist farmer,
gives rise to the systematic and continuing differences in the levels of
capital on each farm and forms the basis for differential rent II -as if the
capitalisation  of the value o f im provem ents on the land (and hence
increases in rent) arise from accumulation in the production process and
not just in the general quality of the land.
!33  ib id , p  620
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Marx points out than the landowners gains from investments made 
by the capitalist tenant farmer are a source of tension. The value of the land 
is increased due to the im provements for which the landowner paid 
nothing and a higher rental is now obtainable. This situation has led to
legislation in some countries which protects the tenant farmer providing a 
minimum period of tenancy to gain from investments, and the payment of
com pensation where investm ents have been made which will benefit the 
landowner after the current tenant has vacated the farm.
A rather different extension of this argum ent, that changes in 
profitability  influence rent and are capitalised into the land price, is
pursued by de Janvry in the introduction of the concept of "institutional
rent". He notes that as capitalism develops, the struggle between sections of
capital affects farming profitability as the terms of trade for agricultural
products decline in comparison to goods produced in the industrial sector.
De Janvry contends that the decline of the agricultural sector adversely 
affects the landlord class as rent levels hinge on the m aintenance of
surplus profits. The demise o f the landlord class, however, may not be
prudent especially where (as in many Latin Am erican countries) the 
industrial and landlord class depend on their combined power to maintain 
their domination over workers. In many countries De Janvry notes that 
import controls, investment subsidies, price supports are common features
and in so far as their effect is to raise the level of surplus profits in
agriculture they may be regarded as "institutional rent" and will "translate
into high land p r i c e s . " ! 34
24. (vi) Rgpt: m  imp.£ditngnt to .-foe_açgwpittM oft pypçgss
R icardo specifica lly  used his ren ta l analysis to d iscuss the 
consequences o f increases in demand for food on grain prices and 
subsequently the rent of land. Ricardo argued that the increasing use of 
land o f inferior soil required to he brought into production in order to 
provide for greater food demand in the developing economy resulted in 
more expensive food. "When land o f an inferior quality is taken into
cultivation, the exchangeable value o f raw produce will rise, because more 
labour is required to produce i t " ! 35
His concern was that in a country developing manufacturing such 
as Britain at the time he was writing, population increases and subsequent
134 De Janvry, A. 1981, p. 173
135 Ricardo, D. 1949, p37.
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increases in demand for food would lead to increased food prices and higher 
land rents if the economy rem ained closed. R icardo disapproved of 
landlord 's benefitting  from the increased rents arguing that rental
increases were of no benefit to society as a whole. He illustrated his point by
again referring to the increase in price of com  through use of inferior 
land with subsequent rental increases. If the price of corn were to increase
from £4 to £5 a quarter then a million quarters will now cost £5 million 
rather than £4 million. However, while this may be a creation of nominal 
value it is "not a creation of wealth; it adds nothing to the resources of a
country; it does not enable it to maintain fleets and armies" Rent must be
considered as "a value purely nominal, and as forming no addition to the
national wealth, but merely as a transfer of value, advantageous only to
landlords and proportionately injurious to the c o n s u m e r " ! 36
Ricardo explored the effects of taxes on rents and taxes on land as an 
exploration o f tools which might be used to transfer some of the rental 
surplus to the government. But he principally used his theoretical work on 
differential rent to argue the case that a country could optimise its wealth
through importing cheap corn financed through m anufactured e x p o r t s . !  37
This conceptualisation of land, and o f rent as a variable share of 
surplus is an essential ingredient o f the classical approach to distribution
theory which divided society into landlords, workers and capitalists. The 
R icardian model o f a developing economy viewed the interests o f the
landlords as opposed to those o f workers and capitalists. M anufacturing 
en trep ren eu rs  and the c la ss ica l econom ists genera lly  based  th e ir 
antagonism  tow ards landlords on their p ro jec tion  o f an expanding 
population with an increased demand for food. The need to increase food 
production output would increase pressure on demand for land and require
the cu ltivation  o f inferior quality soils (referred  to as the inferior 
extensive margin). The increased demand for land would place landlords in 
a more powerful position than previously; they would benefit from higher 
rents. Landlords would thus receive an ever-increasing proportion o f the
surplus value of production leaving workers and capitalists to compete over 
a diminishing share. From the point o f view of the capitalist who has to pay 
workers a minimum socially determined subsistence wage a real fall in the
surplus would be felt by themselves. This reduction, they argued, was
detrimental not only to themselves but to society as a whole because even if
!36 ibid, p273.
!37 ibid, p3. "Advertisement to the Third Edition." and p.288-289 replying to 
"Malthus on Rent" Ricardo was himself an "extensive landed jnx>]nietor in 
Gloucester and a Member of Parliament."
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they reduced their personal consumption levels they could expect a net fall 
in the available investable surplus which would slow down the overall 
growth of the economy.
The R icardian m odels of ground rents and the principle of
diminishing returns to the extensive margin provided the theoretical basis 
for predicting ground rent increase in a developing society and further 
identified rents as a detrimental cost to society. Ricardian rent theory also
provides an explicit theoretical exposition of how rents on differing pieces
of land will be determined and the principles are noted as the first major 
exposition of the "marginal principle" in economic theory. West, Torrens, 
Malthus and Ricardo all produced pamphlets in 1815 which independently 
posited the theory o f d ifferen tia l rent. Their theory perm itted  an 
interpretation of em pirical data on temporary high grain prices and high 
land prices during the period of the Napoleonic w a r s . ! 38 Increased domestic 
food production was essential because war time conditions reduced trading
possibilities. The increase in domestic grain prices altered the profitability 
o f agricu ltura l production and it becam e possib le to produce grain 
profitably even on less fertile lands which were brought into use.
Classical economists considered they had identified the principles for 
the determination o f the distributive share of the surplus when accrued to 
landlords. The rent (the residual) is treated as a differential surplus and
hence determined.by the price of the crop. "Rent, it is to be observed, 
therefore, enters into the composition of the price o f commodities in a 
different way than wages and profit. High or low wages and profit are the 
cause of high or low price; hig^i or low rent is the effect of it."!39
The issue of alternative uses of land was not dealt with by Ricardians. 
There is no discussion of the concept of transfer rents, (as developed by the 
later neoclassical econom ists), since all rent is perceived as agricultural 
rent', Adam Smith had earlier noted that when the price of a certain
agricultural product falls, the profitability conditions o f using land for that
product change and landlords might consider alternative uses of land
which might improve the rent potential and hence demand a change in 
rent which would oblige the tenant to change his p r o d u c t . ! 40 The major 
focus of rental discussion was on the effects of using land at the "extensive" 
margin of less fertile land rather than identifying possible differences in
!38 Blaug, 1978. p.77 
!39 Smith,A. 1917, pl32 
140 ibid, ppl41-146
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rents depending on the type of activity (other crops, pastures) carried out 
on land of the same quality. Von Thunen introduced the consideration of 
location as well as quality as influencing the demand and therefore the rent 
level of a particular piece of l a n d .! 41
For the classical economists therefore land rent derived from its
scarce supply and from differences in quality (location can be considered 
as a quality factor). An increase in demand for land pushed up its price but 
w ithout using up any greater quantity o f society 's resources in the
productive process. The classical econom ists' conclusion that rent is 
determined by price and is not a payment for using up resources (as in the 
case of paym ent for a factor of production which is consumed and 
transformed in the productive process) leads to a view of agricultural rents
as a parasitic phenomena which is detrim ental to the development of 
cap ita lism .
The Ricardian identification of ground rent (as a return to a non- 
reproducible natural agent and an increasing proportion o f the surplus) 
impeding the accumulation process was used to support ideas on taxation 
and land nationalisation without however disturbing the actual status quo 
of daily control over land. James Mill concluded that all future increments 
in rent should be soaked up by tax, and this could be done without 
disturbing the status quo. John Stuart Mill proposed that there should be a 
tax on "the future . increment of unearned rent" by taxing the capital gains 
o f increases in the price of land. Both suggestions leave intact the current 
level of income earned by landlords from ground rent and only call into 
question those future increm ents which were seen as inevitable. Henry
George favoured turning land into "Common P r o p e r t y " !42 but did hot 
favour radical dispossession and redistribution but rather, "I propose to
accomplish the same thing in a simpler, easier, and quieter way, than that 
o f formally confiscating all the land and formally letting it out to the
highest bidders" George's proposal involves a tax on all pure ground rent
(exem pting returns on im provem ents) and opposed any suggestions that
!41 Clark. C, 1973, Chapter 1, reviews the work of Von Thunen in some detail (Von 
Thunen, The Isolated State' translated and edited by Peter Hall, Pergammon Press) 
!42 George. H, 1930, p234. Book VI, Ch 2, "The True Remedy","There is but one way to 
remove an evil-and that is, to remove its cause. Poverty deepens as wealth increases, 
and wages me forced down while productive power grows, because land, which is the 
source of all wealth and the field of all labour, is monopolised. To extirpate poverty,
to make wages what justice commands they should be, the full earnings of the
labourer, we must therefore substitute for the individual ownership of the land a
common ownership. Nothing else will go to the cause of the evil -in nothing else is
there the slightest hope. . . We must make land common property"
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landlords should be compensated for loss of future rents due to t a x a t i o n  ! 43 
"Let the individuals who now hold it (land) still retain, if they want to, 
possession of what they are pleased to call their land. . . Let them buy, sell, 
and bequeath and devise it. We may safely leave them the shell if we take
the kernel. It is not necessary to confiscate land: it is only necessary' to
confiscate ren t.”^^^
Marshall's view on land value and his exposition on rent and "quasi­
rent" is that the greater part of land rent is probably due to improvements. 
Land improvements mean that land acquires a likeness to any other capital
asset em ployed in the productive process; in term s of neoclassical 
theorisation its marginal product will be almost exclusively the result of 
human labour and investments resulting in land improvements rather than 
due to any inherent qualities.
When discussing land value M arshall goes further to include not 
only the orig inal properties o f the land and the subsequent d irect
improvements but also the "highways and other improvements that were 
made for the general purposes of the country and are not a special charge
on its agriculture" but from which individual landowners gain benefits 
which are reflected in land price and hence rental levies. Marshall accepts 
that human working of the land has transformed it from its virgin state and 
that land mostly earns a "quasi-rent". But for him there rem ains the 
elem ent u f "true rent" intrinsic to the nature o f land in itself.!45 Jq bis
discussion on public policy M arshall discusses taxation on land rentals 
which increase without any investment on the part o f the landlord. This 
occurs mainly due to locational circum stances as a town grows or as 
transport systems are expanded.
However, in spite of M arshall's exposition o f quasi-rents' which is 
fully accepted as the cornerstone o f neoclassical marginal productivity 
theory, he continues to invoke the character o f land as a fixed resource,
(whether virgin or improved) as the reason why it should not be treated in 
the same way as any other productive asset which is the private property of 
the capitalist. W hile "land is but one form of capital to the individual
!43 ibid. p287 George was responding to a proposal by Herbert Spencer (which he 
quotes) in which "separate ownership would merge into the joint-stock ownership of 
the public. . tenancy the only land tenure. . . all men would be alike free to become 
tenants. . .Clearly, therefore, on such a system, the earth might be enclosed, 
occiq>ied and cultivated, in entire subordination to the law of equal freedom."
!44 ibid, p288.
!45 Marshall, A. 1988, p358.
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p r o d u c e r , M a r s h a l l  states, "the fixedness of the whole stock of land in
an old country" implies that "from the social point of view, land is not 
exactly on the same footing as those implements of production which a man
can increase without limits" M arshall ultim ately treats land rent as a
payment made which cannot influence supply.
W ithin his discussion of state intervention and taxation M arshall
dem onstrates an attitude to taxation of rent and long term intervention
w hich is more far-reach ing  than that considered by the c lassical
economists, " . . .a far-seeing statesman will feel a far greater responsibility
to future generations when legislating as to land than as to other forms of 
wealth; and that, from the economic and from the ethical point of view, land
must everywhere and always be classed as a thing by itself. If from the fîrst
the State had retained true rents in its own hands, the vigour of industry 
and accumulation need not have been impaired. . .Nothing at all like this 
can be said of the incomes derived from property made by man."l^^
For Marshall this reasoning justifies state intervention. He appears to 
regret that the state had not intervened earlier. His approach seemed to
have inform ed the basis of Zambia's land "nationalisation" on achieving
independence. In Zambia land improvements are saleable and can command
rents but not land in its natural unimproved condition.
M arshall however does not take hiis logic to a point which would
provide a basis for taxing away rents and hence disturbing the current 
status quo of class relations in society, "But the very greatness of the public
interests concerned makes its specially necessary to bear in mind, when 
discussing the equities o f the public value o f land, that a sudden 
appropriation by the State of any incomes from property, the private
ownership of which had once been recognised by it, would destroy security 
and shake the foundations of society. Sudden and extreme measures would 
be inequitable; and partly, but not solely for that reason, they would be un­
business-like and even foolish. . . Caution is necessary."
Marx moved beyond the classical economists' view o f rent as a
parasitice receipt of surplus, and saw it acting as a barrier to accumulation.
His analysis of why this should be so is multifaceted. Firstly, Marx identifies
146 ibid p357
147 ibid, p661. Appendix G, "The incidence of local rates with some suggestions as to 
policy.
148 ibid, p661, Appendix G.
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absolute rent as a barrier to entry of investment in a g r ic u l tu r e .  149 jn  the 
case of absolute rent, "Landed property has itself created the rent. . . if the
worst soil cannot be cultivated although its cultivation would yield the price
of production until it produced something in excess of the price of 
production, then landed property is the creative cause of this rise in 
p r ic e ."  ISO
He considers the situation of the "worst soil" type on which it would 
be possible for a capitalist tenant farmer to achieve an average profit on
his investment if no rent payment were made. However, as Marx points out,
this "is by no means a basis for the landlord to lend his land gratis to the
farmer and to become so philanthropic as to grant credit gratuit for the
sake o f a business f r i e n d s h i p " .IS 1 Therefore, before any land is brought 
into production a rental payment must be obtainable and this requires the
establishm ent of a surplus p rofit which can be appropriated by the 
landow ner d istinct from  a d iffe ren tia l ren t w hich arises from the
difference in fertility of various categories of soil. The need to pay absolute 
rent will force market prices above the price of production: all lands will
pay the level of absolute rent in addition to di^erential rent. Marx advanced 
the idea o f lower organic com position of capital in agriculture as a 
determ inant of the limits o f absolute rent. This idea has led to some
c o n t r o v e r s y .  ^S2 in the discussion on the determination of the limits of
absolute rent does not challenge the principle o f the actual existence of
absolute rent.
A further effect of the accrual of rent to landowners is that the 
market value of the agricultural goods produced will not be determined by 
the weighted average price o f production as in other industries. Due to
ren ta l paym ents the total m arket value o f production, due to rental
payments, w ill be above the total price o f production. For instance, in
Marx's example if the price of a quarter is 60 shillings and the average
required by the capitalist tenant farm er is 20% then capitalist
149 Fiae, B., personal communication, pointed out that absolute rent as a payment for 
the use of new land also appliw to situations where land has a "new use" " New use" 
may seem a strange description but it is apt because absolute rent can be identified 
as occurring not only when previous unused land is brought into. production but also 
when productive use changes; For example land rents in the Natal region of South 
Africa increased dramatically in 1986 with no change in either land quality or 
capital investment. The reason for increased prices lay in a change in the use of the 
l«ld, Ltmd, previously used for sugar cane production, was now being planted with 
timber.
150 MarxJC. 1962 ’Capital Volume IE" p 755.
151 ibid, p 750
152 Ball. M, and Fine, B. debated these points in a series of articles published in 
Economy and Society between 1979 and 1980.
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farmers will be prepared to use up to 50 shillings o f capital on that soil 
which will secure the quarter; the price of production is 50 + 10 = 60
shillings. On all other land which has a better fertility  the price of 
production per quarter will be less. Yet the production of the quarter on 
less fertile soil is the determinant of rent levels and total market value: the 
surplus profits due to better productivity on more fertile soils will be 
appropriated as rent and hence the total market value of production will be 
more than the actual total labour time of production. This means that 
although the rate of profit tends to be equalised among producers through 
the appropriation of rent, the amount of value produced is not in keeping 
with the embodied labour t i m e . ^53 Marx concludes that payment of rent 
creates "a false social value" and that society overpays for agricultural 
products in its capacity as consumer to the advantage of the landlord.
The earlier argument that land would be employed in production 
where the capital used plus the average profit were to equal the market 
price of production thus needs revision. "A small rise in the price of 
production is needed . . .  to bring the new land of the poorest quality onto
the m arket. "^54
Marx points out that while this additional absolute rent forces a rise 
in market price above the price of production this does not necessarily alter 
the market exchange value of production as this is determined through the 
in tersectoral profit equalisation process. D ifferential rent, how ever, can 
exist even when the agricultural produce is sold at the price o f production 
because  d iffe ren tia l ren ts have the ir o rig in  in perm anent surp lus
p ro f i t .  155
W ithin his exposition of differential rent, Marx notes that market 
price will determine which land is regarded as the worst land for the 
production o f a certain agricultural commodity. The situation o f this worst 
land provides the pegging level o f the surplus profits attainable on more 
productive soils as the average price of production will be below the market 
p r ic e .
In term s o f investments Marx states that farm ers w ill invest in 
agriculture in so far as they receive the normal return for their capital and 
that the d ifferen t conditions o f land w ill determ ine the pattern  of
153 BaU, 1980, p.308.
154 ibid, p 757
155 Ball, 1980 p.305
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accumulation taking place, "The better soil is selected because it affords the 
best promise that capital invested in it will be profitable, since it contains
the most natural elements of fertility which need to be u ti l i s e d ."  156 Farmers 
will invest to the point that they receive average returns on their capital. 
However the need to pay rent impedes this point being reached and lowers 
the level of investment which might otherwise have taken place.
For Ball the theory of differential rent is relevant to the discussion of 
accumulation patterns in agriculture in a distinct manner. He points out
that accum ulation on the better lands is determ ined by the level of 
p ro fita b ility  asso c ia ted  w ith the cu rren t m arket p rice . H ow ever
accumulation on the "worst land" will directly lead to an adjustment o f the 
market price itself and hence the profitability of production on all other
l a n d s . ^57
This observation is highly relevant in situations in which price 
fixing takes place independently of market supply of produce. If price 
fixing is determined according to least favourable conditions, farmers with 
low productivity will be shielded from the coercive pressure to accumulate
in order to produce more efficiently and lower their costs of production. In
a com petitive market situation, however, producers on better lands who 
continue investing to lower their costs may in the end undercut the market 
price. Hence the econom ic viability , the continued existence, of less 
productive farm ers, w ill be threatened unless prices are fixed at a 
sufficiently high level to make up for their relative economic inefficiency; 
in this case additional rents accrue to the efficient producers)
A conclusion from Marx's rent theory is that while the entire landed
property system is an essential prerequisite  for the establishm ent of
capitalist agriculture it can become a fetter on society as a whole and 
specifically on the further development of agriculture. For society as a 
whole the payment of rent raises the market price o f agricultural goods. For 
tenant farmers, the payment of rent creates an initial barrier to investment 
and, during the process of capitalist development o f agriculture, they will
be deprived  o f the surplus p ro fit gained from  innovative capital 
investments. The continued existence of rent, the inability of capital to
erode perm anent surplus p rofit d ifferentials, is due to the specific
ownership and condition of land in the production process. Furtherm ore,
land rent stems from surplus and not from normal profits: if landowners
156 Marx, K. Vol 3, p 680
157 Ball, M.1980, p.313
66
demand rental payments which forced down the capitalist tenant farmers' 
profits below the normal return on capital invested elsewhere, the tenant 
would (capital mobility and opportunity perm itting) move his/her capital 
e lse w h e re .
But rent is far from being a more technical microeconomic category, 
as in the receipt to owners' of the marginal productivity value of land as 
presented by the neoclassical school of t h o u g h t .  158 Rent, from the Marxist 
point of view, is the specific result of historical appropriation of land and 
the ensuing capitalist social relations of production. The issue of rent is 
fu rther understood  to be m ore than a d is tribu tive  question; the 
appropriation of rent affects investment and therefore the process of
capitalist accumulation. The M arxist study of rent leads to the conclusion 
that one cannot think of "land" inseparably from "landed property" and
that land, having ownership, is a social relation of production as opposed to
the "factor of production" rental reward approach used by the neoclassical 
eco n o m ists .
Placing rent within the political context o f relations of productions
emphasises that rent levels are not a technical product of differential and 
absolute rent but the result o f class struggle over surplus value. The
identification of differential rents I and II and absolute rent locates the 
source of surplus profits from which rent, as an appropriation of surplus
value, is made. But the struggle between capital and labour or between
capitalists and landlords will also affect the level of payment made for 
lease h o ld .
'
In conclusion, in Ricardo's analysis, rent was an appropriation of 
surplus which affected  the d istribution pattern  betw een entrepreneurs, 
workers and landlords. An increase in food prices due to population
increase and hence the need to bring into production inferior quality soils
led to an increase in the portion of value appropriated by landlords to the 
detrim ent of the rest o f  the econom y. R icardo presented an alternative,
which included food imports exchanged for exports of manufactured goods, 
and allowed for an overall increase in the production of wealth. Land 
nationalisation is therefore advantageous to society if consumers gained
from paying lower prices for agricultural produce.
^58 Massey, D. and Catalano, A. 1978, p.221
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Marshall did not theorise the effect of appropriation of rent on the 
character of economic d e v e l o p m e n t .  ^59 jjjjj concern was more informed by 
welfare considerations than the size of the landlord's distributive share due 
to the monopoly ownership of land. For Marshall the private ownership of 
land, as a life-supporting natural resource in lim ited supply, required 
governmental readiness to intervene in private rights in the interest of 
public welfare. But land nationalisation, extending the Marshallian logic in 
which the state becomes caretaker, may abolish rents but it in no way 
challenges capitalist production relations in agriculture which determ ine 
who receives wages and who reaps profits.
For Marx the very existence of absolute rent creates a barrier for entry
o f en trepreneurs into farm ing activ ities. Rent a lters their p rofitab ility  
conditions as they must achieve an average rate of profit on their agricultural 
activity after paying rent. In M arx's analysis the portion of rent payment 
representing absolute rent must be taken from the producer surplus. This 
apportionm ent of surplus dim inishes the general level of entrepreneurs' 
investab le  surplus thus affec tin g  the developm ental capacity  o f the 
agricultural sector relative to other sectors o f the economy. The appropriation
of rent is also detrim ental to consumers as it causes the market value of
production to be higher than it would otherwise be. But since for Marx land 
rents are the economic expression of social relations o f production under 
capitalism  land nationalisation has limited effects. N ationalisation of landed 
property is meaningless in the absence of a scheme whereby the state changes
the conditions of access to land and relations o f production in agriculture. 
Abolition of landed property is therefore an essential but insufficient step in 
any transition which aims to transform the relations of production.
2.1. (vi)Rent: The Neoclassical treatment of land as a factor of production
Neoclassical treatments of rent continue to depend on the marginal 
principle. Ricardo's importance in terms of his theorisation of the nature of 
differential rent is acknowledged as a foundation stone for later marginal 
theory. But the neoclassical econom ists re jec t all theories including 
Ricardo's which claim that agricultural rent is an undue appropriation of 
part of the economic surplus.
159 Atkins, F. 1986, analyses the neoclassicists failure to "differentiate land from 
other forms of capital" as contributing to inconsistencies towards land reform 
pohcy in the post second World War period. Her own analysis suggests that"a 
unique concept of land can be developed by analysing rent and ownership as part of 
'a system of landed property."
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The ambivalence of the early neoclassical economists with regard to
land (i.e. they acknowledged rent as a distasteful appropriation and yet
could not support nationalisation) was not followed by later neoclassical 
economists and no further theorisation on land as an "exceptional" factor of
production has been produced. It is treated in the same way as other factors 
which are non-renew able and non-reproducible (m inerals, oil, etc) in
diminishing supply. Land is simply another factor, but in fixed supply,
which is not expendable. Current neoclassical theory implicitly rejects the 
classical (and Marxist) analysis of land as distinct from other factors of 
production, and therefore rejects the theorisation of agricultural rent as an
appropriation of part of the surplus. Thus the classical discussion o f the
share o f rem aining surplus between w orkers and capitalists and the
proportionately declining accum ulation fund is entirely absent. Rent is
treated as a scarcity payment for the use of any factor of production, clearly 
identifiable in the case of tenant farming as the payment made to the
landlord. M ore generally, this reflects a shift in the focus of economic 
theory away from the potential for, and obstacles to, growth and towards the
static (in)efficiencies of resource allocation. This is all the more plausible
with the declin ing im portance o f ag ricu ltu re  and the problem  of 
substituting "scarce" capital for "scarce" labour.
W hile the early neoclassical scholars considered land to be an 
exceptional resource the view o f later Neoclassical theorists has held; the
price o f any factor of production, and these include land, may have a rental
com ponent. The W alrasian approach was to consider an economy in 
equilibrium . There is a certain  endow m ent o f resources, preference 
patterns and technical coefficien ts o f production. Each factor has a
generalised marginal productivity which determines its rent and hence its
price. "Land is truly capital since its brings forth a harvest year after year 
and it is the succession of these services which constitute income or 
renL"160 W icksell later wrote, "no special theory of rent is necessary,
every acre of land may be treated in the same way as a labourer: the owner 
o f land under a system of private ownership must be rewarded for its
contribution to production.
Neoclassical theorists co-opted Ricardo's concept of differential rent 
at the intensive margin but used it as the basis for quite a d i^erent theory 
o f distribution. They extended to land the logic o f Ricardo's marginal theory
as applicable to all factors o f production. The entrepreneur would employ
160 Walras, 1954,
161 Wicksell, 1934 pl32.
69
the factor of production to the point where the marginal product brings the 
same return (marginal revenue) as its price. The total surplus earned by
the factor of production on intra-marginal units is referred to by Ricardo as 
"producer surplus" but neoclassical econom ists later used the term 
"economic rent"..
M arshall's exposition of rent theory in his work on short term
com petitive equilibrium differs from the later mainstream t e r m i n o l o g y . '62 
Marshall strictly reserves the term "rent" as purely derived from the use of 
natural properties of a factor such as land although the principle of a 
"rental" reward was seen as applicable to all "agents of production" not just
land. The term "quasi-rent" was applied to make a clear distinction from the 
concept of pure rent as earned by land as a "gift of nature".
M arshall, in terested  in the analysis o f short term com petitive 
equilibrium, said that "quasi-rent" earned by the marginal unit of a factor 
of production could on occasion be greater than its marginal product. For 
example, Marshall applied the logic of Ricardo's land rent theory to the 
short term situation in which any input with an inelastic supply could 
command a rental payment for its use. If, in the short term, the demand for
a specific input increases, greater competition for the same supply will lead
to an increase in market price. In terms of use o f resources there is no
increase in quantity, therefore the price rise is viewed as part of the 
"quasi-rent”. M arshall regarded this rental com ponent as a short term
phenomena; the additional surplus due to demand induced price increase 
would accrue to the producers. Longer term economic adjustm ent would 
ensure an increased supply o f the limiting factor, or an increased rental 
payment to the landlord eliminating this component of "quasi-rents". Thus, 
in the short-run, capital is like land (quasi-land), for being fixed in supply.
N eoclassical econom ists further used the m arginal principle in a
more general elaboration o f a theory of resource allocation. Competitive 
dem and for resources, the general applicability  o f the princip le  o f
dim inishing returns and eventually  declin ing m arginal product, would 
determine the allocation of resources between different enterprises. Within
a prevailing distribution o f ow nership of resources, m arket com petition 
ensures the ir optim al a lloca tion  through cap ita lis t p ro fitab ility  (and
consumer utility maximisation). This optimum status quo is not achieved if
monopoly ownership, capital immobility Or State intervention impedes the 
operation o f a freely competitive process. levons and Walras asserted that
162 Marshall, 1988,p358
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the market competition process not only maximises capitalist profit but also 
society's satisfaction as the process ensured the best possible response to 
consumer demands. Later observations about income inequalities not only
provided a critique of this assertion but also paved the way for welfare 
economists' arguments for reforms within capitalism.
2.2 Methods of Agricultural Land Valuation.
In spite o f extensive criticism  o f the neoclassical theory of 
distribution, (i.e. the distribution of economic rent where rew ards are 
determined at the margin) it still stands as the base reference point in 
capitalist economies. Economists in capitalist countries generally use land 
valuation methods deriving from the theoretical rationale of neoclassical
theory. In a free functioning market operating without coercion on buyer 
of seller it is expected that what each party is willing to pay and receive will 
be decisively influenced by the marginal product o f the land. Hence "Open 
m arket value" has been described as the "most common basis" for an 
"im personal objective m e a s u r e " '63
If  land redistribution is to take place on the basis that outgoing
landowners will be compensated then the method of land valuation adopted 
has im portant budgetary im plications. If governm ent is to buy land for
redistribution this will create a "sellers market" and land prices may rise 
substantially in comparison to the recent past. This is one reason why some 
analysts argue against accepting the "open market value" approach. Others 
consider that land valuation should be done on a methodical assessm ent 
basis; whereby productivity valuation should provide both the basis for
both compensation and future land transactions as discussed in Chapter 1. It 
is therefore pertinent to consider different methods of rental assessm ent 
according to the neoclassical principle that the price of rent is the 
capitalised price of land.
Ricardian economic theory on agricultural land rent does not itself 
provide a method for predicting rent. This is because land is not treated as a
factor o f production: it is treated as a portion of the surplus acquired by
landlords. The demand for land has a major impact on land prices and
consequently on rent. A higher demand for land leads to a higher land 
price and enables the landlord to demand a higher rental. However the 
level o f ren t is not seen as determ ining the m arket price for land 
transactions. Rent is viewed as passively determ ined rather than as a
'63 Turner, D. (1977) p3.
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determinant. It is determined as a residual, i.e. the surplus remaining after 
inputs, wages and farmer's income have been paid.
Neoclassical economic theory views the quantum of agricultural rent 
as a price determined by supply and demand. Land is no longer treated as a 
fixture in the production process whose residual rent will rise and fall 
according to the demand for land. Land is one among other factors of
production an^ will command a rental rew ard, an "economic rent", 
according to its productivity contribution and the demand for its products.
N eoclassical theory thus sweeps away the notion of land rent as an
apportionm ent o f surplus and devises methods o f calcu la ting  land's
productive contribution relative to the ultim ate utility it can provide in 
co n su m p tio n .
M arshall discusses land valuation in relation to public policy on 
taxation. He also expects land rents and hence land value to be determined
not only by the original properties o f the land and the subsequent direct 
improvements but also by the "highways and other improvements that were 
made for the general purposes o f the country and are not a special charge
on its agriculture". Furtherm ore, if indeed the value of all direct and 
indirect improvements were added together, the sum total would be greater
than the actual selling price of land. On the basis o f this reasoning it may 
be said that the value of land is the result o f human labour. The logical 
conclusion is therefore that land can be treated as just another capital asset.
M arshall challenges this approach. He accepts that a great deal of
work is done to the land to prepare it for productive activity even in the 
early stages of simple farm mechanisation; trees are felled, stones dug out 
and removed, drainage ditches sunk. Walls, terracing, windbreaks may all 
be necessary to prevent erosion and preserve the land. H owever for 
M arshall the guiding princip le  governing land valuation is that the
present value of land "should not exceed the expense, in so far as it can be
properly charged to agricultural account, o f bringing the land from  its 
original condition to one in which it would be as fertile and generally 
useful for agricultural purposes as it now is. " '64  Not every expense 
incurred should be counted as M arshall argues, "some o f these expenses 
were incurred to suit agricultural methods no longer used and some of the
past expenditure may even have reduced the potential o f the land. 
Furtherm ore the accounting o f outlay should rightly include the interest
'64 Marshall, A. 1988. p.527
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which could have been earned by the capital but should therefore deduct 
the value of extra produce which is attributable to the im p r o v e m e n t ." '65
For example when Zambia became independent, the state regarded land 
rents in the sense of "pure rent" gained from "the natural properties of the 
soil" as an immoral income source. State legislation, consequently, forbids the 
buying and selling of land (which is held in guardianship by the state) and
allows only for land improvements to be valued as the basis for market
transactions. Thus when commercial farm land is changing hands, a valuation 
firm assesses the current net value of all farmland improvements including 
the tree clearing, ditches and so on. In Zambian practice this method of
valuation o f all past expenditure on land improvements has resulted in very 
high assessments. The sum total arrived at through this method may well be
greater than the price arrived at via market exchange.
Marshall also notes that, in fact, the value of land is often far greater 
than the expenses incurred. This is especially so in areas o f higher 
population density where the demand for land affects the price irrespective 
of the land value estimated on the basis of any improvements or inherent 
qualities of the soil. This is due to an increased demand for agricultural 
land. M arshall suggests that it is appropriate to tax the additional rent
accruing to landlords due to locational factors.
N evertheless in M arshall's  general assessm ent o f  land value, 
stemming from his exposition on rent and "quasi-rent", the greater part of
land rent is due to improvements. Land therefore becomes similar to any 
other capital asset em ployed in the productive process. In term s o f 
neoclassical theory its m arginal product will be alm ost exclusively the
result o f resources invested in land improvements rather than due to any 
inheren t qualities.
Neoclassical theory on land rent treats it as a price for a factor of 
production. It will therefore eommand its own rental reward, an "economic 
rent" according to its productivity contribution and market competition for
access to land.
In the next section I review  four d ifferen t techniques for 
calculating "rental reward" all deriving from the neoclassical approach: (i) 
production functions, (ii) econom ic residual, (iii)productiv ity  value and 
(iv) financial rental rates o f return  assessm ent. Each m ethod claim s
'65 Ibid
R icardian theoretical roots but uses the "return to factor" approach 
subsequently developed by neoclassical theory wherein rent should depend
on the marginal product of land (which differs from its average product). 
In the agricu ltu ra l sector it is generally  expected that there are 
diminishing returns to use of inputs and therefore the marginal costs will 
be more than the average cost. The excess between marginal and average
costs is the rent accruing to the owner of the factor. The first three methods
try to calculate the value of the marginal physical product of the land and
compare this to actual rents The rate of return method is critical of the
productivity valuation approach and though it does not reject its basic 
principle it argues for additional economic elements to be considered in
rental assessm ents.
The definition o f "rent" as marginal productivity includes more than
the sum of money paid by the tenant farmer to a landowner. "Rent" is taken
to mean the money value received which is above that which has been
necessary to secure the supply of the required factors o f production. In the
case o f ag ricu ltu ra l land the production  costs and the fa rm er's
remuneration are deducted from gross value; land taxes are not included in 
costs as they are part of the economic rent.
2a2 .üLJEmdtfçtion ftinctions. as _a method of gakuiatipg. .matgipal. ptodggt.
P roduction  functions app lied  to ag ricu ltu re  iden tify , through
mathematical expression, the expected product from varying inputs of land, 
labour, and other factors. In analytical work on agricultural production
functions the Cobb-Douglas function, which is linearly hom ogeneous, is 
widely used.
Various studies have analysed agricultural production applying the 
Cobb-Douglas production f u n c t i o n . '66 The coefficients attributed to various 
facto rs in d iffering  ag ricu ltu ra l system s are com pared. The labour
coefficien t is generally highest in the sim plest form s o f agricu ltural 
production as practiced by peasants using hand tools in underdeveloped 
countries. The use of mechanical and biological inputs are minimal or non­
existent and the most im portant increm ents in production result from
increases in labour inputs. At low levels o f labour input the marginal
'66 Clark, C. 1973, ppl4 -39 presents and reviews a Nigerian study by Galletti, 
Baldwin and Dina, 1955, on "Nigerian Cocoa Farmers." and also a Gambian study by 
Haswell, 1953, 'Economics of Agriculture in a Savannah Village, Colonial Office 
Research Study No. 8.
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returns to labour actually rise as labour increases and then reaches an 
optimum labour-per-unit-of land area before declining.
For example, the results of cocoa planting and food crops in Nigeria
and groundnut cultivation in Gambia are considered. The production 
function used for the analysis refers only to land and labour; hand hoes as 
the sum total o f physical capital in both cases was thought to be
quantitatively insignificant. In N igerian cocoa production, the exponent 
for land was 0.67 compared to labour's 0.33. In the food crop production 
process the land exponent was 0.24 and the labour exponent 0.76. These 
factor shares demonstrate that in the case of cocoa there is a long period 
which does not involve labour input before the bush bears fruit; this would 
explain the higher exponent of land than in the case o f groundnut 
cu ltivation. The analysis o f groundnut production  in Gambia shows 
marginal returns to labour at first increasing as time spent on field
cultivation increased, and then falling. The im plication is that using more 
labour on weeding and improved tillage has limited production benefits.
The higher exponent for labour when cultivation is carried out with 
hand tools does not always conform to these patterns. Case studies from 
Japan in the 1950s show that in spite of the intensive hand tool cultivation 
the exponents for land were 0.56 and 0.72, r e s p e c t i v e ly . '67
Production functions have also been used in linear programming to
analyse more developed a g r i c u l t u r e . '68 The inputs analysed often include 
equipment, fertilisers, feeding stuffs, as well as capital, land and labour. 
Various studies show that the demand for farm enlargement may result in a 
land price being paid which is above that which may be indicated by the 
prevailing average m arginal productivity o f the land in a certain farming 
district. A farmer operating with a high level of non-land fixed costs may 
calculate that he can increase his area through buying adjoining land
'67xwo Jiqwrnese studies axe presented by Clark, C (1973): firstly Tutiya, 1955, 
untitled, to be found in the Japanese 'Quarterly Journal of Agricultural 
Economics.No.l.' and secondly Maruta, 'Memoirs of the Faculty of Agriculture' 
Kagoshima University, 1956.
'68 Linear programming is also used to assist farmland productivity assessments and 
can yield an alternative valuation method. A programme can be developed for a 
single farm unit in which it is possible to use a mathematical method to forecast the 
varying marginal productivity of a factor as a series of individually distinct 
changes. Linear programmes drawn up for computer processing allow for constraints 
to be fed in. In relation to agriculture this could be say the enq>loyment of a certain 
number of woricers, a minimum area for grazing, or rotational limitations of acreage 
of any one crop.
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without increasing the current level of fixed c o s t s . '69 The farmer may bid 
within this perspective and can afford  to outbid  any other farm er
intending only to farm  the purchased area. Sandqvist's study on three
Swedish regions indicates the m arginal product of land consistently 
decreases as farm size in c r e a s e s . '^6 The rationale offered is that the smaller 
farms do not adequately permit best use of other factors; the return to 
lumpy inputs such as tractors, for instance, will be considerably affected by
farm size. In order to optimise the returns to inputs, farmers may be willing
to purchase land at a price which is above that calculated on the basis of,
what Clark refers to as, its "true marginal productivity."
2.2.(ii) The residual method of calculating marginal product.
In the case o f agricultural land a residual approach is frequently 
used to estimate the marginal productivity of the land and hence its rent.
The calculation of residual income is still akin to the production function 
and program m ing m ethods o f calcu la ting  m arginal p roductiv ity . Its 
similarity stems from the fact that it maintains the principle of identifying 
the reward to the factor. It is maintained that there will be factor mobility
in agriculture in advanced economies which means that the price of frictors
should be in accordance with their marginal productivity. In the case of
land no substantial econom ies o f scale are expected. This is generally
accepted among neoclassical economists and therefore "average returns to 
land should approximate to the m arginal."'7 '
But while this ruling is generally valid neoclassical scholars have
found exceptions. D ivergence between the estim ated rent and the actual
ren t paid  is said, by neoclassica l th eo ris ts , to ind icate  "m arket 
im perfections". U nderdeveloped countries are expected to have m ore
exceptions as m arkets are considered less perfec t than in developed
countries. This is because the power inequalities are more visible and 
therefore acknowledged; the power inequalities w ithin social relations o f 
production will influence the land market; where the demand for land is
high and prospective tenants have no other prospective way o f supporting 
their fam ilies, landlords are extremely powerful and can command high
re n ta ls .
'69 Heady, E.O. et al, 1967 pp21-22
170 Sandqvist, 1963, Sandqvist, 1963, Acta Agricultuxa Scandinavica, presented and 
reviewed by Claxk,C. 1973, pp32-33 and pp46-47 
'71 Clark. C, 1973, p20.
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Habibullah's study of a poor and intensive farming village in East 
Pakistan shows the landlord receiving 72% more rent than that calculated 
to be his "just reward" according to the residual income. This implies that 
the tenant is not receiving the sum due according to the calculated 
marginal product of labour. Power relationships which are operating are 
ignored and Clark offers euphemistic reasons why factor rewards are out of 
keeping with residual calculations, "population density and poverty appear 
to have led to a market very much out of equilibrium" '72
Other studies indicated further inconsistencies which have served to 
undermine the early neoclassical theorists claims that rent and wages are
the "just reward" accruing to the factor. In Sakar's study from Sri Lanka 
(Ceylon), the marginal product of labour indicated by the study was
substantially below the prevailing w a g e . '^3 Wellisz et al studies nine years 
o f data for twenty districts of Andra Pradesh in I n d i a . '^4 Their logarithmic 
function gave the marginal productivity of labour at 497 rupees per man 
year as against the actual wage paid o f only 305. rupees. These examples 
support the acknow ledged critique of m arginal productivity theory; it 
cannot be assum ed that factors w ill autom atically receive their "just 
reward" represented in the price (wage) paid to labour, land or any other 
factors. The relative strengths and weaknesses of those people involved in 
the productive process (workers, tenant farm ers, landlords, input supply 
companies, purchasing agents) affects wage and price levels irrespective of 
theoretical m arginal productivity estim ates.
These exceptions to the general rule, that reward to land can be out of 
keeping with the calculated marginal productivity, have been taken from 
situations in underdeveloped countries where "m arket disequilibrium " is
said to distort the economic process. The expectation is that in developed 
economies land markets operate in equilibrium.
V arious studies on ag ricu ltu re  in advanced econom ies express 
residual income and its relationship to land prices in different ways: (a) 
land prices as a percentage o f capitalised rent in monetary terms, (b) the 
influence o f expectations on land prices (c) land prices/residual income 
expressed in wheat equivalents, (c) the ratio o f m arginal land price to
residual income and (d) percentage yield on land.
ibid. p 59.
'73 ibid, p26, reviewing Sarkar, 1957, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.Pt. 2. 
'74ibid, p29 reviewing Wellisz, 1970, Journal of Political Economy, July-August.
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The basis of calculation of residual income involves both actual and 
imputed costs. An imputed cost, for example, would be the reward to the
farmer for management skills. This may vary from country to country; USA 
and UK calculate it as 5 percent of the value of gross product. In Denmark 
the imputed reward for management is 8 percent. The studies shown are
generally consistent in their inclusion of costs of inputs, labour, interest on
capital (excluding land and buildings) m aintenance and depreciation on 
equ ipm ent, stock , and farm  bu ild ings (exclud ing  dw ellings) and 
rem uneration for m anagerial skills. Actual rents, rates, land tax and
interest are excluded; they cannot be included within the costs as they are a 
part of the economic r e n t . '75
Studies reviewing (a) the relationship between land prices and the 
capitalised value of residual income indicate time lags of up to two years 
before land prices change in response to changes in residual i n c o m e . '76
However it is difficult to apply the same measure to each country; there are 
difficulties in choice o f appropriate discount rate at which to capitalise 
future re n t Land prices in New Zealand were of the order of half or less of 
capitalised . rents, whereas in Denmark land prices always exceeded the 
capitalised value o f  residual income. Even w ithin countries, the same 
measure over a period of time shows fluctuations rather than trends. A USA 
study over fifty five years has land price/capitalised  rent continuously
fluctuating -the highest was 2.09 in the early 1920s, the lowest 0.26 in the
late fifties.
In a further comparative study (b) actual land rents and prices are 
converted to w heat equivalents in a quest to make their com parison
independent o f time and place. All countries are considered irrespective o f  
their development status. Rent is shown as a percentage o f gross product 
and factor income; the greater the use o f inputs, the greater the difference 
between rents as a percentage of gross product and rent as a percentage of
factor incom e.'77
'75 ibid, p64 citing the Institute of Farm Management and Agricultural Economics, 
1959/60, "Technical and Economic Changes in Danish Farming 1917 -57 pp72-74. 
Thirty Years of Farm Accounts and Agricultural Economic in Denmark 1917-47" 
p40.
'76 ibid, p63 citing Johnson reviewing New Zealand's changes in land prices following 
changes in marginal residual income.
'77 Some land productivity analyses separate the return to use of chemical fertiliser 
from the calculation of return to land as the expense and importance of fertiliser on 
land productivity and farm income merits an independent assessment.
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But subjective "expectations" also influence land price as the 
capitalised value of the future, anticipated residual. Interpretation o f a 
series of data on USA land prices going back to 1910 suggests that the reason 
for the fall in land prices after the first world war was because of farmers' 
pessimism that the wartime rise in farm income would not last -so they bid 
down farm land prices. Conversely, in the twenties their mood is described 
as "optimistic" and it was felt that low prices could not last so they bid up 
land prices. These waves of optimism and pessimism influence changes in 
the discount rate and can indeed be expressed a l g e b r a i c a l ly . '78
This comparative review illustrates (as in the earlier chapters) the
variety of factors which influence land price and which are specific to the 
conditions o f each country. The USA illustrates the importance of inputs 
and factor income, Britain's land prices demonstrate the influence of death 
duties, Iraq exhibits the effects of population density, Japan indicates the
effects of taxation whereas in M alaysia rents are said to be high as a 
proportion o f gross product because of population density and land scarcity; 
in Vietnam the rents were zero in the war z o n e s . '79
In the final analysis the relationship between residual rent and land 
prices appears to be country specific and subject to substantial changes, 
even fluctuations over time. Even allowing for difficulties in choosing the 
appropriate discount rate, the proposition that, "in advanced econom ies, 
assuming factor mobility, it can be expected that capitalised rents will be
equal to land prices" is not convincingly substantiated by the studies.
2,2n(üi) The. Produgtiyjty .Method of ..ssiimaüag. )#pd vallwc.
Other methods o f land valuation take a financial approach but are
equally based on the residual principle. Again there is an assumption that 
for land there are no substantial economies of scale and the average 
returns to land should approximate to the marginal productivity.
The "Productivity Value" method is frequently used by banks to make 
a judgement on a loan for the purchase of agricultural land. This is derived 
by dividing profits per hectare by the m ortgage bond interest ra te  as
expressed by PV =' Ro/i where PV is the productivity value, Ro the profit per
hectare and i the mortgage bond interest rate. The concern of the bank is
'78 Claxk, C. 1973, p66 Table 30 examining time series data.
'79 ibid , Chapters 6 "Actual Land Rents" and Chapter 7 "Actual land Prices" see p76 
on USA and the effect of inputs, pp96-98 on UK and the effects of death duties, p86 
on lraq,p87 on the effect of Japanese taxes, p88 on Malaysia,
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that the farmer will be able to repay the loan from profits. It is important to 
be able to predict a sufficiently high level of farming profitability and 
hence monetary liquidity to be able to do this.
A farmer purchasing a farm in a capitalist economy will be equally 
concerned that the gross income from production allows the payment of
production costs and repayment of the land mortgage bond, with sufricient 
remaining for a certain standard of living. If the net income does not
permit debt repayment, the farm er's profitability crisis will obviously end 
in bankruptcy.
The approach is "residual" in that the calculation is: "Will profits pay
the bank debt for the land purchase?" But it differs from the "economic 
residual" approach described earlier which tries to identify the value of the 
total product accruing to land. Calculation on econom ic residuals showed 
some divergence from actual rent payments; the suggestion was that this
mostly occurs where landlords are able to impose unfair rents. In the "bank 
appraisal” approach, the bank is essentially the landlord and the rate of 
interest on the mortgage determines the sum of money that the farmer must 
pay back to the bank in order to buy and continue fanning the land. The 
"Productivity Value" only indicates whether or not the profit will repay the
loan: it could well be that the level of interest on the land purchase is
greater than land's marginal productivity as calculated by the economic
residual method. Sender comments that this method in fact is a cash flow 
evaluation of the farmer's capacity to repay the bank from farming income. 
Therefore the productivity valuation method is really  an assessm ent o f 
actual and expected cash flow value of the physical produce.
In several countries a discrepancy appears to have arisen between
average estimated productivity value and the mortgage repaym ent due on
the capital borrowed in order lo  buy the land. The discrepancy implies that 
the fiurmer does not receive full remuneration for own labour, management
skills and risk bearing. C apstick referring to U.K. farm ing conditions
writes, "The economics o f purchase for ow ner-occupation o f a mediocre
farm and £750 per hectare are beyond reasonable explanation at interest 
rates in 1968-1969. . . How the gap between this net income and interest 
charges on land is bridged is a mystery; it must be assumed that the owner- 
occupier farms and lives at a very low standard, hoping that when he 
retires capital appreciation will repay his m ortgage.” '^ '  Smith, writing in
180 Sender, J. Professor of Economics, Witwatersrand University, South Africa: 
personal communication.
1^ 1 Hasbargen, P.R. (1980) citing Capstick,M. 1970
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the USA, comments, "Present returns to land on average are below the
mortgage interest rates. Increasing amounts of external capital are likely to
be needed in farming. There will be more and more a separation between 
the people who own the farm resources and those who use th e m ."  1^2
2.2.(iv) The rate of return method of agricultural land valuation.
The Productivity Value method of valuing land is criticised as quite 
limited by economists who take a rate of return land valuation approach. 
Heady et al present a capitalisation approach to estimating land value and 
then go on to discuss why the process of farm enlargement may lead to a
situation in which farmers will be prepared to pay more than this, hence
creating an upward pressure on the general level of land prices in the
e c o n o m y . ' ^ 3
A capitalisation formula is used:
P = Y/r
This appears to be the same as PV = Ro/i. the difference is that land 
here is being considered as one among several investments and therefore r
is the discount rate or the rate of return on alternative investments. P is the
land price and Y the residual income per hectare of land. A prospective
purchaser will look for alternative investments. If the price is below this, it 
is probable that there may be several bids and that the competition between 
bidders will raise the price.
Heady et al then demonstrate that when a farmer is buying additional 
land, there may be a willingness to bid a price which is greater than the
estim ated P = Y / r . '^4  The rationale o f this lies in the possibility o f
optim ising  the use o f investm ents a lready  incurred  on bu ild ings, 
m achinery and equipm ent and so on. I f  the farm er purchasing an
adjoining piece of land is able to spread the fixed costs, then his calculation 
o f the potential residual income, (influenced by the specific benefits 
available only to him) will be above the normal estimation. This "abnormal” 
economic potential allows the farmer to outbid those intending to farm only 
the purchase land as a single unit. It is equivalent to the presence o f scale 
eco n o m ies .
182 Hattingh, H.S. & A Heitzberg, 1980, citing Smith, M.J. (1 9 6 1 )”Adjustment in 
Agriculture- a National Basebook” Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa,
1®^  Heady et al, 1965 
1®4 ibid, p l6 3
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There is some frustration with the "Productivity Value" PV =Ro/i 
method as sim plistic, m isleading, erroneous and leading to misguided
arguments about land prices being "too high" '®5 The common starting
point is that the value of a fixed asset can be expressed as the present value 
of the future rent stream generated by the asset. But a whole series of 
factors can influence expectations about the future: changes in terms of 
trade, changes in technology, changes in discount and inflation rates as
well as any political changes. A more complex land rental assessment and
hence land valuation method is required which includes at least some of
these factors.
Nieuwoudt uses such a model to calculate the nominal rate of return
r i  for an investment in real e s t a t e . '®6 He considers the growth of annual 
rents in real terms Ro, the rate of growth of real profits, g, the inflation
rate, k, and the farm mortgage rate, i.
The nominal rate of return on the farming activity is (1+g) (1+k). To 
evaluate the value of land this has to be supplemented by the return which 
accrues to the landlord in the form of rent given by the rental rate of 
return, r. So the rate o f return on land altogether is (1+r) (1+g) (1+k). This 
should be compared to the cost of borrowing, given by the borrowing rate 
on Land Bank loans (1+i).
Nieuwoudt adopts Penny's constant growth m o d e l '® 7  a n d  proposes to 
express present value as:
PV = RoZ(i-g-k)
Using farm survey data he calculates the rate o f return on South 
A frican land as having been favourable com pared to the Land Bank's 
lending rate.
Concluding discussion.
None of the economists (Clark, Heady and Nieuwoudt, ) presenting the
land valuation methods is explicit about political context. However, several 
comments indicate the existence of political factors which influence land
'®5 Hasbargen,F.R. 1980.
186 Nieuwoudt,W.L. 1980, pp389-395.
187 ib id . p389 .
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price. Examples are given which indirectly indicate how land price is 
influenced by the power of landlords, the state of the labour movement, the 
power of financial capital, the moods and expectations of farmers, and the 
political aims of the government which are reflected in credit rates, taxes 
and even in the organisation of technical support services.
The combination of political factors can influence price to such an 
extent that enormous discrepancies arise between the exacted land rental 
and the nominally scientific calculation of its productivity value. This
explains why the method consistently fails to explain actual land prices. The 
theory of marginal analysis which claims for capitalism an ability to best 
"serve a social function" and which ensures the optimal use of a society's 
scarce resources would appear faulted. The actual allocation and price of 
resources are clearly  the product o f po litical and econom ic power 
relationships; neoclassical apologists would perhaps claim that land markets 
are perhaps the worst case o f discrepancies due to m arket imperfection 
under capitalism .
The . methods reviewed above vary in their calculation o f value as
related to existing land prices. But the way a particular method is viewed is
not only dependent on its m athem atical accuracy, interpretation or even 
judgement o f whether the actual land price is justified as an indication or 
rew ard to factor use. The method must itse lf be evaluated within the 
political context within which the study is made.
A state departm ent concerned with restructu ring  o f  agriculture , 
finance capital searching out suitable investment or the indebted farm er 
with high mortgage repayment relative to income are likely to have quite 
differing opinions on what is the most appropriate land valuation method. 
I f  the dom inant view is that m aintaining curren t levels o f ow ner 
occupancy is desirable then the land valuation by productivity valuation is 
perhaps the best, most appropriate model, to indicate the feasibility o f this 
aim. If land prices are above productivity value then bankruptcies may be 
expected to occur. I f  the concern is to attract corporate capital into 
com mercial farming at the expense of smaller scale owner occupiers then 
the calculation of aominal rates of return is that which provides the most 
ap p ro p ria te  inform ation .
O f the four methods described, the production function, the economic 
residual, productivity value and rate of return, two have been used in South 
A frica and the results o f their practical application will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter 6.
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But identifying the method which best interprets prevailing land 
prices in the context of the prevailing status quo is not my major concern. 
My major concern is in establishing how the principle of each method
might relate to the question of making land available to beneficiaries at 
prices they can pay from the seasonal proceeds of production as well as the 
issue of compensation or market regulation which may also be components 
of a land reform policy.
I take cognisance of the rate of return assessment of changes in land 
prices which may indicate that all things considered, (the agricultural
growth rate, the inflation rate, the farm mortgage rate and so on) land is a
good financial investment. But the im mediate practical issue for land 
reform beneficiaries must be whether net income (after payments for the
producers own work and management) is sufficient to pay either the bond 
(interest rate on a loan) or the rent to the landlord in the case o f tenancy.
Heady et al exam ined the process o f structural reform  in USA 
agriculture which includes policy measures favouring farm  enlargem ent. 
They identify farm  enlargem ent as a trend which contributes to the
evolution o f an ever increasing gap between the productivity (seasonal 
cash flow) valuation compared to the market price of land. The South Africa 
state policy on the restructuring o f white commercial agriculture ( Chapter 
5) has had similar results which are to be examined (Chapter 6). The 
implication is tw ofold(l) that only persons who already own land will be 
able to purchase more land; they will pay for the bond of the new piece of
land using not only the net income o f that new piece o f land but also the
income accruing from land which they inherited or have already paid o ff
or (2) that people purchasing land have made enough or are still making 
money outside of agriculture in order to pay off a land loan.
The issues arising in Chapter I recur in this examination o f theory 
and methods. The issue of value of land for compensation purposes should 
be separated from the issue o f the conditions under which land reform  
beneficiaries get access to land. My examination o f approaches to land 
valuation indicates that there is no one "fair, ob jective” approach to 
valuation. Market prices are an expression of a history of power struggles 
(as to who got land in the first place); they are also influenced by 
governm ent po lic ies  tow ards ag ricu ltu re  re s tru c tu rin g  as w ell as 
reflecting the demand for holding land for investment reasons. Outgoing 
land owners can be expected to negotiate the highest price possible; their
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actual payment will depend on the balance of forces within the negotiation
p ro cess .
Among South African blacks who want access to land there may be a 
strata who have made money outside of agriculture who can put down a
substantial deposit and pay off the rest of a (possibly subsidised loan) using 
the proceeds of agricultural production from the farm as a whole. But the
majority of blacks who want access to land have no capital and the 
conditions for their credit viability must be considered; it would be a
perfidious land reform which gave loans that cannot be amortised from an 
average production giving rise to a certain norm of average net income.
There may also be a further group of blacks who want access to land but 
within a communal land tenure system. There are many blacks who feel 
that land should be given to them to use and dispose of as they wish.
The neoclassical approach to South A frican  land reform'®® 
maintains that a competitive land market will ensure the most efficient use 
o f resources. They contend that the apartheid laws flawed the possibility of 
achieving a unitary com petitive m arket in the past. They furtherm ore 
regard the current situation in South Africa's bantustans, (where land is 
valuable, but price-less, as land is state-owned and there is no legal system
of freehold titles) as an impediment to the development of capitalism.'®^
Many South Africans, belonging to the liberation movement still 
identify with the Marxian critique of this entire neoclassical discussion of
land valuation. They hold to their understanding o f M arx's rent theory
which provides the critique of classical and neoclassical economists. Firstly, 
rent is but the economic expression of a set of historically determined social 
relations o f production. Secondly, rent is in principle appropriated from 
surplus profits and in fre t the price of land is but the value of capitalised 
rent. Thirdly, to tal ren t paym ent is a com posite o f three d ifferen t
interconnected rents due to the influence o f various factors such as quality 
of soil, location, varying applications of capital and the fact o f ownership in 
itself. Fourthly, as accum ulation in agriculture proceeds rents w ill be
altered as land improvements are capitalised into the land price. In fifth
place, rents are viewed as a barrier to investment in the agricultural sector 
o f the economy. Sixthly, while land nationalisation by the state may be
accepted as the panacea to classical concerns as capital tied up in land would
'®® represented by the National Party, the Democratic Party, and all current state 
institutions and parastatals such as the DBSA.
'®9 Cross C and R Haines, (eds) 1988 many of the articles in "Towards Freehold" 
represent this view.
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be freed to invest in other economic activities, its occurrence would be
meaningless if there were no change over control of land thus basically
maintaining the social relations of production.
Their ideal would be the nationalisation of land, the abolition of a 
land market as the basis for beginning the longer term process of 
transforming productive relations. Their assessm ent o f the possibilities of
realising this project at this point in time is a pessimistic one. South Africa's
transform ation possibilities are governed by current realities as well as
deriving energy from a projection of a different future. The next three 
chapters deal with an examination of the current reality of South African
ru ral life. C hapter 3 deals w ith how the racia lly  separate  but
interdependent system of land distribution, tenure and agrarian production 
was formed. Chapters 4 and 5 exam ine the analytical and econom ic 
questions relating to land and production in black rural life and white 
com m ercial production.
86
Chapter 3 :The Racial Division of Land and Conditions of Tenure.
The historical background is essential for an understanding of the
present system of land ownership and occupation, and for analysing the 
prospects of future land redistribution. Market exchange of freehold land
dominates the present system, but there is no unitary land market. Separate
systems of occupancy rights, tenure systems, rentals and m arketability 
operate in relation to white freehold land and black occupied land. These
diverse types of land tenure and markets suggest the need for a flexible
approach on land redistribution policies.
Section 1 of this chapter describes some main elements o f pre­
colonial organisation of production and black attitudes to land. Section 2 
describes the settler forms of land tenure as the process of land conquest
steadily advanced. Section 3 reviews African attempts to retain both access 
and ownership through reserves or land purchase. Section 4 deals with the
struggles to retain use rights on land now formally owned by whites. The 
fifth section presents the prevailing tenure status and practice, the concept
o f the indigenous land ethic as well as m arketability of land holdings
within the bantustans.
3.1. P re  Colonial use of and a ttitu d es  to land.
In 1652'^Othe te rrito ria l defin ition  of each o f South A frica's 
indigenous people was still in flux. The Khoikhoi, San, Nguni, Sotho, Tsonga
and V en d a . people were identifiable by their distinct organisation of
production, social structure and language. The boundaries o f the area 
which each people occupied were not static. Production depended on 
extensive land use; groups moved to maintain production levels in their 
system of shifting cultivation, pastoral, hunting and gathering activities.
Groups traded and respected land rights but there were conflicts as 
expressed by cattle  raiding. T erritorial w arfare, involving whole tribal
communities, developed only at the end o f the eighteenth century when
separate kingdoms emerged. Victory meant a loss o f political territorial 
power for the vanquished but never a loss of the right of access to land. For 
exam ple, Shaka incurpurated the yOung men and women surviving his 
victory over them into his regiments and harems; people were integrated
190 1652 is when the Netherlands' East India Company (VOC) occupied Table Bay 
establishing a refreshment station for their trading ships. Vereenigde Nederlandsche 
Ge-Octroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United Netherlands Chartered East India 
Company) in abbreviated form.
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rather than driven into the d e s e r t . C o m p l e t e  loss of a c c e s s . to arable land
was unknown in indigenous culture but became the distinctive feature of
colonialism in its steady advance towards capitalist forms of production in 
a g r i c u l t u r e .
For South Africa's indigenous peoples the loss of access to land was a
painful and protracted process and was spread over two centuries as the 
Dutch, and later the English, pursued their objective o f  total colonial
domination. The Khoikhoi and San were the first to be affected; in the
eastern  part o f  the country the conquest of tribal chiefdom s and the 
destruction of their mixed farming systems only occurred decades later.
Colonial conquest took various forms including insidious usurpation, 
extermination and land seizure after battle. In some cases African chiefs 
attempted to retain some of their land through giving away' a part of the
tribal territory, either for personal gain or to safeguard the community
against absolute land dispossession. The next sections select some of the
dominant groups and describe various aspects of their pre-colonial use of
land, experience of land dispossession and social organisation.
3.1.n) Dependence on extensive land use- the demise of the San:
Colonial records refer to the San and Khoikhoi peoples in offensive
terminology as 'Bnshmen' and 'Hottentots'. A nthropological writing tended 
to describe them as rem ote hunter-gatherer societies, a "quintessential
exam ple o f  a p ris tine  p reh isto ric  society." W ilm sen, supported by 
extensively researched archival evidence, challenges those conventionally
accepted views. There was extensive interaction o f the San with other 
peoples. Evidence contradicts the notion that the Khoikhoi people were 
simply nom adic pasto ralists ' w hereas the San com m unities lived by 
hunting and gathering . It is soundly argued  tha t they becam e
subsistence foragers as a result of a m arginalisation process which has 
roots in pre-colonial indigenous social form ations but advanced more
191 Wilson M and L Thompson, 1969, p. 124.
192 Wilmsen, E.N. 1989. Chapter 1 The Evolution of Illusion' is a masterpiece of 
tracing out the self deception of historiographers while Chapter 2 The Poverty of 
Misappropriated theory' indicates that anthropologists paradoxically established 
"Bushmen" antiquity while denying them history did so because it fell in with 
Euroamerican anthropological theory and supported the superiority of "civilised 
"society.
1^  ^ Wilson M and L Thompson, 1969, p.63. A dependent client relationship has been 
described between some San groups attached to Khoikhoi camps but here their 
differing organisation of production and social structure are presented separately.
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rapidly as a result of colonial policies. .Anthropological representation of
the San denies them a prior history and at best represents a static snapshot
of what the San were forced to become in order to survive.
The San people ow ned vast herds o f cattle ; archaeo log ical
investigation suggests that groups co-existed in a dom inant/subordinate 
relationship. Cattle bones of mainly prime anim als are found on the 
settlements sites of dominant groups whereas the bones of runts and aged 
animals characterise the settlements of subordinate groups. It is argued that
class relationships were inherent in San society.
With regard to the status of land, both San and Khoikhoi shared a
common attitude. For both peoples, free movement over a vast land area was
imperative. There was no formal legal system of land ownership. Of special 
importance were established and hereditary rights to water holes and areas 
o f  edible plants known as veldkos and, among the San, the private
ownership of wild honey beehives.
The San people inhabited both seashores and mountains of the entire 
western half of South Africa at the time of the arrival of the Dutch
colonisers. They lived and travelled in 'bands' whose size varied from 25-30
people in more arid areas like the Kalahari to 200-300 people in better 
rainfall areas. Kinship bonds, closely tied to thé transfer of wealth, were 
less developed in this society whose inheritable resources included cattle, 
rights to water and land areas of veldkos. The San used regular trails which 
varied with the seasons and they plaimed their treks to make the best use of 
natural resources. Hunting game, fishing, the collection o f honey and 
veldkos provided. the basic diet: honey was so important that wild hives were 
marked as private property and the owners would violently punish a person
caught stealing. The San's cooperative approach to exploiting natural 
resources was notable. One European described passing,
"a magnificent set of pitfalls, which the bushmen who live about these hills
had made; the whole breadth of the valley was staked and bushed across. . .
When a herd of animals was seen among the hills, the Bushmen drove them 
through this valley up to the fence.
The San people's existence was precarious and depended on access to 
vast land areas. Colonisation meant loss of cattle and land rights, leading to
extermination or enslavement. A report by Ahthing, the Civil Commissioner
194ibid, pp.48 & 53.
195 Gallon cited by Wilson and Thompson, 1969, pp.48-49
89
for Namaqualand in 1862 and documental evidence assembled by the
historian M a r a i s  196 a testimony of warfare in which adults were killed
and children kidnapped. Wilson and Thompson summarise:
... all made war on the hunters, driving them successively from one
range afte r another: D rakenberg, P iquetburg , R oggeveld, Cam bedoo,
Sneeuberg, Tarka, and even from 'Bushmanland' along the Orange river. 
Between 1715 and 1862 the hunters were hunted, almost as they themselves 
hunted animals, for many white farmers thought and spoke of them as 
though they were animals, and thousands were killed.
C hild ren  w ere com m only taken hom e by m em bers o f
c o m m a n d o s  197 to be brought up and apprenticed' as farm servants, 'tame 
bushmen' the farmers called them, and indeed the demand for servants was 
probably one of the reasons for commando expeditions against the hunters. 
...Ten wagon loads of children were taken from the Tooverberg according to 
a survivor from that a r e a .  198
Anthing concludes his 1863 report to the Cape of Good Hope
Parliament with a recommendation that a reserve should be established for
the San People to prevent their complete l iq u id a t io n .  199 No such reserves
were established for the San people; those who survived moved further and
further northward to desert lands in South West Africa and Botswana. These
arid lands o f little farming value, a poor contrast to the abundance of 
p rev ious resou rce  a rea s, p rov ided  a safer haven  from  co lon ia l 
e n c ro a c h m e n t .
3.1.fill. The Khoikhoi: dispossession of livestock, land and extermination
The Khoikhoi social structure was more h ierarch ica l. than in the San 
culture. Kinship and lineage were linked to leadership and inheritance
with seniority rules that were respected in each family. Leadership of a 
group was linked with wealth mainly as represented by the animal stock. 
This leadership position varied among different groups but in many the
senior kinsman assum ed some of the judicial functions associated with
196 Marais M M, 'Armesorg aan die Kaap onder die Kompanjie, 1652-1795 as cited in 
Wilson M and L Thompson, 1969, p.71.
197 The name given to the white farmers who engaged in these hunting parties.
198 Stow, 1905, p. 176
199 Davenport & Hunt, 1974, citing Parliamentary Papers, Cape of Good Hope. 1862, 
paper A. 39, 4, pp.7-8."The evidence I had obtained was that the colonists had intruded 
into that part of the country which borders on the Hartebeeste and Orange river. . .Wild 
game had become exceedingly scarce ... ostrich eggs, honey, grass seed, and roots had 
all become exceedingly scarce, the ostriches being destroyed by hunters, the seed and 
roots in consequence of the intrusion of the colonist flocks....in many cases they died 
of hunger. . . unless something is done to provide them with a means of subsistence, 
they must either steal or perish. . . I would again venture to repeat the recommendation 
to locate the Bush-people on certain places to be set apart for that purpose in the lands 
which their tribes have for many generations occupied.
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c h i e f t a i n c y .T h e  Khoikhoi herded large numbers of cattle and sheep. Up 
to sixteen hundred cattle and several hundred sheep are reported in the 
diary of Van Riebeeck, the first commander at the Cape. While there was
common pasturage, the animals were owned by families. They slaughtered 
animals only for ritual purposes and dried the surplus meat for later
consumption. They gelded animals and trained oxen to carry riders. They
had surpluses for trading and evidence of artifacts, such as copper beads,
suggests early trading with the Portuguese through Angola. The Dutch later 
bartered coral beads for cattle.
The Dutch policy in the Cape was to gain access to the herds of the 
Khoikhoi and to settle on some of their land. In spite of the Khoikhoi's
historical tradition of protecting their breeding stock, using animals for
milk and only killing for ritual purposes, the Dutch persuaded them to part 
with large numbers of animals for heads, tobacco and brandy. Negotiation 
over the barter or over a land conflict was often 'eased' with alcoholic
d r in k .201
In 1657 Van Riebeck initiated a process of documented freehold land
grants to Dutch white s e t t l e r s . 202  This was the beginning o f the 'legal' 
process of dispossession. The land was disposed of by the East India Company 
who claimed 'title of purchase' from the natives'. Doubts were cast, in the 
contemporary period, on the manner and "just price" for which these 
supposed ' just title of purchases' were o b ta in e d .203  Contemporary journals 
suggest that the Khoikhoi had a very different interpretation of the 
concept of .'purchase price', that the Khoikhoi accepted gifts as tribute' for 
access to the use of their land and in no way viewed the acceptance of the 
gift as a land sale t r a n s a c t io n .2 0 4  o the r records by missionaries describe 
insidious th e f t .2 0 5
200 Kolb, 1731,p 142-3, as cited by M  Wilson & L Thompson, 1969, p.60."The richest 
person in the kraal is the captain, or provost: he is the leader of . the party, and the 
spokesman on all occasions."
201 Davenport, T.R.H. & K.SJlunt, (1974), p ll,  citing H.C.V. Leibbrandt, "Precis of the 
Cape Arquives: Journal, 1676, 283. "the Govemer . . met . the Hottentoo Captain,
Cuijper. . . after he had been treated with a little arrack. . . he departed well
satisfied."
202 Thom(ed), 1936, pp.90-91. Die Geskiedenis van die Skaaboedery in Suid-Afrika '
as translated in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, p.Z.
203 Schapera I, 1933, citing Grevenbroek.
This peninsula .. the Dutch occupied under the command of the great van Riebeeck, 
and now hold from the natives on a just title of purchase, and with the sanction of 
the law, and the settlement grows greater day by day in burghers, farms and
fortunes; but what the just price was that passed between them the settlers do not
know, and the purchasers are averse to stating.'
204i)fiYenport, T.R.H.& Hunt, K.S. 1974 p.6.Translation of Mentzel, 1741,'The 
Hottentots are, as it were, the bloodhounds who smell out the most fertile lands.
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The Khoikhoi did not passively accept being driven northward and 
1658-1660 is chronicled as the period of the first Dutch/Khoikhoi war. In
1660 van Riebeeck reported as follows:
the reasons advanced by them for .. making war upon us last year .... 
that our people ... had done them much injury, and also perhaps stolen and
eaten up some of their sheep and calves etc., in which there is also some 
truth ....they had cause for revenge, they said, upon people who had come to
take and occupy their land which had been their own in all ages .... keeping 
them off ground upon which they had been accustomed to depasture their 
cattle.... we were at length compelled to say that they had entirely forfeited
that right, through the war which they had waged against us, and that we
were not inclined to restore it, as it had now become the property of the 
Company by the sword and by the laws of war.'
(van Riebeeck report to Chamber XVII in Holland in 1660.206
Another defeat in the war of 1673-1677 and smallpox epidemics in 
1713, 1735, and 1767 decimated most of the Khoikhoi communities. In 1652
the estim ated population of the Khoikhoi was more than two hundred 
thousand; the 1805 Cape census showed only twenty thousand Hottentots'.
For those who were not pressed into labouring on white farms, the
mission stations provided some protection. This is the origin of the present 
day six 'C oloured Rural A reas', com monly known as the coloured 
r e s e r v e s . '207 The organisation o f the Khoikhoi production in these areas 
had to adapt to the much smaller land areas available. Land cultivation and
lim ited  pasto ra l farm ing was a s tringen t m odification  to nom adic 
pastoralism . The severe land limitations restricted the number o f people 
who could be sustained by farming activity. This, together with a later
When their kraals were discovered in such places several Europeans or Afrikanders 
soon appear and, by gifts, flattery and other forms of cajolery, wheedle the 
Hottentots into granting permission for them to settle alongside. But as soon as the 
pasture land becomes too scanty for the cattle of these newcomers and the 
Hottentots* the latter are induced by trifling gifts to withdraw and travel further 
inland.'
20^ M Wilson and L Thonq>son, 1969, p.69. citing John Canqxbell, 1813, Travels in 
South Africa.' p.329 *We came to a Hottentot kraal, where we would have halted for 
the night, but their fountain was dried up, so that they would have no water for man 
or beast, and were to remove from it on the morrow, from their own account they had 
once a better place, but a boor having asked p^mission Hrst to sow a little com, 
then to erect a mill, they allowed it; after which he aR)lied to the government for a 
grant of the whole place, which they promised not knowing it was in the possession 
of the hottentots; of course they were driven from it. An old Hottentot told us that he 
remembered the time when the boors were all within rive days journey of Cape Town, 
and that the country was full of Hottentot kraals; but they had gradually been driven 
up country to make room for white people.'
206 Wilson and Thompson, 1969, p.65.
207 Surplus Peoples' Project, 1989, p.l
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introduction of taxation laws ensured that wage work and migration would 
be a permanent necessity to ensure a family's reproduction.
3.1.(iii). The Nguni and Sotho: land access, stratification and the myth of 
"communality" in aero-pastoral systems.
The Nguni and Sotho speaking peoples differed in lineage, language, 
and kinship systems. Genealogies of Xhosa, Zulu, Mpondo, Thembu tribes 
covering generations can be traced out^OS but their social structure and 
organisation of production had much in common. Social stratification and 
organisation of production enabled a greater production of surpluses than 
that o f the San and the KhoiKhoi. There was social division between the 
royal family of the chiefs, the artisans and the homestead groups who were 
responsible for production and cattle herding and from whom the male 
youth were drawn for military service. As a result of their greater ability to 
organise resistance they were able to retain more of their land.
Chiefs exercised considerable social control not only in performing
judicial functions. The wealth status of a chief was an important source of 
power. The giving or withholding of a gift of cattle to a young man who had 
none was decisive; a youth without cattle as the bride price would not be 
able to marry and enjoy his wife's produce. Patriarchal domination of men 
over women was well established in Nguni and Sotho speaking peoples; 
young women niovpd from tilling their fathers' fields to tilling those of 
their husbands. 209
Families owned specific land areas for cultivation. The land was
selected by a homestead on approval by the chief and then cleared for
production. A system of shifting cultivation was used but land lying fallow 
retained identifiable ow nersh ip .210 Only alienation from the tribe itself
could result in land alienation. The myth o f ownership communality is
208)^jlgQjj and Thompson, 1969, pp.91-2
209Lewis, J. 1984 citing Morgan, N. 1833, An Account of the Amakosae,' South Africa 
Quarterly Journal, Vol 2, No 1, p. 10 ."These imizi (homesteads) in general are 
formed by one family and by others that are united into that family in bonds of 
friendship  or servitude, for there ex ists m C affrelaud a state of vassalage. This 
kraal is under the control of a person who is generally the senior of the whole and 
always the father of the many who form this; to him belong the greatest flocks which 
are pastured near it, to him they look for assistance and advice - a sort of 
patriarchal authority exists in him and becomes a sort of natural councillor of the 
nation."
210 This model of identifiable land ownership within a system of shifting cultivation 
. continues to exist in many parts of neighbouring Mozambique in which peasants 
respect ownership without any legal system of title deeds.
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derived from the absence of a land market, and from the fact that, unless
fences were erected, all cattle would graze the remains o f  the harvest.
Large areas were common property for grazing, hunting and firewood
collection. But the land chosen for cultivation was the most fertile land and 
ownership of such land was a highly valued, if non-monetary, asset.
The organisation of  production and stratification of the Xhosa people 
is particularly well documented. Access to labour power was the important
determinant of production capacity and ability to accumulate wealth in the 
form of  cattle. There were considerable economic differences between and 
w ithin  hom es tead s .211
In principle, while the opportunity to establish a homestead was
open to all married men it was not a real possibility for everyone because of
econom ic lim itations, M arriage requ ired  access to cattle ; w ealth ier 
homestead expanded through the acquisition of indebted adherents. Young 
men who attached themselves were from the poor and had neither enough 
cattle or suitable land to be able to start a homestead of their own. The extent 
of social stratification, as indicated through polygamy and possession of
cattle, is apparent from 1848 British census figures. Lewis analyses the data 
from the Ngquika division o f the Xhosa under the Chief Sandilie. This
division was made up of 1 090 homesteads, 5 765 households, and 20 928
people. 32.4 per cent of adult men were unmarried and 47.3 per cent of
households were monogamous. Of the 20.3 per cent of households which 
were polygamous the majority had two wives, some three wives and a small 
minority had five to seven wives. Of the homesteads 14 per cent had more 
than eight households thus indicating the incorporation of monogamous or
even many o f the polygamous households into the dominant homesteads. 
This pattern of differentiation is mirrored in the data on the ownership of 
cattle. Twenty per cent of the households had large herds of up to 160 cattle 
while the remaining 80 per cent owned less than five cattle each. And 
within this last group 31,5 per cent had no cattle at all.
This pre-colonial Xhosa social formation was not static. Expansion of a 
homestead would reach its limits (in terms of access to arable land and
211 Theal, G.M. (ed.) 1897-1905 'Records of the Cape Colony' vol viii pp.204-5 citing a 
journalist who, shipwrecked for six months, observed the lifestyle of the Xhosa 
people,There are rich and poor among them, but this is according to the number of
cattle The kings have four, five and seven wives. The women do all the work,
planting and tilling the earth with sticks to prepare it for their grain . . The women
bring no dowry in marriage, on the contrary the husband pays the bride's father with 
cattle,. and they become slaves to their husbands . . ornaments go to the men, and the 
women wear only skins better or worse according to the position of their husbands.'
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pasture to support the number of families) and a breakup would occur. The 
expansion o f chiefdom and new chiefs on newly incorporated territory 
from the 16th century was the result of such expansion. As the chiefdom
reached its limits of expansion, the population would realign itself and a 
group would break away under a new political leadership to attempt to 
establish themselves on new territory.
The power of these social and economic structures determined not 
only the response which the Nguni and Sotho peoples were able to make to 
the colonial invasion of their lands but also the determinants of a continued 
differentiation of production under the new conditions prevailing after 
conquest. Before colonial conquest chiefdoms developing power to become 
kingdom s in tensified  their struggles with other chiefdom s and these 
defeated w ere absorbed into the victorious chiefdoms. But the ongoing 
dynamic process o f Nguni and Southo expansion was checked by the Dutch
occupation to the west; although tribal power clashes continued there was, 
in the nineteenth century, a marked intensification of struggle with the 
colonisers. In 1806 the British took, over from the Dutch in the Cape Colony 
and the Voortrekker Afrikaners, as the Dutch settlers had become known, 
steadily moved eastward away from the Cape. The Xhosa were driven out of 
the Zuurveld which they had occupied since the seventeenth century after 
losing a major military encounter in 1837. In spite of their capacity to
organise regiments of young warriors, the colonisers' use of horses, wagons 
and guns ensured the defeat of the two most powerful African kingdoms the 
Ndebele (1837-1838) and the Zulu (1838-1840). The British then annexed the 
central p a r t . o f the coastal sector o f Natal in 1843 and all the territory
between the Orange and Vaal rivers in 1848. The wars with the African 
chiefdoms continued, with each war weakening the capacity not only to
resist but also debilitating the economic base of the society. In the war of
1848 and 1850 the Xhosa people not only lost a lot of land but one observer 
recorded that over 40,000 cattle were taken by the colonial forces. In the
war of 1850 1853 the colonial victors confiscated at least 75,000 cattle.
By 1860 the best farming lands o f the entire country were almost 
completely in the nominal control of the colonisers either in the hands of
individuals as farmers or absentee landlords or in the hands of companies. 
Africans only retained tracts of land under treaties granting limited land 
rights, by allocation of reserves, through the purchase of portions of the 
land originally lost in battle and through various forms of tenancy on land 
now legally owned by whites. The treaties were not always respected (as 
exem plified by the reservation o f land for the Griquas in 1846 certain
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conditions of which were revoked against African interests several years 
l a t e r ) . 212 Tenancy agreements were exploitative, insecure and the African 
right to land purchase eventually cancelled.
Black struggles to retain access to land through tenancy agreements 
is reviewed in section (3.3.). Section (3.6.) deals with social practice and 
conditions of land access p r e v a i l i n g  in the Bantustans. Many of the 
elem ents of social p ractice derive from the social organisation of 
production of this agro-pastoral system. One of its basic elements within its 
stratified society was to secure access to land (and food) of the most lowly 
members of its community. Other elements were the herding of animals on 
com munal pasture w hereas arable land was cu ltivated  by individual 
households and individually owned in spite of the lack of formal title and 
marketability. Arable holdings were not equal; they differed in size and 
land quality. The richest most powerful families got access to more fertile 
lands and were able to cultivate larger portion of it. Inequality rather than 
egalitarian ism  characterises the organisation  o f production of these 
communities while offering some basic security to all its members. These 
attitudes made sense in a pre-capitalist organisation of production where 
overall production of surplus (and its appropriation by chiefs through 
tribute) was not yet based on a system of land seizure, creation of a 
proletariat and the accumulation of wealth to be used as productive capital
by a minority.
3 .2 . C o lo n ia l C o n q u e s t a n d  th e  Im p o s it io n  o f New T e n u re  
S y s te m s .
At the time of conquest there were no land titles and land was 
not bought and sold; colonial adm inistrations regarded this an economic 
anachronism. The Dutch East India company, (VOC) the Dutch government 
and later the British viewed the conquered land as a marketable asset.
Legally docum ented land grants, sales and tenancy agreem ents w ere 
necessary to this process. VOC's objective was to furnish supplies to its
passing ships. Trading with the Khoikhoi was limited and the VOC rapidly 
encouraged the settlement of Dutch farmers. The VOC settled land to farmers 
in various ways: in 1657 Van Riebeeck announced freehold land grants 
which had a series o f conditions attached to them in order to ensure 
surpluses for the Company. For example, Van R iebeeck set out the
conditions of allocation of a freehold land grant as:
212 Davenport & Hunt, 1974 p.20.
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"they shall receive in freehold as much land . . .  as five of them may 
be able to plough . . .  or otherwise prepare in three years' time from 1 
March next. . . The land will remain their property forever to do with as 
they like, that is, they may sell, lease, or otherwise alienate it, . . . before the 
expiry of three years it may not be alienated, sold or leased. . . this is to 
serve instead of a deed given by mortgage... In addition to grain, (they) are 
to cultivate tobacco and garden fruits. . . to breed cattle, pigs, geese, ducks, 
fowls etc..
Agriculture is to be practised diligently. . . All the produce will be 
bought by the Company at a fair price to he fixed later."2
Farming, described as "semi subsistence stockfarming because of its
extensiveness and relatively  small com m ercialised  surpluses, expanded 
rapidly. By 1700 the existing, white farming population increased to such an 
extent that further immigration was not desired. The Company objective 
changed from one of securing supplies to also raising additional income. In 
most cases white settlement had taken place on what were known as "loan 
farms" of an average size of 3000 morgen. Thus VOC owned the land and 
allocated it as a gratuitous loan for use. This specific form of tenure enabled 
farmers to settle on land temporarily and then move later to new regions- 
thus suiting the needs of a farm ing population in the process of 
t r e k k i n g .214 in 1714 the Company began to charge a yearly rent of
twelve riksdollars on grazing land used for grazing and, by way of a tithe, 
the tenants were "obliged to bring a tenth of the harvest grain to this castle 
to the lord or the Hon. C o m p a n y . " 2 1 5
Settlers held vast areas of land under these tenancy arrangements.
One specific practice used to mark out an area involved horseriding for a 
specified time. A centre starting point would be chosen and then a person 
would ride outward bound for thirty minutes and place a marker. This was 
repeated six or eight times to stake out a perimeter. As a result nineteenth 
century farm  maps are characterised by a hexagonal/octagonal layout.
Many farms, staked out according to this practice were between 6000 and 
8000 acres. This was accepted as a reasonable, not extraordinary, amount of 
land for which to make a tenancy request:
"A boor, upon discovering w ater on a suffic ien t quantity of 
unoccupied land, forwards through the secretary o f his district, what he 
terms a request' for a place, that is, a memorial, asking for a grant of 6000 
acres; and he will hardly pay the expense of measurement for less than 4000 
acres. His memorial is referred for report to the Landdrost; and if there 
exists no real location objection, and the applicant prevents competition by 
securing the favour of the powerful officer, the land is granted as a matter
213 ibid. citing Thom, H.B. 1936, "Die Geskiedenis van die Skaaboerdery in Suid- 
Africa. pp 90-91.
214 Goodfellow, D.M. 1931, p.52.
215 Davenport and Hunt. 1974,p2. citing "Kaapse Plakaatboek, ii, p.31.
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of course. It is inspected and measured at an expense of from 300 to 600 
rixdollars. The annual quitrent is fixed at the inspection, and is generally 
from thirty to fifty rix dollars, perhaps about one percent upon the 
estimated value. . . although his tenure requires residence and cultivation, 
he is not really obliged to conform to it. The occupation is considered 
sufficient for all the purposes of Government, if he pays his quit-rent, and 
is enabled, by removing his cattle to it for part of the year, to keep a greater 
stock and pay a larger o p g r a a f . " 2 l 6
The VOC introduced the practice of quitrent' in 1732 which was a 
tenancy agreement between the company and the settler for a fifteen year
period. The company retained an option on the renewal of the tenancy. 
Records suggest that one idea behind the quitrent was to make additional 
pieces of land available to the settler farmer so that the old land could lie
fallow or be used for winter grazing if needed. However as the farms were 
so vast this does not seem plausible. Basically the system of quitrent enabled
the company to draw an annual rent while offering security for a definite
p e rio d .
The quitrent practice, however, was not so advantageous to the 
tenants. The contracts stipulated that if the tenancy agreem ent were to
terminate the company would not compensate for any land improvements
that may have been made. Tenants criticised the company complaining that 
they had no incentive to make farm im provem ents. Also the colonial
settlers w anted ow nership not tenancy afte r hazarding the risks of 
em igration and trekking. They requested freehold status but company
directors were reluctant to lose the increasing annual quitrent revenue. 
The company proposed a compromise of a "loan freehold tenure", in terms 
of which the tenant would be granted freehold ownership of 60 morgen and 
would pay a "recognition fee" of 24 rixdollars a year for the rest of the
farmland .
The British abolished the Dutch company practice of quitrent when 
they took over. They first offered security o f tenure in perpetuity; all
holders o f land on loan could apply for "perpetual quitrent". Application 
had to be made for an "irrevocable title" to a former "loan place (which) 
shall not exceed three thousand morgen" for which "the holders shall pay
to Public Revenue an increased yearly renit. . . in no case . . . exceeding a 
sum of two hundred and fifty rix dollars.
The B ritish  la te r fu rther m odified land tenure arrangem ents.
Freehold land title, "the right to hold the land hereditarily and . . .  to sell
216 Thompson,L.M. I960 pp 105-106.
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and otherwise alienate it. . . as free and allodial property" became the
dominant form of property h o ld in g .217
The previous Company and Dutch practice had not involved any
capital down payments; existing freehold land titles were the result of 
grants or on condition of payment of the recognition fee. The British
however introduced a lump sum capital payment system from prospective
landholders. They declared the land taken over by the British in the
nineteenth century as British Crown Lands. In 1860 the Cape Parliament
passed an Act to regulate the sale of Crown land subject to an annual 
quitrent. In this case the quitrent" was similar to the on-going British
practice which gave property owners m arketable title deeds but which 
requires them to pay ground rent to the British monarchy in order to
provide a continuing source of income. In Natal in 1949 the British 
experimented with another new scheme known as the Byrne scheme which 
involved the auction of Crown land to British emigrants as part of a plan to
system atically colonise the newly conquered territory.218
Sir John Cradock, representing the British im perial adm inistration, 
explained the political economy, ideology and rationale o f the British
freehold  land strategy. W hen issuing the proclam ation to enable the
transformation of loan farms into perpetual quitrent he said,
"The whole tenor o f  the foregoing regula tions ' will m anifes t the
pa te rnal  v iew His M ajesty has taken o f  this Colony; and, in deeply
considering the perm anent interest of the occupiers o f  the lands, to what
extent the Crown has resolved to sacrifice its rights and prerogatives, in 
order  to place property upon the solid and secure foundation, without 
which fa ir  adven ture  and  speculation cannot arise , and even com m on 
industry and labour will lose much of its effect. . ."219
The Land Act of 1913 resulted in further land alienation from blacks; 
areas were now designated exclusively for white or black occupancy. The
State took ownership of thousands of hectares of land displacing blacks and 
placing white settlers on the land. Settlement schemes such as the Milner 
scheme had earlier aimed to settle "Englishmen in the new colonies, in 
order to increase the English v o te ."220 Now it was felt the immigrants with
217 Davenport & Hunt, 1974p.6. citing Cradock in Theal, G.M. (ed.) "Records of the 
Cape Colony" ix. 203-8.
218 ibid. p.7. citing the Colonial Office to Joseph Byrne, 6 January 1949, in 
Parliamentary Papers, 1849, xxxvi [1059] Correspondence re. the Establishment of 
the Settlement of Natal.
219 Davenport and Hunt, 1974 p.76 citing Theal, "Records", ix, pp.203-208.
220 Goodfellow, D.M. 1931, p243
99
capital should look after themselves. The Land Act of 1913 included 
improved provision for existing or potential white farmers,
"It aimed an assisting carefully selected applicants from the rural 
districts to obtain freehold tenure of areas of land of not more than 500 
morgen. It provided for advances to be made to them in respect of the 
purchase price of land, and of practically all other expenses incurred 
during several years, while the settlers were finding their feet"221
Thus the rights and prerogatives of the indigenous people were
swept away by a new set of rights and prerogatives won by conquest. They 
privatised the conquered land, transformed the tenure system and made 
land into a saleable commodity as part of the foundation of a capitalist 
economic system. Only some minor land areas were demarcated as African 
reserves or remained in state possession as Crown Lands; land in white
areas had freehold title to be freely marketed albeit (eventually) only 
among whites. The British therefore finished what the Dutch had begun;
they completed the process of expropriation and laid down the conditions 
for the future organisation of capitalist production.
3.3. The A frican  S trugg le to R etain  Access to L and .
Land dispossession did not however mark the end of African land 
struggles. The nature of the struggles changed. Initially, Africans fought a
political and diplomatic battle to increase the land designated as reserves.
Later, steps were taken to buy in to the new economic order by organising
African land purchase. And, most painfully, Africans struggled to retain as 
much of their farming areas as possible where whites formally held title
deeds.
3.3.(i). The creation of "reserves".
Despite the firm military and political grip of white minority rule
there was an ever present sense o f economic insecurity. W hite farmers
were apprehensive that African farmers would dominate the new m arket 
opportunities provided by the opening up of the gold mines. In turn the
mine owners were concerned that if Africans could independently make a
good living from their own farms less labour would "voluntarily” seek
em ploym ent. F urtherm ore the w hite colonisers period ically  expressed 
psychological fear of being racially outnumbered and endangered.
221 ibid. p244
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. . Complaints that the kaffirs begin to multiply amongst us, and 
that depredations are not only increasing, but they make locations on 
inhabited places, erect numerous kraals, and may become dangerous to our 
inhabitants; and as it has appeared to o u r . Council that it is necessary that 
provision should be forthw ith made to avoid endangering the whole 
c o u n try . "
The "reserves", geographically defined areas into which Africans
could be hemmed in, provided the appropriate mechanism to the dominant 
race group to secure its economic strategy. In 1846 the British established 
Native Reserves in Natal. As well as demarcating the Reserve areas the 
British also mapped out and registered 371 farms intended for freehold 
occupation on the vast lands surrounding the reserves; of these whites 
claimed only 100 at the time. Many Africans, however, presented claims to 
these very same farms on the basis of treaties drawn up in earlier periods of 
the conquest process. Amidst such confusion the British simply decided to 
disrespect the early accords The British reason for a disregard of African 
claims based on treaties is recorded as, "it does not appear that it was 
intended that those claims should be subject to registration with a view to 
issue of titles. "222
But the conquest of battle and pen-strokes of treaties did not effect
the physical rem oval of the  African peoples from their heartland of 
residence and production. On farms not yet claimed by whites or on many of
those claimed but not yet occupied, the government wrote,"the majority . . . 
are either inhabited by Kaffirs, or so densely surrounded by them as to be 
considered unsafe" Prospective white farmers clamoured for protection and 
advocated the "resettlem ent of natives" as a m atter of (white) "public 
fa i th" .223
Both the British, governing the Cape and Natal, and the Afrikaners, 
ruling the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal) 
now shared the view that there should be areas in which Africans would
have residen tia l rights with lim ited production potential. But various 
documents prove unambiguously that the prim ary reason for the reserve 
plan was to control Africans as labour resource. 224
222 Davenport and Hunt, 1974 citing Parliament Papers [980], 1848, pp.57-59, "The 
Establishment of Native Reserves in Natal: Enclosure in Sir P. Maitland to W.E. 
Gladstone." 16 May 1846.
223 ibid, pp.57-59.
224 Davenport and Hunt, 1976, p. 14. citing G.W.Ethers, Select Constitutional 
Documents, pp.320-325. In 1867, for example, the Afrikaners established a reserve, 
Witziehoek. They recognised a Paulus Mopeli as the Chief who would have the 
political power to administer the reserve but stipulated the conditions of his 
administration. Several conditions indicate the British objective of ensuring that the
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The settlers secured a legal right to black child labour and control 
over the movement of indigenous people. The required payment of a hut tax
created considerable pressure for adults to look for wage work (readily
available on the mines), especially the poorest strata who had few cattle and 
limited household labour and who could not therefore generate sufficient 
produce to raise the compulsory tax payments.
3.3.(ii) African Land Purchase.
In the earlier period, the British and Afrikaners differed on whether
Africans who had resources should be allowed to buy freehold farms in the 
areas outside the reserves. Under the British in the Cape Colony there were 
no legal restrictions on land purchase. The Transvaal Voortrekker state
passed Resolution 159 in 1855 which limited freehold land ownership to 
burghers and stipulated that "natives" should be precluded from ever
receiving such rights. But A frikaner opinion was divided and fierce 
political debate continued leading to the annulment o f Resolution 159
twenty six years later in 1881 (Article XIII of the Pretoria Convention).
The financial capacity of Africans to purchase land was limited. 
Theirs had been an agricultural economy with attendant artisanal activity 
and limited commercial interaction. Whites now controlled trade and the 
land areas bearing mineral resources, and although Africans could buy the 
new farm ing im plem ents which would enable them to increase their
com mercial surpluses, the funds they could generate through farm sales 
were limited. In 1905, Parliam ent discussed statistics on A frican Land
Purchase in the Transvaal which indicated that "the en tire A frican 
population had bought little more than 1000 morgen of land each year for 
the past twelve y e a r s .  "225
Africans rarely succeeded in accumulating sufficient funds to buy 
farms as individuals; instead they formed syndicates. The chief or headman 
would organise the collection o f money for such a purchase and carry
reserves would secure a supply of labour to white activities outside of the reserves: 
"S. Mopeli to be obliged to supply men for commandos (to the government of the 
Orange Free StfUe) 6. No person subordinate to Captain Mopeli shall be allowed to 
leave the lands assigned to him to live on, without being provided with a printed 
pass signed by the officer stationed there. . . 8. Hut tax of 10s per annum. . .16. The 
Commandant shall have the right to book in (apprentice) coloured children belonging 
to the territory, till they shall become of age, with burghers of the State, when 
parents or nearest relatives may request him to do so. . ."
225 Wilson M and L Thonqjson, 1971, p 154.
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through the necessary legal form alities. For example 55 family members
were signatories to the purchase of a piece of land, Bulfontein No 293 and 
paid in the region of £10 000 for this land. But Africans not only had to
secure a cohesive group to collect funds but they also had to fulfil entirely
different and more difficult and expensive procedures than whites before 
they obtained their land title. The Glen Gray Act stipulated, that if Africans 
expressed interest m purchasing a piece of land, such property would have
to be surveyed. An exceedingly high cost was charged for these surveys,
sometimes amounting to two to three times the market value of the land.226
". . . the purchase of land was hedged round by many practical
difficulties. There were the expenses of the survey. . . A lump sum of
money had to be found such as surpassed the comprehension of most 
natives. And even if all these steps were taken, the native was still not 
the absolute owner of the land. He found he had taken it by means of
what was known as a mortgage. He had to keep on paying sums of money 
every six months, and if he failed to pay on any occasion, he might lose 
the land. The native, indeed was a natural victim of the land shark." 
Goodfellow, 1931, p.230.
Hence blacks were never able to buy significant quantities of land
and much o f what they did buy was later lost through mortgage
fo re c lo s u re s .227
3.3.(iii) African Tenancy on Mission and State Crown Land.
Many A fricans became tenants on M ission land and Crownland 
because of the limited reserve areas and their inability to raise funds for 
land purchase. However it is not clear in all cases whether African farmers 
took up the offers of tenancy or whether the church occupied land where 
Africans were already farming. In many cases the community was already 
on the land in question and the legislation gave official sanction for it to 
stay. For instance in 1854 "trust tenure" was introduced on mission stations
on the Eastern Cape frontier,
"It was not a clear point whether these mission lands were the
property of the mission community congregated within it. . . but, . . . was 
thought desirable that the lands should be granted and held in trust by 
certain trustees, o f which the representative of the mission societies and 
the civ il com m issioner of the d istric t should of necessity  be
m e m b e rs ."228
226 Goodfellow, D.M. p. 154.
227 Cross, C. 1990, p.4.
228 Davenport and Hunt, 1976, p.35, citing Further Papers relative to the State of the 
Kaffir Tribes, July 1855, No. 12, Sir G Cathcart to the Duke of Newcastle, 14th march 
1854.
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Tenancy conditions differed greatly and changed over time. The 
M fengu on a Crown reserve eventually gained the right to perpetual 
quitrent titles. The Glen Gray Act of 1894 approved the introduction of a 
system of individual title to all the reserves.
However the white parliam entary  debate continued over the 
conditions under which Africans would be allowed to hold their land. 
Liberals preferred the introduction of individual title which they believe to 
be part of the conditions necessary for Africans entrepreneurs who wished 
to advance their com mercial capacity. Others feared the challenge of 
A frican  en trep reneursh ip  or tha t the developm ent o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
capitalism  in the reserves might displace African fam ilies. The mining 
houses had a vested interest in the reserves remaining as places where 
male workers could leave their wives and children. In this way the mining 
houses saved on the social investm ent costs since single male hostel 
quarters are cheaper than family dwellings but more im portantly the 
mines could pay workers lower wages on the supposition that wives and 
children were producing food for them selves. This is a controversial 
proposition as the withdrawal o f labour (and land) from black rural 
fam ilies itse lf underm ined the very organisation  of production, and 
weakened the capacity of the rurally based household to produce food.229
Although the debate on African tenure conditions continued to rage, 
the position which most benefitted  the mining houses gained political 
ascendancy. The 1913 Land Act explicitly prohibited a system of title deeds 
in the reserves. In fact the colonial state then imposed the conditions on 
land in the reserves, overlaying customary pre-colonial land practice, and 
appointing salary earning "chiefs" to adm inister what they called the 
"traditional system of communal land tenure" in the reserves.
3 ,3 . ( iv ) RgMa.1 tghahçy .
M any im m igrants faced  d ifficu lties  in es tab lish ing  p ro fitab le  
farm ing activities. They lacked operating capital and had never before 
farmed in these agro-climatic conditions. As the colonialists advanced east 
and northwards taking over land from the Nguni and Sotho speaking people 
they encountered a larger agro-pastoral farming population who did not 
have the same mobility as the San and the Khoikhoi but had every interest 
in pursuing any option which would allow them to continue farming. The 
lands eventually available in the reserves, acquired through purchase or
229 wolpe H (1972) pp439-444.
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through tenure of Mission and Crown Land, were extremely limited relative 
to the African population who wanted to continue farming.
The land areas initially taken over by each white settler were vast. 
These farm s were subsequently divided and redivided follow ing the 
tradition of Roman Dutch law in which the land, following the death of the 
landowner, is divided among his sons. White immigrants who arrived later 
who did not have a land grant often took up tenancy and were known as
"bywoners". Especially prior to the discovery of the gold on the 
W itw atersrand reef, the profits which im m igrants could make out of
marketable surpluses were quite limited. Few town settlements needed food 
su pp lies. A g ricu ltu ra l en trep ren eu rs  had to look fo r p ro fitab le
opportunities using non-perishable items such as skins, hides and wool. 
Landlordism often provided the most profitable option and African land 
hunger allowed the landlords to gain greater profits from African tenants 
than white "bywoner" tenants :
"The owners invariably allowed natives to occupy it [land] in 
exchange for rent. Very often it appears that this renting to natives was 
very profitable. We hear of examples of larger amounts per acre being 
received from natives than ever could have been obtained from white
fa rm e rs . "230
Africans could pay higher rents than white tenants because in 
addition to cultivating the farm, family income was supplemented by off- 
farm wages. Goodfellow refers to these excessive rent charges as "rack- 
renting" as landowners exploited blacks' willingness "to pay very heavily 
rather than give up their holdings." Such rack renting (the only option
available for many to m aintain some access to land) required African 
families to cultivate large land areas in order to attain the desired level of
production for consum ption and paym ent o f the exorbitant rent. The 
tenancy conditions were harsh and there was no security of tenure.
Tenants could be legally evicted at any moment on the arbitrary whim of 
the landlord. Furthermore the landowners did not allow the tenants freedom 
to organise their own production and placed numerous conditions on the 
tenancy; eg. in many cases the landowner placed a limit on the number of 
cattle that could be kept on the land. Whites referred to black tenants as
"squatters" which graphically expresses not only the power relationship 
between white landowners and black tenants but also the general derisive
230 Goodfellow, D.M. 1933, p.75.
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attitude of the whites whether in governm ent, com m erce, industry or
f a r m i n g .
3.3.(v) Sharecropping and labour tenancy.
African farm ing experience and their ow nership of cattle and 
ploughs was extremely beneficial to white immigrants. People living on
homesteads which, after conquest, fell outside of these reserve or mission
areas sought either to remain on their original land, to which whites now 
held title deeds, or to trek with their cattle and moveable belongings to seek 
settlement opportunities on the farms of other whites. Whites were able to 
exploit Africans' ownership of means of production and their farming 
skills. Through their acquisition of title deeds white farmers were able to 
stipulate tenancy conditions which enabled them to enjoy profits without 
having invested one cent of capital into the farming activity or spending
even one cent on wages. W hite landow ners enjoyed profits through 
A fricans ' farm ing on w hite title d  land through m onetary  ren ta l
arrangem ents, share cropping agreements or through labour tenancy.
The extent of absentee landlordism is not recorded. But even where 
the landowners lived on the farm stead as owner occupiers the white
landowner only partially organised the production activity taking place on 
the farm. Africans organised their own production activities on the basis of 
sharecropping and labour tenancy arrangem ents. At this stage of history
African families still had cattle and tools and increasingly began to use 
their monetary savings gained through sales of agricultural surplus to buy 
the ploughs which would allow them to expand their cultivated area.
"Share cropping" describes those cond itions w hich perm itted
African land occupation in return for a payment of rent in the form of part 
of their crops. When the landlord took as much as half of the black tenants 
production this was known as "sowing on halves" whereas "sowing on
shares" meant the tenant and landlord negotiated the percentage to be paid
in kind. Under the sharecropping system the white landowner did not mark 
out any specific area which would then be under the control of the black 
tenant. The sharecropper worked the white's land on condition that after 
harvest the produce would be split between sharecropper and landowner. 
M any sharecroppers financed  the en tire  p roduction  ac tiv ity . They 
ploughed with their own oxen and tools, sowed their own seed, carried the
costs of depreciation. The "share" paid to landlord was considerable. Thus 
tenants were squeezed to produce sufficient output, which after the share
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payment, would leave enough produce for home consumption and the sales 
needed to purchase other necessities and save for investment. Tn the 1970s 
and 1980s the rental norm for white tenants renting land from white
landowners has been a rental value approxim ating five percent of the 
value of the crop - thus a very different norm to that of "sowing on halves"!
Labour tenants entered into very different contracts. In law they 
are treated as employees, not tenants; contracts stipulated that in exchange
for an area of land which the labour tenant could farm as if it were his/her
own then certain members of the family would provide labour services to 
the landowner. This labour would either not be paid for, or would be a 
nominal sum; the labour service was in lieu of rental payment for the black 
fam ily's use of land for cultivation and grazing cattle. Black fam ilies 
therefore cultivated defined land areas (usually the poorest part of the farm 
area) and occasionally the landowner laid down conditions about the
number of cattle, sheep and goats that could be grazed. In the early part of 
labour tenancy history these conditions were fairly lax but later whites laid 
down more and more stringent conditions as part of a strategy to weaken
independent African production and secure a more readily available labour 
so u rc e .
African farming activities on white-owned land were the source of a 
continuous and tense debate resulting in legislative changes over many
decades. W hites who were trying to make p rofits  from  their own
entrepreneurial activities rather than as landlords often faced difficulties 
in recruiting black labour at the wage rates that they offered. They 
complained bitterly of labour shortage problems and tended to blame the
continuity o f independent A frican production as a major cause. W hite 
farmers referred to black tenancy as "kaffir farming " and, especially in the 
Cape Colony, argued that the system of black tenancy "had the effect of 
locking up labour so that it was not available for the general agricultural 
development of the c o u n t r y ."231
But in general the white colonisers had neither the capital nor, at 
first, the skills to develop fully fledged capitalist farming. For many, at this 
stage o f economic and technological development landlordism was the most 
p ro fitab le  and there fo re  p re fe rred  option. H ence early  co lon ia lists  
developed this "semi-feudal" system in order to obtain agricultural surplus;
231 ibid, p.77.
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Africans paid rent in kind or labour to either white landowners, the church 
(through , farms occupied by Mission stations) and the C r o w n / s t a t e . 232
3.4. Land access and conditions of ten u re  in "B an tu s tan s" .
The initial "reserves" (and later "homelands") scheme aimed to avoid 
complete black land dispossession in the albeit reduced land area, in order
to prevent land sales and hence dispossession the governm ent had, 
anachronistically, to prevent the emergence of land marketability within a 
capitalist economy. Ironically South African academics have written, "An- 
open market for land, plus legal safeguards, is the best protection against a 
doctrinaire Marxist approach which removes all land from the reach of 
market f o r c e s .  "233 But South Africa's leading capitalists, in the interest of 
increased profitability, supported the creation of "reserves" where blacks
would have long terra access to land from which they could neither sell nor
themselves be removed.
3.4.(i). Black Population and Land availability 1985.
The 1913 Land Act delimited "scheduled areas" for black occupation 
and established the spatial framework for apartheid. The 1936 Land Act
provided the legal framework under which some o f the surviving African 
freehold land was incorporated into the reserves. But black freehold in the
areas now designated as white were labelled as "blackspots" and the regime 
dispossessed and forcibly removed these freeholders. Before the Nationalist 
Party took power in 1948 land had been territorially divided on a racial 
basis but not ethnically; the "reserves" were inhabited by Africans o f
differing ethnic origin. Lebowa, for exam ple, previously form ed one 
geographic entity which the N ationalists now divided into G azankulu, 
Venda and KwaNdebele "homelands". The grand design of the Nationalists
Party's apartheid rule was to divide the A frican population further by 
creating these 'Homelands" strictly according to tribal origin. The 1959
Bantu Self Government Act decreed that the North Sotho should reside in 
the area defined as Lebowa, the South Sotho in QwaQwa, the Tswana in
Bophutatswana, the Zulu in KwaZulu, the Swazi in KaNgwane, the Tsonga in 
Gazankulu, the Venda in Venda. For the Xhosa, two "homelands" were 
defined, the C iskei and the Transkei. Later the white National Party
governm ent m apped out yet another area fo r the South N debele,
K w aN debele.
232 Morris, M.L. 1976, p.293
233 Behimann, H.I. 1980, p.21.
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Between 1946 and 1962 there were risings in W itzieshoek, on the 
border of Lesotho; in Marica just south of Botswana; in Sekhukhuneland in 
north-western Transvaal; in Zululand on the South Coast and throughout 
the  T r a n s k e i . 234 T he  Pondo  rev o l ts  in the  T ra n sk e i  and  the 
Sekhukhuneland  res is tance  in 1958 are specific testim ony to the deep 
opposition aroused against the governm ent's  imposition of new territorial 
a u t h o r i t i e s . 235 Furtherm ore  the governm ent wiped out the little  that 
rem ained  o f  parliam entary  represen ta tion  o f  A fricans who were instead 
c o n fe r re d  with "cit izensh ip"  o f  the "hom elands"  through  the B antu  
Homeland Citizen Bill of 1969.
Since 1948 the National Party governm ent rem oved m illions of 
Africans from 'white' South Africa in addition to those displaced in earlier 
periods. A quarter of a m illion have been rem oved from so called 
'blackspots'. One and a half million were removed as a result of the abolition 
o f labour tenancy and squatting, and as many as 400 000 Africans, 
considered as 'unproductive' were forced out of the urban areas to the 
bantustans. The overcrowded masses of the unemployed and landless in the 
tribal homelands are the result of apartheid policy wherein:
". . the only basis on which the bantu is present in the white areas is to 
sell their labour power and nothing else."
(1976. M.C. Botha, Minister of Labour and M a n p o w e r . )236
Of South Africa's almost five million whites, only half a million live 
outside the cities. They are the 60,000 white farmers, their families and the 
populations of the small rural towns which service the farming industry. 
44% of South Africa's disenfranchised blacks live and work in the so-called 
"white" urban and rural areas and constitute the core of the workforce. 
56%, a residual group, inhabit the "bantustan " "reserves"; they are mostly 
the elderly, women, unem ployed youth and children. These 14 m illion 
people now live in the confines of 16,7 million hectares but half of them are 
la n d le s s .
The definition of arable and non-arable land is controversial. Earlier 
classifications failed to take account of land slope and as a result steep sided
234 Mbeki, G. 1964, pi 11-134
235 See D.AJames's dissertation, 1987, "Kinship and Land in an Inter-Ethnic Rural 
C om m unity" for an account of the insecurity and divisiveness caused by the National 
party's ethnic policy.
236 Mbongwa, 1984, p l l
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hills were categorised as arable. There is evidence that in the 'homelands' 
much of the classification of arable' land is i n c o r r e c t . 237
Table.3.1. Racial Land Distribution
Land Distribution. B a n t u s ta n s
Surface  Area 1 6 ,7 2 7  
('000 Ha.)
Rest of RSA 
105,373
Total for RSA 
122,100
Arable Land 2,338 12,260 14,598
% Arabiç 14% 12% 12%
Source: Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, 1987, Table 5
Table 3.2: African PoDulation and Access to Land in the H o m e l a n d s " 2 3 8
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4 )
Surface Area A ra b le P o p u la tio n Arable land
('000 Ha.) (’000. HaJ ( 000) /household
Qf 6 pçrspnç
C is k e i 650 75 750 0.6
T r a n s k e i 4,355 754 3,000 1,5
K w a Z u lu 3,316 565 4,382 0.8
V e n d a 620 65 460 0,8
L e b o w a 2,454 347 2,157 1,0
G a z a n k u l u 773 65 620 0,6
B o p h u t a t 4,000 400 1,721 1,4
-s  w a n a
K a n g w a n e 300 36 448 0,5
K w a N d e b e le 197 24 286 0,5
Q w a q w a 62 7 209 0,2
Sub T otal 16,727 2,338 14,043
2.8. million families live in the h o m e l a n d s ' 2 3 9  Cobbett's data, Table 
3.2., column 4, on the difference in land availability per household indicates 
the miniscule a v e r a g e . 2 4 0  Even so there are several qualifications to these 
averages. Many bantustan residents live in 'closer settlements' ie an urban 
type high density housing zone. It is suggested that up to 40 percent of the
237 Lenta, 1981
238 Cobbett M, 1987, p8.Table 1.
239 This is based on a household average of 5 which is high for a society dominated by 
migrancy. For similar communities in neighbouring Mozambique the census data 
family average is less than five. See Centre of African Studies. 1986. 'Marracuene: 
Terms of trade'
240 compare these average per black household farm with the Agures in Chapter 3 on 
white farming where the average is more than 1000 hectares.
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hom eland population live in such zones but even taking this into 
consideration the mean amount of arable land per household is still below 
two hectares.241 On the other hand there is increased corporate investment 
in land in bantustans. These tend to take place on areas being annexed to 
bantustans as relatively small amounts of land are bought by government 
and transferred in fulfillment of the 1936 objective of making 13% of land 
available to b l a c k s . 242 Bantustan development parastatals and private sector 
investments are mainly responsible for increase in the value of bantustans' 
marketed agricultural produce from R56,2 million in 1970 to R163 million in
1985; a real increase of 190 p e r c e n t . 2 4 3  The occupation of this annexed land 
by parastatals and the private sector (especially in KwaZulu) inflates the 
amount of land apparently available to black households w ithout their 
effectively gaining access to it. Estimates of landlessness now range from 25
per cent to 60 per cent244 as between communities; those who have land
differ considerably in the size of holdings and organisation of production.
3.4.(ii). Tenure: a web of regulation modified by social practice
Africans gain limited access to land through various tenure systems
which operate in the "homelands": communal tenure, trust tenure, quitrent, 
freehold and leasehold. These vary enormously in the degree of state 
control to which they are subject. In areas where there is less state control 
people have m odified their tenure system s to accom m odate changing 
conditions. Therefore although several tenure systems operate officially  
informal systems have developed in practice.
The com m unal tenure svstem . a colonial m odification  o f the
indigenous communitarian system, has so far proved most able to respond to 
social crisis in the rural areas. "Communal land" is mostly adm inistered by 
chiefs under the Tribal Authority system of the homelands but where there 
is m ore state control local m agistrates exercise authority . There are
widespread reports o f corruption in the adm inistration of land; and chiefs 
have mostly collaborated with the state to implement unpopular policies 
such as "betterment" which did not allow for widely spread homesteads but 
grouped houses together, dem arcated arable fields and grazing areas and
insisted on cattle culling and fencing. Where chiefs have supported popular
241 ibid, p7
242Letsoalo, E. 1987, p66, and p71.
243 ibid,plO.
244 Yawitch,J.1982, May, Natnss and Peters, 1985
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resistance to betterment or to forced incorporation into homelands, the 
rightful chief has been replaced with a state approved appointment.
N otwithstanding all these difficulties, the communal land tenure 
system has offered most autonomy (com paratively) to communities who 
have been able to preserve some of the character of land rights most valued 
by A fricans. Conceptions of land right differ significantly from the 
capitalist conception of property rights. Cross writes "Land is as much a 
relation between people as it is the means of production. . . Where the state
has not taken control, land granting takes place between fam ilies and 
descent groups. It creates ties of clientship between the families involved; 
households living on what was once one landholding tend to form a 
cooperating te rrito ria l group and m aintain in ternal so lidarity . These 
connections are building blocks for survival s t r a t e g i e s . "245
The concept of the land right "ethic" embodies the following set of
p r i n c i p l e s 2 4 6 ;
(i) a right of access to land which once conferred gives civic status 
and the right to participate in community affairs,
(ii) access is not just to an arable plot but includes a residential site, 
grazing rights and access to common property resources (wood, water, 
reeds, clay) irrespective of their location,
(iii) the right of the community to pressurize for the transfer of 
unused or underutilised land according to need,
(iv) long term  occupancy o f loaned land confers leg itim ate 
perm anent right,
(v) the family land holding is governed by the male head of the
household who respects the rights of relatives, heirs, wives. Land is 
transferred as needed rather than inherited. In more modern areas the
focus becomes restricted to immediate family rather than the m ale-line
kinship g r o u p . 247
Ethnic tradition persists and within fam ilies the process o f land 
exchanging hands in the "reserves" is through a system of devolution 
rather than inheritance; Land acquisition comes with marriage rather than
death; as members of the family marry they may request the allocation of a
kraal site, an area of cropping land and the right to graze stock on the
communal grazing area. So a system of ultim ogeniture prevails because
245 Cross, C. 1990b, pi.
2 4 6  i b i d .  p . 5 .
247 Cross 1990b, pp. 1-2, James, 1987.
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other household m em bers w ill already have procured allo tm ents. 
Furthermore, land access after marriage is a male prerogative. A daughter- 
in-law may gain access to family land whereas an unmarried daughter may 
only continue to work on her father's land for as long as he or her mother
is alive.249
C onsiderable research  on land tenure in the h o m e l a n d s ^ ^ O  
concludes that, "(it is) a myth . . . that land tenure in the homelands is 
communal. Only certain resources which do not occur on the individuals 
holdings are used communally, notably commonage grazing. The arable 
land is held . . . securely. . . under individual tenure."251
M ost of the land occupied by blacks falls under the ultim ate 
jurisdiction of the South African Development Trust, but the term "trust
tenure" itself refers to a controlled land system on land which the South
African state bought from white farmers to be added on to the "homelands" 
Trust tenure is the most controlled tenure system and hence affords the 
least popular control. In many areas even chiefs exercised little control;
instead  sta te  o ffic ia ls  reg is te r  a rab le  p lo ts , im pose "betterm en t"
instructions, control stock and ro ta te  grazing areas, restric t housing
patterns and may even appoint and sack farmers. Landholders pay a small
rent for the one allotted field which may not be subdivided, sharecropped or 
even freely loaned. In part of the Transvaal and Transkei where trust 
tenure operates, landlessness is over 50% because of control over
subdivision. People have almost no autonomy or flexibility. There is no 
adm inistrative im perative even to respect any principle of inheritance.
Cross states categorically that trust tenure is unpopular; it has no social or 
political basis except to underpin "the apartheid state and its structures of 
indirect rule.
Historically, quitrent for whites was almost on a par with freehold; 
whites who were granted perpetual quitrent by the state could sell or 
transfer land. However an element of conditionality remained: the state 
retained the right to demand the transfer of tenancy - a right it might 
exercise if say the farmer's land use practices were poor. However quitrent
248 James, 1987, p 141 notes, "Far from amounting to preferential treatment for the 
youngest, this type of inheritance involves a substantial burden of responsibility 
iq>on the heir, whose duty it becomes to care for his ageing mother, or for both 
parents in the case of a monogamous marriage.
249 ibid, pp.97-124.
250 especially Cross. C
251 The Urban Foundation, 1990, p.20.
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for blacks is mure conditional, occurs in frequently , is alm ost never
marketed, but is attractive as it allows for more individual control over land 
than either communal or trust tenure. Quitrents granted in the Ciskei in the
1980s consist of larger plots, subdivision is illegal, inheritance goes to the
eldest son with widows enjoying usufruct. Quitrent holders, according to 
Cross, "constitute a landed class m aintained by state action". Although
quitrent farmers seem to be less affected by state planning interference
and have almost as much security as freeholders, they must strictly use
their quitrent land for family residence and family production.
Besides trust tenure and quitrent the state operates yet another 
leasehold system making land available to individuals. These leasehold are 
mostly available through state run agricultural development projects or on 
business sites where the state rents out land to black e n t r e p r e n e u r s .252
W here black South Africans have been able to m aintain 
freehold ownership of land they have been able253 to control their own 
land use and transfer and respond m ost e ffec tive ly  to changing 
demographic and economic conditions. The results ' are not always positive. 
Few freeholds belong to blacks who farm either through the use of wage 
labour or tenants. Many freehold purchases were carried out by families or 
syndicates and these farms are now heavily populated by descendants of the 
original purchasers and extended clientele. Black freeholds are alm ost 
never marketed. Many freeholders have beeome landlords of residential 
tenants, especially on freeholds in areas which have become peri-urban. 
C lass d ifferen tia tio n  and con trad ic tions are  em erging strongly and 
landlords go armed when collecting r e n ts .2 5 4  iq  other areas the patron 
client relationships are exploited to further political disputes; Cross suggests 
that violence in Natal's tenancy areas is exacerbated by "politicised local 
patron-client followings controlled by men described as warlords'.
B lack freeholds are areas of po litical pow er. F reeholds once 
represented  the "progressive" ideal - an area w here A fricans could
252 ibid, p.22,
253 This point of view is informed by various experiences and considerations, (i) The
state should not acquire land unless there is an demand for it in that location, (ii)
People with specific land claims may be expected to actively pursue these but 
beyond that there is the issue of million of unemployed. In neighbouring states a 
forced 'back to the land' pohcy has been tried. (See Hanlon, 1984, pp. 244 -249) It
is felt that this is unacceptable. It was felt that the economic terms of trade and .
living conditions in the rural areas needed to prove themselves attractive and then 
the state should facilitate land acquisition
254 Violence in 1985 in Inanda's tenancy areas was apparently directed at landlords. Cross,
1990, p.22.
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continue communitarian ideas without governm ent interference. However 
there has been a steadfast breakdown of some of the "communal" land right
principles. For example cash paying tenants never gain a legitimate right 
through prolonged occupancy and an influx of new arrivals into pe ri­
urban tenant areas has broken down long established social, patron-client 
relationship  which enjoyed quasi-traditional use rights.
3 .4 .3 .Land M arketabilitv .
The accom m odation o f d iffering  a ttitudes tow ards land, the
inheritance of racially based and varying tenure systems requires flexible 
approaches, innovation and regional sensitivity in the future. In terms of
land and tenure reform there is a reported strongly-held view that there
should be access to land as a god-given r e s o u r c e ^ ^ S  from which people 
should not profit through rent or sale but m arketability is an ever 
increasing occurence evenn in areas held under communal tenure.
The state controlled tenure systems are riddled with corruption
docum ented by innum erable rural r e s e a r c h e r s . 2 5 6  Baskin, interview ing 
fam ilies in the Transkei, found nearly all the interviews revealed that a 
large degree of corruption existed in the distribution of land; a situation
which emerges as a result of land scarcity and the great desire of the people
for l a n d . 2 5 7
Q ’Are the arable plots of this location of the same size?’
A. ’No.'
Q 'Who possesses bigger plots?'
A. 'Those who administer the land.'
Q 'What do you mean by that?'
A. I mean the headman, land is for sale.'
Q 'Where is the level bought?'
A. 'At the headman, you can even buy a beast so that you can get
somebody's land.'
Q. 'Do you mean to say that I can give a headman a beast and then
takeover land which belonged to another person.'
A. 'Y es.'
Cross notes on-the-ground increase in land transactions whether in 
rem ote rural or peri-urban areas. She draws attention to a recurring 
sociological phenomenon that expressed social attitude often lags behind 
actual social practice ie. verbal expression often represents tradition and
belies the changes taking place. Cross sets out her researched "directions of
255 Claassens, A. 1989.
256 Letsoalo L, 1987, Baskin, 1985, Behrmann, 1980, Haines and Tapscott 1988,
257 Baskin, 1984
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change in land right p e r c e p t i o n s " . 258 gbe notes an expressed popular 
attraction to freehold: "The risks it carries of losing the land parcel through 
debt or desperation and of prom oting elite control are less widely
p e r c e i v e d .  "259 Démocratisation at the local government level to facilitate 
ground level discussion of who gains access to and control over land will he
an essential part of transforming the tenure system.
The inception  o f form al aparthe id  caused fa r-reach ing  and 
differentiating changes in black land economy. The removal of people from
white farms and black freehold farms in white areas increased dependency, 
on remittances from wages of family members who had wage employment.
Black farming was itself undermined through land shortage, loss of means 
of production and loss of labour itself as the most able bodied family
members migrated in search of wage work. Bantustans are characterised by 
a circulating and increasing population; outm igration to peri-urban areas
(often temporary) as well as demographic increases due to both removals
and natural increase have catalysed tenure changes. Land rights in vast 
shack settlements are translated into residential tenancies and land rental 
and sales are commonplace. Even in rem ote rural districts where land
resources are under severe pressure informal (illegal) land markets have
developed .
I have described several forms of tenure operating in South Africa's
black land areas; they range from communal tenure, trust tenure, quitrent 
to freehold. In the first three of these, a marketed exchange of ownership 
has been expressly forbidden by the state in the past. Exchange o f
ownership is rare in the pockets of freehold land in black areas.
Paym ent for access to land is an increasing phenomenon. Five 
different situations can be identified, (a) payment for land access in tribal
258 Cross, C. 1990b, memo to Centre of Applied Legal Studies, p.4. "Different
principles are changing at different rates but the changes in land right pcrCeptrOrhs are 
approximately as follows: (1) Universal access gives way to an acceptance that access to 
land is conditional and not automatic. (2) General access to the factors of subsistence
transforms into a conditional access to transport and intermediary modem-economy
household support factors. (3) A universal value of use priority over non-utilitarian 
ownership relaxes to allow for private discretion in land transfer. (4) The obligation to 
continuing exchange gives way to the economic principle that land transfers are one off
and final. (5) The obligation to return land at need is taken over by assertions of the
landholders individual decision autonomy. (6) Acceptance that occupancy means 
gradual transfer gives way to a belief in permanent individual ownership. (7) Vested 
claims to the land parcel simplify to an individual ownership right. (8) The 
commitment to continuity of the descent group dwindles to continuity of the individual 
family line. (9) The principle of settlement seniority moves towards a simple 
egalitarian ism .
259 Cross, 1990a, p.27.
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areas, (h) cash rentals on either trust or freehold areas, (c) sharecropping, 
(d) cash rentals in peri-urban areas and (e) institutionally supported rental 
arrangem ents in agri-business areas.
While land is not officially on sale there is substantial evidence that 
in fact people do informally pay a "price" for their access to it.-^O 'While 
the land is held as a right, a new occupier of land, such as a newly married 
man is required to pay a traditional fee to the Chief or headman.26l in the 
Abakwamkhanazi tribe in Natal the chief is paid approximately R40 plus 
gifts such as drink, while the induna receives about RIO plus gifts. Jeppe 
also mentions that rights to land may be sold or leased among the 
tribespeople, although not on credit or m o r t g a g e . 262
However, in spite of these changes (which mean new entrants may 
pay for access) the principle of right of access has been upheld The result 
is a diminishing size of fields and environmental d e g r a d a t i o n . 2 6 3  This is not 
however a uniform experience; in the Ciskei fields are registered as the 
result of extensive state control and subdivision to accommodate population 
increase is not permitted. Such state control and other state tenures, ie. trust 
tenure, quitrent, development schemes, which discrim inate and allow land 
to some people and not to others are seen as fundamentally unjust and 
interfering with the accepted practice of indigenous tenure rights.
Cash rentals are a very delicate matter in black rural areas. Having 
more land than one can use for oneself and making it available to be loaned 
by another family or community member amounts to an open admission 
that one has more than one needs or can effectively use. According to the 
tenets of indigenous land rights, a loan, if extended, transforms itself into 
an ownership right for the lessee.
Land is a scarce resource and there is great reluctance to part with 
ownership rights. The family may live o ff m igrant rem ittances and not 
need to use the land at present - but they do not expect to move permanently 
to an urban-industrial area and want to keep their land access rights. The
260 Behrmann. 1980,pl9, Baskin, J. 1984
261 There is intense resentment of the rural ehte, the chiefs, the headmen and tribal 
authority who support the homeland government. In an ANC workshop, October 1990, 
them was a heated debate on whether Tribal Authorities who want to work with the 
ANC should be allowed to. The debate concluded by recognising the abhorrent role 
played by many members of Tribal Authorities but that there were exceptions of chiefs 
who had supported popular struggles. Source: participant observation.
262 Behrmann, H.I., 1980 pl9
263 Cross, 1990a, pl l .
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family may also not use land because their cash sources are used up and 
nothing remains for the purchase of inputs -the family hopes to be able to 
use the land at some time in the future.
There is some evidence of sharecropp ing in the bantustans. 
Fieldworkers. have mostly cited cases where widows enter sharecropping 
a rra n g em en ts  w h en  they are too old to work their own land for
t h e m s e l v e s . 2 6 4
Cash rentals have become common in black peri-urban areas. While, 
black freeholds almost never change ownership, many freeholders have 
become landlords to residential tenants especially in rural areas which 
have become peri-urban as cities have expanded. In KwaZulu's peri-urban 
areas class contradictions are emerging strongly within such communities 
and there has been a steady breakdown of some of the "communal " land 
right principles. Cash paying tenants, for example, never gain a legitimate
right to ownership through prolonged occupancy as was historically the 
case. The influx of new arrivals into peri-urban tenant areas has broken
down long established social, patron-client relationships which previously 
enjoyed quasi-traditional use rights.
While this peri-urban cash rental situation may seem to provide the 
basis for more liberal land transaction patterns in the future, there has
been a certain halt to their development in the war-torn areas in KwaZulu. 
The open cash rentals approach allowed for "outsiders” to gain footholds in 
what were previously stable extended family netw ork com munities. The 
"outsiders" are now identified  as the "harbingers" o f v io lence and 
com m unities have entered a phase of "closing up; new entrants from
further flung rural areas only succeed in gaining access if  they are 
vouched for by existing members of the c o m m u n i ty .265
There are increasing instances o f institutionally  supported rental
arrangements. Black land-owners in the sugar areas of Natal have begun to 
rent out land. They rent out land more commonly to whites than to blacks. 
The rental arrangem ent to white sugar producers is in the form o f a
Contract Service Agreement. The black, mostly absentee, landlord receives 
between 10% to 15% of the gross returns as the rental p a y m e n t.2 6 6  it is said
264 May, J. 1987.
265 Author's field interview notes, peri-urban areas outside Pine Town, Durban, Natal, 
February 1992.
266 Thompson D and M Lynne, 1992, pl2-15
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that these black landholders feel that rental to whites is outside the cultural 
boundaries of indigenous land right practice and therefore liberates the 
landholder from the expectations which a black tenant would have.
There has also been an increase of land rentals between blacks in 
sugar producing areas where the landholder has a production quota. It 
seems that the possession of a production quota which is granted for a
specific piece of land gives the holder a sense of indisputable right quite 
independent of who is tilling the land. The landowner who has a production 
quota thus feels able to lease the land and here too it is understood that the- 
rental arrangement cannot approximate to an ownership right over time.
Protagonists of a freehold, free-market, non-racial land system point 
critically to land utilisation in the bantustans; they blame communality and 
the indigenous land righ t eth ic as the p rinc ip le  cause o f land 
underutilisation. This will be explored more fully in the next chapter. But it 
is very clear that tenants' rights are also tenuous. There is no protective 
tenant legislation of the kind that has been developed by tenant farmers in
the U.K., and it is the lack of tenant rights which Vaughan has identified as 
the major factor inhibiting land rentals in KwaZulu rather that the tenure 
conditions and concept of indigenous land e t h i c . 2 6 7
3.5. Conclusion.
The accommodation of differing attitudes towards land, and the 
legacy of racially based tenure systems will require flexible approaches, 
reg iona l sensitiv ity  and innovation  in a transfo rm atio n  period  
involving land reform . And, not least of all, it w ill require some 
sweeping questioning of conventional wisdoms and attitudes to white 
and black farming. Fikile Bam concludes that, "the sum total of all the 
politicking ' preceding and m otivating the passing o f the various 
legislative enactments relating to land and its use, has been the firm 
grafting of a black and white mentality. . . When thinking 'white',
concepts that spring to mind are ownership, registration, title deeds, 
mortgage bonds, servitudes, leases, succession and the will." I would add:
modern, technically superior, and efficient. For Bam "When thinking 
'black" on the other hand, it is chiefs, superintendents, allotments, soil 
erosion, permits, squatting, curfew, trespass, evictions and removals that
im pulsively  capture the I m a g i n a t i o n .  Barn's list how ever is
267 personal discussion with A. Vaughan, University of Durban-Westville.
268 Bam, F. 1987, p4.
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inomplete; expressed views on black farming also include: technically
backw ard , econom ica lly  unm otiva ted  with uneconom ic , u nsc ien t if ic
attitudes to livestock holding, outmoded concept of land rights.
This racial land characterisation contrasts strongly with the earlier 
discussion on theory o f  rent and land valuation which was firmly based 
within the context of a unitary system of marketable capitalist farms using 
a fully fledged rural proletariat, divorced from its means o f  production 
working for cash wages.
The evolution towards agrarian capitalism in South Africa, however,
is more accurately portrayed by a conception of lengthy, interdependence. 
W hite agriculture depended for • its development on the elim ination of 
em erg en t b lack  e n tre p re n e u rs  and th e ir  su b o rd in a tio n . T h e ir  
transformation into tenants gave initial access to their labour and means of 
production. As the capital basis of white agriculture strengthened and 
farm ers eventually m echanised, farm w orkers have been expelled. The 
setting up of bantustans allowed some black households to retain access to
land while ensuring that the insufficient land base would provide a labour
pool for industry and white agriculture. M oreover the drain o f migrant
labour from black rural households underm ined their productive base. 
Bantustans now provide the basic source of casual farm labour; homeland
residents depend on remittances for their basic reproduction. Any use they 
make o f land also depends on remittances to pay for ploughing, seeds, 
fertiliser and sometimes labour.
B ut am ong ag rarian  p roducers, black and w hite there  are 
considerable differences within the organisation of their production. These 
differences give rise to differing attitudes to land reform. Some blacks, 
especially those who have been labour tenants or who were removed from 
blackspots to desolate bantustan residences without access to land on which
to produce commercially or retain their livestock, look forward to renewed
farming possibilities. The profitable sector of white farms expects business 
continuity whereas the indebted grain farm ing sector, as review ed in 
C hapter 1,(situated in the h istorically  most conservative regions: the
Transvaal and the Orange Free State) is fearful of forthcoming reform. The 
following two chapters examine changes in the organisation of agriculture 
among black and white producers between 1948 to 1990. This identification
of economic stratification and understanding of socio-political attitudes is
essential; it highlights the necessity of flexibility in policy design in
keeping with the homogeneity of the rural population.
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C h a p te r  4. W h ite  c o m m e rc ia l fa rm in g : s ta te  in te rv e n t io n ,
te c h n o lo g ic a l in n o v a tio n  a n d  in c re a s in g  s t r a t i f ic a t io n .
The history of white farming from early conquest until the late 
twentieth century is punctuated by racially biased legislation concerning 
land and labour and increased state intervention to provide favourable 
economic conditions for the dominant, ie. white, group.
This chapter describes the role of the state in shaping and reshaping 
not only the technical and geographic profile of agriculture but also who 
farms and under what conditions. State fostered white ow ner-occupier 
hegem ony involved system atic expulsion o f A fricans from the land, 
legislation designed to ensure a supply of cheap labour and extensive state 
economic and technical support. This support, apart from enhancing the 
investm ent potential o f farms, also made it possible for less efficient 
farm ers to survive. Section 4.1 reviews state assistance from the early 
period of colonisation to 1948 the year in which the National Party won the 
white election. Section 4.2. summarises the evaluation of the status quo 
carried out by a government commission in the late 1960s and the decision 
to support centralisation and productivity improvements is reviewed in 4.3. 
From 1975-1990 the state focussed more on economic efficiency; Section 4.4 
provides an outline of government support to a modernisation process and 
its effects on farm ing structure. Section 4.5. outline the governm ents' 
policy initiatives to move commercial farming on to a free-m arket footing. 
Since the 1980s, it prom oted deregulation and began to cut back on 
subsidies. The latest period since 1990 is one of political flux wherein stated 
economic objectives diverge from the consequences o f actual practice as 
policy  is com prom ised due to p o litic a l considera tions. Increasing  
stratification has been one of the consequences o f deregulation and faced 
w ith p o litic a l lobbying from  the w hite farm ing  constituency  the
government has succumbed to pressure to bail out the white farm ing 
constituency the governing thus continuing racist policy practice.
4.1. S tate  S upport up  to 1948
State intervention to support colonial settler agriculture increased 
gradually. In the early period of colonisation prior to 1870 intervention was 
designed to facilitate the expropriation of the best agricultural lands from 
blacks and allocate them to white settlers at low or no costs. Some settlers
developed vineyards and exported wine and wool. But most settler farming 
in this early period was semi-subsistence stock farming. State assistance
121
came in the form of very low rentals in this p e r i o d . 269 Transport was a 
major difficulty; animals trekked not only between points of sale but also to 
summer and winter grazing areas. Drought reduced the natural grazing on 
the transport routes restricting the movement of produce. Moreover oxen 
trekked slowly limiting produce to that suited for transport over large 
distances such as wool and pastoral produce.
There was some diversification of farming activities. Ostrich farming 
boomed as an export industry for a limited period until fashions in Europe
changed drastically. Companies invested in sugar plantations and sugar 
mills. African farmers were also encouraged to cultivate sugar. Plantation
owners found it difficult to recruit workers for their plantations, in part 
because they did not offer any access to land as in the labour tenant
farming system. The state intervened to ease the labour shortage through 
the importation of thousands of indentured Indian agricultural workers.
State support to farmers increased as the mining industry developed 
after 1870 because of rising domestic demand for agricultural produce. The 
state's most important assistance to white farmers was its investment in rail
transport to link the mining areas to the three Cape ports. The state also 
imposed customs tariffs on imports which specially benefitted the Natal 
sugar producers and the wheat and maize farmers. A rail subsidy, granted 
only to whites, applied to produce en route to the W itw atersrand and 
remained in place for more than a century. The "colonial-produce-rate " (as
the subsidised tariff was called) also lessened locational advantage giving
more distant farmers an equal benefit from the mining trade in Kimberly.
Low rainfall made arable farming risky in many areas. The colonial 
settlers wanted irrigation schemes wherever possible but lacked both the 
capital and the necessary technical expertise. Their lobby succeeded and in
1876 the government passed the Irrigation Act; it was the first of a series of 
acts which gave white farm ers the right to receive subsidised technical 
advice from government engineers and special loans for irrigation works.
In the 1890s South A frican agricu lture faced serious setbacks. 
Destruction of crops by locusts followed drought seasons. These disasters
269 Davenport and Hunt, 1976, p3. citing reports of De Chavotmes and of Van Imhoff. In 
1743, when introducing "loan freehold tenure" the VOC company administrator. Van 
Imhofr, reviewed rent levels and advised that they should remain at 24 rixdoliars 
because "to some of them (the farm  occupants) it was a hardship when rent was 
increased from 12 to 24 rixdollars. In such cases, you, as honest and faithful 
ministers, must use your discretion and be considerate."
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were followed in 1 8 9 6  by a serious plague of cattle diseases which were
exacerbated by poor veterinary practices which the state undertook to 
improve. Political strife also exacerbated the effects of the natural disasters.
During the Anglo-Boer war, 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 0 2 ,  British soldiers demolished farm 
buildings and razed farm land. They devastated considerable areas of 
farming land belonging to Boer settler families: "Not less than a thousand 
individuals have been torn loose from the land which was their way of life 
and the p illa r o f the ir s e l f - r e s p e c t . "270 A lthough undocum ented ,
presumably many more thousand black families were also affected. These
natural disasters and war damage occurred while the mining industry was 
rapidly developing.
After the Anglo-Boer war the authorities were even more concerned 
to assist agriculture. The state committed itself to building a flourishing 
white agriculture and securing a greater supply of domestically recruited 
labour for the mines. This rose steadily from 96,700 in 1896 to 312,000 by
1930 and 444,000 in 1940.271 State supported land resettlem ent for whites 
went hand in hand with restric tions on sharecropping and prohibiting 
African land purchase. Statistics show that from 1910 until 1936 the state 
spent approxim ately R225m whereas it spent alm ost nothing on African
a g r i c u l t u r e . 2 7 2
The state's post war activities included land settlement schemes. The 
state allowed Boer farmers to claim lands they had previously held and also 
gave them compensation to reestablish their farm ing activities. This was 
seen as a "political necessity" and no conditions were attached to the 
c o m p e n s a t i o n . 2 7 3  However, Boer repatriation was not the main thrust of 
land settlement policy: the primary concern was to direct the economy 
m ore determ inedly. C ertain  historical realities were judged undesirable, 
m eriting state intervention. For example, in some areas the farm holdings
were vast as the result of the initial 3 , 0 0 0  to 6 , 0 0 0  morgen land grants or
because companies bought up huge areas of land during the period of
search for minerals. They had amassed huge tracts of land for prospecting 
purposes estimated to be about two thirds of the whole of the Transvaal. This 
company land was minimally farmed because, while farmers were allowed 
to remain as tenants, they had no security and feared that cultivation might
270 De Kiewiet,1942, pl96,
271 These figures only refer to the increases in workers recruited within South Africa 
and do not include those recruited in neighbouring states.
272 Lipton, M.1986 p 105.
273 Goodfellow.D.M. 1931.
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be disturbed by prospecting at any t i m e . 274 One such land company wrote
to the government offering to sell land,
". . . We are sellers of land. Our sales at present are chiefly to our
own tenants at ruling market prices . . .There are certain farms which
we think would naturally fall into any native reserves which might be
contemplated . . .There are two particular places, one is a farm on
Malaboch mountain, Buffeshoek 1072, which is very largely occupied by
natives today and which Malaboch has negotiated to acquire . . .His own
kraal is on that farm. It was originally part of his stad.
We have another block in the North, 122,000 acres . . a ranching
proposition. . ..a suitable block for native purpose.
I sold three months ago, 130,000 acres for £7000, that was a Swazi
plantation concession.
We hold mineral concessions over an enormous area two to three
million a c r e s .  "275
On the other hand, there were other areas where relatively poor
pastoral land had been excessively divided as the result of Roman Dutch
inheritance practice in which a farm is not inherited by the eldest son but 
divided between all s o n s . 2 7 6  Many fractional holdings were also farmed by 
white "bywoners", who arrived after land had already been distributed.
The governm ent com m itted itself to revam ping white agriculture. 
This would entail more radical state intervention in some parts of the 
country than in others. The state bought land and established experimental 
f a r m s . 277 a  large budget was also allocated to provide for the purchase of 
company land which was divided up to create farms of 300 to 400 acres.
These farms were allocated to government-approved white settlers to buy 
on m ortgage. The governm ent also financed agricu ltu ra l co lleges on 
several experim ental farm s in the Transvaal w here new settlers were 
encouraged to study for two years before taking up a settlement farm. This 
internship on experim ental farms was considered necessary because the
employment of whites as labourers was almost unheard of, and this made it 
diffrcult for whites to gain practical knowledge through employment.
In 1908 the state provided the capital to establish the Land Bank in an
attem pt to tackle the problem of thousands o f acres of underdeveloped
farms. Poor, extensive farming practices were blamed on the lack of capital 
to invest in land improvements. In particular, finance was provided for
274 ibid, p i36.
275 Daveiq>on and Hunt, 1974, p30, cite an offer of  sale of land to the government by 
Henderson Transvaal Estates.
276 Goodfellow, D.M. 1931, p57. cites a case of a fourth generation son receiving a 
hundred and forty seventh of the original farm.
277 ibid, p204.
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fencing to paddock animals to help control the spread of vermin and to
encourage rotational grazing.
Farm ers also lobbied the government about conditions of input 
supply and m arketing . They expressed  g riev an ces  aga in st rural 
shopkeepers because of unfavourable prices and a lack of bargaining 
power. They lobbied for governm ent financed  central depots. The 
governm ent, responding favourably, passed the Cooperative Act whereby 
any group of white farmers who formed a cooperative society was entitled 
to both technical and financial assistance at special rates. Furtherm ore
after the 1920s-1930s depression white farmers won the right to price 
support schemes.
But labour was the issue on which farmers lobbied most vehemently, 
always complaining about the shortage of African labour. A century of 
varied legislation facilitated labour recruitm ent by white farmers. In the 
early period of colonisation a Pass Law forbade Africans to move around the 
countryside without a letter of perm ission signed by their last white 
employer. The state also sanctioned a system of apprenticeship under which 
African children bom on a white-owned farm were bound to stay and work 
until they were nineteen. White farmers also used the "master, and servant" 
agreem ents copied from  Europe designed to tie an apprentice to an
employer during and after a period of training. But in South Africa, this
agreem ent simply became a contract of bondage. These measures were 
unevenly applied  throughout South A frica especially  w here absentee 
landownership and sharecropping arrangem ents still prevailed. In the post 
W orld W ar II period there was a more rigorous im plem entation of
legislation to secure an African labour force totally divested of its land and 
means of production.
During the first decades of this century the state expanded its
interventionist role. The introduction of a Land Bank, a growing demand
for extension services, the expansion of the export m arket led to an 
enorm ous increase in the bureaucracy dealing with agricu lture . State
involvem ent in post war reconstruction had "the im portant effect o f 
making South Africa known as a country" in which white settlers coming 
into the agricultural sector could get "a good start"278 a  state-led drive to 
settle white owner-occupiers, the expulsion of sharecroppers, the division 
of the huge land areas o f the early settlers resulted in a significant growth 
of farming units from the turn of the century until the 1950s. In 1918 there
278 ibid. p213.
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were 76,149 white owned farming units, in 1930 there were 96,940 and a 
peak was reached in 1952 of 119,556 u n i t s . 279
The National Party government, in the post 1948 period, encouraged 
centralisation and modernisation in the white farming sector following the 
recommendations of a major Commission of Enquiry. Facts and figures indicate 
that centralisation was indeed aehieved; the number of farm s decreased 
d ram atically  together w ith s ig n ifican t increases in land and labour 
productivity. I describe the measures put in place by government during the
1960s and 1970s as well, as the wider economic context which facilitated these 
changes. These policies had a major impact on the organisation of production
particularly in the grain sector. The last section deals with some of the 
negative consequences o f m odern isation  as w ell as deregu lation  and 
s tra t if ic a tio n .
4.2. 1960s: E valuation  of the s ta tu s  quo
The government's preoccupation in the 1950s was to modernise farming 
and make visible gains in labour and land productivity increases. It
w anted to foster only the m ost effic ien t farm ers. M ajor review  
commissions appointed in the mid-sixties studied agriculture in both the
reserve areas and the white farms. The Commission of Enquiry into the
Occupancy of European Farms criticised small farm size and lack of
capital investment as root causes for low productivity and low profits. The 
C om m ission's second interim  report identified three im pedim ents to
farm ing im provem ent (i) physio-biological, (ii) sociological and (iii) 
economic, causing financial stress' among many f a r m e r s . 2 8 0
The physio-biological causes were: seasonal clim atic d ifferences,
reluctance of farmers to make planning allowances for weather, erosion 
and subsequent declining pasture potential, inability to adopt appropriate 
farming systems, and finally pests and diseases which intermittently attack 
plants and animals causing production losses.
279 Joubert. J, & J.A.Groenewald, 1974, p5
280 RSA (1970) The Marais-du Plessis Commission, 2nd Report, 1970, p9. italics as in 
original. It is most commonly referred to as the Marais-du Plessis Commission after 
the two men who chaired the commission in the Erst two periods. The financial 
stress which the government refers to here and subsequently must always be 
contextualised i.e. that white farmers were unable to live in the style they wanted 
and, on a book-keeping a^^xaisal, commercial farming incomes were not increasing 
on par with urban professional incomes.
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The sociological causes contributing to financial stress in the farming 
community included:
* a horizontal approach towards farm expansion in preference to 
vertical development potential.
* inadequate personal qualities ( i.e. lack of managerial and 
organising ability, sound judgement, enterprise, initiative, and the 
'abiliry w  spend money judiciously'),
* lack of farm records for management and planning,
inadequate training of young prospective farmers, over optimism 
based on exceptional years, slow adaptation to change,
* few alternative occupations for an outgoing farmer and no 
state process to assist,
*'exaggerated views about democracy' ie.. resentment at any 
state interference to regulate land use,
* use of inefficient workers together with farmers who 'have 
forgotten how to work themselves and are therefore unable to 
give the necessary guidance to their employees',
* 'hankering' for land regardless of farming competency,
* and finally 'bequeathment leading to subdivision o f  land into 
units that are too small to support a reasonable standard o f  
l i v i ng .
Among the direct economic weaknesses identified were: subdivision 
into uneconomic units, debt burdens beyond the farmer's liquidity capacity, 
'purchase of still more implements in favourable years, instead of payments 
in redemption of already existing debts, extravagant prices paid for land in 
relation to its true productive value at the particular tim e, injudicious 
obtaining and granting of credit, a narrowing gap between the price level 
received by the farmer for his product and his costs of production and 
fin a lly  the techno log ica l developm ent o f fa rm er w hose increased  
investm en t requ irem en t inc reased  p roducer vu lne rab ility  to 'na tura l 
reverses and unfavourable price-relations.'^^^
Another preoccupation o f the Commission was the change in ratio of 
white to black inhabitants in the white agricultural areas. Since the 1950s 
increasing numbers of white rural inhabitants migrated to the urban areas. 
Between 1951 and 1960 there was an 8.5 percent decrease in white rural 
dwellers compared to a 20.9 increase in the number of Africans resident in 
the white rural a r e a s . 2 8 2  The commission described the implication of this
2^1 ibid. italics as in original
282 ibid, p. 19, citing Cilliers, S.P. 1968,
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social change as follows,' I f  the tide does not turn and the growth o f  non- 
White preponderance on the White platteiand continues, this state o f  affairs 
will in the end hold out a serious threat to white civilisation in this 
c ou n t ry . '
In conjunction with recom m endations and legislation to ensure a 
restriction of non White families on farms the Commission, in its Second 
Report, considered methods of attracting more young white farmers on to 
the l a n d . 283 in their view, free market entry into farming required such
high levels of capital for land and equipment purchase that it excluded
'promising, interested young men' who had no capital. This situation 
becam e progressively w orse due to spiralling of land prices'. The 
com m ission recom m ended state acquisition  o f agricu ltu ra l land which
should be rented on a long term basis and transferable from one generation 
to the next. The rent payable should be assessed on the basis of the 
productivity of the land (i.e. net income and yearly cash flow) and not on 
the basis of a rental rate of return valuation of its free market price.
The commission's reflections on the financial consequences for the 
government of a divergence between the productive and market value of 
land were: 'as the land must be bought at the market value aiid later again 
made available to prospective farmers at productive value....the state will 
have to be prepared to devote fairly large amounts of money in such
c a se s . '2 8 4  This is one of the proposals currently put forward by the DBSA to 
advance a concept of affrrmative action to favour land acquisition by black 
entrepreneurs. There are some problems with this proposal which I explore 
in Chapter 7. But ultimately the report is ambivalent in its attitude towards 
new white entrants and elsewhere calls for 'judicious" frnance in favour of 
the existing more profitable f a r m e r s .2 8 5
In line with périodisation, the Third (Final) Report of the Commission 
published in 1972 is, however, less a m b iv a le n t2 8 6  and marks a decisive 
turning point in S.A. government policy away from unquestioning support 
for a ll w hite farm ers, large and sm all. From  now on econom ic
considerations supercede concerns over racial population ratios. Referring 
to less than average sized units the report states that vigorous steps to be
283 ibid,, pp 20-21
284 ibid. p 40
285 ibid. p 38
286 r s A. 1972. The third Report (Chairperson, Swart) does not even mention, let alone 
contemplate, mechanisms facilitating the entry of young whites without capital into 
the sector.
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taken to form bigger farm units 287 many families now trying to eke out a 
living on undersized farms will have to give up their farms and make a 
living e l s e w h e r e ' 2 8 8  .'As regards non-White labourers, . . if . . in the
national interest, the productivity of labour is to be raised, the number of
non-White labourers will have to be reduced sharply.'
The report calls for 'v igorous steps' to assist increased production 
levels and encourage farm enlargement. Fewer farm ers would then share 
the overa ll  farm ing  sector incom e betw een them. Individual farm ers ' 
business income should then attain greater parity vis a vis non agricultural
i n v e s t m e n t s .
S ection  4 .3 . 1970s: C e n tra lis a t io n  ach iev ed .
In the thirty five years between 1950 and 1985 the number of farms
fell dramatically from the 1950s peak of 116,848 farming units to 58,500
units by the mid -1980s. State-led policy to secure the restructuring of white
com m ercial farm ing through the dem ise of the sm aller scale, less
profitable, white farmers was as effective as earlier state policy to ensure
the demise o f the African peasantry.
4.3.(i) M easuring centralisation
Centralisation can be initially identified through an exam ination of 
three basic and in terrelated  m easurem ents: farm  units, land area and
average farm size. These are the number of white farm units (N), the total 
cultivated land area (A) and the average farm size ( S = A/N). If the number 
o f farm s decreases within a fixed farm ing area resulting in a higher 
average farm size centralisation may be said to have o c c u r r e d . 289 Only if 
the number of farm units declines more rapidly than, the land area, (and
287 Bach Government assessment remains consistently and unashamedly racist in 
every one of its periodic reports on white farming. The discussion on 'uneconomic 
units' is never contextually compared with the economic situation of black farmers 
who, in the "bantustans " farm on average less than two hectares per family.'
288 Financial Times, 29/9/67 reported, 'Real per capita farm incomes are declining at 
an annual compound rate of 0.67 per cent: the average White fanner has an 
investment exceeding £25 000 on which he earns less than £2 000 a year.'
289  The interrelationship is important otherwise a mistaken conclusion may be 
reached. For example it is possible for the number of units to decline along with the 
cultivated land area if a number of farms go out of business and their land is not 
taken over by remaining farmers. In this situation average farm size would not 
increase. The sisal industry in Tanzania provides one such typical case of a sector 
in secular decline. Alternatively the total land area may increase while the number 
of farm units remains constant as would happen in the case of a given number of 
farmers confronting an open land frontier.
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hence the average farm size increases) can the presence o f  centralisation 
be a f f i r m e d . 2 9 0  The appropriate  measure is therefore: S = A/N. An
examination of the relative movement of the number of units (N) vis-a-vis. 
the land area (A) is always required.
This data are presented in Table 4 . 1 .  'Farm Units and Land Utilisation.
Figure 4 . 1 .  deals with the number of farm units. The number of units is 
generally accepted as synonymous with the number of farm operators.29 • 
The number of units increased annually during the 1930's reaching a peak 
in 1950. The next thirty years are marked by an unhindered decline in the
number of units. The decline is abruptly checked in 1983; it signals a new 
era in agricultural production economics which is to be di&cussed later.
Table 4.1. 'Farm Units and Land Utilisation'
Y e a r Ale of Form Units Land in Use Land cul t ivated  Av fa rm  s i z e
1 9 3 7 104554 85578: 6066; 810
1 9 4 6 112453 88641. 7394 788
1 9 5 0 116848; 86921 7662. 744
1 9 5 5 111566, 87472 8168 784
1 9 6 0 105859: 91790. 9563. 867
1 9 6 4 101387. 91364 901
1 9 6 5 95438: 87795= 10028 920
1 9 6 7 92853 86368 930
1 9 6 8 92908' 87921: - 946
1 9 6 9 91885: 89135! 114411 970
1971 904221 89298 11621. . 987
1 9 7 2 .. 86092. 87815' ; 1020
1 9 7 3 81935! 87916: 1072
1 9 7 4 79855: 87155; ; 1078
1 9 7 5 77591: 85505; ! 1 102
1 9 7 6 75562; 857191 102121 1 134
1 9 7 0 71621! 854471 !1 1193
1 9 7 9 69360! I
1 9 8 0 69372; , i
1981 644301 86267; . 8675! 1339
1 9 8 3 59960! 86027: i 1438
1 9 8 5 658801 86150! i 1308
1 9 8 6 648101 06077! i 1340
1 9 8 7 651701 85795! 1316
Source: Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, 1992, RSA, Table 6, p6.
Figure 4.1. Number of Farms by Year
290 Leaving aside the possibility of a combination, for example, a secular decline in 
one part of the country together with an expanding cultivation with an open land 
frontier in another part.
291 Some farmers own three units, another three persons own one unit; units therefore 
should confidently be interpreted as operators.
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Figure 4.2 compares the number of farm units and the land in use 
year by year. The scatter o f land use has two outstanding features. Firstly, 
the scatter is virtually horizontal over the whole period (attention is 
demanded by its level rather than any growth rate) and, secondly, it shows 
remarkably little variation. Figure 4.2 depicts the average level along with 
the scatter. The mean total average of the land in use is 87 242 thousand 
hectares. The standard deviation o f the spread is 2021 thousand hectares. 
The coefficient o f variation i.e. the percentage (standard deviation/mean) 
equals 2.3%.
In summary the land frontier for white commercial farmers appears 
fully closed. W hite farm ing hegemony had been thoroughly accom plished 
over a Axed and greater part of agricultural land. This is shown in the 
constancy o f land in use (depicted by an average land use characterised by 
constancy) and very little spread. The largest o f these relatively minor 
increases appeared between the m id-tifties and m id-sixties following the 
peak in the number o f farming units and may be interpreted as a response 
by farmers to try to maintain farm-size in spite of the increasing number 
o f farm units.
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The closure of the land frontier to white settler farmers is usually 
dated as having taken place in the 1930's.^^^ Such data incidentally
obscures an ongoing sub process, i.e. the displacem ent of black labour 
tenants and sharecroppers by white landowners. Statistical data on land use 
in white areas always classiAed it as white farming' whereas many white 
fa rm ers s till fa rm ed ' th rough using  b lack  labour tenan ts  and 
sharecroppers. But w hether whites farm ed land through hired labour, 
sharecroppers or labour tenants the fact o f the ir having reached a
definitive formal area o f land occupation rem ains. The pressure to get 
ban tustan  land for com m ercial (w hite) farm ing  use is a fu rth er 
conArmation of the land Aontier limitation and the tension around access 
to good farm ing land. Such access is achieved through development of 
corporation farm ing in . the bantustans on trust land or through white 
farmers operating under the name of a black resident.^^^
Figure 4.3 shows 'Average Farm-size by year' and notably the lowest 
average is found in the early 1950s when the number of units is at its 
highest. Moreover in Figure 4, S, the average farm size is indeed the mirror
R.S.A. Government 1971, p 13, 'The occupation of undeveloped areas in South 
Africa by pioneer farmers was actually only completed in about the third decade of 
this century, when just about all land available for occupation had been taken up.' 
293 The inq>lication of the constancy of A (with little variation) is that S is inversely 
related with N. Therefore S=A/N becomes S = constant/N. The growth rate in S will be 
aRMOxmudely the o]^x>site of the growth rate in N that is roughly equal in size, but 
with opposite signs.
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image of N in Figure 1 due to the constancy of A. Average farm-size went 
through three distinct periods (a) from 1930 to the early 1960s, (b) From 
1964 to the early 1980s and (c) 1984 onwards.
Figure 4.3. Average farm size hv vear
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From 1930 to the early 1960s average farm size reflects â state of 
stagnancy rather than dynamic change. The growth curve is basically level 
with a dip which coincides with the highest number of farm units and then 
curves mildly upwards. The mean level for the 30 years from 1930-1960 (six 
observations) equalled 809 hectares.
From 1964 to 1981 there was a sustained and more rapid growth of 
average farm size. During this period average farm-size increased 59%; the 
average compounded growth rate for this period was 2.5%.
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But there are also changes of pace of growth within this period. The 
seven year period 1964-1971 experienced a 10 per cent change in farm -size 
with an annual average growth rate of 1.32 per cent. In the next seven year 
period 1971 -1978 the change in farm -size was 21 percent with a 2.7 per cent 
.growth rate. This change in rate o f growth is shown in Figure 4.4 in which 
the geom etric  - data series is converted  to logarithm s. The m ost rap id  
increase takes place in the m iddle period 1971-1983 after which there is a 
m arked  stagnation .
Average Farm size (lop x) 1964 -1987
3 .2
&
»s
'5
3 . 0 -X
2 .9
1 9 9 0- 1 9 7 0 1 9 6 01 9 6 0 Year
source: çomputni data from tqdib 4.1.
4.3. (ii) Land in use and land cultivated
Land-in-iise refers both to land under pasture and land ploughed up 
for crops. Land cultivated refers only to the latter, (see Figure 4.5). Between 
the late 1930's and the end o f the 1960s the amount of land cultivated 
actually doubled before falling significantly in the 1970s. Two factors may
have contributed to the earlier continuous increase in land cultivation. 
Firstly at a time of increasing farm units, farmers may have chosen to farm 
their land more intensively in response to the closed land barrier. This was
done by ploughing up land previously left to pasture. The second and
related factor which assisted  the expansion of cultivated land is the
34
rep lacem en t o f ox p loughing  w ith trac to rs^^^  w hich
p lo u g h in g  c a p a c i t y . 295
in creased  the
Figure 4.5. Land cultivated hv vear
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The Second Report of the Commission o f Enquiry into A g r i c u i t u r e 2 9 6  
notes that price increases for farm produce during the Second World War 
meant that large temporary profits could readily be made ( and that) in 
the spirit of over-optimism as regards the production potential of particular 
areas, many , farmers established themselves on units which later proved to 
be too small to offer them a reasonable standard of living' and . . .  'a good 
deal o f land unfortunately came under cultivation which, because o f it 
nature and climatic conditions should never have been brought under the
plough light soils have been exposed to serious wind erosion as a result of
c u l t iv a t io n '
The sharp fall of land area cultivated in the 1970s will be shown to 
coincide w ith the rapid adoption of technology which increased land 
productivity and moreover had better returns on better quality soils and 
thus discouraged the use of more marginal lands. This period of adoption of
294 South African Financial Gazette, October 11, 1974. and second report of Swart 
Commission 1970: In 1937 there were only 6019 tractors in the whole country. By 
1967 there were 170 000 and by 1974 there were almost 250 000 , nearly two 
tractors to every farm.
295 Africa, R. 1976 p.2. Table 2 citing AGREKON Vol.9 No.2 April 1970. and p.6.
296 RSA,1970,pp. 5-6.
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bio technology co incides with governm en t policy changes. The m arginal 
farm ing areas of the Karoo were taken out of production and the conditions 
for anim al production becam e m ore favourable.
The changes in (a) farm  units, (b) to tal a rea  farm ed  and (c) 
cultivated area are compared graphically in figures 4.6a, 4.6b, and 4..6c. The 
peak figure for each column is identified (in hold print) in Table 4.1. The 
peaks occur in different tim e periods and are suggestive of the follow ing 
p é r io d is a t io n .
Figure 4.6a. N um ber of farm s hv vear
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Figure 4.6c. Land cultivated bv vear
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There was a mild expansionary period from the 1930s to the 1950s in 
terms o f farm units and the land frontier was subsequently extended to its 
peak as farmers pushed the extensive margin in an effort to m aintain
average farm size. The pressure on land required increased output to he 
achieved through enlarging the area of cultivated land. This pattern of 
increase in cultivated land is broken sharply at the beginning of the 1970s.
Table 4.2 provides additional information indicating that the process
of farm  enlargem ent involved sm aller units being absorbed into larger
ones. In 1950, 34,704 units under 100 morgen farmed 913,000 morgen. By 
1978 there were only 15,024 units in a roughly equivalent category, 
farming under 50 hectares occupying 28,000 hectares. An exam ination of 
the Transfer of Rural Immovable Property allows for a year by year 
examination. For example in the farming year ending "March 1983, some
9,414 farms, covering 3.5 million ha. were sold. Of these, 56,2 per cent were 
less than 100 ha in size, and 72,8 per cent were smaller than 300 ha. whereas 
only 8.7 percent of the farms sold were 1 000 ha. or more.'^^^
At the other end o f the size spectrum the 818 units with more than 
10,000 morgen in 1950 increased by 1,209 by 1962 and reached 3,607 by 1978. 
The ownership pattern was increasingly skewed. By 1978 the largest 20,000 
farm units occupied more than 70 million of the 85 million hectares of land 
then in farming use. In other words 27 per cent of farms of more than 1,000 
hectares occupied 83 per cent of the farm land. Most of the farms are
297 Marcus, T, 1986, p5.
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o w n e r-o c c u p ied  a lth o u g h  co m p an ies  have begun  to d iv e rs ify  th e ir  
investment to include farm ing and increased their land holding units from 
2 percent to 9.8 percent between 1975 and 1985.298 The amount o f land for 
rental is low at 17 percent when compared to U.K. 50 percent and Belgium 70 
percent; in the post war period up to the present it has never been more
than 20 percent. 299
Table 4.2. 'Number and Area o f Farms Acording to Size Groups'
Year i 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 2 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 8
S iz e  group! Units Area Units Area S iz e  group:; Units Area
(morgen)i "000m 0 0 0 m h e c ta r e s 0 0 0  Ha.
5 and l e s s 9 815 5 594 l e s s  than 2 316 < 1
6 - 2 0 ! 10 984 12 588* 2 -  9.9 5 296 28
21 -  100 . 13 905 913 15 265 860 10 -  49.9Î 9 412 238
50 - 9 9 . 9 5 132: 371
< 100 -  1991 6 211 906
101 -  500! 37 508 10 554 30 251 9 257. 2 0 0  -  2 9 9 4 986 1 217
5 0 1 - 1  OOOi 20 448. 14 918 16 918 1 1 845 3 0 0  -  4 9 9 7 949 3 099
5 0 0  -  9 9 9 11 841 8 461
1 001 -  2 000 12 853 18 266 1.2 159' 16 688
2 001 -  3 000 4 440' 11061 8 826 26 670 1 0 0 0 - 1  999 9 340 13 098
3 001 -  5 000 3 622: 14 410 i i
001 -  10 0 0 0 2 454 16 846 3 140 21 280 2 0 0 0 - 4  999! 7 531: 23 253
> 10 000 818: 14 106 1 209! 20.016’ 5 0 0 0 - 9  9991 2 584! 17 757
! i > 10 oooj 1.023i 17 019
TOTAL 116 8471101 4 8 0  0 5  6151106 6 1 5 1 71 621 85 4 4 7
1 : i 1
Source: RSA. Agricultural Census Data: various years
In terms of the centralisation process (accepting average farm size 
as a summary indicator) the data and further analysis indicate: '
* the 1960s were a period of a clear break with past trends. The
predominant stagnation (with a mild cyclical movement around a stationary
trend) suddenly changed towards sustained growth.
* the mid-1960s to late 1970s displayed a fairly regular growth with
an annual average increase of 2.3%. This resulted in a growth o f average 
farm size by 25.5 per cent over a ten year period.
298 Cooper, D.(1986) p4 Ownership by sector of agricultural land: Individuals and 
partners, 90.7 percent; Private Companies 9.8 percent. Public companies 0.45 
percent. Municipalities, 1 percent. Government enterprise 0.8 percent; other 0.25 
percent.
299 Hattingh, H.S. & Herzberg, A. 1980, pp 2-3.
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* 1984 marked a watershed in the agricultural economy in which 
farm enlargement was no longer a dominant feature. Commenting on the
enforcement of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, 1970, the 1989 
report of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Markets notes the 
increase in applications for subdivision and that increases of this kind 'can 
usually he expected only in times o f  recession'. However business
corporations continue their entry into the farming sector. I t . would appear 
that the m id-1980s herald  a period o f increasing d ifferen tiation  in 
com m ercial farm ing. Econom ic centralisation o f resources continues to 
dom inate econom ically in co-existence with low income farm ers. The 
opening up of white com m ercial agriculture to blacks would probably 
reinforce this tendency.
4.4. M o d e rn isa tio n  a n d  S ta te  In te rv e n tio n
The centralisation process took place in a period of adoption of new 
technology, both m echanical and chem ical, labour saving technology
(tractors, threshing m achines, herbicides) as well as yield increasing 
technology (new seeds, fertilisers, pesticides) Table 4.3 indicates the
productivity index of labour on the basis o f agricultural output divided by
the employment data^^^ converted into an index. This is com pared with 
average farm size for those years for which all data is available.
F igure 4.7 depicts this relationship . It shows a fairly  strong 
association between both variables. It can be concluded that over this 
period the increase in average farm-size went hand in hand with increased 
productivity of labour. This is possibly as a result o f the introduction of new 
means of production. The strength o f this association can be measured by 
regression analysis.^^^ My estimates which indicate an increase in farm-
300 R.S.A. 1990.P 40.
301 See Hendrie, 1976, p4, and Simkins C, 1978, on the lack of time series data and 
resultant inaccuracy of employment statistics. They are at least indicative of trends 
in spite of changing categories and changing method of collecting data. For example, 
before 1968 only permanent woikers were counted, then data on both permanent and 
casual are put together. The South African Police carried out a farm census up to 
1979. Since then information is processed from mail-in questionnaires.
302 The simple linear regression is:
P = -83.1 + 168.2 S 
where P is the productivity index.
The percentage of variance in P associated with variance in S is given by the coefricient 
of determination as nearly 80 per cent.
r = 0.89 
r2= 0.79
Estimating a double log linear function yields:
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size by 10% was associated with an 18% increase in productivity. However 
the decline in absolute employment levels which went hand in hand with 
increased labour productivity is again checked in 1984. Employment 
actually increases again. The new economic conditions which pressured 
this change are explored later.
Table 4.3. Productivity and Farm Size.
1 2 3 4 5 6 = 3 * 1 0 0 / 4
Year ;Av Farm Vol Ag Employ­ Employ-  Labour
s i z e  !Prod ment 0 0 0 ment index Prod
ha index index
19 6 8 970 81 1640 1 14.4 70.8
1971 908: 95 1639 1 14.3 83.1
1 9 7 2 1020 = 99 1506 105.0 94.3
1 9 7 3 1073; 86 1468 102.4 84.0
1 9 7 4 1079, 105 1454 101.4 103.6
1 9 7 5 1 102- 100 1434 100.0 100.0
1 9 7 6 1 1 34 100 1280 89.3 1 12.0
1 9 7 8 11 93. 1 15 1293 90.2 127.5
1981 1339: 130 1146 79.9. 169.7
1 9 8 3 1435: 107 1132 78.9 135.6
1 9 8 5 1 1308: 122 1324 92.4 132.0
Source. Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. 1987, RSA. p4, p6 and p88
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Agricultural output increased 40 percent between 1960 and 1970 (see 
Table 4.4) and the overall, increase between 1960 -1990 was 91,9 percent. 
Increased production capacity has largely been able to respond to increased 
demand for carbohydrates resulting from rising population as well as 
increasing demand for proteins resulting from increases in real wage 
levels during this period. A minor quantity of agricultural produce was 
imported particularly rice, rubber, tea and cotton and to a lesser extent milk 
powder, cheese, meat, wheat and b u t t e r . A  comparison of average farm
size with the index of volume of agricultural production shows a fairly 
strong association between the variables. These associations suggest that 
the process of centralisation went together with labour saving technologies 
and also involved yield increasing technologies.
These production increases were achieved while enormous changes 
took place in the structure and organisation of agriculture. A closed land 
fron tie r m eant sustained agricu ltu ra l growth could only be achieved 
through increased yields. From the government's point of view, increased 
farm-size was both a condition for modernisation and a strategy for fewer 
farm ers with a higher farm income and the government devised policy
measures to achieve this end.
44.(1) Credit Policy.
Government support measures already involved access to credit for 
certain  infrastructural investm ents, tax re lie f for individual farm ers for 
selected investments, subsidies on specific farm inputs. However, the 1971
Commission concluded that past subsidy policy had some negative results. 
Subsidies provided 20 per cent of average farm incom e^^  and were seen to
be holding back the productivity of agriculture by keeping inefficient 
farm ers on the land. Future support policies favoured the more profitable 
farm ers and there was a cam paign against 'injudicious* financing o f
farm ers on uneconomic' units. The support for the more proritable farmers
involved (a) a credit policy which would make sure that the largest
producers gained most benefits from cheap credit^®^ (b) The subsidy
303 EROSA, 1988, No.7. plO.
304 Cooper, 1987a , p 10.
305 RSA, 1971, p 85, Section 4.6.2.2.3. 'More generous credit concessions to bigger 
. farmers" Cheap credit previously more easily able to the poorer sections of the
farming community was to be extended to the better off sections.' It appears 
indefensible that those farmers who contribute most ...should be denied the 
opportunity to avail themselves of certain benefits in agricultural financing...The
14 1
policies available per unit o f produce would benefit farm ers on good land 
with higher productivity more than those with below average productivity: 
(c) profits reinvested in m achinery and farm  equipm ent would not be taxed. 
This po licy  is only benefic ia l to p ro fit m aking en te rp rises and m ost 
beneficial to those making most profit.
Table 4.4. 'Volume of Agricultural Production 1955-1985
Year 1955 1960 1970 1980 1985
index of  Volume of
ogrlculturol  production
1 9 7 5 = 1 0 0 52 6 2 8 8 1 19 1 19
Crop Production 000
tons  motor products
Moize 3 7 8 4 5 2 7 5 8 6 0 0 1 4656 8 0 7 7
Wheat* 7 8 8 7 6 9 1396 1472 1680
Grain Sorghum 164 3 3 5 551 5 4 6 6 0 0
Groundnuts 152: 180 2 6 8 2 3 7 9 2
Sunflower  seed 6 4 1 13 138 521 2 6 3
Soya beans no. ;n.o. 2 9 2 7 6 3 4
Oats 9 0  . 1 17 121 6 5 2 3
Barley 26; 2 5 3 0 6 0 2 5 6
Dry beans 5 0 5 4 6 2 8 9 8 8
P e a s j e n t i l s 14: 158 144 176 8
S u g a r c a n e * in.Q. tn.Q. . 1 1 8 0 4 1 3249 1 6 6 3 3
Chicory 81 127 2 1 5 157 12
Cotton . 19 156 3 9 3 1448 1131
Watt! ebark 2 1 8 178 130 1 14 6 3
Lucerne Hay in.a. i 8 4 6 1264 3 1 7 6 8 7 3 3
T e f f  and other  Hay 1624. 2 6 0 9 3 9 6 0 7 0 5 0 6 5 5 0
Tobacco 2 0 1 ' 2 6 2 3 2 4 2 7 8 3 2 2
Hort icu lture  n.a ; I
1 1
Animal Products  000 tons i i
Beef  & Veal 3869Î 4 1 3 2 4 4 2 7  i 5288!  5 6 8 0
Pig Meat i 5361 5 6 6 8 3 8 9 0 3 1 140
Sheep & goat  meat 39! 1419 2 3 2 9 1800 1900
Wool 1324! 1355 1240Î 1045 981
Chicken 2901 4 2 0 1210! 3 6 4 0 5 0 7 0
B u tte r : 370! 481 449 ! 172 182
Cheese i 122! 172 185! 323 339
Condensed Milk i 2 7 b \ 3 1 2 4 2 2 Î 4 1 4 2 4 0
Milk Powder '■ 40! 6 2 190l 3 0 9 3 6 0
Source: Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, RSA, 1987,p88, 1990,p8
Government also used conservation concerns as part o f its rationale 
to elim inate sub-economic' units although there is no evidence to support
Commission feels more capital should be available to assist the production 
enterprises of the bigger and better farmers.
1 4 2
the view that larger farms have a better land practice. This notion of the 
relationship  betw een farm size and soil erosion^®^ together with an 
assessment that one third of farms were 'uneconomic' had already led to 
'The Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure Act of 1966. This provided for 
financial aid towards rehabilitation and resettlem ent. It provided, via the 
Agricultural Credit Board, credit at low rates of interest, for emergency 
assistance to farm ers hit by drought and floods and for conservation 
w o r k s . F u t u r e  credit from the Board was primarily for land purchase to 
enable existing farm ers to buy out small farm s to prom ote farm 
e n la rg e m e n t .
Besides farm enlargem ent and in tensification of production the 
government se lec ted . (i) further economic measures (some already in place 
and some new) to facilitate the desired changes. Some directly improved the 
term s o f trade thus improving profitability  conditions. Other contextual 
conditions influenced the cen tra lisa tion  and productiv ity  process: the
demand for non-agricultural labour and higher wages offered in the non- 
ag ricu ltu ra l sectors as well as the availab ility  of, and governm ent 
assistance to introduce, labour saving technology
4.4.(ii)Government subsidies and the terms of trade.
The state provided indirect technical assistance subsidies over a long 
period. Plant and anim al improvement, selection o f seed, land utilisation, 
cultivation and fertiliser practices are the core of this programme.^®^ This 
type of assistance to farmers was complemented by several direct subsidy 
schemes; by 1970 the state spent R108 million per year on direct subsidies. 
The greater part, an average 69,7 per cent, was spent on reducing the costs 
o f factors o f production. Conservation works and im provem ent o f land 
utilisation accounted for 15 per cent., assistance to industries 8 per cent, and 
8 per cent relief aid for flood and drought relief.
306 400 million tons of top soil and £250 million worth of plant nutrients were 
estimated as being washed into the sea each year. Financial Times. South Africa, 
25/9/67. More recent studies (Scotney & P.J. PcHiee 1990 mimeograph) indicate that 
40% to 70% of the cultivated land in the commercial sector is seriously eroded by 
wind and water..
397por example out of a national budget of 252 m illion Rand in 1968 as much as 10 
m illion Rand was mad«» available to the Land Bank and a hirther 3 million Rand for 
farmers' assistance was allocated to the government sector dealing with Agricultural 
Economics and Marketing.
308 RSA Government, 1970, p 6
1 4 3
The subsidy of means o f production was made up o f various
components: (i) fertiliser subsidy, fuel subsidy and rail rebates, (ii) interest
subsidies, (iii) customs and excise concessions (iv) tax concessions.
(i) The rationale of the fertiliser subsidy was to encourage the use of 
fertilisers by farm ers' to increase land productivity. The Com m ission 
concluded that the desired use of fertiliser had not yet been reached. They 
recommended that subsidies both for the purchase and railway transport of
fertiliser should continue.309 Subsidies on fertiliser and fuel were later 
extended to include pesticides, the payment of repairs to tractors, spare 
parts and electricity supplies.310 .
(ii) Interest subsidies were paid out by the government to the Land 
Bank and the Department of Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure. Money 
paid to the Land Bank was in respect of cases in which the Bank borrowed 
money from the government at a rate of interest which was above its own 
ruling rate. This subsidy gave farm borrowers access to loans at lower than
market interest rates. The subsidy initially included mortgages for land 
purchase and also as security for operating capital. Th^ Agricultural Credit 
Act stipulated a fixed interest rate on all loans to farmers of 5 per cent. 
Funds allocated to the Department of Agriculture and Marketing (R 1032 
million in 1970) covered the difference between the interest rate at which 
the Land Bank obtained funds and that offered to farmers.
In the August 1970 budget, after the Com m ission presented its 
conclusions, the state liquidated the general subsidies on loans. Only 
certain farmers were to qua lily for a subsidy interest on their mortgages of 
up to one and â half percent o f any mortgage with an interest rate above
seven and a half percent. BeneHciaries were to be full time farmers whose
main income was from farming. Later it was stipulated that only land 
purchase should qualify for mortgage relief and not borrowing undertaken 
for operating expenditure.
(iii) Customs and excise concessions included (i) goods imported free 
of customs duty and (ii) goods on which duty was paid but if used for a 
certain purpose a rebate was available. The first category mainly Included 
tractor imports. The second category covered diesel oil and paraffin. The 
Commission recommended that the duty free equipment imports and fuel
309 There were different subsidies available on specific fertilisers, R24 on pure 
nitrogen, R64 on citric acid soluble phosphate, R6. on Potassium and so on.
310 Marcus. T, 1986.
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rebates should be kept in place especially on consideration of increasing 
producer cost compared to producer prices and the importance of fuel in
the farmers' cost structure.
All o f the above subsidies were beneficial to farmers because they
directly affected farming expenditure. Other subsidies on the producer
price enabled farmers to earn more for the product than if there were an 
open m arket. M aize, bread, butter and grain sorghum made up a 
governm ent sponsored price-stab ilisation  " package.311
(iv) The tax rules were specially favourable to farmers making large
profits. Duty free import and fuel rebates already made the use of 
m achinery econom ically more attractive but for farm ers making profits 
there was an additional powerful incentive to purchase machinery and 
equipment. A law provided that any profits spent on tractors, equipment 
and agricultural implements would not be taxable eg. if a farmer made a
profit of R20 (XX) but spent R13 000 on machines the taxable income for that 
year would be R7 000. This special concession was to end only as a result of 
the Margo Commission recommendations in 1988 and will be discussed later.
Terms of trade for farmers had declined for the entire decade of the 
1950s312 and contributed to lower profitability in agriculture. The revised 
government assistance package reversed the previous trend. It had made 
the terms o f trade* towards the end of the 1960s and early 1970s more 
favourable than they would have been otherw ise. The cost reducing 
assistance kept down the index o f farm requisites. The price stabilisation 
assistance boosted the index of producer prices. (See Table 8, Terms of
Trade: Index of Producer Prices/Index o f farm  requisites') There was an
upswing in terms of trade for farmers from an index low point of 85.7 in
1961 to an all time high of 117.5 in 1973. The favourable terms of trade led to 
real increases in farm incomes. This provided additional impetus to the 
trend to buy more machinery and land especially when backed up by the 
supportive m easures encouraging investm ent in labour saving m achines 
and use o f yield increasing technology.
3i i RSA Government, 1971.
312 RSA Government, 1971, p 14, Figure 2.2."The ratio of the price range of 
agricultural products to the composite price range of cost items (price parity index) 
from 1947/48 to 1968/69."
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Table 4.5, Comparative Indices: Terms of Trade. Produce Prices/Farm ing 
Requisites. Consumer Price Index & the Volume of Agricultural Production
Index Index Terms of Volume of Consumer
Farming Farm Produce trade agrlcultual  Pr ice  Index
Year R equis i te s P r i c e s 2 / 1  * 100 production C.P.I.
1 9 7 5 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 5 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 5 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 5 = 1 0 0
1 9 5 9 4 7 . 2 5 8 4 8 . 0 0
1 9 6 0 4 7 . 3 4 0 . 9 8 6 . 5 6 2 4 8 . 6 0
1961 4 7 . 6 4 0 . 8 8 5 . 7 6 7 4 9 . 6 0
1 9 6 2 4 8 . 4 4 1 . 7 8 6 .  1 6 9 5 0 . 3 0
1 9 6 3 5 0  0 4 3 . 5 8 7 . 0 6 6 5 0 . 9 0
1 9 6 4 4 9 . 6 4 5 . 6 9 1 . 9 70 5 2 . 2 0
1 9 6 5 5 0 . 5 4 7 . 3 9 3 . 7 71 5 4 . 1 0
1 9 6 6 5 1 . 4 4 8 . 6 9 4 . 6 8 9 5 6 . 0 0
1 9 6 7 5 1 . 8 5 0 . 0 9 6 . 5 7 9 5 7 . 9 0
1 9 6 8 5 2 . 2 4 9 . 8 9 5 . 4 8 2 5 8 . 9 0
1 9 6 9 5 3  1 5 0 . 7 9 5 . 5 8 6 6 0 . 6 0
1 9 7 0 5 4 . 6 5 2 . 0 9 5 . 2 8 8 6 3 . 8 0
1971 5 7 . 6 5 6 . 7 9 8 . 8 9 9 6 7 . 7 0
1 9 7 2 6 2 . 8 7 0 . 0 1 1 1 .5 9 4 7 2 . 1 0
1 9 7 3 7 0 . 7 8 3 . 1 1 17 .5 9 7 7 8 . 9 0
1 9 7 4 8 3 . 5 9 1 . 4 1 0 9 .5 102 8 8 .1  0
1 9 7 5 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 .0 100 1 0 0 . 0 0
1 9 7 6 i 1 1 5 .2 1 0 9 . 3 9 4 . 9 106 1 1 1 . 1 0
1 9 7 7 ' 1 3 0 .7 1 17 .7 9 0  1 1 13 1 2 3 . 7 0
1 9 7 8 ’ 1 5 0 . 0 1 3 2 . 8 8 8 . 5 1 13 1 3 7 . 2 0
1 9 7 9 1 7 8 . 4 1 5 7 . 8 8 8 . 5 1 18 1 5 5 . 3 0
1 9 8 0 2 0 7 .1 1 8 1 .7 8 7 . 7 1 19 1 7 6 . 7 0
1981 ! 2 3 4 . 9 2 0 3 . 8 8 6 . 8 129 2 0 3 . 5 0
1 9 8 2 i 2 7 1 . 0 2 3 0 . 0 8 4 . 9 1 17 2 3 3 . 5 0
1 9 8 3 1 3 0 0 . 5 2 5 7 . 7 8 5 . 8 10 8 2 6 2 . 2 0
1 9 8 4 I 3 3 4 . 9 2 8 4 .  li 8 4 . 9 1 18 2 9 2 . 8 0
1 9 8 5 i 4 0 2 . 8 31 1.9! 7 7 . 4 1 18 3 4 0 . 3 0
1 9 8 6 1 4 6 8 . 5 354.61 7 5 . 7 1 16 4 0 3 . 7 0
1 9 8 7 j 5 1 6 . 1 417.91 8 1 . 0 1 17 4 6 8 . 7 0
1 9 8 8 ! 5 8 7 . 0 4 6 3 . 8 7 9 . 0 128 5 2 8 . 8 0
1 9 8 9 n.a 4 8 9 .4 ! n.a 125 6 0 5 . 9 0
1 9 9 0 I 7 6 7 . 6 5 3 3 . 0 6 9 . 4 120 6 9 2 . 9 0
Source; Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, (AAS) 1987, 1990 & 1992. The 1990
Abstract uses 1975 as a base year, index 100 but shows figures indicating the year's 
start (ie 92.7 for requisites) The 1992 Abstract uses 1985 as the base year of 100 for 
indices of farm prices and 1975 as the base year of 100 for indices of requisites. I have 
recalculated the figures from Table 90 & 92 of AAS 1987&1990 and Table 89 of AAS 
1992, to make them comparable, maintaining 1975 =100. Volume of agricultural 
production, data from Table 82, AAS, 1987 &1992, Consumer Price Index from Table 
90, AAS 1987 and Table 89, AAS, 1992.
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4.4.(iii) Competing demand for black labour
The 1960s expansion in the dom estic m anufacturing  industry 
increased the dem and for black labour. B lack m anufacturing w orkers 
increased by 4 per cent per annum. More significantly, at least for Western
Transvaal farm ers, Bophutatswana increased its demand for mine labour 
five-fold between 1970 and 1976. This was the result of a changing labour
recruitm ent policy in relation to neighbouring states. Malawi withdrew its
mine w orkers afte r controversy over a transport acciden t involving 
M alawian workers on their way to the mines. South A&ican sanctions 
against Mozambique cut the quota of workers to be recruited from there. 
M ine owners had to make up for shortfalls in the normal supplies of 
foreign workers through domestic recruitm ent from the bantustans'
W hen wages availab le  tu b lack w orkers accord ing  to the ir 
em ployment sector are com pared, farm ers' com plaints' that they had a 
shortage of (reliable) labour, especially in some regions, is probably no 
exaggeration. Western Transvaal wages are well below wage rates in other 
sectors (except domestic employment) even though there was an increase
in real wages for those perm anent agricultural w orkers who still had 
jobs.^^^
The increase in availability of higher-paid non-agricultural jobs in 
m anufacturing, mining and construction attracted  men away from  the 
white farms. A wave of workers' strikes in Durban in 1973 added to
concerns about "labour being difficult to control”. Farmers took the option 
o f m echanising and reducing their labour needs rather than com peting 
with the labour market, de Klerk estimates that until the mid-seventies most
(black) men in Western Transvaal who could no longer find employment 
in agriculture, or who no longer wanted it, were able to find work
e l s e w h e r e . ' ^ B u t  after this period the increase in non-agricultural jobs 
no longer outweighed the retrenchm ent rate in agriculture, thus further 
mechanisation added to absolute increases in the economy's unemployment
lev e ls .
De Klerk. M 1984. This thesis examines in some detail the different wage rates. 
According to one labour recruiter Western Transvaal wages are below agricultural 
wage averages in other parts of South Africa; a seasonal worker earned only about Rl, 
50c per day in 1981 compared to R3,50c per day in Western Cape.
314 je  Klerk,.M,l984, p 248.
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Since 1984 there appears to be a reverse in trends. The fall in the 
value of the rand has affected the terms of trade of imported machinery. 
Capital costs are therefore increasing more rapidly than the cost of labour. 
However the organisation of production and use o f new seeds, herbicides 
etc. altered so substantially since the late 1960s that it is difficult to envisage 
any m ajor re -em p loym en t o f labour w ithou t a new su b stan tia l
reorganisation of production; this is likely to involve a different land and 
livestock usage.
4.4.(iv) Availability o f cost effective, labour saving technology
The governm ent facilitated the spread o f silo technology through 
making loans available to agricultural cooperatives at subsidised interest 
rates. In 1963, an analysis carried out by research officers of the Mealie 
Industry Control Board concluded that, 'a switch to bulk handling would 
undoubtedly result in considerable savings for the maize industry'. Silo
construction began to take place at selected sites, mostly besides railway 
lines.315 The diffusion of silo technology took place rapidly. In the Western 
Transvaal, for example, silo capacity in the region increased by 340 per 
cent between 1968 and 1981.316
Once silos were built, bulk handling and delivery eliminated one of
the needs for large labour teams. Bulk handling gets rid of the need to fill 
heavy sacks while harvesting. If a bulk delivery system is complemented by 
harvesting with combines there is no need to recru it large male labour
teams. Farmers began to buy the combine harvesters which had already 
been on the market in South Africa for several years.
Two types of combines were readily available. Power Take O ff 
combines (PTOs) were pulled by tractors powered by the propeller shaft of 
the tractor itself. De Klerk describes them as 'simple, robust, reliable, well 
suited to smaller farming units' and at R6,000 relatively inexpensive. The SP 
combines. Self Propelled, have their own engine and a greater harvesting 
capacity, but at three times the price were not the preferred option for most
3^6 Van Wyk, J.J. 1970, Division of Agricultural Production Economics, Economic 
Series No. 73. By 1970 the predicted savings were verifiable; the cost of delivering a 
standard 9 ton load of maize in sacks as R3, 04c and the comparative cost for bulk 
delivery was R2, 06c.
316 See Table, 'Maize Production...' and Table, Terms of trade. The period of most 
rapidly expanding capacity was between 1973 and 1977. A bumper harvest in 1973 
and above average harvests in three subsequent years coincided with the most 
positive period terms of trade for farmers in twenty years creating a conducive 
investment climate.
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farmers. The larger the area of maize harvested the wider the spread of 
fixed costs resulting in economies of scale. This is true for both technologies 
at both yield levels .317 But hand harvesting proves to be cheaper than 
Power Take Off only on the smaller land areas and the lowest yields. For any 
farmer with more than a hundred hectares with yields above 1.6 tons per 
hectare there are savings to be made through harvest m echanisation. In 
Western Transvaal the 1969/70 season marked the point at which expected 
average yield increases surpassed the 1.6 tons per hectare.318
Governm ent policy allow ing profits to be untaxed if  spent on 
machinery provided a definite incentive towards m echanisation. But the 
rate of adoption of combine harvesting appears to be depend on yield levels, 
favourable investment conditions and a prior conversion to bulk handling 
and delivery  operations. The governm ent policy  to subsid ise  silo 
construction ensured the latter and similar infrastructural subsidies can be 
identified throughout the different agricultural sectors.
4.5. 1980s: D e re g u la tio n  an d  In c re a s in g  S tr a t if ic a tio n
The governm ent's m odernisation policies' proved effective. The 
investm ent and expenditure patterns of farm ers altered  substantially as
they adopted a high input cost-high physical output' farm ing system. In
the period 1975-1983 farmers bought 123 528 tractors. There was overall 
farm  enlargm ent as existing farm ers took advantage o f investm ent 
incentives to purchase land from  those leaving the sector. Perm anent 
workers were retrenched and there was an absolute fall in demand for 
seasonal w o rk e rs .31^ T hree hundred thousand  o ffic ia lly  reg is te red
farmworkers lost their jobs; they either found alternative employment or 
Joined the 'discarded people' who populate the homelands.
31^ The Department of Agricultural Economics carried out a study, in the late sixties, 
on the cost comparison of hand harvesting compared to combine harvesting which 
de Klerk updated using 1975 prices. Table 9 selects information relating to hand 
harvesting compared to Power Take Off combines. Van Wyk's original calculations 
(based on, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35 'sacks per morgen) are converted to kg/ha accounting 
for the seemingly odd range of yield/ha in Table 8. Figure 9 indicates the machine 
cost per kilo at the lowest and highest yield levels per hectare and on different 
harvest areas.
31 ^ de Klerk, 1984, p 80. Note however while the expected yield per hectare was 
consistently above 1.6 tons as from 1970 topping 3.1 tons per hectare in 1981 the 
actual average yield per hectare twice plunged below the 1.6 tons per hectare break 
even point. Average actual yield in 1972 was 0.9 tons per hectare and 1.55 tons per 
hectare in 1975/76.
319 Budlender, D. 1984 p 306,
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However, by 1984, there are clear indications o f new trends 
em erg ing . Farm  em ploym ent began  to in c re a se  ag a in . T rac to r
m anufacturers assessed that new purchases would only be made on a 
replacem ent basis,320 the number of farm  units began to increase. An 
exam ination of the wider econom ic context in which agriculture has 
developed suggests several causal factors which add to the farm ers' 
economic problems and which are examined in greater detail below. (i) The
increased potential of production output appears to be also more susceptible 
to drought and harvest unpredictability (ii) The government promotion of 
deregulation has exacerbated already deteriorating economic conditions; a 
cost squeeze, a quota system and price deregulation have affected many 
p ro d u c ts .
4.5 (i) The increased unpredictability o f production.
The vulnerability of stock farmers due to periodic drought has long
been i d e n t i f i e d . 321 The condition of pasture land has declined, in some 
extreme cases, to a point where there is insignificant recovery o f the veld
between droughts. Economic vulnerability of arable farmers due to seasonal 
differences in weather conditions has been greatly exacerbated as a result
of m odernisation. For example. Table 4.6 shows that maize production 
considerably increased from .1955/56 to 1988/89. Average annual production 
of the first five years was 4.02 million tons and 8.66 million tons for the last 
five years. Figure 4.8, a scatter plot of 'Maize production; time series data' 
indicates a general strong upward trend with some variations. A closer look 
at the variations especially in tons per hectare in . different years, indicates
some unsatisfactory results. Two years after an all time high in maize 
productivity per hectare at 3.39 tons per hectare the 1982/83 harvest
yielded an all time low of only 1.01 tons per hectare.
Variations in agricultural harvests are unavoidable but the type of 
new technology which was adopted has exacerbated unpredictability. Table
4.6 further exam ines the maize production time series data. Production
figures are twice smoothed in medians o f three. In Figure 4.9 the smoothed
data curve is contrasted with the annual maize production data. The outliers
indicate both the high and low results obtainable from year ' to year. In
terms of production, the dominant trend is a production increase to be 
expected from the improved seed varieties. But the outstanding feature is 
the constancy of the low point of production in the poor harvest years
320 Mïircus, T. 1986, p 36.
321 RSA Government, 1970.The Marais /de Plessis Commission 2nd report, p.9.
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which are the low rainfall years. The plant breeding technology is only 
able to realise its potential in years of good rainfall when adequately 
fertilised. However the new seeds are not drought resistant. In poor rainfall 
years production per hectare consistently dropped back to almost one ton 
per hectare.
Table 4.6 Maize Production: time series data.
Productfoniproduction ! 1 smoothed 12 smoothed :Rough i Tons
Veer mil l ion t o n s  modi one of  31 modi one. of 31 o u t l i e r s  1per  He.
1 9 5 5 / 5 6 3.01 3.01 3.01 o.ol 1.12
1 9 5 6 / 5 7 4.31 3.01 3.0Î -0.51 1.24
1 9 5 7 / 5 8 3.71 4.01 4.01 -0.31 1.00
1 9 5 8 / 5 9 4.01 4.0: 4.01 0.01 1.00
1 9 5 9 / 6 0 4.31 4.31 4.3i 0.01 1.02
1 9 6 0 / 6 1 ' 5.31 5.31 5.31 o.ol 1.29
1 9 6 1 / 6 2 6.01 6.01 6 01 0 01 1 30
1 9 6 2 / 6 3 6 . l ! 6.0! 6.01 1.0! 1.40
1 9 6 3 / 6 4 4.3i 4.91 4 .9 | -6.01 0 .9 7
1 9 6 4 / 6 5 4.91 4.91 4.9l o.o l 1 .14
1 9 6 5 / 6 6 5 1 5.1! 5.11 O.Oi 1.20
1 9 6 6 / 6 7 9.01 5.31 5.31 4.5i 2 .1 0
1 9 6 7 / 6 8 5.3: 5.31 5.3! 0.01 1.12
1 9 6 8 / 6 9 5.3! 5 .3 ' 5.31 0.01 1.20
1 9 6 9 / 7 0 6 1: 6.1; 6.1! 0.0! 1.40
1 9 7 0 / 7 1 0.6! 0.6i 0.61 O.Oi 1.95
1 9 7 1 / 7 2 9.5: 0 .6 , 0.6 : 0.91 2 .0 0
1 9 7 2 / 7 3 4.2, 9.5! 9.1: -4.91 1.16
1 9 7 3 / 7 4 1 1.0' 9. | ! 9.11 ' 1.91 2 .4 6
1 9 7 4 / 7 5 9.1 9.1 9.1 O.OI 2 .0 3
1 9 7 5 / 7 6 7 .5 9.1! 9 .1 ' 1.61 1.65
1 9 7 6 / 7 7 9 .7 9 .7 ' 9 .7 ' 0.0! 2 .1 0
1 9 7 7 / 7 8 10.1 9 .7 ' 9.7! 4.0! 2 .2 4
1 9 7 8 / 7 9 0 .3 10.1 10.1! -1.01 1.93
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 10.0 10.0! 10.01 0.0! 2 .5 0
1 9 8 0 / 8 1 14.7' 10.0: 10.01 3.9; 3 .39
1 9 8 1 / 8 2 0 . 4 ‘ 0.4; 0.41 0.01 1.96
1 9 8 2 / 8 3 4.1 4.4! 4 .4 , - 3 .0 ' 1.01
1 9 8 3 / 8 4 4.4i 4.41 4.4 : 0 .0 ' 1.11
1 9 8 4 / 8 5 7 .7 0.1: 0.0: 0.0! 2 .0 3
1 9 8 5 / 8 6 0.0 0.01 0.0: 0 .0 ' 1.96
1 9 8 6 / 8 7 7.0: 7.0: 7.01 0.0: 1.76
1 9 8 7 / 8 8 ■ 6.0. 7.0; 7.0i -0 .2! 1.05
1 9 8 8 / 8 9 1 1.6 0.4. 7 .0 . 3 .2 3 .0 7
1 9 8 9 / 9 0 0.4. 0.4i 0 .4 . 0.0. 2.41
1 9 9 0 / 9 1 7 .7 7 .7 ’ 7 7 0 .0
1 9 9 1 / 9 2 4 .5 7 .7 ' I T 3.2
Source: Abstract of Agricultural Statistics 1992, Table 7 for the period 1955/56-
1990/9 1.
* The 1991/92 figure is a DBS A estimate (DBSA 1992) from their assessment 
of the impact of the current agricultural drought.
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In ecological terms this fact is disturbing. W eather forecasts for
Southern Africa predict further drought. Soil mapping indicates increased 
soil erosion. It would appear that agricultural Research and Development 
should focus on the breeding of drought resistant grain varieties and also
turn to a lte rn a tiv e  farm ing  system s w hich prom ote env ironm enta l
sustainability. This is necessary for food security income stabilisation and
in order to ensure a farming future.
Figure 4.8.' Maize Production: time series data.
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Data source: AtKtract of AgHcultiral Statistics, 1992 Table 7.
Figure 4.9.'Maize Production: smoothed time series data.
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4,5.(U) Government D Q licv changes: the demise of less productive farmers
The adoption of the new technology was undertaken in a period of 
negative real interest rates for investment borrowing, tax concessions on 
investm ents, favourab le  term s o f trade and substan tia l governm ent 
subsidies for agricultural inputs. By 1984 this situation had begun to change 
and continued to change drastically. The governm ent significantly altered 
its support policies. Since 1982 there have been major changes in (a) credit 
policy and inflation rates, (b) taxation (c) subsidies, rebates and pricing 
systems and (d) devaluation o f the rand causing steep increases of imported 
equipment and inputs. The cumulative effects of these on the terms o f trade 
were substantially unfavourable to the farming community.
Tab le _ 4 .7 Credit Conditions and Monetarv Information.
Year  ' Commercial! Land Bank! inf lat ion rate iU SS/R
Rate ratoi
1 9 6 0  1 0.331 6.001 1.7i 1.39
1 9 6 9 8.001 6.001 2.91 1.39
1 9 7 0 8.17' 6.001 5.31 1.39
1971 8.831 6.001 6.11 1.40
1 9 7 2 8.791 6.00Î 6.5i 1.29
1 9 7 3 8.001 6.00' 9.41 1.44
1 9 7 4 1 0.1 71 7.001 1 1.7,' 1.47
1 9 7 5 1 1.79! 7 00: 13.5; 1.36
1 9 7 6 • 12.25; 7.00, 11.1! 1.15
1 9 7 7 12.50- 7.001 1 1.31 1.15
1 9 7 8 1 2.1 3i 7.00; 10.9! 1.15
1 9 7 9 10.00- 7.00' 13.3; 1.18
1 9 8 0 9.50: 7.00! 13.8! 1.28
1981 14.00; 7.00' 15.2: 1.14
1 9 8 2 19.33 1 0.00: 14.7 0.92
1 9 8 3 16.67 10.001 12.3' 0.89
1 9 8 4 22.33 1 O.OOi 1 1.7' 0.69
1 9 8 5 21.50 13.341 16.2. 0.45
1 9 8 6 14.33: 1 3.945 18.6, 0.44
1 9 8 7 12.50: 13 69; 16 1' 0.49
1 9 8 8 15.33! 13.68' 12.9: 0.44
1 9 8 9 19.83" 14.59! 14.7 = 0.38
1 9 9 0 2 1.00 16.06' 14.4: 0.38
1991 17.00: 16.3
Source: Comm ercial Lending Rate from International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1991, IMF, pp670-671. The R/$ exchange rate, ibid., pp668-669. The 
inflation rate computed from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) Abstract of 
Agricultural Statistcs, 1990, Table 90 and 1992, Table 89. The Land Bank rate 
is that charged on long term loans. Land Bank Annual Reports.
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(a) credit Dolicv and inflation rates.
Table 4.7 indicates the changes in borrowing conditions for farmers.
Up to the end of 1983 the state Land Bank was the cheapest access to farm 
cred it. The cred it fac ilitie s  o f  ag ricu ltu ra l supply and m arketing  
cooperatives was the next cheapest supply of finance. Comm ercial banks 
provide the most expensive credit. But the credit available from the Land 
Bank and cooperatives was limited. The Land Bank credit was available for 
long term borrowing and mostly granted for land purchase. Cooperatives 
mostly extended credit for seasonal input supplies and m arketing costs. 
Commercial banks tended to be used for short term loans. However the 
average rate of interest available to farmers was below the inflation rate 
until 1982 and this itself provided a borrowing incentive.
In 1982 the state deeided to modify its poliey of low interest rates for 
farmers. Land Bank, interest rates increased 6.3 percentage points from 1981 
to 1985. The average interest rate overtook the inflation rate and remained 
higher. By 1984 Land Bank interest rates as high as the Cooperatives'
lending rate. The government's credit policy changes coincided with the 
worst drought in three decades.
(b) Spbsidies ..^ d . rebates and- pncjpg systems.
The government has changed its approach to agricultural subsidies.
Instead of product subsidies the main subsidy at present, and which is not 
categorised as such in the statistics, is financial, A review of expenditure
patterns indicates that large subsidies used to be given to lower the
production costs (fertilisers, rebates on transport) and subsidies on maize 
and bread lowered the cost of staples to low income consumers. Table 4.8.
indicates the change since 1975 in nominal terms; the recent reductions are 
more severe if the high rate of inflation is taken into account.
The governm ent says the changed subsidy policy reflec ts  its 
com m itm ent to deregu la tion . H ow ever the m oney the governm ent 
continues to spend is still used as a policy instrument. The current state 
objective is that grain farming should take place on the best arable lands
and pricing structure should no longer provide the incentive for grain 
production on land which is less suitable and has a lower productivity.
Hence the reduction o f expenditure is not across the board for all 
categories. G overnm ent expenditure on stock feed and grazing  has 
increased  with the ob jective  o f encouraging  pasto ra l farm ing .T he
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complementary policy shaping action is the reduction of those subsidies 
and rebates which were important to grain farm ers. A new price system 
was introduced as a further tool. The 1989 maize harvest was m arketed 
according to a dual price quota system. There was one frxed price operating 
up to one level of output and a lower price available to sales above this 
a moun t .
Table 4.8. Government Subsidies and Rebates.(in Rand million)
Year Bread I Maize ! F e r t l - S t o c k  feed fT ran sport
( w h e a t )  I 1 U s e r s  & grazing! r e b a t e s
1 9 7 5 44.61 31.51 15.41 O.Oi 2.1
1 9 7 6 6 1.61 54.81 18.41 O.OI 2 .3
1 9 7 7 67.81 61.91 17.81 O.OI 3 .0
1 9 7 8 65.41 51.7! 14.21 O.OI 4 .0
1 9 7 9 - 5 7 4 1 4 7  91 8.41 O.OI 1.6
1 9 8 0 1 16.41 44.71 3.51 3.91 2 .4
1981 1 6 2 . l l 59.41 1 1.01 15.71 4 .0
1 9 8 2 182.0Î 83.01 12.0! 14.11 3.1
1 9 8 3 193.51 69.91 10.61 22.81 5 .2
1 9 8 4 ' 267.61 132.41 3.5: 54.21 19.3
1 9 8 5 194.3: 215 .0! 3.41 75.1! 14.6
1 9 8 6 180.5Î 250 .0! 2.5! 64.01 10.3
1 9 8 7 147.01 1 5 1 .oi 2.01 4 0 . li 5 .0
1 9 8 8 147.41 359.01 1.01 69.2! 6 .8
1 9 8 9 132.0! 80.01 O.OI 4 4 .  l | 2 .9
1 9 9 0 105.91 76.01 0 .0 10.5: 5 .4
Source; Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, 1992, Table 104
Farmers have begun to re-examine their level of input use as a
result o f the cut in subsidies. Until 1982 chemical usage was not only more 
widespread but it was also being applied more intensively. For example, in 
the period 1966-1982 the amount of fertiliser used per hectare of maize rose
from 20kg/ha. in 1966 to 100 kg/ha. in 1982. A record high usage was
recorded in 1981 when average figures topped 110 kg/ha. Since 1981 the
rising cost of chemical fertilisers and the phasing out of the subsidy has
made farmers measure more carefully the extra yield due to levels of 
fertiliser application and many are now reducing the quantities per
h e c t a r e . 322
(c) Terms of trade. Table 4.5 compares the increase in the price 
index of farm equipment and inputs with farm product prices and the
consumer price index. The index is set at 100 for 1975. By 1986 the overall
322 Marcus, T. 1986, p36.
155
general index level for farming requisites was 465.5, for all machinery and
equipment 535.9 and for tractors 615.4. In comparison the overall index for
farm ers' output prices was 310.4.323 Although the volume o f output 
increased in this period, farmers claim that increased volume of output fails
to compensate for the lower net income per unit o f output which results
from the deteriorating terms of trade.
Differences in the rate of increase o f various types o f farm ing 
requisites largely depended on the import content o f the produce. The
decline in the international value of the Rdnd in the 1980s led to an
enormous rise in import costs. The value o f the rand in dollar terms 
declined from 0.9 rand to the dollar in 1983 to 0.69 in 1984, 0.46 in 1985, 0.45
in 1986, 0.49 in 1987 and 0.38 by 1989. (See Table 4.5.)
Fertilisers are dom estically m ixed and packaged but some use 
considerable quantities o f imported products. Tractors are either im ported 
or domestically produced but need imported components. The increase in 
tractor purchase costs was the highest. Table 4.5 indicates that the terms of 
trade for agriculture at 85 in 1960 substantially improved for the next
twelve years to reach their all time favourable peak in 1972 at 117.5. Ten
years later it was back to the 1960 level at 84.9. The figures for 1984-87 
show an all time low, an average 76.7 for these three years.
However changes in terms of trade would not appear to have been
absolutely determ inant in shaping farm ers' expectations and investm ent 
behaviour at least until 1982 when borrowing conditions changed. For if 
the nominal expenditures on equipment and machinery are deflated and 
the 1975 price used as the base, the comparative volume purchased annually
can be calcinated (Column 4, Table 4.9) This is represented graphically in
Figure 4.8 'Volume o f machinery and Equipment Purchase per year.' Thé 
sharp decline in the terms of trade in 1978 did not appear to affect
machinery and equipment purchase. A good harvest and tax concessions on
new equipment outweighed longer term considerations of declining terms 
of trade.
G rain farm ers are the m ajor pu rchasers o f m achinery and 
equipment. The unpredictability of production harvest tends to influence 
farmers to 'live from day to day rather than behave according to long term
323 A-AS, 1987, Table 91 gives this more detailed breakdown of the various categories 
of farming requisites.
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Table 4,9,'yoW me of Machinery and Equipment Purchase per Year.'
1 1 2 3 4
Year Nominal value Nominal price  i Price  • Volume =
mil l ion rand 1975  base 1* 3
1 9 5 9 50.3! 43.91 9 4 .6 /4 3 .9 1 108 .4
1 9 6 0 58.61 44.91 9 4 .6 /4 4 .9 1 123 .5
1961 ! 46.51 4 5  31 9 4 . 6 / 4 5 . 3i 97.1
1 9 6 2 ; 54.7> 46.11 9 4 .6 / 4 6 .1 ! 1 12.2
1 9 6 3 64.61 46.91 9 4 .6 / 4 6 .9 ! 130 .3
1 9 6 4 7 0 .7 ' 48 . r 9 4 .6 /4 8 .1 1 139 .0
1 9 6 5 6 6 .7 ’ 4 9  7: 9 4 .6 /4 9 .7 1 126 .9
1 9 6 6 I 70.41 50.3Î 9 4 . 6 / 5 0 . 3i 1 3 2 .4
1 9 6 7 95.61 51.11 9 4 .6 /5 1 .1 1 177.0
1 9 6 8 98.2! 52.41 9 4 .6 /5 2 .4 1 177.3
1 9 6 9 107.7! 54.01 9 4 .6 /5 4 .0 1  . 188 .7
1 9 7 0 120.91 56.2! 9 4 .6 / 5 6 .2 ! 2 0 3 .5
1971 142.41 58.51 9 4 .6 / 5 8 .5 ! 2 3 0 .3
1 9 7 2 142.0: 63.5Î 9 4 .6 /6 3 .5 1 2 1 1 .5
1 9 7 3 163 7! 6 9  7' 9 4 .6 /6 9 .7 1 222.2
1 9 7 4 192.91 75.91 9 4 . 6 / 7 5 . 9i 2 4 0 .4
1 9 7 5 ! 3 3 6 .5i 94.6Î 9 4 6 / 9 4  61 3 3 6 .5
1 9 7 6 321.8! 1 15.2! 9 4 .6 /1  15.2! 2 6 4 .3
1 9 7 7 356.31 127.41 9 4 .6 /1 2 7 .4 1 2 6 4 .6
1 9 7 8 368.91 145.1 ' 9 4 .6 /1 4 5 .1 1 2 4 0 .5
1 9 7 9 397 .8 : 167.4: 9 4 .6 /1 6 7 .4 ! 2 2 4 .8
1 9 8 0 636.1 181.0: 9 4 .6 /1 8 1 .0 1 3 3 2 .5
1981 946.9! 207.8! 9 4 .6 /2 0 7 .8 1 .431 .1
1 9 8 2 7 2 2 .3 241.5! 9 4 .6 / 2 4 1 .5 ! 2 8 2 .9
1 9 8 3 669 .9 : 283.11 9 4 .6 / 2 8 3 .1 ! 2 2 3 .9
1 9 8 4 608.0* 3 1 1 7 9 4 .6 / 3 1  1.7! 184 .5
1 9 8 5 663.5: 378 .3 : 9 4 .6 /3 7 8 :3 ! 165 .9
1 9 8 6 633.91 490.9 : 9 4 .6 / 4 9 0 .9 : 122.2
1 9 8 7 658 .0 : 6 0 5 .7 ’ 9 4 .6 / 6 0 5 .7 ! 102.8
1 9 8 8 9 7 0 .0 683 .2 : 9 4 .6 /6 8 3 .2 ! 134 .3
Source; Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, 1990, Tables 80 & 92.
e x p e c t a t i o n s . '324 i com pare data on m aize harvests and m achinery 
purchased in Figure 4,9., Maize Harvest and Machinery purchase by year.' 
The graphics indicate that large maize harvests led to extra cash availability 
(under a fixed price system) and were followed by increased spending on 
machinery. This trend only changed after 1984. For the first time the 
improved harvest in 1984/85 and 1985/86 did not result in an increase in 
purchase of machinery. This may have been due to liquidity problems 
following the earlier two year drought. Furthermore, the subsequent repeal 
of the favourable tax regulations for the purchase of new equipment make 
it unlikely that good harvests will lead to increased, tractor purchase as it 
did in the 1970s.
324 Personal communication with David Cooper, coordinator of Environment and 
Development Agency, Johannesburg, RSA.
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Figure 4,10. 'Volume of Machinery and Equipment Purchase bv Year.
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Figure 4 . II.  'Maize Harvest and Machine Purchase by Year.*
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Table 4.5. also compares the index of producer prices received by 
farmers and the consumer price index. 1975 is used as the base index of 100. 
By 1981 both the agricultural products and the consumer index were almost 
equal at 201 and 203.5 respectively. The trajectory of rate of increase then 
diverges and the final available figure shows producer prices at 310.4 
compared to the consumer price index of 340.3. The implication is that 
farmers would have to increase output in order to maintain the real value of 
their income and purchasing power in terms of consumer goods. The index
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of volume of agricultural production suggests this would have been possible 
for some farmers.
(d^The cumulative effect of changes in production economics.
W hen farm ers adopted the "hi-tech" labour saving and yield  
increasing strategy the economic conditions were very different to those 
prevailing since the 1980s. Price fixing, subsidies, rebates, negative interest 
rates, favourable tax laws, favourable terms of trade have all been reversed. 
Increased  vo la tility  o f p roduction  has increased  farm ers ' econom ic 
insecurity. The result is a continued centralisation process within the 
farming sector with a sharply skewed income distribution.
In the last twenty five years 40 000 farms have been bought out and 
merged with other farm units. Approximately 60 000 units remain. In 1983
27.5 per cent of the white commercial farming sector accounted for 72.8 per 
cent o f gross farm income and controlled 80 per cent o f agricultural 
r e s o u r c e s . H a t t i n g h  estim ated that 1 percent of farm ers or 590 units 
contributed 16 per cent of gross farm income earning a projected average 
of R2,62 million per unit in 1985, 6 percent of units produced 40 per cent of 
gross farm income.
W ithin this top echelon o f profitable farm ing . are a number of
companies which have diversified their investments to include agriculture 
along with their mining and industrial portfolios. These include Anglo 
A m erican corporation which runs "mega farms" through its Soetevelde 
subsidiary in the Eastern and Southern Transvaal, N orthern Free State,
Northern Natal and the Rhodes Fruit farms in the Western Cape. Anglo also
owns Tongaat-H ulett which farm s sugar and vegetables. O ther Anglo 
subsidiaries SAPPI and Mondi are major buyers of agricultural land for 
timber planting. Kanhym Estates, a beef and maize company, partly owned 
by Gencor owns farms in Eastern Transvaal. Sanlam is identified as the 
ultim ate controlling shareholder of Kanhym E s t a t e s . P o u l t r y  companies 
such as Farmfare and Stein Bros, are owned by food industry companies.
In the meat industry, both production and distribution are dominated 
by 'the big three' the cooperative Vleissentral, and Imperial Cold Storage
Cooper. D, (1986) citing a SAAU 1984 report and Hattingh, a civil service 
economist.
Neill, D.G.R. 1986. p2. citing McGregor, R 1985.
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and Karoo K a n h y m . I m p e r i a l  Cold Storage is not a recent newcomer to
the farming sector. ICS originally started operations in 1923 in partnership
with De Beers and the British South Africa Company. In 1937 they became 
sole owners of vast ranching lands. Macgregors 1985 index, however now
shows S.A. M utual to be the u ltim ate con tro lling  shareholder, via
B a r l o w s . 328 These companies, along with the suppliers to agriculture and
five food processing conglomerates (CG Smith, Premier Foods, Tiger Foods,
Federate Foods and the co-operatives) are investing in agriculture as part of
a process of vertical integration. Their various subsidiaries supply farming 
requisites, are involved in production, are buyers and processors o f 
agricultural products, and do packing, wholesaling and r e t a i l i n g . 329
But s tra tifica tio n  in farm ing is not only ind icated  b y  the
phenomenon of large companies taking over production where they can 
gain through vertical integration. S tratification also occurs between farm 
product sectors as profitability  conditions for d ifferent products change 
over time. The sectors which are currently flourishing are those (a) who 
produce high value produce for urban consumption; fruits and vegetables 
which generally need considerable capital investm ent and irrigation and
(b) timber for paper products which are commanding an all time high in
real price increases and export possibilities and (c) those export sectors for
which export conditions have improved eg.grapes, citrus and wine. This 
reflec ts im proved export conditions ra ther than increased  p roductive 
capacity with foreign exchange earnings benefitting enormously from the 
devaluation o f the rand.
The farming sectors which are doing badly are those most severely 
affected by adverse weather conditions (i.e.. rain-fed grain farming) as
well as export products for which the international prices have declined 
and even the devalued rand does not compensate. In 1980 maize and sugar 
were the two most important export products. Since then there has been a
severe decline in the international sugar market and by 1984 the value of
sugar exports had fallen 53 p e r c e n t . 330
At the bottom end of the farming spectrum 72.5 percent of farming
units, roughly 40 000 farms, share between them only 27.2 percent of farm
income; many of them grain farmers. The farmers leaving the sector tend
327 Marcus, T . 1986 p. 10.
328 Neill, D.S.R. 1986, p2.
329 Cooper, 1987, p8.
330 Sunday Star. 27/4/88
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to be those operating on com paratively small sized farm ing units. From
April 1982 to March 1983 some 9414 farms covering 3.5 million hectares 
were sold. Of these 56.2 percent were less than 110 hectares, 72.8 percent 
were smaller than 300 hectares. Only 8.7 percent of the farms sold were
more than 1000 hectares.331
The statistics fail to indicate some new trends. For example some
farmers at the bottom end o f the spectrum are changing their land use. 
Subdivision is taking place inform ally especially  in areas where the 
profitability conditions have d e t e r i o r a t e d .332 M oreover there are land use 
changes due to new leases; corporate owners now rent out gradually 
increasing tracts o f land which they have held for speculative (and often
m ineral-related) reasons rather than for agricultural potential. Changes in 
the law now make it possible for white farmers to rent out land legally to 
blacks. So while there is little  change in reg istered  ow nership, the 
occupation and use o f land is greatly affected. Such patterns are emerging 
not only in marginal productive areas but generally in areas with weak
m arketing services.
In conclusion , at p resen t South A frica 's  w hite com m ercial 
agriculture is both in the midst of further restructuring and political crisis. 
State intervention to promote a more rapid modernisation of agriculture has
been follow ed by a policy w hich began effectively  to squeeze the 
econom ically less efficient producers out of farm ing. C entralisation has 
continued but with increasing stratifica tion  among farm ers. Previously
subsidy policies and super exploitative labour conditions allow ed an 
extended life-span for less productive white commercial farmers. But their 
inability to sustain a desired level of farm  income or farm  liquidity
appeared, until recently, to indicate inevitable liquidation for many.
However although government policy on deregulation and reduction 
of subsidies began to be implemented in the early eighties, it is only at the 
end o f the decade that many thousands of farmers have technically arrived 
at bankruptcy (the 1991/92 drought has simply exacerbated the problem).
Debt levels have increased and the incidence of bankruptcy as a 
cause for leaving farming has risen. In 1985 144 farmers were declared
bankrupt. The 1987 total of bankruptcies were 412 and by 1988 an estimated
331 Marcus. T, (1986)
332 Mabin. A, 1990, p9.discusses the situation in the eastern Transvaal highveid
d i s t r i c t s .
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3 000 farmers were un the verge o f sequestration. By 1988 the finance 
minister expressed grave concern over the farming debt estim ated at R14 
billion remarking that 'the short term component of the debt since 1982
comprised more than SO percent of the total - a situation generally regarded 
as u n s o u n d . '3 3 3  By the end of 1990 the debt owed by individual farmers
totalled R15,9 b i l l io n .3 3 4  This debt was held as follows: commercial banks 
R4,9 billion (31.2%), agricultural cooperatives R3.8 billion (23;9%), the Land 
Bank R3,4 billion (21.7%) the A gricultural C redit Board R l,013  m illion
(6.4%) other financial institutions R l,2  billion (7.5%), private persons and 
others R l,5  billion (9.3%)
Farmers have become obliged to borrow further in order to service
their interest payments, to m eet short term cash payments. They have
mostly done this by restructuring their debt. Short term debt carries a
higher rate of interest than long term debt and restructuring debt arrears 
often means a higher debt servicing cost.
This crisis has coincided with the National Party commitment to
political change and a perspective of a democratically elected government
in which it cannot hope to wield the same power as in the p as t The political
pressure on the National Party from dissatisfied farm ers and the banking
sector has been considerable. Banks have opted for a self-im posed
m oratorium  on sequestrations. They fear depressing real estate prices 
through auctioning ' off property in the midst of an economic recession; 
they have difficulty managing a sequestrated farm themselves.
Although the government stated its commitment to supporting only 
the economically efficient farmers and not sustaining the continuity of less 
productive farmers in practice political pressures and pragm atism  have 
forced the governm ent to act d ifferently . The governm ent intervened 
throughout the 1980s with selective Financial A ssistance schemes which 
provided credit at 8%. In 1988 it allocated R309 million to maize farmers,
R900 million as state guarantees of carry over debts and R400 million to 
keep insolvent farm ers on the l a n d .3 3 5  N evertheless the state granted 
financial assistance in one form or another to some 27 000 (about one third)
333 Cape Times, 17/3/88.
334 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, 1992, Table 103.
333 The Star, 27/1/88.But delegates at the farmers' union (SAAU) conference in 1988 
complained that the R400 aid scheme is inadequate; fewer than 10 percent of the 3 
000 *needy farmers had applied for aid because refusal' they argued ‘virtually 
guaranteed liquidation'.
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of the country's white farmers during the decade ending in 1990.^^^ The 
average loan assistance over the period 1981/82 to 1991/92 am ounted to 
R26,231 per farm and subsidies average R35.726 per farm.337
The Government has gradually succumbed to political pressure. The 
1988 grant of R400 m illion special assistance for farm ers in financial
difficulties due to drought conditions appeared to be given reluctantly as a 
political response and a deviation from the principle policy to deregulate 
and sift out those white commercial farmers who could not survive in the 
new economic conditions. But the most recent measures completely renege 
on the sta ted  ob jective  o f only supporting  econom ically  e ffic ien t 
f a r m e r s . T h e  la test governm ent assis tance  package, approved  by 
parliam ent as "debt relief" goes far beyond such re lie f and for many 
beneficiaries actually writes o ff debts accumulated in the last decade. R3.8 
billion is to be made available for drought relief of which R3.25 billion is
specifically available for summer grain farmers. These farmers will receive 
R375 a hectare; R175 is intended to reduce farm ers' debt w ith the 
agricultural co-operative which has been providing production credit, RlOO 
is intended to cover the debt specifically due to the failed 1991/92 crop and 
RlOO is said to be for cooperatives to retain towards production credit for the 
following year. In previous years debt re lief assistance was only given 
after a relatively stringent evaluation of the farm er's capacity to rem ain 
solvent in the future- hence aiming to help effective producers out o f a
tem porary problem . The current re lie f  package has a very d ifferen t 
objective. It aims to generally reduce the debt levels of summer grain 
farmers, the most acrimonious section of the white farming constituency. 
For example the R375 grant will reduce average debt levels from R766 per
hectare to R39h a level considered to be manageable in the f u t u r e . T h e  
im plications of this package in terms of future land redistribution are 
examined in Chapter 7.
This C hap ter h igh ligh ted  the re s tru c tu rin g  p rocess w ith in  
com m ercial agriculture during N ational Party governm ent's rule since 
1948. This examination of the restructuring of the South African agrarian 
economy reveals the process through which the government engineered a 
'reform ' o f white com m ercial agriculture through certain  infrastructure 
investm ents, profit taxation  po lic ies, se lec ted  subsidies for certa in
RSA 1992a, Chapter 10
Using the mid period estimate of farm numbers of 65 880. 
RSA Government, 1992b.
339 f RRP (1992) p2.
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technological item s, producer pricing policy and changes in rates of 
interest. Land prices are influenced by government policies and changing 
profitability conditions and in their turn land prices, as I will show in 
Chapter 7, themselves directly influence a continuously changing profile 
of number and size of farms. I examine the complexity of contemplating a 
land redistribution program m e in a 'free m arket' system with stratified  
existing and potential producers and a heritage of state intervention which 
has supported land prices.
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C h ap te r 5. C lass Form ation  am ong Blacks in South  A frica 's  R u ra l
Areas.
Land and agrarian reform programmes which fail to take account o f 
geographical and social differentiation risk policy choices which have dire 
consequences. The M ozam bican failure to link class analysis to its 
cooperative programme or to recognise the majority of state farm workers 
as sem i-proletarians is a case in. point.^^^ Sim ilarly Zimbabwean land
reform  crite ria  d isqualified  wage w orkers as benefic iaries  o f land
redistribution thus failing to recognise the role o f wage remittances as a 
contribution to the production capacity of the rural homestead. A full 
com prehension o f social classes and econom ic dynamics, in the rural 
economy is essential to policy design. Moreover it is equally important to 
seek rigorous and com prehensive clarity to "form ulate and apply an 
em pirical criterion for the grouping o f (rural) households into social
classes"^^* otherwise the differentiated analysis (while laudable in intent)
may produce misleading r e s u l t s . M y  objective in this chapter is not only 
to describe differentiation of black rural dw ellers but also to identify 
sp ec ific  g roups w hose e ssen tia l c h a ra c te r is tic s  d is tin g u ish  them
sufficiently from other groupings to indicate their potential and differing 
aspirations vis -a -vis a land reform and agrarian restructuring.
The entry point of this chapter outlines some of the main differences 
in historical approaches to rural class analysis in predominantly peasant 
societies. I note the need for a modified analytical approach particularly in 
the w orld's South where land alienation is mostly incom plete, where 
migrancy is prevalent and analysis of class and class consciousness . is 
necessarily more complex. I present data on South A frican labour 
migration, income sources and land use of black households. In section 
three I examine the contemporary debate on rural class analysis in the
South drawing on work carried out in India and Latin America and Africa. I
then examine some of the recent contributions on rural class analysis in 
South Africa. I conclude that the analyses resulting from the various
33?The work ut' the Centre of Atfican Studies, Eduardo Mondlane university in its post 
independence policy research emphasised the need to cater for unemployed mine 
workers in the rural areas whose lack of wage income contributed to a wider social and 
economic crisis as shrinking rural incomes also affected artesans. In later years, a
rural policy which focussed on the poor peasantry rather than agricultores 
organisadas' i.e. largely black male entrepreneurs' would have provided Frelimo with a
peasant base of support in the war against REN AMO (Mozambique National Resistance)
338 Patnaik, U. (1987) p i.
339 [ this to be the case with most of the S.A. rural class analysis which 1 review
later in this chapter.
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methodological approaches are unsatisfactory. Against a background of a
critique of these approaches I suggest àn alternative analytical framework.
I set out a categorisation of groups of South Africa's rural inhabitants and 
relate it to prospects of land redistribution and agrarian restructuring.
5.1 D iffering  h is to rica l ap p ro ach es  to  analy sis  of r u r a l  a rea s .
In feudal societies the essence of a rural revolution among the 
peasantry would involve a struggle against feudal landlords. In many 
African societies there was no such exploitation in the classic feudal or
capitalist sense. But there are differences one would expect within a peasant 
economy based on petty commodity production (PCP): the family is not 
separated from the land, its means of production and the household unit is
both the unit of production and consumption.
In analysing the development of capitalism and class formation Marx
emphasised the process of prim itive accum ulation the separation o f the
direct producer trom the means by which he can realise his own labour as a 
necessary pre-condition o f the capitalist mode o f p r o d u c t i o n . 340 However 
colonial capitalism  was to devise other means o f drawing the peasant
economy into its exploitative domain whether by forced cropping, forced 
labour or the imposition of taxes which forced the peasantry to sell either 
produce or labour in order to pay taxes. Once pre-capitalist economies were 
penetrated by the money economy and drawn into the market significant 
differentiation developed within that society.
In South A frica loss of territo ria l power through colonisation
precluded the possibility that the South African indigenous peoples would 
be able to re-establish, in the same manner, their former organisation of 
p roduction . M oreover South A frican  econom ic p rosp ec ts  changed
dramatically when whites began mining gold. The discovery of mineral 
wealth fostered an unprecedented growth o f the internal m arket for
agricultural produce thus transforming attitudes to landholding (because of 
the possibility of mineral rights and its commercial agricultural potential), 
and there was a rapid growth in the demand for non-agricultural labour. 
The reorganisation of production by the Indigenous peoples, therefore, took 
place in a changing framework. They faced restricted access to land. The
potential of an expanded market for their produce was off-set by laws 
which impacted on their organisation of production. The hut tax was one 
such law; families needed a marketable surplus above their own personal
3*^ 0 Marx, K, Capital. Volume 1.
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needs in order to pay the tax and if this were not possible a member of the
family had to find wage work to raise the cash.
A frican  fam ilie s  resp o n d ed  d iffe re n tly  to these  chang ing  
circum stances and their response was very much determ ined by their
position within the tribal social formation.^'*! Colonial writers generally 
fo stered  an inaccurate  view  o f triba l so c ie ties  as predom inan tly  
"egalitarian" and with "redistributive" structures^^^ devoid o f econom ic
strata and class conflict. The notion of communality, lack o f private land
ow nership and rudim entary agricu ltural techniques have been used to
bolster a version of the African as lacking in entrepreneurial ability, and
as living in a communal system which impeded the individual's incentive to
compete and d e v e l o p . B u n d y  led a new and progressive wave of
historical data analysis and interpretation in the 1970s which focussed on
African peasant based production in the 1870-1890 period. Historical records 
proved a considerable rise in marketed surplus from African producers,
contradicting long held conservative views about the backwardness and
incapacity of Africans to respond to new conditions.
Lewis analyses data on the marketed produce of black communities 
and interprets the inform ation in relation to the differential capacity of 
households to exploit the new market opportunities. He notes that some rich
peasants were able to expand production and invest in oxen, ploughs and
transport. But for the majority, the poor peasantry, this was not possible.
The latter was not even likely to produce sufficient surplus to cover their 
hut tax. The sale of grain to raise the money to pay the hut tax could only
have been at the expense of family c o n s u m p t i o n . 345 Wage workers and 
migrant mine workers must have come mainly from the poor peasantry.
3 4 1 Lewis, J.1984.
342 Wolpe, 1972, p.432.
343 Gooilt’eiiow.D.M. 1931 is a good example of such historical appraisal.
344 Bundy,C. 1979.
345 Such consideration must permit a reassessment of the nature of the absolute
quantity o f  commercialised surplus. If the per family produce which was so ld  in
order to pay the hut tax is calculated and discounted from the total commercial 
produce and subtracted from the records available on commercialised produce this
considerably depletes that quantity of truly surplus produce which may be said to 
have been produced by the rich peasantry. On the other hand, perhaps the poor 
peasantry did not pay the hut tax through self-denial of consumption of home 
produce- perhaps they paid from wage income. But whatever the modified appraisal, 
the analysis remains valid, peasants were able to respond to market conditions and 
produce notable marketable surpluses.
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My use of the descriptive words rich, middle and poor peasantry stem 
from the methodology used by Lenin to analyse Russian rural society and
by Chinese leaders to provide guidelines for the redistribution of land.^46 
The Chinese took particular care to clarify class relations. Households were 
not simply classiHed according to how much land and means of production 
they owned. What was also considered important was the extent to which
their income depended on exploiting other people whether through rents,
interest or hired l a b o u r . ^47 More recently in the 1970s in Southern Africa, 
researchers in Mozambique used the same principles to group households
into social c l a s s e s . ^48
Rich peasants, in M ozam bique were few in number and their
material well-being not always significantly superior to those of middle
peasantry. But one essential d ifferentiating  characteristic  o f the rich 
peasantry was the fact o f their hiring labour. The characteristics of
M ozam bican m iddle peasants were: ow nership and use of means o f
production especially ploughs, oxen and sometimes a m illing m achine,
ag ricu ltu ra l production  both for home consum ption and m arketable
surplus, relatively larger land holdings, the ownership of relatively large
numbers of fruit or nut trees, some additional income from artesanal
activity and a relatively large family labour force. Poor peasants, however, 
usually owned hand tools but rarely oxen and ploughs, had less land and 
generally a less w ell-established base o f agricultural production. Their
marketable surplus was mostly insignificant (the days of forced cropping 
being over), and they often produced too little food for family consumption 
so that some family members would look for work to supplem ent the
household income.
It is interesting to note that the Mozambican researchers identified a
relatively larger family household (i.e. household labour force) as a 
significant but not as a key determ inant o f class stratification. This
m ethodological approach took cognisance o f C hayanov's theory but
im plicitly rejected the analytical application advanced by him. It is 
conceded that the number of productive family members alters productive 
capacity; (a young family may have a larger ratio of dependents than an 
older family with productive adolescents) but this is not accepted as a class
346 Lenin, V.I. (1977) p 77
347 stavis, B. (1978) p30.
348 CEA, 1977, p i06-8
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d e t e r m i n a n t . ^49 Chayanov advances a view of a peasant economy made of 
innum erable scarcely distinguishable "family farm s" whose only notable
difference is their fam ily size and the fact that larger fam ilies are
relatively better off than smaller ones. Moreover Chayanov’s proposition is
based on the "superior viability" and "efficiency" of family farms relative
to capitalist farms.^^® Patnaik's expose of this so-called superior viability is 
dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 6 which examines the linkages 
between class, scale, technology and production functions in relation to
land distribution and agrarian reform. Here suffice it to say that Chayanov 
fails to propose an adequate theory regarding the dynamics of a peasant 
economy; its genesis and whether and under what conditions it might give 
way to other forms of economic production. At best he offers a theory of 
cyclical household differentiation.
In present day South Africa however, as in many southern countries, 
the dominant feature of the majority o f rural households is that some of 
their members are migrants. The way m igrant wages are used differs 
according to the class of the rural household. One cannot simply categorise 
those households which have migrant workers as the "poor peasantry" on 
the assumption that migrancy occurs because they have insufficient land 
and means of production with which to satisfy their family needs. In the
southern Mozambican study in which the agricultural base remains a major 
component of the household income it was found that migrant remittances 
served a different purpose depending on social class. The poor peasantry
principally used remittances to buy food whereas the middle peasantry used 
it to buy means of production and strengthen their agricultural base. In
South Africa, however, the agricultural base has been so destroyed and 
m ig ran t rem ittan ces  so dom inate the ru ra l econom y th a t the 
concep tu a lisa tio n  o f these ru ral residen ts  as peasantry  m ust be 
reconsidered. In Section 2, I Indicate the extent to which the agricultural 
base has been weakened through state intervention as well as migrancy 
and proletarianisation. In Section 3, I return to the debate on rural class 
analysis and introduce alternative approaches which are more applicable to 
migrant rural societies.
349sender J & S Smith, (1990) pp36-38 apply Chayanovian proposition to household 
!)urvey data lu a Tauzauiau case Study and find it completely tails to provide a 
"satisfactory explanation of the determinants of individual's income and wealth"
350 Banaji J, 1976, presents a summary of selected parts of Kautsky's "The Agrarian 
Question."which examines the conditions of agrarian transformation, the speed of 
which is slower than might have been anticipated in Marx's writings because of a 
small farm resilience to continue even while using less productive methods
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5.2. The demise of the peasantry
The growth of urban centres and investm ent in rail transport
encouraged many white land-ow ners to manage their own production.
Although some of them started o ff with no capital, landlordism enabled
them to amass savings from the rents of their black tenants. But to manage 
their own production they wanted farm labourers, not tenants, on their 
farms. The mining houses also desperately wanted supplies o f (black) 
labour whose wages (although low) were higher than farm wages. Both 
mining capital and agrarian capital thus had vested (even if competing)
interests in securing the African dispossession of, or closure of access to 
land and means of production.
For the middle and rich peasantry the path to proletarianisation was 
to be protracted. This process was delayed but could not be prevented by 
their ability to farm, to develop new skills and to expand production. This 
capacity was demonstrated by the rich peasantry in the reserves and those 
black tenants on white owned land, many of whom succeeded in amassing 
oxen, ploughs, and cattle even w hilst "farm ing on halves". But the 
p easan try  as a w hole ex p e rie n c e d  a d e v a s ta tin g  and  b itte r
pro letarianisation process. D iscrim inatory legislation, passed periodically  
throughout the first seven decades o f the tw entieth century, ensured
further loss of land and means o f production pushing many to seek wage 
work. For the majority the result has been landlessness, unemployment,
dependency on waged household members or simply destitution.
. Legislation ensured the limitation and eventuallly the elimination 
of cash tenants and/or sharecroppers.^^  ^ As white land-ow nership was 
formalised blacks lost all legal title to their land. Many of them continued 
to farm on the same land on a cash rent or sharecropping basis. The 
"landless" cash-paying tenants or sharecroppers were referred  to as
"squatters". Some white interest groups opposed squatting as it impeded the 
availability of black wage labour whether for mining or farming. Many 
white farmers regarded these tenants as competitors and maligned them as 
stock thieves. White farmers in the Orange Free State complained that share 
cropping created a scarcity of labour and destroyed the right relationship
351 "Sharecropping" whereby an agreed portion of the crop is paid to the landowner as 
rent is Alternatively referred to as farming on shares', sowing on shares' or on the 
h a lv es '.
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between master and servant.^^2 Laws were passed to limit the number of 
black families in residence on white farms. In Natal's legislature Ordinance
2 of 1855 limited black residence on white farms to only three families. The 
Transvaal Squatters' Law (Law 11 of 1887, amended by Law 21 of 1895) "laid 
down the five-family rule but permitted five coloured' families for every
white head of household, including the white squatter (bywoner) heads of 
households if the owner of the land agreed"^^^
The four different colonies/republics initially made their own laws 
governing the renting or purchasing of land by Africans. The Orange Free
State and the Transvaal both passed laws in 1895 on the numbers of so-called
"squatters" who could reside on white land. Restrictions on squatters were
passed in the Cape in 1909 but never in Natal. Africans could purchase land
in the Cape and Natal but never in the Orange Free State. Eventually this 
prohibition was extended to the Transvaal. The 1913 Land Act finally unifred
the approach to purchase and hire; it prohibited black purchase or hire 
except in the areas scheduled as Native areas.^^4
There was, however, some allowance for the continuity of existing 
rental arrangements except in the Orange Free State "where the renting of 
land by Natives, whether for cash or on the share cropping system became 
illegal"^^^ The law gave landlords leverage to obtain a labour supply for 
their own farming activities. They foreclosed sharecropping rentals and 
offered labour tenancy agreements. Many sharecroppers took to the roads 
in search of landlords who would offer them better tenancy conditions. This
phenomenon of richer African peasants trudging the roads with herds of 
livestock in search of land contributed to the formation of - the African 
National Congress in 1912 which sent delegations to London to seek Imperial 
intervention against the enforcement of the Land Act.
In the first two decades of this century the number of labour tenants
increased with share croppers joining their ranks as a direct result of the 
N ative 1913 Land A c t . 356 Labour tenancy becam e the dom inant, if
352 Davenport & Hunt, 1974, citing Keyter, MP tor Picks burg giving evidence to the 
Beaumont Commission in 1916
353 Davenport and Hunt, 1974, p33.
354 Morris, 1976, p338.Relevant legislation includes: The Native Land Act, No. 27, of 
1913. The Private Locations Act of 1909 in the Cape Colony (regulating squatters); 
Ch. xxxiv Part I article 6 of the OPS Law book 1895 (on purchase) and Law No. 4 on 
squatting; Law No 21 of 1895 in the Transvaal.
355 ibid. citing Van de Horst,S. 1942, p291.'Native Labour in South Africa." OUP
356 Morris, M . 1976. and Bundy C, 1979,p241". . .by 1913 white food producers in all 
four provinces were aware of a growing and potentially even greater economic
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transitional, system of labour supply with regional variations. By the 1930s 
most labour on farms in the Cape was wage labour whereas in Natal it 
constituted up to 90% of the labour in some districts. "In general it was 
estimated that as late as the 1940s farm labour consisted o f 70% labour
tenants and 30% labourers earning cash wages.
There has been a considerable debate on the proletarian versus 
peasant characterisation of the labour tenant during the em ergence of 
agrarian capitalism. According to one analysis, wages in 1928/29 were made 
up of cash wages, payment in kind, the rental value of the arable land used
by the labour tenant and the value of g r a z i n g . 3 5 8  The proportionate share
of each wage component was calculated as follows: For coloured workers in 
wheat growing areas the payment in cash and kind was 100%. In other
areas it varied from 63% to 87%. In the North Eastern Orange Free State the 
value of the land and grazing was 56% and therefore greater than the cash 
and kind payment. But this was the exception rather than the rule.
The generalised use of labour paid predominantly in cash and kind 
evidences the establishment of the capitalist mode of production in white 
commercial agriculture by the end of the 1920s, Many labour tenants no 
longer owned their own oxen and ploughs. For those who still had their own 
animals and means of production, the white landowners reduced the area 
which they were permitted to plough and restricted the number of animals 
which they were allowed to graze.
As white farm ers intensified their com m ercial farm ing activities 
they altered the conditions offered to labour tenants. Grazing areas were
reduced and eventually rules were laid down on the number of livestock
which a labour tenant could keep. These rules effectively attacked the 
saving base of the labour tenants who were impoverished by the forced sale
of animals at reportedly low p r i c e s . 359 Labour tenants consistently lost 
their struggles to retain more favourable conditions. Eventually legislation 
limited the number of labour tenants permitted and, in later decades, they
challenge from African producers. The desire to reduce competition by peasant 
producers was one of the motives behind the Native Land Act,"
357 ibid, citing Hurwitz 1957 Agriculture in Natal 1860-1950. Natal Regional Survey.' 
OUP. p29 in and the Native Farm Labour Committee, 1939, p30.
358 ibid citing data from Neveiing, C.H. 1931,'Farm Labour in South Africa' in 
Journal of the Economic Society of South Africa. Vol.IV, Part 2.No.8.
359 Bud lender, D. 1984, South African Review Two."There first came the tractors and 
the big ploughs. The threshing machines came later. . . (People) were reduced as a 
result of those machines. They were rendered redundant because the machines had 
taken over. Ever since they started cultivating with tractors and cultivating wheat, 
thev told us to sell our cattle."
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faced expulsion. The out-m igration from commercial farms is examined in 
greater detail below.
The continued existence of labour tenancy (even in a modified form) 
leads some historians to argue that capitalism in South African agriculture 
only dates from the 1960s.^^® Contemporary interviews with old people who 
were labour tenants in the earlier decades o f the tw entieth century 
establish that they thought of themselves as peasant farmers rather than as 
w o r k e r s . B u t  this subjective perception does not detract from the 
objective decline of labour tenant conditions as part of the process towards 
the en trenchm ent o f cap ita lis t re la tio n s  o f p r o d u c t i o n . 362 C ross 's  
observation that there is often a lag between changes in social practice and
social thinking seems applicable here.^^^
The process o f elim inating labour tenancy was regionally uneven 
and never fully achieved. But in an overall national perspective, the 
conditions for state supported white agrarian  capitalism  w ere firm ly
established by the 1 9 2 0 s . 364 The demise of cash tenants, share croppers and
labour tenants was part of the losing battle by Africans to retain land and 
resources and was in tegral to developing the dom inance o f w hite 
commercial agriculture. While some labour tenancy has continued it had 
minor over all significance. The main focus of my . analysis therefore 
concentrates on the profile of black producers in the present bantustan
a re a s .
360 Beinart. W, Delius. P, & S Trapido. 1986
361 Keegan, T. 1988
362 Morris, M. 1987, p.3.
Cross C, 1990, was referring to statements professing beliefs on tenancy which 
differ from actual tenurial practice.
364 Morris, 1976. p302-302. Morris combs through the debate on transitions towards
capitalism in agriculture. He accepts that labour tenancy is generally understood as
a labour form characteristic of a feudal mode of production. But for Morris South
Africa's white agriculture was capitalist by the late 1920s in spite of the numerical
dominancy o f labour tenants. Morris supports his views though an examination of 
the conditions of production of labour tenants. He finds that the majority were by 
this time dispossessed of their own means of production. He views the landlords'
giving access to land, cultivation of labour tenants' land as well as some payment in 
kind as part of a multifaceted wage deal. He calls on Lenin to support his
interpretation, " . . .  Labour service. . . should be drawn into two types: 1) labour 
service that can only be performed by a peasant farmer who owns draught animals
and implements . . . and 2) labour service that can be performed by a rural
proletarian who has no implements . . .  It is obvious that for both peasant and
landlord, the firsf and the second type of labour are of opposite significance, and 
that the latter type constitutes a direct transition to capitalism, merging with it by 
a number if quite im perceptible transitions." Lenin, 1964, pp205-6, "The
Development of Capitalism in Russia, Collected works. Volume 3", Lawrence and 
W ishart.
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5.3. M igrancy , E m ploym ent, L and  Use an d  Incom e Sources.
Migrancy is a dominant feature of the bantustan social structure; it
both depletes household agricultural potential because of the withdrawal of 
labour and/or provides cash for farming inputs. In section (i) I review the 
tr i-se c to ra l m ig ra tion  p a tte rn s  betw een  w hite  ru ra l a rea s , b lack  
"homelands" and the urban and industrial areas as well as rapidly escalating
unem ploym ent. I exam ine (ii) the phenom enon and paradox o f land
shortage and land unused. I compare (iii) the income sources (and their 
relative importance) of black households in the "homelands".
5.3.(i) Employment and migration.
Labour m igration is comm on throughout Africa and in Other parts of 
the world. It is often explained in terms o f demand and supply in the labour 
market influenced by factors which facilitate or inhibit migration. The co­
existence of centres of growth and peripheral areas of stagnation appear to 
be a generalised feature of capitalist development.^^^ The pattern in South 
Africa has been unique in that its system o f institutionalised racism
remains virtually intact. Racially selective legislation, such as the Group 
Areas Act and Urban Areas Act, inhibited free labour movement and
influenced demographic settlement patterns right up to the end of the 20th 
Century. A dditional state intervention in com m ercial agricu lture also 
influenced rural dem ography; the state induced m echanisation process
accelerated out-m igration from com mercial farms. .
Table 5 J  .Regional Analysis of black out-migration from the white rural 
areas. 1980-1985.
R eg io n  Net Outmigration Drop in %p.a.
Pop u la tio n .
C. Orange Free State 220 000 2.4.
D. Eastern Cape 110 000 4.1.
E. Natal 530 000 8.9
F. Eastern Transvaal 400 000 5.4
G. Northern Transvaal 210 000 7.5
Others 140 000
TOTAL I 610 000
Dem ographic studies indicate that the rural areas outside the 
homelands have been the main source of out-migration for the most recent
365 W ebster, D. 1979 ppl-15 .
174
period studied, 1980-1985.^^^ Net outmigration from these areas was 1.6 
million in this period while net inmigration into the metropolitan areas was 
900 000. M etropolitan inm igration includes (and does not distinguish 
between) those from homelands and white com m ercial farm ing areas.
The "homelands " population in this period therefore increased as a result of 
natural population increase as well as inmigration from white commercial 
farming areas. A significant portion of the outm igration from white rural 
areas resulted from apartheid policies. For example, 1.80 000 people in the 
Orange Free State were classified as "unemployed" and sent to Botshabelo - 
an arid, artificially-created  alm ost refugee-type settlem ent area with no 
economic base now housing three quarters of a million people.
A longer re trospec tive  exam ination o f ou tm igration  from  the 
platteland indicates that in early 1950 35% of the black population lived in 
these areas. This was equivalent to the number o f blacks living on the 
reserves. In 1985 this percentage had dropped to a low of 14% and is 
projected to be less than 10% by the year 2000.368
Three principal reasons are offered to explain the rap id  pace o f 
outm igration (a) labour displacing m echanisation actively encouraged by 
state subsidies (b) the eviction o f rural black residents who did not have 
wage employment; these included labour tenants, sharecroppers as well as 
"black spot" freeholders and (c) the opportunities for better paid off-farm 
em p lo y m en t.
366 S im kins C, 1990, e s tim a tes  the b lack  rural p o pu la tion  ou ts id e  the hom elands as 
3.8 m illion  in 1983 o f w hich 3.4 m illion  resided  on the farm s.
367 'phere w ere also m igration  flow s w ithin and betw een reg ions; in reg ion  D, the net 
inm igration  to Port E lizabeth  was about 60 000 w hile there  was an ou tm ig ra tion  o f  
about o f about 120 000 from  the region as a whole.
368 Urban Foundation Report 1990.
175
Table 5.2: Agricultural Wage Income of Black People on White Farms. 1970
1987_
Date Total wages Wages per regular &
(R million) dom estic w orker (R/year)
( 1985 constant
1970 788.2 858
1971 736.0 876
1972 768.2 961
1974 800.2 927
1975 859.9 1010
1976 866.2 1076
1978 890.6 1114
1979 905.2 1169
1980 876.7 . 1169
1981 878.8 1276
1983 903.5 1232
1985 924.2 1120
1986 895.5 1092
1987 811.0 1017
Source: Simkins C 1990, Table 3, derived from
and Surveys.
Table 5.3 : Comparative sectoral increases in real wages 1972-83.
S ec to r % increase in real wage
A g r ic u ltu re  . 26
M in in g  254
M a n u fa c tu r in g  65
T rade  21
Government and private service 52
Source: Simkins, C. 1990. derived from an analysis of SA statistics 1986.
The relatively large increase in mining wages can be attributed to 
the very low base from which mining started but more so, as the result of
the successfu l w age strugg les wun by o rgan ised  ' labour in m ining. 
Agriculture compares better to the less organised trading sector, and up to 
1983 the real wage gains (for the smaller number of workers in the sector)
were on a par to the trading sector. But as Table 5..2. shows the real wage
gains have since been lost and in 1987 wage levels were the same as in 1975.
While the white rural areas dominated the statistics for migration
trends from the early 1970s to the mid-eighties, this trend has now declined 
and more recent figures indicate an absolute increase in commercial farm 
labour. Future migrants from rural to urban areas are expected to come
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from the "homelands" The estimates also indicate that, while there will be 
steady out-m igration from homeland areas, it will not outstrip population 
increase  w ith in  these a r e a s . H e n c e  the cu rren t p rob lem s o f 
overcrowding in the "homelands" will remain and even deteriorate unless 
alternative programmes are in place. Social research on poverty, migration 
and unem ploym ent in hom eland areas indicates that the levels o f
outm igration would be much higher if  there were an expansion o f 
employment opportunities but that "homelands" are regarded as a safer
residual habitat than urban areas while unemployed.
South A frica's unem ploym ent rate is increasing rapidly; micro 
studies in 1987 in KwaZulu indicate a 14% unemployment rate (of whom
nearly 60 percent have some working experience); whereas more recent 
estimates show 35% and even up to 50% in some areas (of whom the majority 
have never had a job). Among the unemployed in the homelands 40%
expressed a preference for urban work (68% of these respondents were 
women) whereas 56% said they really would take any job in any place.^^®
A review o f the changes in annual increase of the labour force and
average annual increase in em ployment opportunities estim ated that 41,5 
per cent of the potential work force does not have formal employment 
o p p o r tu n i t i e s .371 in 1985 total population was estimated as 33,3 million and 
is projected as 47,6 million for the year 2000 and 60 million by 2010. There is 
every indication that the unemployment problem will grow.
5.3. (in The paradox of land shortage and land unused.
Landlessness is com m onplace and cannot simply be blam ed on
allocation problems. The bantustan population has increased both as a
369 ib,a.
3^() R esearchers have had  d ifficu lty  iden tify ing  "unem ploym ent"; the  unem ployed  m ay 
be id e n tif ied  as "w illing  and  a b le  to  w ork" h en ce  re se a rch e rs  have  looked  fo r 
ev idence  o f  an  ac tive  jo b  search  to  confirm  such  w illingness. F ield  w ork in terv iew s 
in d ica ted  tha t o f a sam ple o f  adu lts  o f  a w orking age bu t w ithout jo b s  53% had  
ac tive ly  looked for w ork in  the prev ious m onth. O f these  16% w ent to  the nearest 
lab o u r bureau. 58% d irec tly  ca n v assed  p o ten tia l em ployers thus using  fam ily  funds 
for trave lling  and  accom m odation , 19% m ade enqu iries th rough  friends and  re la tives 
and 7% looked in new spapers. The 47% who had not sought work the previous m onth 
d id  not do so e ither because they thought th e ir  chances w ere too  sligh t o r because 
they lacked funds to undertake the search . O nly a quarte r o f those not seek ing  w ork 
w ere sa tisfied ; they had hom e com m itm ents and did not w ant w age work for the tim e 
being, M panza, Z. and J N attrass, 1987, pp45-46.
M panza.Z . and J N attrass, 1987. pp45-46.
3^^ Beukes. E. P. 1990 citing the D evelopm ent Bank o f Southern A frica.
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result of basic demographic factors and because o f forced removals. 
Land availability per family and land quality have drastically declined and 
families can no longer produce as much of their food needs as they did
previously especially since 1948. Studies o f  food production in the 
homelands from the 1870s indicate that surplus production ended by the
1890s.^^^ But according to Simkins, hom eland production continued to
provide about SO per cent of food needs for the resident population up to the 
1950s. By the end of the 1970s the reserves produced only about 10 per cent 
of food needs. This decline coincides with a growing level of unemployment.
Retrenchment and lack of opportunities for youth have caused a crisis for 
many homeland families. Many families want access to more land to gain 
better levels of food security for their families.
However there is 'a strange phenomenon o f unutilised land'.^^4 ^s a
generalised feature o f homeland agriculture. In KwaZulu, for exam ple,
Lenta, a rural researcher observed, "the outside observer is generally left
puzzled" by arable land left uncultivated every year. Lenta cites KwaZulu 
Government Departm ent of A griculture and Forestry unpublished annual 
reports which record 80.5 per cent of arable land cultivated in 1965, 73 per 
cent in 1972 falling to 67 per cent for the 1978/79 agricultural season.
Explanations on why land is underutilised are manifold. For Low the 
principal reasons are tenure arrangem ents and the off-farm  em ployment
opportunities at relatively high wages.^^^ Others also blame the African 
land ethic as a contributory factor. Those families whose off farm income is 
sufficient to influence a reduction in their farming activities are inhibited 
to rent out their excess land because it would constitute an admission o f 
having too much land. Furthermore if the lease extended over time, the
traditional ethic would result in a transfer of ownership rights to the lessee.
The registration of individual rights (as in freehold) is advocated to resolve
this p r o b l e m . 37 6  H ow ever, as considerable  percen tages o f freeho ld  
farmland owned by whites is also underutilised, freehold titling in itself is 
not the a n s w e r .3 7 7  Derman complements Low's analysis by his examination 
of the returns to labour, calculating that,^^®
3^2 Surplus Peoples P ro ject, 1985 
3^3 S im kins, C. 1981
374 uem a, G. 1981.
375 Low, A (1986)
376 Lyne, M C & W L N ieuw oudt. (1991) p i 93-201.
377 W einer, D. (1989.) pplO -14.
378 Behrm an. 1981 c ited  by Lenta.
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'"the labour content involved in the cultivation of one hectare of 
maize is about 360 hours, if no tractor is available for work. Given a maize
production cycle of 110 days, seven and a half working hours per day, seven
days per week, for three and a half months a year would be required to
cultivate two hectares of land under maize. . . .Comparatively few women
who are, in effect, family heads can concentrate such a large amount of 
labour into such a short period of time."
With regard to returns to labour,
'. . . yields are low. According to the 1977 figures, the average yield in 
the cultivation of cereals in KwaZulu was five bags per hectare, the highest 
ever recorded for the area. This means that in 1977 the net return per 
hectare was about R35, or about nine cents per hour of labour expended and 
the equivalent of three hours labour for a loaf of bread.'
However opportunity costs, im pedim ents to land ren tals, low 
returns for labour input provide some of the reasons why land is not 
cu ltivated  there appear to be other very s ign ifican t reasons why 
households who actually would like to cultivate land fail to do so. Lenta, 
investigating  the phenom enon o f uncu ltivated  so-called  arab le  land, 
interviewed 130 families in five Kwazulu districts. His micro study indicates
that families use off-farm income differently; some will use it to invest in 
farming, for others all funds are used up for food and education. Families 
who failed to cultivate land often had more than one reason; four major 
points emerged:.
(a) Eleven percent of respondents said their land was too rocky or 
the soil was too poor to make cultivation worthwhile. They questioned the 
classification of land. Lenta concludes that what, 'appears as the neglect of 
valuable land may be the rational refusal to use land, for purposes for which
it is unsuited.'^79
(b) Thirty per cent of the respondents said that a shortage of labour was 
the main reason for uncultivated land. This reveals a second strange 
phenomena': a shortage of labour amid unemployment. Labour is not itself 
in short supply but families have no money to hire it. Their own labour, 
available for agricultural work after fulfilling other reproductive tasks, is 
insufficient to cultivate the land fully even though the plots are very small.
Other plotholders are old and disabled and unable to work their land.
Labour, in general, should be treated as an input to be bought in the same 
way as seed, fertiliser, oxen or tractors. In terms of disequilibrium models
379 Lenta, 1981
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the effective demand for labour is significantly different from the notional
supply schedule.380
Both my wife and I are too old for planting all this land; my children 
used to hire some labourers to plant the land, but this year they failed to do
th a t . '
'I am all by myself; my children go to school; my husband is working in 
Durban, so I cannot plough all the land.'
'I plough part of the farm of my late brother as a precautionary measure 
against forfeiture of land, until my nephew returns from town to settle
h e r e . '
Many of the elderly see their role as safeguarding the cultivation 
rights of their children. For women the tasks of child-rearing and cooking 
are time consuming; they do not have a full working day available for 
cultivation. Families with migrant workers hold on to land as a fallback
security and because of the uncertainty of permanent urban residence.
(c) A lack of money to buy farm inputs is the third major reason for
not farming. Wages are the principal source of finance for farming inputs. 
Agricultural products grown are mainly for home consumption, and there 
is little, if any, farm income to finance the next planting. The prevailing 
and rising unemployment, which appears to increase time available for
farming, actually diminishes the chances of a family cultivating its land. 
There are no credit facilities available and, if there were, a part of the 
produce would have to be sold, not eaten, to repay the loan.
"I have no money to hire a tractor or oxen; I spent my little money on
school books, school fees and uniforms for the children.'
'My husband periodically sends R30 to cover all expenses at home,
that is clothing, hospital fees, school fees and groceries. Eventually I am left 
with nothing for doing farming.' 381
(d) For families who manage to solve their finance problems there 
are other obstacles to overcome. Even when there are funds to hire oxen 
and tractors there is com petition for their hire at the time which is 
agriculturally  most opportune for ploughing. Technological change is 
much further advanced than in neighbouring Southern African countries; 
any piece of land which is bigger than a kitchen garden is ploughed by
donkeys, oxen or tractor, Preparing larger tracts of land with a hoe is
unacceptable. As far back as 1877 there was one plough per 25 hectares; 
twenty years later it was one for every six hectares. Since the 1950s tractors
380 L enta. 198 1 ,pp36-37 .
381 ibid.
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began to replace ox-drawn ploughs. But means o f production are in short
supply. Only 64% of households have both arable land, oxen and ploughs. 
Those without oxen, the poorer households, wait their turn and are forced
to hire and plough later; the later sowing results in a lower productivity.
In general the co-existence of land shortage and land unused' is the
result of a combination of low returns to labour, unsuitable land, a shortage
of family labour, a lack of finance to purchase inputs and an absolute
shortage of means of production. Access to land is not a panacea to fall back 
on when wage labour is not available. Without resources, support services
and a ready access to market, land, whatever the quality, cannot be fully 
utilised. Extended family survival strategies currently often also involve 
access to a residential and arable site in a rural area as well as a residential 
site in urban areas to house the wage earning members o f the family
n e tw o rk .
5.3.(iii)The Relative Importance of Income Sources to Rural Residents
To assess the relative importance of different income sources a
comparison can be made between migrant and commuter earnings, and the
value of bantustan agricultural production. Cobbett, having done this, (See
Appendix 2) concludes that agriculture is not econom ically im portant: 
'Homeland' residents are agriculturally de-skilled and basically have the
characteristics of a displaced urban people. The key issue, therefore, is 
urban settlem ent.
Moll examined in greater detail the com position o f rural income
based on a review of data from a number of micro-studies as in Table 5.4. 382
382 Moii.T.. (1988b) Table 1, p.351.
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Table . 5.4. The Composition of Rural Cash Income.
A rea R e m it­ P e n s io n s L ocal H om e Sales
ta n c e s + transfer jo b s e n t e r ­ cattle
p a y m e n ts p r is e s p ro d i
(% ) (%) (% ) (%)
(% ) I
1. Am ato la
Basin, Ciskei 33 26 -2 6 - 15
2, Nkandla,
KwaZulu 46 29 -2 5 - 0
3. M ahlabatini,
KwaZulu 59 24 7 6 4
4. Ntsiqo,
Transkei 46 19 -3 4 - 2
5. Transkei,
rural areas 30 9 -5 8 - 2
6. Transkei,
all areas 34 8 -5 7 - 0
7. Lower Roza,
Transkei 36 19 28 17 0
Source Moll, T., 1988b Table I. p35l.
These figures indicate a degree of diversity in the source o f cash 
income in the rural areas. In four situations Moll's statistics show that the 
value of subsistence production (i.e. on-farm consumption) is 32% o f a 
mean off-farm  income of R928 per year. In Lower Roza, however, the 
contribution of farm produce to total household income is as low as 8% with 
a total cash income of R1675 per year compared to R150 as the imputed value 
of on-farm consumption.
These differences between bantustans are considerable. The average 
family landholding of QwaQwa and KwaNdebele is more than double that of 
Lebowa and G azankulu . H ousehold farm ing  is econom ically  m ore 
significant in the Transkei and Venda (where it comprises up to thirty 
percent of household income) but almost irrelevant in KwaNdebele. The 
most recent com puted average contribution of agriculture to household 
income is only ten p e r c e n t .383 But questions can be raised on the accuracy 
of the figures. It is, for example, not clear how accurate the estimates are on 
the value o f on-farm  consumption. Furtherm ore, there is generally an 
inadequate assessment of the value of livestock to the family which depends 
on its varied use whether for meat and niilk, as a capital good used for 
ploughing and transport, as a saving medium or as a trading item. 
Bromberger calculates cattle as giving a higher rate of return at 18,7
383 Cobbett, M, (1987) Table 3, p68.
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percen t than any bank saving investm ent op tion w hich m ight be
locationally less conveniently available to rural c o m m u n i t i e s . 384 As a 
trading item cattle are still frequently used to fulfill dowry commitments.
The focus on arable land in black rural com munities and some 
apparent underutilisation of this resource detracts from an appreciation of
the role of grazing land as a more important and over-utilised resource for 
black rural communities. Household ownership of cattle is as high as 64% 
in some parts of KwaZulu and as low as 23% in L e b o w a . 385 Over 4,2 million 
cattle, more than a third of South Africa's cattle herd are to be found in the 
bantustans. The average number of cattle owned by these families is four, 
but ten percent of families have more than ten cattle each. It is estimated
that, overall, half a million families in the homelands own cattle.
But even if we take into account the contribution of livestock to the 
black rural economy it remains incontestable that wage earning is the most 
important single factor in the black rural economy. At the same time we
should not allow macro economic averages to obscure social dynamics and 
the importance of land to a family. For example, an urban/rural extended 
family with a homestead in Lebowa earned, on average, R2599 in 1984 i.e.
R216 per month. In comparison to these wage earnings the R77 per year
estim ated value of agricultural household production seems irrelevant. But 
at such depressed standards of living and high unemployment, everything
counts towards a fam ily 's survival strategy. Y aw itch's interview s with 
Lebowan families support this v ie w ;3 8 6
” Lina is 55 years old and works the 0.85 Ha. plot harvesting 3 bags of 
maize cobs, some millet and some watermelon. Her son, aged 30, sends R40 
per month. None of the other four family members has employment.
Sarah and her daughter, Agnes, live together and have R85 per 
month to live on. Sarah weaves grass mats and earns R20 per month, her
daughter Agnes earns R60 per year through knitting work. Agnes's husband 
is away from home working at a garage. He sends R60 per month. They have
three children. The normal daily diet is mealie porridge, a relish (sauce) of
leaves and black tea."
Land im poverishm ent and landlessness increases the household 's 
reliance on wage incomes. Families who receive remittances will use them
for different purposes depending on their situation. For some fam ilies 
remittances will provide the basic income for reproduction; for others the
remittance will allow for savings for investment in agriculture or small
384 B rom berger, N, (1987) p60.
385 M ay, J (1992) plO.
386 Yawitc'h, J. 1982
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scale rural business activities. Hence the better o ff members of the rural 
community are often those with the most secure remittance base. At the most
im poverished end o f the ru ra l spectrum  fam ilies experience severe
deprivation and every opportunity to get food is vital. Remittances are often
small and irregular and in a month when the rem ittance does not arrive 
agriculture assum es an im portance which is obscured by any yearly 
averaging of its money value contribution to the household economy.
As the following table shows it is the poorest families with the least
significant proportion of bantustan agricultural production who are most 
dependant on their meagre produce.
Wages + P e n s io n s P e a s a n t M isc e l­
R e m itta n - + trans­ P ro d u c ­ la n e o u s T otal
In c o m e -c e s f e r s tio n A n n u a l
G roups (- in mean rand per annum) In c o m e
Poor 20% 308 155 192 71 626
Poor 40% 539 178 114 100 931
Richer 20% 5288 447 428 723 6886
Richer 5% 9331 503 671 781 11286
Source: May (1987) Table 4, p22.
The richest 5% of the sample produced more than seven times the value of 
the poorest twenty' percent. However the R671 worth of produce of the 
richest 5% also represents only 5,9% of their total income against roughly 
30% for the pooresr 20%..
5.4. D efin ing  ru r a l  p ro d u c e rs : the  c o n te m p o ra ry  d eb a te
Deere and De Janvry express disatisfaction with existing theoretical 
approaches to analysing the peasantry. They also reject the Chayanovian 
approach in which the changing household profile (from young married
adults to middle aged adults with mature children to old aged survivors) is a
/
key element in the analyses of rural differentiation. Their work predates 
that of Bernstein, Neocosmos et al who strangely do not refer to it since, 
though it re lates  specifically to Lat in America, it focusses on rural 
economies (such as those in Southern Africa) where outmigration to, and 
cash remittances from, urban areas is common. Their view of the peasantry 
is that of an oscillating and "transitory social stratum under capitalism" 
whose transition may be protracted and whose numbers may temporarily 
increase. Deere and De Janvry recognise that as an overview  "these 
peasants differentiate and are reproduced increasingly as wage workers:
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the majority lose their status as producers of commodities while attempting 
to maintain that o f use values as a necessary complement to wage earnings 
in insuring household subsistence."
Deere and De Janvry's "Conceptual Framework for the Em pirical 
A nalysis o f Peasants" draws upon M arx's categories o f production , 
circulation, reproduction and d ifferentiation illustrated  figuratively as a 
f l o w . 387 The starting point of the analysis is o f the organisation o f the 
peasant household, the registration o f its "stocks of means of production" 
which comprise land and water, means o f work (tools and biochem ical 
inputs) and the composite family labour power. Household labour may then 
be used in the home, sold as wage labour or the household may hire wage 
labour. Subsequently, household production may be consumed (as a use 
value by the household) or sold on the market as a commodity. The income 
generated from sales plus the income from wage labour provides the net 
income which may be used, for consumption, for replacement of tools to 
secure reproduction or for accumulation for investment purposes.
Deere and de Janvry, studying the Cajam arcan region o f Peru, 
analyse the stocks of the means of production o f 1,050 households. In 
contrast to Patnaik's approach (wherein scale is not necessarily a good 
indicator) they categorise class on the basis of size of land holding. And in 
their categorisation they immediately adopt the nomenclature o f "landless 
peasants, smallholders, middle peasants, rich peasants, and farmers". I find 
the re ten tion  o f peasant nom enclature d isappoin ting  as it deflects 
understanding from the considerable impact o f proletarianisation on the 
ru ral econom y. Further lim itations of this household ca tegorisa tion  
becomes self-evident when Deere and de Janvry disaggregate household 
activity (agricultural activity, anim al care, artisanal work, reproduction 
work, commerce, hiring out of labour) between the mother, the father and 
the children (unfortunately the data do not indicate the hiring of labour). 
At least one member of the majority of landless and small holder households 
is a wage earner. It is misleading to describe these people as "subsistence 
producers" when "over 80% of the total gross income of the landless and 
small holder strata is monetary income derived from sale of labour and sale 
of produce. "
Patnaik's m ethodological approach to analysing and identifying 
classes within the peasantry includes a consideration of hired l a b o u r . 388
387 Deere C D & De Janvry A, 1979, p.603.
388 Patnaik. 1988. pp301-333.
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This is an im portant elem ent to her in analysing social relations of 
production and thus classifying people. She argues for an interconnected 
analysis of components of the production process, land, capital and labour.
Land, as an indicator by itself, can confuse rather than clarify if no 
distinction is made in relation to the different quality of land, whether it is 
irrigated or not and the method of production. Patnaik designs a "labour 
exploitation index" as a means of "capturing" the class status of a household 
"essentially by looking at the extent of use of outside labour or conversely 
the extent of the family working for others, relative to the extent of self 
employment. The index is calculated as follows:^®^
E = )UY = (Hi-Ho) = (Lo-Li)
F F
where:
Hi = Labour-days hired on the operational holding of the household 
Ho = Family labour days hired out to others
Li = Labour days worked on leased in land (whether by family or hired labour)
Lo = Labour days similarly worked on land leased out by household 
F = Labour days worked by household workers on the operational holding.
Thus peasant families are classified into rich, middle, small and poor 
(widows and orphans). The methodology permits a consistent treatm ent of 
time series data and hence the identification of trends of change in the
differentiation pattern. The method applied to data on Haryana indicates a 
continuing developm ent of capitalist agrarian relations which m anifests 
classic tendencies of displacem ent, increasing land concentration and an 
increase in the percentage of the labour force working as agricultural 
labourers. The methodology assists the analysis of power relations in society 
and illum inates the changing class structure as ag rarian  capitalism  
p ro ceed s.
Bernstein, however, suggests that this m ethodological approach is 
inadequate as a means of addressing the social formation of the "Third
World". He draws attention to the prevalence and continuity o f petty 
com modity producers, (PCPs) "a phenom enal category o f com m odity 
producers who possess the means of production necessary to produce 
com m odities, and who engage in production on the basis o f unpaid 
household labour a l o n e '3 9 0 .  differen tiation  may then occur in either 
direction PCPs become capitalists or wage workers. Bernstein considers that 
certain common positions whether inherited from evolutionary variants of 
Marxism, or created from a critique of the evolutionary tradition (typically
389 ibiü, p.304.
390 Gibbon and Neocosmos. 1985, p. 170.
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in a Third W oridist framework), have held back understanding o f the 
prevalence and nature of petty commodity production in the conditions of
contem porary capitalism . The com m on positions (w hich lead to this 
deficiency) are as follows:
(1) the idea that PCP is a transitional category within capitalism;
(2) the assumption that PCP necessarily disappears in the course of
capitalist development (the linear proletarianisation ' thesis);
(3) the assimilation of the specificities of PCP into encompassing 
notions of non-wage labour under capitalism (the 'peasants and housewives 
th e s is ') ;
(4) functionalist explanations of PCP (and non-wage labour more 
generally) as productive of 'cheap' labour . power and other commodities 
that subsidise' capital accumulation;
(5) the assumption that small commodity producers are exploited' by
c a p ita l;
(6) any necessary association of PCP with 'subsistence' (use value) 
p ro d u c tio n .
Bernstein provides an exposition of Gibbon and Neocosmos' paper on 
the generation of petty commodity production and the implications of their 
argument. Their fundamental take off point is their identification . of and 
distinction between the essential relations of capitalism (capital and wage 
labour) and the phenomena that it produces (wages, prices, profit, the state 
and so on). The essential, argues Bernstein, is "systematically obscured" by 
the phenom ena which include, "gender relations, the division betw een
town and countryside, the division of labour between agriculture and 
industry as well as continuing notions of family', kinship', the household', 
dom estic p r o d u c t i o n ' 3 9 l  Gibbon and Neocosmos em phasise capital rather 
than labour in their characterisation of PCP as "petty capitalist enterprise" 
or petty bourgeois capitalist enterprise.' This emphasis on capital rather 
than labour is consistent with their dismissal of the view that small scale 
com m odity p roducers often  operate  as d isgu ised  p ro le ta rian s. But 
furtherm ore Gibbon and Neocosmos differentiate the class positions of 
members of a single household rather than categorising the household as 
one entity. They suggest that "patriarchal heads of households may 
represent more the class place of capital, and women and children more the 
class place of labour, indicating one channel of exploitation and possible 
a c c u m u l a t i o n . "392 Concepts of "kinship " "family " and "self-exploitation"
391 Bernstein, H. 1988, p26I.
392 ibid. p.266.
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become more complex when gender and individuals' econom ic in ter­
rela tionship  w ithin the fam ily structure are considered. Furtherm ore
savings from wage work may provide the accumulation fund to expand PCP 
rather than indicate the PGP's inability to provide a living and hence the 
path to sem i-proletarianisation.
The Bernstein, Gibbon and Neocosmos proposals are rich in
providing provisos and qualifiers to schematic approaches to class analysis 
(grounded in ownership of land and means of production and hiring in and 
out o f labour). Their commentaries provide a critical basis and emphasise 
the need for a better analytical approach to the continuing phenomenon of
peasantry as petty commodity producers within capitalist economies, But
they do not offer an alternative methodological approach which can be
applied to empirical data in order to group agricultural households. And 
because they fail to provide this alternative, their subsequent analyses and
that o f their followers resulted in some confusing class analysis as will be 
discussed in relation to South Africa below.
5.5 D ivergent A pproaches to Sou th  A frican  R u ra l ClaSs A nalysis
Disaggregation is essential to draw up policy which is responsive to
social dynam ics. M ozam bican policy-m akers' fa ilu re  to analyse class 
differentiation in the M ozambican countryside and the integration of the 
peasantry into the cap ita list econom y led them  to m ake m istaken
assumptions about "subsistence " producers.
T here are obvious d iffe ren ces  am ongst the South A frican
"homelands' The family average landholding of QwaQwa and KwaNdebele is 
more than double than that of Lebowa and Gazankulu. Household farming is 
com paratively more econom ically significant in the Transkei and Venda 
but almost irrelevant in KwaNdebele and QwaQwa. That there my be more
"peasants" in the Transkei than KwaNdebele is open to speculation and an
analy tical d isaggregating  fram ew ork is requ ired  to substan tia te  the 
a s s e r tio n .
But class analysis, if it is to assist policy making, must itself be
accurate. On this count Levin and Neocosmos criticise the class analysis
There was a gross failure on the part of policy makers to estimate the needs of the 
peasantry even in terms of items such as hoes, radio batteries which eventually 
contributed to peasants reducing the marketed output or illegally selling produce 
across borders.
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presented by Lipton^^^ and Innes and O'Meara^^^ because the latter are 
said to conceive of the African population in the "homelands'" incorrectly 
as a mass of linear proletarianised', sem i-proletarianised people.]*^
Innes and O'M eara, researching in the Transkei, found that while
91,6 per cent of their household sample still cultivated some land, 60 per 
cent of all families were primarily dependent on the sale of their labour- 
power. Among the farm ing households only 0.1 per cent produced 
exclusively for the market and only 8.5 per cent had any extra, after home 
consumption, for sale. They concluded that the mass of the population in the 
Transkei had been proletarianised and sem i-proletarianised.^^^
Levin and N eocosm os take Innes and O 'M eara's work and 
re in terpret the data. They use a d ifferen t analy tical fram ew ork; the 
destiny-of-product' as the major differentiating criterion. Table 4.7 shows 
the different interpretation of the same data:
Lipton, M. 1986 
limes and O'Meara, 1976 
Levin & Neocosmos. 1987. 
Innes and O'Meara ibid.
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Table 5.6. Class Analysis: Common data and Divergent Interpretation.
1976: Innes and O'Meara's 
Original Study
1987: Levin & Neocosmos 
Reinterpretation.
60% dependent on wages 
of whom 
8.4% have no production 
51.6% have some production
8,4 + 51,6 =
60% sem i-pro letarians
91.6 have agricultural
_______ production of whom:
0,1% for commercial sale only 
a n d
8,4% for home use and sale 
a n d  \
83,1% consume all produce.
0,1% + 8,4 =
8,5% upper middle and 
rich peasantry
83,1 - 51,6 =
31,5 lower middle peasantry.
Conclusion: extensive proletar­
ianisation, small class of 
co llaboration ist bourgeoisie
Conclusion: 40% differentiated 
peasantry, 60% p ro le ta rian isa .
- tio n .
Neither of the above is offering an analysis of social relations o f
production based on the scale of operations, the means of production and 
employment of or by others. Levin and Neocosmos use a division of lower
middle, upper middle and rich peasants depending whether or not produce
is all eaten at home and, if eaten, whether it is enough to secure
independence from wage income. Thus a commercial producer is classified 
as a rich peasant. The 8.4% who can eat produce and not depend on wages 
are named upper middle and rich peasants. Of the remaining 83.1% who 
cultivate land 51.6% stated their primary dependence on wages. Thus, Levin
and Neocosmos conclude there must be 31.5% who produce enough to eat but 
who do not sell anything; these are lower middle peasantry. In trying to 
correct a tendency which lumps people together as (semi) proletarians
Levin and Neocosmos appear to over-react and exaggerate (at least on the
basis of the used data) the continuity and size of a peasantry and the extent 
of its differentiation.
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Even so the criteria used in earlier Marxist methodological analysis 
such as land area, ownership of means of production and hiring of labour 
require qualification in a m igrant society. Field-w ork by Jam es^^^ and 
Lenta suggest that those families with a high level o f rem ittances from 
migrant workers are those who can make the most out of their land. Thus
the families with the most (skilled) workers, the most proletarianised, are 
likely to be among Levin & Neocosmos's 8.4% who sell produce as well as 
consuming a part. It seems incongruous to classify them as upper middle 
peasants. Neither should hire of labour or sale o f produce in themselves 
immediately lead to an upper middle peasantry classification. Many single 
parent families^^^ and ailing old folk on the edge of malnutrition, who if 
they get a little money, occasionally pay for some help on their small plot if 
they can raise a little money, or enter into sharecropping arrangements. It
would be absurd to include them as upper middle peasants.
Levin and Neocosmos' strength lies in their reasoning as to why 
differentiation should be explored and not glossed over by broad definitions
such as "sem i-proletarians " They stress the im portance o f analysing
incipient class differentiation for identifying appropriate policy and as a 
'necessary prerequisite' if "principled alliances" are to be formed in the
class struggle. The weakness of Levin and Neocosmos's work is precisely 
their choice o f analytical criteria  (eg. the destiny of produce as a 
determ inant) and subsequent classification. They far too readily classify 
sections of homeland' population as upper middle and lower peasantry. It is
im probab le  that the " lan d less-cu rren tly -u n em p lo y ed  youth  or the
redundant worker shifted to a homeland from an urban area would regard 
themselves as members of the "poor peasantry".
However, Levin and Neocosm os's thesis, that there exists a
su b s ta n tia lly  la rg e r  p e a sa n try  than  the Innes  an d  O 'M eara
p ro le tarian isa tion  in terpreta tion  would have us believe, is probably 
correct. This would be especially true in relation to women. Academic work
discussing South Africa peasantry and its proletarianisation due to migrant 
work is usually gender b iased tow ards men.^®® But until fu rther
substantiated by more detailed analyses which address the issues of
ownership of means of production, hiring of labour and gender, we should 
treat Levin and Neocosmos's claim s o f the extent and definition of 
differentiation of "the peasantry " with circumspection.
James, D. 1985
See field interviews by Yawitch 1982 
400 Wolpe and Innes and O'Meara's work is no exception.
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More recent field  studies underline the different gender roles.^®^ 
Women have become managers of rural resources. Young unemployed men 
are often in crisis as there is no social role for would-be-migrants' in the 
household. Removals from 'w hite' farm ing areas and urban areas have
greatly increased the percentage of landless residents.
5.6. A p ro p o sa l fo r an  a l te rn a tiv e  a n a ly tic a l m ethodology
While class analysis holds the key to correct policy considerations, 
there is in my submission no existing satisfactory migrant, rural/urban,
gender-qualified class categorisation o f South A frica's rural areas (which 
straddles the tandem  urban/rural fam ily) w hich w ould enable us to 
categorise analytically the class composition of the society in which land 
reform will take place. Patnaik's labour exploitation index and her ta b le ^ ^
which defines the characteristics of different classes requires m odification
if it is to be useful to an analysis o f South African reality.
In my review of the attempts to provide a class analysis of the social 
structure o f South A frica's rural areas I have em phasised that the 
theoretical fram ew ork must take cognisance o f (a) the source o f
agricultural financing which may frequently be off-farm  income, mostly
remittances from a migrant member of the household unit, (b) the context
in which labour is hired or sharecropping takes place to avoid a
mechanistic categorisation as upper middle peasants o f the elderly poor or
infirm , who get access to some produce from  their land through 
sharecropping or using rem ittances to hire labour, and (c) the relative
importance of ajgricultural production vis-a-vis other income sources to the 
household income as a whole.
W ithout these considerations serious analytical errors could be
made. A peasant emphasis which categorises families merely because they 
produce marketable surpluses as middle or upper peasants might be flawed 
for the following reasons: upon an examination of the source of finance or 
the nature of the commercialised produce we may, in any case, discover (a) 
it is those families with the strongest migrant worker base who have 
sufficient levels of rem ittances to invest in agriculture. It is therefore 
wrong to categorise them as upper peasants since the source of income 
comes only minimally from agriculture and (b) that a person with small
James, 1985. Richkin, 1987, Clarke et al, 1975
*^ 02 Patnaik, 1988, p.322
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piece of land (eg. 0,5 hectares) may market the entire crop. But it is very
often not a surplus; in fact the household may be living below the poverty 
datum line but funds are needed to pay for basic necessities.
The information required for class categorisation of rural residents
in a migrant society needs therefore to include data on;
(i) Access to land (ownership or tenancy), its quantity, quality and 
whether it is irrigated.
(ii) The source(s) of production credit i.e.. Is agriculture financed
out of the sales of last season's produce, or through off-farm income or by a 
corporation in the case of an agribusiness contract. If there are multiple
financing sources, what is their relative importance.
(iii) Access to means of production: hoes, oxen, ploughs, donkeys, 
tractors and so on (and the means by which these acquisitions were 
f in a n c e d ) .
(iv) The hiring in and out of labour by the household unit. In terms
of hiring out the relative importance of the wage income to the overall
household income should be identified. In term s o f hiring in labour,
establishing its relative importance to overall production.
(v) The quantity of output and the end use of the produce or income 
derived from its sale ( i.e.. cotton sold for cash which is used to buy basic 
food supply cannot be classified as surplus production) whether it is for
basic needs only, includes financing the next seasons' inputs or saving for 
capital investm ent.
While class formation is an ongoing dynamic and oscillation occurs
it is possible to distinguish 3 broad categories of rural dwellers which have 
a bearing on our discussion of class formation and land reform. The first
group which may be conceived as the pro letarian ised  rural dwellers
includes (a) the landless unemployed, (b) landless seasonal workers, (c)
subsistence, mainly female headed households with access to a plot but
dependent on wage incom e, (d) subsisting con tract farm ers ^®^(e)
permanent farm workers. The second group is the worker-peasant group 
which is the most oscillating in both its potential and in its aspirations. It
includes (f) those permanent farm workers who aspire to own land through
May J, 1987, has micro defined this group in the following way (a) the simple 
commodity producer - able to farm, although engaged in wage labour, (b) the prolo- 
peasantry/peasantariat- the archetypal migrant labourer, unable to farm effectively, 
but unable to forsake agriculture as a last resort, (c) the lumpen-peasantariat-the 
m arginalised and poor, relying upon transfers, charity and on other survival 
s tra teg ie s .
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land reform , (g), contract farm ers, (h) labour tenants. The third group. 
which display most potential as entrepreneurs includes (i) those labour 
tenants who hire s ign ifican t am ounts o f labour (j) en trep reneu ria l 
w orker-peasant fam ilies, (k) rural entrepreneurs. Finally the follow ing 
groups would expect to re-establish their rural entrepreneurial base (k) 
dispossessed freeholders who expect reparation, com pensation to enable 
them to begin farming afresh, (1) communities with historical land claims 
who expect to expand their p roductive base in the fu tu re  (m) 
entrepreneurial out-growers. The following tabulation indicates the groups 
and potential oscillation between classes.
1 2 3
la. Landless Unemployed 
Ib. Landless/seasonal workers 
Ic. Subsistence(fem ale) units
Id . Perm anent farm  w orkers 2f.
Ic.  C orttrac t/O u t-g row er................... 2g
2h. - Labour tenants -3i
3 j.W o rk e r-p e a sa n ts  
3 k. E n tre p re n e u rs  
31. E x -fre e h o ld e rs  
3nLHistorical - 
Community claims
"Peasantariat" Aspiyapt Aspimt
Middle peasants Entrepreneurs
These categories of rural residents can be more fully described to 
indicate the dominant nature of the household and its aspirations vis a vis
land redistribution:
1(a) the landless unemployed: men and women who have been
consigned to bantustans as the result of urban rem ovals and and/or 
industrial retrenchment. They do not have land. They depend for their very
survival on money sent to them by migrant family members who have wage
employment. Many seek seasonal agricultural employment. Their current 
proletarian status, as having nothing to sell but their labour power, does 
not preclude what Levin and Neocosmos term as petty bourgeois aspiration 
to own land and work it themselves. They are an oscillating group who will 
take either an agricu ltu ra l (wage or s e l f  em p lo y ed ) Of industrial 
opportunity  to obtain  an incom e; their p rio rity  is su rv ival and 
re p ro d u c tio n .
1(b) landless-seasonal farm workers, mainly women: these have
been consigned to bantustans as a result of labour displacement on white
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commercial farms. Many of these women, and their men, may have been
sharecroppers in the past especially in the grain areas of the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State. Now they may have a dwelling in the bantustans as their
formal place of residence; they are itinerant and move from one farm and 
region to another as the seasons progress and take whatever jobs are on
o ffe r .
1(c) subsistence, mainly female headed households who have access 
to plots but who depend mainly on the earnings o f (mostly male) migrants. 
They grow small quantities of maize and pumpkin, gather leaves for relish; 
produce which is very important because the families are so poor. Sometime 
these families cannot use all th e . land they have because they cannot pay 
for ploughing, nor do they have enough money for seeds and fertiliser or, 
in the case of the elderly, the strength to till for themselves or the money to 
pay anyone else. Widows, from  w ithin  this grouping, often enter into 
sharecropping arrangements with other families.^®'^ There are also women 
commuters, often single parents, who work in town, leaving their children
in care in the rural areas returning on occasional weekends. Apartheid and 
migrancy have contributed to unusually high rates o f social breakdown.
Clarke and Ngobese identify single parent women as a socially marginalised 
but quantitatively significant grouping who need special consideration in 
policy form ulation.
These three categories (belonging to Group I) are numerous in an 
South African economy in which almost half of the 15-35 age group (the 
majority of the total population) do not have jobs and for whom social crisis 
is a daily reality. I define these three categories, for whom the rural areas 
are still the major nexus of their lives, as a peasantariat. Peasantariat
confers to this group an oscillating status - a group which will move
according to opportunities. It is even less stable than the peasant-worker 
group whose larger agricultural investment gives them a larger material 
stake in the rural areas. These groups have been elsewhere categorised as 
displaced urban' people. It is said that many of these people would have 
probably moved to town if not for apartheid legislation and indeed are now 
doing so. This view assumes that the women will relinquish their 
independent status and face the probability of urban unem ploym ent.
The following four categories all have considerable arable farming
experience on land which they consider to be their own - but with
Rick de Satge, formerly with the EDA (Environment Development Agency) 
recounting field work experience in Herschel district, personal communication.
195
differing levels of autonomy and different expectations from  a new
governm ent's land redistribution policy:
1(d) and 2(f) perm anent farm  workers: mostly men (agricultural 
proletariat): these are mainly on-farm residents. Their housing is tied to 
their job and very few workers belong to unions. The past experience o f 
permanent farm workers gives rise to varying aspirations. Some workers
on Western Cape fruit farms have stated that they do not aspire to land 
redistribution or even, at present, a worker-managed farm; their demands
are Housing security (the right to a domicile that is not tied to the job), the 
right to unionise, the right to equal pay for equal work to replace the 
racially  based wage d ifferen tials which are the norm at present. 
However regional analysis is required; other perm anent farm  workers, 
especially from grain areas in the Transvaal and Orange Free State come 
from a share cropping or labour tenancy background from the same farm 
or farming area where they are now classiHed as farm workers. Some of 
these workers may well aspire to farm commercially if they can get access 
to land as well as credits and marketing.
1(e) and 2(g) contract-w orkers or "out-growers": agribusiness has 
actively introduced out-growers schemes in some areas of the bantustans. 
There are, for example, now 30000 sugar growers whereas there were none 
a few years ago. The out-grower uses his or her own land within the 
allocated tribal areas. The company provides support for a certain product 
and no other. This restricted assistance for only one crop has led to 
accusations that it is analogous to the system of forced cropping which took 
place during the colonial period in neighbouring states. The out-grower 
has very little decision making power; the agribusiness provides a contract 
which is often not fully understood."^^ The out-grower delivers the product 
and is credited  afte r the firm  has subtracted all repaym ents. The 
outgrowing experience of sugar producers again requires regional analysis
as it is hctcrugcneuus. In KwaNgane entrepreneurs on land areas o f 7 to 35
hectares manage their own businesses. In KwaZulu individual farm areas 
are smaller and the out-grow er provides mostly labour and acts as a
contractée rather than as an independent farmer. In other bantustans' eg..
Author's interview notes, Anglo American Stellenbosch wine farm June 1990. 
Workers are bitter about racism in the workplace: there is an enormous difference in 
remuneration between a white and black foreman in terms o f salary, type of 
accommodation and benefits package 
406 Vaughan A, author's interview notes, February, 1991. She has been researching in 
Natal black sugar growing areas for the last few years says that many growers do not 
understand the small print of the contract - they do not understand interest rate (as 
well as its variability) on their loan for inputs etc.
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the Transkei, systems of contract farming for maize production have been 
introduced in so called cooperatives.^®^ Each producer has a piece o f land 
within the "co-operative" but the organisation of production is completely 
out o f his or her control. The company determines the crop, the inputs, the 
commercialisation policy of the produce and it is even forbidden to harvest 
mealie cobs for home consumption. But the 'peasant* is responsible for any
debts incurred. In this situation the farm er appears to be more of a
'contract worker' than a peasant.
2(h) and 3(i) labour tenants: tens of thousands of families have
lived in the "white" rural areas for generations under legal contracts in 
the South Eastern Transvaal, Northern Natal and parts of the Orange Free 
State.^®® Labour tenants secure access (for themselves and their family) to 
a portion of farmland in exchange for work, most commonly for six months 
of the year. Generally a fit and able male family member will fulfill the 
labour contract while the rem aining family members work the fam ily 
fields; many own cattle, oxen . and ploughs. When classic style labour
tenancy was legislated against, farmers began to pay nominal wages, so low 
that, "It is now common for the members of an extended family to 
contribute to the "wages" of the person, who by working for the farmer, 
secures the family's right to remain on the farm."^®^ Labour tenants claim 
a birthright to the land on which their families have lived and worked for
generations in contrast to the transient white legal owners whom they 
have endowed with an African character title as "the ones who come and
go"-
3(j) entrepreneurial w orker-peasant fam ilies: these are fam ilies
who have substantial wage earnings which they invest in their base in the 
black rural economy to develop their farming activities. They buy oxen,
plough their land and may even employ people to help with weeding and 
harvesting. If they do not have access to enough land in their own right
under com munal or trust tenure -they will look for borrowing, cash rental
or sharecropping arrangements. These families usually gain their relative 
economic well-being precisely because they have family members who 
have skilled work in better paid urban jobs. It is these off-farm  wages 
which have permitted the family to develop agricultural activities.
^®^ Jam es, 1985
■^ ®^ Claassens, A (1989) Section 2.2. Struggles without title deeds: Non-landowners.' 
409 Claassens, A. (1988) p.5.
197
3(k) rural entrepreneurs: These are very often chiefs or family 
members of chiefs who have had the opportunity o f better education and 
they have jobs w ithin the bantustan bureaucracies. They have often 
benefitted from apartheid  corrupt bureaucracy by receiving favours in 
land allocation (especially in the areas where the state purchased land for 
expanding the bantustan areas).4l® Many have (as members of or related to 
members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie) also gained access to funds for 
"small business development "They own up to tens o f hectares o f land, 
tractors, oxen, ploughs and are often traders owning grinding mills, pick­
up trucks, cafés (small shops) as well as brick making ventures.
Two more categories are identifiable not because of current class 
position but because they have shared the same historical experience. This 
leads them to aim for the same objective i.e. to re-establish  their 
entrepreneurial base. They are:
3(1) dispossessed ex-freeholders: these are mainly people who were 
removed from "blackspots" who expect to repossess their land in a post 
apartheid South Africa. While this is a distinct political group its class 
character is not clear. Removal from the land often went hand in hand with 
dispossession of means o f production.
3(m) claimants from dispossessed communities: many producers on 
communal lands actually farm on areas which were severely reduced by 
land dispossession. Namaqualand pastoralists fall into this category. Again 
while one can identify a common interest because o f a common historical 
experience the "community" is itself differentiated.
The diversity of the rural areas indicates the likelihood of differing 
claims and aspirations. Some aspire to the right to own and farm land or to 
get more farm land than they have at the moment. Fifty per cent of people
in one Kwazulu study said they would like to move to urban areas; fifty per
410 The Ciskei government requested a "development plan" for Mpofu, an area 
formerly part of but then purchased to be added on to the Ciskei. The government 
request stated that some three hundred farms covering several thousand hectares 
should be subject to a comprehensive plan for large scale entrepreneurs - the land 
had been allocated for subsidised purchase by black entrepreneurs through the 
Ciskei government (subsidised because the incumbents are to pay a minor 
proportion of the price paid by the white state to the outgoing white farmers. Some 
mention was made of farm squatters which the Ciskeian government state it was 
prepared to remove. A preliminary socio-economic survey has shown these farms to 
be people with literally thousands o f . labour tenants who have farmed for 
generations.
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cent wanted more land of their own.^H In Namaqualand^l^^ many residents 
want to expand the boundaries of the reserves to include land they claim
was usurped from them decades ago. The presence of three generations of
white farm ing fam ilies has not modified their attitudes. For some farm 
labourers better working conditions and different managerial practices are 
the prime concem.413 For others the demand is to live as a united family at 
the site o f industrial employment. Some migrant workers, employed in the 
mines all their lives, have stated their wish for a family homestead with 
land in the rural areas. For the unemployed, the overriding concern may be 
access to work whether industrial or agricultural, as em ployee or self
employed. Class differences within rural communities and diverse historical 
experience call for policies which are responsive to differing demands.
Men and women's varied experience may lead to different aspirations even
w ithin fam ilies.
African producers in the bantustans have faced many constraints in
the organisation o f their production. Migrancy has greatly affected family
structure and remittances from wage employment are the mainstay of a 
rural household. The tw entieth century has been dynamic in terms of 
econom ic grow th, class form ation , population increase and po litical 
struggles. In 1991 South Africa appears on the threshold of a major political
transform ation. Sections of the liberation m ovem ent understand black 
repossession of now white owned land as part and parcel o f regaining
b lack  sovereignty ' and nationhood. But m igrancy, p ro le ta rian isa tio n , 
landlessness and unemployment have severed or weakened rural ties. The
political demand for land reform  takes place in a context which has
changed radically as has land use and tenancy conditions. The paradox of a 
unused land in a labour surplus situation has been reviewed here and the
re la tiv e  im portance o f wage earners ' rem ittances and ag ricu ltu ra l 
production analysed. This led to a discussion on class differentiation and the 
differing experience of men and women due to male migrancy. Such an 
analysis may indicate what can be expected in terms of peoples' demand for 
land arising from their class position. It has been proposed that land should
not be redistributed to individuals, because it may create a rural petty
b o u rg eo is ie  who are  in h e ren tly  co n se rv a tiv e  in th e ir p o litic a l 
consciousness as well as the fact that land resettlem ent of this nature
simply realigns the conditions o f agrarian cap ita list d e v e l o p m e n t . 4 1 4
41 i Studies carried out by the Rural Urban Studies Unit, University of Natal, Durban. 
41- Surplus People's Project, 1989, p i.
412 Hamman, J,.1990, p. 10 
414 Krickler, J,. 1987.
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Ultimately land reform is a political demand and the landless unemployed, 
the agriculturally de-skilled, the displaced urban people who currently still 
live in the closer settlements of the bantustans may decide that access to 
land for agricultural production is the only possibility they see for 
themselves. Later, cooperation, may also be recognised as a survival 
strategy option. The necessity for policy flexibility according to class, 
aspiration and feasibility is noted and will be explored further in Chapter 7. 
Moreover the land redistribution and agrarian reform  in a unitary South 
A frica requires some fu rther considera tion  on the coex istence or 
m od ification  o f the tenu ria l conditions o f ag ricu ltu ra l land, its 
marketability and, significantly, the differential racial access to capital and 
skills which is. the apartheid inheritance. These are the topics to be pursued 
in the next chapters.
2 0 0
C hapter 6. D ifferentiation , Scale and P roductivity.
Chapter two examined the economic theory of land rent and land 
valuation. Two features with im plications for South Africa need to be 
elaborated. Firstly, the discussions assume a capitalist framework in which 
agricultural land tenure is based on marketable freehold. Secondly, there is 
an assumption of a general average rate of profit operating across the
sector based on a prevailing average production function. At the level of 
the individual entrepreneur, technical innovation, excellent m anagem ent 
and so on does, of course, permit higher profit levels temporarily until a 
new social norm is established; C onversely, entrepreneurs failing  . to 
achieve the average rate of profit will be squeezed out of the sector. But the 
principal assumption is that there is, at a given moment, a prevailing norm 
of average profitability. Chapters 3, 4 and 5, however, have described 
racially separate land markets, diverse and co-existing forms o f tenure, 
class differences among black rural residents as well as considerable 
stratifrcation among white commercial producers. All this, uniquely in the 
case of South Africa, detracts from the operation of the economic law 
relating to average rate of production.
Capitalist agricultural development in the northern hem isphere has 
resulted in ever increasing scale o f units both in terms of physical size and 
capital investment. There is a tendency to believe in the superior efficiency 
of these productive units which is partly attributed to scale economies. In 
the southern hemisphere a large scale commercial sector co-exists with a
small scale petty commodity production. In these circumstances there are 
two d ivergent approaches to the consequences of land reform  for 
productive efficiency. One approach cautions against radical redistribution 
because it will reduce the number of large scale producers and lead to 
efficiency loss; the other approach maintains that redistribution will lead to 
output increases because land reform beneficiaries would operate their 
smaller scale units more intensively.
In this chapter I focus on the debate on scale and productivity. I 
consider the production functions of black and white producers which will
provide, in Chapter 7 , the basis for linking the issues of differentiation, 
productivity, land valuation and land redistribution.
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6.1. The debate over productivity in relation to land reform.
As stated above an examination of scale and choice of technology has 
a bearing on impending land reform prospects in South Africa. One of the 
arguments advanced against the im plem entation of land reform  derives 
from the belief that large scale mechanised production using high yielding 
technology is far superior to small scale production. Hence any benefits 
deriving from redistribution have to be weighed against the costs to the 
economy of a fall in productivity and efficiency. This point of view was 
strongly argued to caution against extensive land reform in Zimbabwe.
The protaganists of this approach assume that in different sectors of 
the farming economy (grain growing, livestock production, wool, fruit and 
so on) there is a minimum effieient size which permits the use of the most
competitive production technology and a maximum realisation of its scale 
e c o n o m i e s . 415 Hence a land reform should aim for a land redistribution 
only to beneficiaries with access to capital based on the principal of 
minimum efficient size, (m .e.s.) It is argued that a land reform which 
creates farms below m.e.s. may be a pointless exercise in the longer term. If 
a minimum efficient scale exists there will be economic pressure for land 
reform beneficiaries operating below this scale to go out o f production.
Within a capitalist framework, the ongoing process of differentiation will
ensure that the poorest marginal sector will once again tend to lose its land
through bankruptcy or sale of the assets due to economic desperation.
However many protagonists supporting land reform  argue that 
"small can be just as p r o d u c t i v e " 4 1 6  They maintain that while land reform
may be a necessary part of black struggle for sovereignty and self 
determination it can, at the same time, even increase the country's overall
agricultural production. They draw support for their position from the 
work of Lipton and Sen and cite instances, in South Africa, o f small scale 
producers achieving production yields which are comparable with those of
large scale white commercial farmers.
In this section 1 examine more closely both the issue of economies of
scale in commercial farming and the proposition that small scale producers
415 Moll,P. 1988
4l<i Urban Foundation (1990), Christodoulou, N.T. and N. Vink (1990) of the 
DBS A (Development Bank of Southern Africa) in South Africa; as well as a 
range of "development" economists and social scientists: de Janvry (1981), 
Lipton M, (1977), Prosterman R L (1987) Binswanger and Elgin (1990).
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can achieve com parably high yields. I draw both on South A frican 
materials and comparative data from other countries. I conclude that the 
proposition that small-scale can be just as productive is questionable and 
that it therefore provides a dubious rationale for a development strategy. At 
the same time the work on economies of scale in capitalist production
establishes that after the minimum efficient size o f a specific production 
technology is attained, the primary benefit o f larger farms accrues to the 
individual entrepreneur rather than to the general economy in terms of 
additional output. Moreover it is almost impossible to tailor farm size to the 
optimal size requirements of indivisible investment inputs and hence the 
theoretically determined best productive use of land often does not take 
p lace .
Looking at land reform as a strategy designed to improve social 
welfare Sender submits that a more efficient development of capitalism in 
agriculture would generate employment in rural areas with wage levels for
the rural poor (as wage labourers) which are higher than the income they
could generate for them selves (as peasantry) through a land reform
p r o g r a m m e . 417 This follows from the low level o f investable resources 
available to peasant households and their weak market position. But 
ultim ately, (as Sender agrees) land reform  is a political demand and, 
especially given South A frica's history of racial dispossession, it is
unacceptable to argue against it on a narrow technical basis. But I would go
further: while the political demand for land reform may concentrate on 
small scale individual aspirations (with limited access to land, capital and 
technology) this does not preclude the later formation of cooperatives as a
strategy to strengthen the hand of small scale producers within the 
cap ita lis t econom y and potentially  to develop dem ocratic form s o f
cooperative practice which provide the basis for initiating a socialist
c h a l le n g e .
Section (1) reviews the debate on the claim ed superiority and
inevitability of large scale farming. Section (ii) examines selected data on
small scale production and raises the issue of the kind of productivity being 
discussed and furthermore the importance o f comparing like with like, ie 
one p ro d u c tio n  function w ith an o th e r p ro d u c tio n  func tion . I conclude that
a land reform strategy based on redistribution to individuals who operate on 
a family-labour based production unit may have important benefits which 
would increase if cooperativisation can provide access to better technology
417 Sender, J. Professor of Economics, Witwatersrand University, personal 
co m m u n ic a tio n .
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to improve the production function. I refer briefly to Nolan's criticism of 
this redistribution strategy as producing an "equalisation" o f poverty and 
support Bram ail's counterview  that the w ell-being (albeit at a modest
income level) of China's rural majority is surely a great achievement when 
compared to similar countries such as India and Brazil where resource
ownership and income distribution have remained skewed and the endowed 
strata have failed to invest in production activ ities to generate more 
widespread economic benefits.
6.2. T he econom ic s u p e r io r ity  of la rg e -sca le  fa rm in g .
During the genesis of capitalism it was believed that farming would 
be subject to the same tendencies as manufacturing. Marx^lS and Lenin^l^ 
are alleged to have forecast that small family size farms would go out of 
production to be replaced, at first, by fewer larger scale family farms to be 
eventually taken over by company capital. The received wisdom that "large- 
scale farming is technically s u p e r io r " 4 2 0  provided some of the rationale for 
the co llectiv isation  process in the socialist experim ents o f various 
c o u n tr ie s .
However family owned farm businesses are still very significant in
capitalist economies and collectivisation has been beset with difficulties. 
There have been productivity problems on collective farms whether in
Eastern Europe (eg. the Soviet Union421)^ Asia, (China422) A frica,
(eg.M ozam bique423) or Latin America (eg. Nicaragua424)
418 Marx (1976) pp 905-912, "The Genesis of the Capitalist Farmer" presents 
an overview of what happened historically, especially in Britain, with 
regard to the enclosure movement.
419 Lenin (1977), "The Development of Capitalism in Russia." Ch 1, Ft 11, 
"The ruin of the small producers." However, Lenin, in fact did not identity 
family operations with small physical size at the theoretical level. At Utsa 
Patnaik points out (personal com m unication) Lenin's polem ical p ieces, 
where positions are stated in more extreme forms, have to be distinguished 
from more considered articles resulting form data analysis. She refers to 
Lenin's Collected Works, Volume 22 'New data on the laws governing the 
development of capitalism ' "where he analyses U.S. census data using a 
concept of scale of production different from physical farm size. This 
position does not com e out as clearly in the earlier writing (eg.. 
Development of Capitalism in Russia) because he was using secondary 
zemstvo data which did not permit a more accurate analysis."
420 Lenin V I,(1965)'The Land Question and the Fight for Freedom." p 122. 
Lenin refers to "large scale farm ing('s) technical superiority as an 
"indisputable theoretical truth"
421 Medvedev Z A, (1987)
422 Nolan P, (1988) and Wadekin (1990)
423 CEA (1983), Dolny H (1988)
424 Kaimowitz D, in Fitzgerald E V K and Wuyts M (1988)
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Similarly, although there has been an increase o f company owned
farms in many countries, family run production units have shown great 
resilience. Company capital has found it more lucrative to invest in both the
supply of inputs to the production p r o c e s s 4 2 5  and the processing o f the 
output. Company entry into the actual production process tends to take place 
only selectively when there are economies to be gained through vertical 
integration as for paper, beef, poultry, wine and, previously, s u g a r .426
B r e w s t e r 4 2 7  offers a simple explanation for the continuity of family
operated production units (either on an owner-occupier or tenant basis). He
notes that "both before and after mechanisation farm operations are widely 
separated by time intervals irredeemably imposed by biological advance
and climate. In agriculture . . . technological advance does not accelerate
the functional division of labour and specialisation since operations are not
concurrent as they are in industry. Rather, it allows a family to reduce its
hiring of l a b o u r .  " 4 2 8  por Brewster this explains a predominance in the 
northern capitalist countries (U.S.A., Canada, Great Britain) of large scale 
farms run by a single operator (whether owner or manager) employing a 
reduced amount of hired labour.
But this process has not been uniform in all the capitalist countries.
Relatively small units still exist in many o f the EEC countries especially
where inheritance ' p ractices led to subdivision o f farms. One o f the
problems of these smaller units (as has been noted in relation to white
commercial farming in South Africa) is their inability to produce sufficient
to provide the constituents' socially desired level of farm income. This leads 
to a political battle in which the farmers lobby for price supports and 
governm ents foster land reform  policies designed to speed up a 
restructuring process towards fewer larger farms.
In the white commercial farming sector in South Africa the trend 
towards fewer farmers owning larger farms continued unabated in the post
war period until the 1980s; a trend which has been common to the
425 ciuodman, Sorj & Wilkinson (1987)
426 This is particularly identifiable in South Africa where SAPPI and MONDI 
companies dominate forestry production, Anglo American have invested in 
v ineyards. However there are new developm ents in the sugar industry 
where company millers are no longer em phasising plantation production 
but rather organising small holder contract farming. See Vaughan A, 1990
427 Brewster, J (1950) in his article, "Machine Process in Agriculture and 
Industry." as cited by Lehman D, (1986) pp 606-7.
428 Lehman’s ( 1986) succinct summary o f  Brewster's argument, p.607.
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northern capitalist economies.429 Krause and Kyle have explored in greater 
detail the reasons contributing to this trend in the USA. They criticise the
old style classifications which count acres and livestock and suggest a more 
sophisticated analysis which encom passes vertically  in tegrated business 
units. For example, for some commodities such as beef and poultry there are 
major changes in the direction of creating production, processing and 
m arketing units. F urtherm ore the econom ic capacity  o f un its is
increasingiy skewed; 1.1 per cent of cattle feed lots dealt with 52.5% of ail
cattle by 1969. While technological economies of scale are thought to be the
primary reason creating the pull for firms to expand and push out other 
producers, it was argued that other factors are of increasing importance;430 
for example, certain pull factors towards larger and vertically integrated 
units include econom ies resulting from  buying and selling in larger
volumes. Average market prices may not always apply to larger firms
which may have advantages such as special contracts or v ertica l
integration allowing for a higher net price. Credit is cheaper for larger 
firms. Large scale units are thought to allow a complement of activity
spread over the farming year which is less likely to occur on smaller units 
thus m aintaining em ployee productivity in the o ff peak season. These 
factors are expected to more than cover the higher price which may be paid
to manage the larger enterprise.
There are several implications for public policy resulting from the 
em ergence and dom inance of large business units. Farm ing support
programmes have failed to differentiate between types of units. The result 
has been that corporate farming businesses have often been the main
beneficiaries of policies designed to improve incomes of single operator 
family farms. Another important aspect for public policy debate is on the 
long term social fabric of the farming areas. The trend is towards a
depopulated corporate countryside in which small scale family farming has 
no economic place. While this trend may not be vociferously opposed in
highly u rban ised  in d u s tria lise d  so c ie ties  it w ould seem  w holly
in a p p ro p ria te  in so u th ern  econom ies w here th e re  is m assive
unem ployment and landlessness.
A case study on large scale farming in South Africa has been carried
out by Moll. In his examination of comm ercial grain farming he gives
429 Krause and Kyle, 1970, pp 748. mention that in 1930 there were more 
than six million relatively small, unmechanised, family owned units. By 
1964 this figure was reduced to less than half a million with 141 914 larger 
farm units producing 44% of output.
430 ibid. pp 750
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special consideration to the issues of economic and technological scale on 
the assumption that land reform  would seek to create and m aintain a 
greater number of farmers. He identifies the reasons why white farmers 
tended enlarge their farms as well as the push factors influencing those 
owner-occupier farmers to decide to leave the sector.
The starting point was to acknowledge the intuition shared by South 
African economists and farmers alike that there are significant economies 
of scale to be gained through farm enlargement.431 These may be expected 
to level off, after which a situation of constant returns to scale is presumed
to the point of maximum management capacity. M oll's objective was to 
verify the existence of scale economies and to identify the minimum 
efficient scale (MES), ie. the level of output above which the long run 
average cost curve is horizontal or rising.
Moll used statistical cost analysis as his primary research method and 
estim ated production functions as a secondary method. He uses statistical 
cost analysis to derive the average practice' curve and argues that the 
curve is the most relevant information to be used in government policy 
formation as it indicates the par to be achieved by producers for different
farm  size w ithin a specific sector of production using a certain  
t e c h n o l o g y . 432 This approach entails plotting average cost (AC) against 
farm size measures like area, capital invested and revenue, and computing a 
Long Run Average Cost (LRAC) curve. The attraction of this method is (i) its 
simplicity, (ii) the potential it offers for the analyst to use knowledge 
gained from interviews and (iii) it is based on current farming practice,
unlike production function estimates. The statistical cost analysis also allows
431 M oll checked with farm ers that they shared this opinion. He
interviewed 31 farmers in Malmesbury and 24 in Bredasdorp.
4 3 2  According to Moll's literature survey the "results of returns to scale 
studies in agriculture are determined by the method chosen" The synthetic 
firm method shows very high costs at small sizes which fall rapidly as 
m echanisation takes place up to the point where two people are fully 
employed after which reductions in average cost are minimal or zero. The
production function method usually finds constant returns to scale except
for very capital intensive operations like feed lots and broilers which show
increasing returns to scale Furthermore "when the production function
method is combined with covariance analysis to eliminate management bias, 
strongly decreasing returns to scale are shown. A third method, statistical 
cost analysis often shows gently increasing returns to scale in the smallest 
one third to one half of the observed range, of sizes and approximately 
constant returns to scale beyond" A fourth approach, the "survivorship 
approach " at its simplest involves comparing the size distribution of farms
at two different point in time. It assumes that under competitive conditions
those firms who do not attain  average costs fail to gain sufficient
entrepreneurial reward and drop out.
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for separate analysis of the economies of scale due to various financial and 
marketing factors and not just machine use, m anagerial efficiency and 
labour specialisation. Moll carried out two surveys as well as examining 
official data sets from the census and postal records on maize/livestock and 
wheat livestock farms
Farmers gave improved net farm income as their main reason for 
buying additional f a r m l a n d . 433 They failed  to distinguish between the
additional portion of net farm income accruing from the extra hectares
farmed and any addition due to more efficient use of resources because of 
the increase in farm size. The wish of farmers to help their sons settle on 
the land was a second major factor. They also felt expansion would enable
them to use their machinery more e c o n o m i c a l l y . 434 Lower interest rates
and volume discounts on input purchases were referred to as further 
sources of scale economies. However several interviewees felt that farmers 
operating sm aller scale farms had more m anagerial time available per 
hectare and could therefore manage the land more intensively and use
machinery more carefully thus prolonging machine life.
Farmers' perceptions were compared with data collected on trends in 
unit costs. Farmers expected unit costs to fall as farm size increased. Moll
examined whether the reductions were constant over a range of size or if 
they levelled off indicating some minimal or optimal operational size.
Moll's results challenged popular p e r c e p t i o n s . 435 He found smaller 
farms cropped a higher proportion of their farm area and used machinery
of the same horsepower more intensively than larger farms436 They did
not have a higher proportion of second hand m achinery and their 
machinery was not older than on the larger farms. Yields per hectare did
433 Part of the pressure to increase income is to maintain parity with rising 
urban incomes. See Moll P, 1988, p 163. and p 288. Farmer's incomes were as 
much as 50% less than those of equivalent occupations in 1970; this 
disparity decreased in subsequent years.
434 All the farmers that Moll interview ed in the Bredasdorp district 
"believed that larger farms have lower machinery costs per unit area,
especially in combines, the minimum efficient size being about 250-500
hectares under grains (ie the minimum efficient farm size including land 
for grazing of stock would be some 500- lOOOha.) Some believed that 
machinery costs per unit area continue to fall to a size of 800 to 1000 ha and 
bey o n d .
435 ibid pp50-5I.
436 One difference was noted concerning com bine harvesters; their 
ownership and use depended on the total adjoining areas operated. Moll
suggests this is because of the expense of moving a combine from one farm 
unit to another.
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not increase significantly as farm size increased. Machinery costs per unit 
o f output were also constant after a certain minimum scale was reached. The 
survey also indicated a technological bias towards m achinery adoption 
irrespective o f econom ic rationale . This re itera tes  de K lerk 's earlie r
findings that machinery which displaces labour is favoured, over and 
above economic considerations, because it reduces the employer's need to 
recruit and supervise labour.
M ore spec ifica lly  when the o pera to r's  m anageria l labour is 
discounted there are clear indivisibilities in the m aize-livestock farm ing 
samples below 250-300 ha as the analyses showed falling unit costs within
this range. But indivisibilities were not found in the 50-300 ha range in the 
w heat-livestock area. Above this range the analysis indicated constant 
returns to scale in the range of 250-2300 in the maize farming region. 
H ow ever unee the en trep ren eu r's  m anagerial labour is priced then the 
minimum efficient scale alters significantly. The results indicate that one 
operator can efficiently manage a 850-1650 ha maize-livestock farm and a
750-1050 ha. wheat-livestock farm.
Smaller farms were not able to achieve higher yield per hectare as a 
strategy to raise income. The difference in production activity between 
smaller (200-500ha) farms and larger ones was to crop a higher proportion
of the farm so as to optimise use of the machinery. This is a higher risk 
farming strategy because of the drought vulnerability of crop farming.
The results contradict farm er's beliefs that they might enjoy 
substantial scale economies through more effective use of m a c h i n e r y . 437 
The real benefits are that additional land is farm ed without incurring 
additional management costs and risk is reduced through changing the 
cropping mix. The basic scale economy is that of the managing operator.
Moll concludes that the implications for land reform strategy are as
follows: there could be economic efficiency gains if farms of less than 300
ha are amalgamated, but these gains may be as small as 5 per cent.
Conversely a land reform strategy in South Africa (assuming a direction 
towards establishing sm aller scale black entrepreneurs) should avoid a 
redistribution of land that creates farms within the 50 to 300 hectare size
437 Moll P, p8 l "Misperception: perhaps the respondents confused unit 
machinery costs, which do fall with size on account o f  falling cropping 
intensity, with unit total costs, which do not."
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bracket438^ otherwise there would be a tendency to call for price supports. 
On the other hand, if the objective of a land reform  is to maximise
employment then employment is more intense on smaller scale farms as a
greater proportion of the farm area is cropped.
6.3. P roductiv ity  on "sm all scale" p ro d u c tio n  u n its
It is important to any discussion of scale and productivity to separate
different types of productivity: land productivity (yield per hectare), labour 
productivity (output per labour unit) and capital productivity (output per
unit o f capital expenditure). Although yield can be described either in 
physical or monetary terms. I restric t the discussion here to physical 
considerations. In term s o f technological innovation, yield increasing 
technology may be e ither m echanical o f b io techno log ica l. T rac to r 
ploughing may contribute to increased land productivity as it may permit a
larger area to be ploughed and yield may increase through better timing 
and quality of tillage. It may be possible to undertake double cropping or a 
different range of crops because of the. swiftness o f operation.^^^ My
preference, however, is to restric t the discussion to yield increasing
technology of the type achieved through use of seed varieties, fertilisers,
pesticides and irrigation.
A great deal o f the research on scale, technology, efficiency, and
land reform  deals mainly with ow ner-occupiers or tenants operating 
within a capitalist organisation of production. Com parative research on 
efficiency of state farms and cooperatives is less abundant. Researchers
seem to employ different productivity criteria according to the type of farm 
unit. Studies of large scale com mercial farms most often refer to the 
efficiency of employment due to mechanisation assum ing the use of a 
certain  b io-technological package. The scale and effic iency  analysis 
th e reafte r concen tra tes on scale econom ies accru ing  to m achinery 
employed on farms of various size and identifies the . optimal management 
size which can be undertaken by one operator/manager. Studies of small 
scale units run by simple commodity producers most often focus on land 
productivity reviewing the capacity to use new technology, the minimal
438 The Urban Foundation land, reform proposals include suggestions to 
give assistance to create black entrepreneurial farms of 200 hectares. Thus 
Moll's work provides a basis for critical reflection of this proposal in its 
own terms.
439 Machinery also modifies the soil structure: heavy tractors can compress 
the soil, to form a relatively im permeable layer that inhibits proper 
drainage and affects fertility.
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scale required if certain tillage m achinery (oxen, tractors) is to be
introduced or the capital requirem ent o f new technology (eg. tubewells). 
The first assumes that commercial viability hinges on reduced unit costs. 
The second assumes a labour surplus and compares land productivity where 
there is access to inputs and/or capital improvements.
Moll acknow ledges that his study is restric ted  to the w hite
commercial sector where the smallest wheat or maize farms are about 50 
hectares in size and all use a certain  type o f m echanisation and
biotechnology. The production model is that of an operator m anager 
employing both permanent and casual labour. The issue o f organisation of
production on units of less than fifty hectares, which is very likely to occur
in South Africa, d id . not fall within the scope of the study.
Land made available to individuals through a state supported land
redistribution process may well be far less than the fifty hectares minimum 
size studied by Moll. Therefore it is pertinent to look at inform ation
available on scale, m echanisation and biotechnology use as well as the 
economic and marketing conditions facing producers operating on farms
below 50 hectares.
A study by Weiner, McKenzie and Vink^^O challenges several pieces 
of conventional wisdom concerning land p roductiv ity  and land use
frequently proffered about white com mercial farming compared to black
farming on small plots (commonly 0,5 to 5 hectares) in the bantustans. One
such pearl of "wisdom" is that white farmers exploit the full potential of 
their cultivable land area whereas blacks fail to cultivate a considerable, 
proportion of land in the bantustans. Another common prejudice is that 
blacks are incapable farmers and therefore it follows that any significant
land transfer to blacks would result in an overall drop in production.
DBSA research on land use in white areas suggest both a distorted use 
and underutilisation of land in d ifferent regions. Farm ers in eastern
regions, favoured with flat lands but low rainfall, found it preferable to 
cultivate grazing land because o f the m achinery subsidies and the
prevailing producer price. But in the lUore hilly and wetter western parts
two thirds of all medium potential arable land is used for grazing. Weiner 
calculated that over three quarters of South Africa's high potential arable 
land is located in Natal and Eastern Transvaal and that only half of the land 
had been cleared for arable use. Forestry, beef and dairy grazing, mine
440 McKenzie,C.C., Weiner D and N.Vink.( 1990)
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industry ownership of land and slopes less favourable to machine use are 
the reasons offered for the low level of arable production.
Research on land use in the bantustans contain classifrcation errors 
leading to an overestimate in the amount of arable land. Lack of capital for 
means of production, or money to buy inputs and hire labour as well as 
com petition from off-farm  income earning opportunities are given as
reasons for the underutilisation of productive land in the bantustans.(see 
Chapter 5)
M cK enzie et al^^l suggest that black farm ers operate fairly
competently given the many limiting factors they face. S t u d i e s 4 4 2  carried 
out in the bantustans on maize yields for dryland farming without access to 
improved seeds and fertilisers compare favourably to the yields obtained
forty years ago by white farmers in the same technical circumstances. And 
w here black farm ers do have access and skills to use im proved
biotechnology the yields are comparable to those o f white farmers. Weiner 
also produced an input-output table443 calculating resource use efficiency 
and found a favourable comparison. White farming has a higher input rate 
and achieves a higher output but (again in contradiction to conventional
wisdom) rarely with any greater efficiency of resource use.
The various stud ies ind icate  the im portance o f  access to 
biotechnology. Investment opportunity and institutional support. There are 
examples of extremely high yields on tiny homestead plots indicating a 
capacity to use land intensively in a situation  w here labour and 
biotechnological inputs are available but there is an absolute land shortage
Such findings are consistent with those of other countries where 
there is evidence of an inverse relationship between size of holding and 
land productivity. The phenomenon occurs when there is a shortage of 
land, an absence of wage labour opportunities but sufficient access to the 
basic inputs. Farmers employing wage labour will do so to the point where 
the marginal value product of labour is equal to the wage. On the other 
hand. Sen has argued, persons working their own land, who want to
maxim ise total output, will apply their labour beyond this p o i n t .  444
441 ibid, 1990,p9
442 Weiner, 1989 draft, pp 15-21, cites studies by Lipton, Coetzee, Lyne and 
Ortmann, May and Roodt.
443 Weiner, ibid. p 19-20
444 Sen A, 1962, p245.
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Lehman'^^^ reviews the literature on the survival of simple commodity 
producers within third world capitalist countries. He notes that Chayanov 
(1967), Lipton (1974), Sen (1966) and de Janvry (1982) all concur on one 
point: "The costs of production on a peasant farm are lower than those of a 
capitalist farm producing the same crop on the same piece Of land" 
assum ing the same use of biotechnology and that "small agricultural 
producers use their labour very intensively to extract unparalleled levels of 
productivity from their land and capital"^^^ Much of the data available 
showing the inverse rela tionship  betw een size o f land holding and 
productivity come from Asian^^^ and Latin American^^® countries; much 
less is available from A frica but the International Labour O rganisation 
(ILO) on publishing the results o f two government surveys concluded that 
the available data makes a strong case for subdivision o f large farms in 
K enya,
Table 6.1. The Relationship between Output. Land Utilisation. Employment 
and Farm Size on Settlement Schemes. 1967/68 season.
Farm Size Average Size Land under Labour per QyiuwlL
G fo u a (a c re s ) Crops % 1000 acres S h i i i in a s /
e q u iv a le n t a c r e
less than 10 7.3 45 808 635
10-19.9 13.8 30 399 250
20-29.9 23.5 24 234 156
30 39.9 34.7 16 159 161
40-49.9 44.4 14 124 113
50-59.9 52.3 15 111 98
60-69.9 64.5 19 109. 98
more than 70 124.8 14 70 111
Source: Kenyan Statistical Digest, Vol X, No I, March 1972. Reproduced in Hunt. 1984, 
p 254.
If land productivity is taken as a rationale for land reform then this 
phenom enon can and has been used to ju stify  far reach ing  land 
redistribution. This is what Hunt concludes for Kenya. She emphasises that 
in the prevailing  situation of unem ploym ent, land productiv ity  and 
creating self employment opportunities should overide labour productivity 
considerations. In a follow-up report to the ILO studies, Livingstone
4^5 Lehman D, 1986, p 603 
ibid p 604
Sen 1962., Roy P, 1981
Berry R A & W R Cline^ 1979. pp 44 -126 review data from Brazil, 
Columbia, the Philippines, West Pakistan, India and Malaysia as well as 
analysing extensive data from a wider range of countries.
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recommends a sub division of all farms over ten hectares, and proposes 2.5
hectares as the area which a family can till without hiring labour.
Patnaik is extremely critical of the land productivity approach to the 
land reform debate. She applies both a scientific and class approach to the
analysis of productivity data. She points out that the issue of land reform is
predom inantly  p o litica l (w hich overides the p roductiv ity  issue) but
furthermore that there must be an inherent logical fallacy in the inverse 
land size/productivity argument. Her first point is that one must be 
comparing like with like and on this basis it is illogical, in terms o f
economics, (in a market situation) to presume that the poor peasant is
operating with the same production function as the capitalist farmer. The
entrepreneurial landowner, she argues, always has the option to lease out 
land. If therefore the landowner is to undertake a production activity this
can only be expected to occur when a technological change can permit the 
landlord to undertake the farming activity and earn not only the rent but 
the going market return on the operational activity. This must hold true for
market economies but may fail when there are institutional impediments
such as the racial separation of land access in South Africa.
Patnaik illustrates her logic through a study o f data from W est
Bengal, India using farm size as a first rough approximation from which to
begin class analysis; Patnaik compares outputs and inputs per farm and per 
acre of gross sown area.^^^ She examines labour productivity and changing
production functions as richer peasants invest their surplus. Her case
studies reaffirm  Kautsky's statem ent: "A small estate cultivated in an
intensive manner can constitute a bigger scale of exploitation than a larger 
estate cultivated in an extensive manner." The point is that scale should not
be isolated from the nature of the production function and the quality of
land. The rich peasant farmer having used investable surplus for irrigation 
will achieve a much higher output than the poor peasant operating a more 
extensive area however much labour the peasant uses. .
-^ ■+9 Patnaik U, 1972, p 1614.
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Table 6.2. A Comparison of Farm-size. Yields and Labour Productivity.^
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Net.. UhfiJK Gross Gross Out
Cultivated davs hired Family. o u tp u t put per
Size AyeuL&& Area per In /O u t labour davs per Acre F am ily
Class Acres Farm Size capita -afitfis per Farm per farm Bj l L a b o u r
) ( + / -) Dav Rs.
00.01-1.25 0.73 0.16 - 90.34 57.83 298.90 3.75
1.26-2.50 1.83 0.31 - 46.94 92.66 275.41 5.43
2.51-3.75 3.17 0.46 - 20.59 151.50 259.36 5.43
3.76-5.00 4.28 0.58 - 3.40 160.65 251.25 6.69
5.01-7.50 5.99 0.63 + 39.59 253.61 209.30 4.94
7.51-10 8.28 0.92 + 106.91 306.60 259.30 7.00
10.01-15 12.88 1.02 +478.30 171.33 207.71 15.62
15 17.05 1.25 +823.28 281.48 246.09 14.91
2.67 0.42 - 15.13 106.48 250.52 6.27 .
Source: Patnaik.U, (1972) p404. Table 6.2.:data taken from Patnaik. Her data source was 
the Farm Management Report, West Bengal 1956-7.
The survey method data are taken for all columns except cols. 4 and 5 
for which only cost-accounting method data are available. Col 4 has been
calculated from the Report, p.33 Table 3.30 and col. 5 form col 4 and Report, 
p. 197 Table A -11. Patnaik observes that the shortage of land on what she 
calls "dwarf holdings" limits the days worked. No matter how intensively 
labour is applied, by a self-exploiting poor peasant family, involuntary 
unemployment occurs. In fact the so-called "inverse relationship" between 
farm size and land productivity is a testimony to desperation to maximise 
production in the absence of other economic alternatives. The larger richer 
peasant holding attains higher yields (excepting the very smallest class of
dwarf holdings) and a higher labour productivity. These rich peasants are
emergent entrepreneurs who can be expected to expand their activities and 
adopt improved techniques.
When high land productivity on dwarf holdings is examined from 
this angle Patnaik says, "it may be judged how grotesque is the efficiency' 
argument for land reform . . . (which) the followers of neo-classical
economism seek to garb in the raiment of economism, and the most vulgar,
fallacious type of economism at that."
ibid, pp 404
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A stronger proposition is put forward in Patnaik's later work*^^* in
which she shows that the family-labour based sector and hired labour based 
farming are not identical with small-sized and large-sized farms once data 
are separated. Furthermore, not only labour productivity but also land
productivity was higher on hired labour based holdings as a consequence of
the different "production functions" that they operate.
Vaughan exam ines small scale sugar production by blacks in
KwaZulu and KwaNgane. Her data suggests the need for scepticism of the 
D evelopm ent Bank's claims'^^^ that small scale producers are highly
competitive^ Commercial levels of agricultural productivity have not been 
generally achieved in KwaZulu sugar production. It is estimated that: "The
average yield for a small-scale (black) farmer is 35 tons of cane a hectare a 
year com pared with the 50 tons of the (white) com m ercial farm er. 
Vaughan's analysis complements that of Patnaik as she further reviews the
marketing conditions, facing small-scale producers. Her contention is that 
"liberal development ideologies . . . gloss over the complexities of economic
and social realities" and fail to give sufficient attention to the "limitations, 
vulnerability and fragility " of small-scale producers.
Sugar production in KwaZulu, for example, was fostered by the South 
African Sugar Association (SASA). This involved many producers giving up 
their maize production (produced for both home consumption and sale) and 
exposing themselves to the vulnerability of non-food cash crop production 
in the hope of a higher cash income to compensate the risk. From the mid­
seventies SASA administered a Small Growers Financial Aid Fund (FAF)
making credit available for the first time to producers unable to get bank 
credit because of the communal land status. In 1987, 22 000 growers 
cultivated 18.7% of the KwaZulu/Natal hectarage. The number of growers is 
now over 30 000. Production is both dryland and on irrigation schemes. 
Holdings range from 0,5 to 36 hectares with an average size of individual 
holdings o f 2 hectares. Producers face a range of problems: credit, labour,
contracting service and finally marketing.
Many cane growers use a combination of family and wage labour for 
cultivation. But black growers complain both about availability o f labour 
and work performance. Firstly, most of the rural areas economically active 
people have left for the urban areas to search for better job opportunities
451 Patnaik, U. 1987
452 S.S.Brand, Development Bank of Southern Africa. Weekly Mail. June 
1990.
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and, secondly, local white farmers appear to pay better wages and food. 
Contract services are used for major operations: land preparation, cane
cutting and haulage. Growers appear to have very different experiences. In
the Olimati area near Glendale Mill growers complained of poor contracting 
services; cutting was done badly and not at the arranged time. The inferior 
quality o f  late cut cane caused financial losses to the g r o w e r s . 453 However 
in Inanda a local contractor employs specialised Pondo cutters. Growers 
express satisfaction that they are achieving production levels com parable  
to white farmers. These are the exceptions which lend credence to Brand's 
statement, "We have to get the fictitious argum ent (that smaller farm ers ' 
mean less efficient production) out of the w a y . "454
But Vaughan's emphasis is on the vulnerability of the small scale 
producer, ie. "The entire existence of petty commodity producers depends on 
the interplay of wider economic and political forces." For instance, SASA 
has been encouraging black growers in the Entumeni Mill area since 1973. 
In 1988, when 1300 black growers delivered 100 000 tons of sugar cane to 
the Entumeni Mill Premier Holdings, (Entumeni mill owners and South
A frica 's largest agribusiness firm ) announced their pending sale and 
closure of the mill. Timber companies were buying out white farmers
undermining the m ill's economic base. Entumeni KwaZulu cane growers 
challenged the closure. Proposals for it's rem aining open hinged on 
obtaining a thirty year supply contract from thirty white farm ers in the 
area. No white farnier agreed to this in view of the huge prices for land on 
offer from tim ber companies. The demise o f the 1300 black growers
appeared inevitable. In 1989 the state approved the construction o f an 
ethanol project which it had previously rejected. The ethanol plant will
require expanded sugar supply. Entumeni black sugar growers have gained 
a reprieve but the experience has revealed the full extent of their economic 
vulnerability beyond the sphere o f production.
In term s o f the scale and technology debate the KwaZulu and
Bophutatswana examples illustrate the specificity of South Africa's racially 
based land division. White farmers pay better wage rates and their land
productivity is less likely to fall due to shortage of workers. They are better
able to deal with contractors to operate at the most opportune time. In short 
they operate on a different production function in spite of black growers 
having gained adcess to technology and skills through institu tional
453 Vaughan A , 1990.
454 S.S.Brand, Chief Executive of the Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
Supplement to the Weekly Mail, March 30 to April 4th 1990)
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support. In the present situation the non-marketability  of bantustan land 
has impeded whites buying out black producers .455 These realities have far 
reaching implications for a land reform design which aims to assist the 
entry of b lack en trep reneurs .  Land-ow nersh ip  through m arke t access
would seem com pletely  unv iab le  for rural househo lds  dependen t on 
migrant wages for their reproduction and who want more land to improve 
their household food security.
Small scale producers in South Africa who achieve high land 
productivity levels are the exception even when credit and technology and 
training are all present. Brand's statement, "we have to get away from the 
idea that small producers cannot farm effectively" is on the face of it a DBS A 
expression of confidence in black farmers as users of national resources; it 
helps also to challenge rascist attitudes towards blacks. But what is not 
expressed is the underlying philosophy of the DBSA approach which is 
based on the assumption that blacks have lower expectations than whites. 
The result is that many whites will exit the agricultural sector because they 
are unable to generate their expected level of remuneration and they could 
be replaced by blacks many of whom will prove themselves capable of 
achieving an effective output - but will at the same time have lower income 
expectations than whites.
The im plications of institutional barriers and differing production 
functions has far-reaching im plications with regard to earlier discussions 
on land valuation and land markets. Moll's average practice curve is the 
average of white commercial farmers. The Swedish example of a production
valuation of land is based on an evolving social norm which may be 
homogeneously applied because there is no institutional division of the 
population. South Africa's specificity is its institutionalised racism and the
apartheid legacy. Estimating the productive value of land depends on a
social norm of production resulting from farm ers' operational production 
function. But in South Africa there is no One average practice curve. The
455"If the agricultural production of the small peasant is not drawn into the 
sphere o f commodity production, if it is merely a part o f household 
economy, it also remains outside the centralising tendencies of the modern 
mode of production. However irrational his parcellised economy may be, no 
matter what waste of effort it may lead to, he clings to it tightly, just as his 
wife clings to her wretched household economy, which likewise produces 
infinitely m iserable results with an enormous expenditure of labour power 
but which represents the only sphere in which she is not subject to 
another's rule and is free from exploitation. Lenin Volume 4, pp 119-131, 
quoting Kautsky.
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implications of this legacy for a land reform programme will be explored in 
Chapter 7.
6.4. L and  R eform , P o litica l D em ands and  F o rm s of P roduction
Land reform protagonists, asserts Patnaik, should be guided by the 
strength of political demand. The argument that small can be more or just as 
productive applies to productivity achieved only through an extreme use of 
low-productivity labour in a situation of land and capital shortage. 456
There will be political resistance to any land reform which restricts
itself to the entry of black entrepreneurs into the previous white-only 
sector. Therefore a forward-looking land reform policy must contemplate a 
fundamental land redistribution which will probably require the allocation
of land units below the minimum 50 hectares recommended by Moll.
Sender has reasoned that land redistribution is objectively pointless 
because the dynam ic process o f con tinu ing  d iffe ren tia tio n  w ith in  
capitalism will ensure the reoccurrence of landlessness and that, in any 
case, wage workers have a higher income than extremely poor self-
exploiting peasants. But he accepts that the political demands for land 
reform counterbalance the longer term considerations.
The alternative, for petty commodity producers, is to organise 
collective production as a long term survival strategy. Bhalla and Chadha's 
study of the small scale peasant in Punjab using green revolution 
technology shows that productivity of farm ers with management skills 
depended on their access to institutional support, extension, credit and
equivalen t b io-technology i n p u t s . 457 A lthough sm all scale producers 
adopted new biotechnology rapidly, large scale farm ers were undoubtedly 
advantaged because their investible surplus meant, they could more quickly 
undertake the capital investment required for tubewells etc. The latter is 
presented as the major reason why it is in the interest of the poor peasant 
class to form cooperatives.
456 "Thtj existence of a small peasantry in every capitalist society is due not 
to the technical superiority of small production in agriculture, but to the 
fact that small peasants reduce their requirements below that of the wage 
workers and tax their energies far more than the latter do. . ."Lenin, 
"Development of Capitalism in Russia." Preface to first edition p.4. quoted by 
P a tn a ik .
45V Bhalla G S & Chadha, 1982
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The formation of co-operatives offers immense potential advantages
to a poor peasantry. Land can be pooled in order to gain the benefit of scale 
economies. There is a continued ownership of the means of production 
which may be more rapidly developed due to a higher investable surplus. 
Large scale projects may be undertaken, beyond any individual capacity, 
water projects, afforestation become more feasible and so on. A co-operative 
may undertake a vertical integration approach to production, permitting a 
potential enjoyment of profits not available to the individual small scale 
producer. At the least the collective allows the opportunity for self-
realization and continued autonomy denied to the wage worker.
But in practice, the record of achievements of collective production 
are generally less glossy. State coercion and centralised planning have 
caused alienation, a lack of sense of ownership of the collective project and 
have generally resulted in a low productivity of labour, land and c a p i t a l . 4 5 8  
At the same time, in comparable circumstances, collective production has 
clearly benefitted the majority of its producers. Bram all, for example, 
emphasises that comparisons should be made o f countries with sim ilar 
socio-economic profiles. Hence the transform ations which have occurred
in China should be compared with countries like Brazil and India. Nolan's 
study did focus only on China. He insists that despite the overall longer term 
production achievem ents, the precipitate collectivisation caused two major 
famines. He characterises China's achievem ents in the socialisation of 
agriculture as "the equalisation of poverty". Since Nolan does not compare 
China with India, he does not reflect on whether China's strategy o f low 
incomes but with household food security is superior to the widespread 
m alnutrition among India's rural poor. India's economic strategy has not 
produced better social or economic results. His conjecture that productivity 
could have been higher in China if a less . equal distribution of resources 
had been perm itted is not supported by comparison with countries with 
unequal distribution of resources.
There are successes among the early failures o f collectivism which 
reaffirm its potential. China's initial approach to collectivisation through a 
gradual transition  via m utual aid, cooperation and use o f m aterial 
incentives demonstrated a remarkable potential. In a later period China's 
collective farms "made possible the mobilisation o f the rural labour force 
on an unprecedented scale . . . (enabling) vast water conservancy projects
458 Nolan P (1988) on China, Dolny H (1986) on Mozambique, Kaimowitz D 
(1988) on Nicaragua, Danilov, V.P. (1988) on the Soviet Union.
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and infrastructure construction, . .crucial. . . in raising farm y i e l d s . " 4 5 9
M ozam bican women, through the form ation  o f p eri-u rban  producer 
cooperatives, successfully protected their inform al access to land when 
they were in danger dispossession. Simukai, is am ong a handful of 
Zim babw ean cooperatives which have overcom e severe handicaps and 
succeeded both business-wise and in providing a better social quality of life.
Among the lessons to be learnt o f the early  fa ilu res o f 
collectivisation are the need to identify common class interest. 460 the 
dangers of any top-down approach and the prerequisites of a collective
profit-m aking business: m anagerial com petence, technical skills and a
participatory democracy. In future attempts at collectivisation there is the 
need to re-exam ine the connection between individual land control and
productive co llaboration. C hina's early co llective attem pts successfully
combined individual land control with cooperation. Elsewhere an ultra­
leftism has imposed collectivisation of land control as a prior condition to
cooperative activity. Another option, examined more fully in Chapter 8, is 
that of Development and Land Trusts through which individuals may profit 
through participating in a scheme designed to benefit both the individual
and the larger community.461
Finally a discussion on scale economies, choice o f technology and 
organ isation  of production  in re la tion  to land reform  should be
underw ritten by considerations of economic developm ent strategy as a 
whole. As argued below technology and scale should not be discussed merely 
from the production point of v i e w . 462
Land reform policy involves choices. Large farms may remain intact
and the reform element will be reflected in new management practices, 
labour legislation and housing s e c u r i t y . 463 Farms may also be transformed
459 Bramall, C (1991)
460 ibid. ' Poor peasants quite rightly fear "cooperative capture" by rich 
peasants, who then proceed to manipulate cooperative policy to suit their 
own interest."
461 Warburton D & D Wilcox. (1988)
462 Wuyts, M (1981)
"the question of mechanisation o f  agriculture cannot he posed in the
abstract or at the general level, but needs to he analyzed in view of  the
specific conditions of the present-day rural economy" " the question of 
choice of technique in agriculture is not merely a technical issue, but 
principally a political choice which affects the whole social structure of the
rural economy."
463 Some farm-workers on Western cape wine farms have said that they are
not interested in a division o f  the land but they would like (i) the racial
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into state farm s or cooperatives w hich should imply a d iffe ren t
management practice but the technological organisation of production may 
not change very much. A  further option is to subdivide a farm into smaller
units and introduce a new technological package. But different sectors of
agricultural production face d iffering  scale, technology and efficiency 
criteria. A  "small is beautiful" approach can be a recipe for low productivity 
and low earnings; each sector needs to be studied separately and their
economies of scale investigated.
6 .5 .A g r ic u ltu re  an d  E conom ic S tra te g y
In relation to the role of agricu lture in the m acro-econom y,
considering key issues of em ploym ent and m arketed food supplies, I
contrast highly m echanised g rain  farm ing (w hether run by p riv a te
company, state or cooperative) with less m echanised grain farm ing. I
contend that a continuation of past policies which reduced the real costs of 
m e c h a n i s a t i o n 4 6 4  cannot alleviate the unemployment crisis. A  more labour
absorbing strategy must be pursued.
In an earlier phase of capitalism a major concern was to mechanise 
agriculture and increase production. Farms would thus provide a higher
marketed surplus per unit employee. This agricultural development would 
secure both a release of farm employees to industry and a food supply to the 
urban industrial centres. Population growth and a reduced labour demand
due to innovative labour saving industrial technology have changed the
terms of the debate.
In present circum stances agricultural developm ent should not be
judged mainly by calculating output per unit employee but rather by a 
strategy which creates most wage or self-employment opportunities. Wuyts 
refers to this as identifying the best labour absorbing strategy which he
distinguishes from a labour-intensive strategy. "This is a crucial distinction
. . .  as (one) refers to the technique which generates the greatest demand
basis of both the management structure and pay differentials to end (ii) an 
implementation o f  the Basic Conditions o f  Employment Act on farms and 
(iii) housing security. See Hamman J (1990) "Working for a house."
464 Farm owners pursued a mechanisation policy which in their terms was 
both cost effective, eased the seasonal labour recruitment problem as well 
and ijj also less dcitianding in m anagerial terms. Costs were reduced through 
special import conditions pertaining to agricultural machinery, fuel 
rebates, tax exemption on farming profits used for machinery purchase. See 
the "White Paper" on "The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax 
Structure of the Republic of South Africa." (I988)p 16. hereafter referred to 
as "The .Margo Report."
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for labour (to operate the given equipment) while the (other) enables the
greater employment o f labour within the economy" through its specific 
backward linkages, production of surplus and subsequent forward linkages.
For example, the use of hand hoes may be the most labour-intensive 
technique but the output productivity per head may be very low. The use of 
oxen and ploughs, how ever may perm it g rea ter d irec t em ploym ent 
possibilities in agriculture than say tractors (but less than hoes) but 
achieves a higher p roductiv ity  and fu rther em ploym ent possib ilities  
through the wider economy.
Wuyts goes on to distinguish between output per head and output for 
given investment, . . . a tractor is clearly more productive than an ox-
plough, but many ox-ploughs can be bought for the price of one tractor,
and their combined output may well be greater than that of one tractor; i.e. 
although the tractor yields a higher output per head, it does not necessarily 
yield a higher output for equal investment c o s t .  "465
Another critical observation is the distinction between total output 
and marketed surplus. For example the technique which yields the highest 
output for given investment is not necessarily that which provides the 
highest marketed surplus. This is because the labour absorbing technique 
may have a higher on-farm consumption as the producers themselves want 
to eat part o f their produce. As observed earlier the issue at stake is not just 
one o f producing a m arketable surplus to feed the towns but one of
producing enough food for both town and countryside. Increasing self- 
employment on the land or increased job opportunities can reduce the
demands made by the previous landless unemployed both on the state for 
social welfare handouts and on their own extended family networks.
The implications of the choice of technology debate is especially 
im portant to the m anufacturing industry. South A frica's domestic tractor 
production has, for exam ple, concentrated  on an im port substitu tion
strategy to provide m achines for large scale grain farm ing. If an
em ployment expansion strategy is pursued requiring the adoption o f a 
modified mechanisation strategy (possibly on sm aller scale units) it follows 
that research , developm ent and a state fostering  of m anufacturing 
industries to support this aspect of agricultural reform is essential.
465\vuyts. M. (1981) p 10.
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A further extension of the logic of a labour absorbing strategy is that 
land redistribution should take place with preference to summer rainfall 
areas which have a high person/land (carrying) capacity. Furtherm ore 
any entrant-sm all holders will be best placed to gain the maximum 
advantage from intensive use of land and capital.
While any land reform will be bound by its inherited structure and 
organisation of production, there are a myriad choices to be made which 
will influence the country's future political, economic and social character. 
D evelopm ent s tra tegy  req u ire s  n a tio n a l d ec isio n s  on investm en t, 
technology, em ploym ent, form s o f ow nersh ip , on-farm  consum ption 
weighed against marketed supplies to urban centres. Moreover South Africa 
faces the predicament of an enormous percentage of formally unemployed 
people and a high level of malnutritution. Land redistribution challenges 
the skewed resource and income distribution and offers the potential for 
increased employment and improved n u t r i t i o n .4 6 6  However the present 
farming system is itself unsustainable both ecologically and economically. 
A new human, mechanical and biological mix is required in a search for an 
economically viable and sustainable agricultural system. The new mix will 
not come about spontaneously but must be fostered by state intervention. It 
is my submission that the policy design must be primarily informed by a 
labour absorbing strategy in agriculture.
466Both Moll’s data and DBSA data (Christodoulou &Vink, 1990) show more 
intensive use of labour on smaller sized farms.
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C hapter 7. Productivity, P rofitability  and Land Prices.
Access to land, the cost of access and the form of tenure are key
issues in the land redistribution debate. There is no clean start and a policy 
which dismisses the past is unacceptable. While there may be a willingness 
to forgive the past; reparations are expected. The starting point is the
legacy of the present rural economy which includes racially separate, 
diverse and co-existing forms of tenure, class differences among black 
rural residen ts as w ell as considerab le  s tra tifica tio n  am ong w hite
commercial producers. Furtherm ore, the land ownership profile within the
commercial freehold sector and its m arket conditions have been heavily
influenced by past and ongoing state intervention. As a result, the mean 
average of productivity and profitability is not the sole determinant o f land
prices. These will also be influenced by the reality that South African 
commercial agriculture is dominated by a few thousand units commanding 
control over eighty percent o f land and resources. This facto r of 
concentration plays a role in determining land prices by those who have 
the m arket power. These are  the inherited conditions w ithin which 
agrarian reform and land redistribution must take place.
The prevailing view of all the major political parties is that land 
should not be nationalised and that a land m arket should continue to 
operate. In Section (i) below I review the trends in South African land
prices in the commercial freehold sector (a) nominally (b) between sectors
and (c) in real terms. I note the influence of government policy on the 
centralisation process which itself influences the land market. In section 
(ii) I discuss the ongoing debate over land prices especially on the ever 
widening gap between the estimated productivity valuation and the market
price and (iii) the implications of subsidised access to land within a free
market context. In the last section I explore the implications o f a land 
redistribution strategy which mainly depends on subsidised access within a 
market context. I argue that such a strategy is largely inappropriate 
considering the apartheid  heritage of racially  d ifferen tiated  access to 
capital and skills and explore some of the drawbacks. I conclude by 
considering the conditions facing new entrants into the com m ercial 
farming sector in terms of capital needs, the im portance o f differing 
production functions of different strata of producers and how changing
conditions of profitability will affect farmers' ability to pay off their bond.
The recognition of different production functions operating among
differen t categories of producers must have im plications for a land
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distribution which is based in the context of a continued land market. 
D ifferent production functions resu lt in d ifferen t productiv ity  values.
There will be variable levels of net income from what may objectively be
the same land type. Different levels of net income affect farmers' liquidity 
and capacity to repay a land mortgage and must be considered in designing 
a land reform strategy.
7.1. C hanges in L an d  P rices  1968-1990: n o m in a l, re a l an d  by 
s e c t o r .
In 1986 the government published a report on the restructuring of 
white agriculture reviewing the changes since its last major enquiry in the 
early seventies. In relation to the agricultural land market thé government 
expressed two m ajor concerns. F irstly  land p rices w ere increasing
phenomenally and they feared a collapse in the land market, "The increase 
in land value as the result of inflation and negative or very low interest 
rates is a deferred income that is only realised on the sale of the land . . 
sudden and considerable increases in real interest rates could cause the 
land market to collapse as happened in the USA during 1982 to 1984; land 
prices dropped by 50 percent which led to large scale bankruptcy among 
f a r m e r s .  "467 The second major concern was the ever-widening discrepancy 
between an assessment of the productive value of land and its market value.
Part (i) o f this section looks at the trends in land prices as
concentration has taken place and as the general profitability conditions in
the farming sector have deteriorated towards the end o f the 1980s. I 
distinguish between the inflationary nominal land values and deflated real
values and also identify some differing trends between farming sectors. I 
rev iew  the governm ent in te rv en tio n  to p rev en t b an k ru p tc ies , to 
reschedule debt and, in some cases, to write o ff debt and ultim ately
supporting land values.
7.1.(i) Changes in nominal land prices
The "serious inflation of agricultural land prices" is represented by 
the data in Table 7.1. and the values of nominal prices are mapped out in 
Figure 7.1. The table and map indicate changes in average nominal land 
prices over a twenty three year period 1968 to 1991, There is a different rate 
of change in different sub-periods. From 1968 to 1980 there is a gradual 
annual nominal increase. As from 1980 to 1988 the rate of increase is much
467 Economic Advisory Council to the State President. 1986.
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higher and is sustained throughout the period. Prices almost tripled from 
the start to the end of both periods but between 1968 to 1980 the average 
increase per annum was 8 percent whereas between 1980 to 1989 the 
average increase was 39 percent per year.
Table 7.1. Nominal Land Prices 1968-1991.
Y ear RSA.R/Ha Rate of Increase I n f la t io n
N om ina l %. Rate %
1968 50.0
1969 54.5 9.0 2.9
1970 68.7 26.0 5.1
1971 82.0 19.4 6.4
1972 86.1 5.0 6.5
1973 89.5 3.9 9.4
1974 96.7 8.0 11.6
1975 103.6 7.1 13.5.
1976 136.0 31.3 11.2
1977 122.5 -9.9 11.0
1978 137.5 12.2 11.0
1979 134.4 -2.2 13.2
1980 145.7 8.4 13.8
1981 199.7 37.1 15.2
1982 237.1 18.7 14.7
1983 258.6 9.1 12.4
1984 336.7 30.2 11.5
1985 361.6 7.2 16.3
1986 364.4 0.9 18.6
1987 375.0 2.9 16.1
1988 427.8 14.1 12.9
1989 496.5 16.1 14.7
1990 614.4 23.7 14.4
1991 798.1 29.9 16.3
Source: Land Price data is from "Transfers of Rural Immovable Property" -annual
reports. Figures refer to the year ending as 31 March. The Inflation rate is computed
from the Consumer Price Index. Table 90, Abstract of Agricultural Statistics 1987, and
1992.
The governm ent's  p relim inary  exp lanation  for the post-1980  
increase in nominal land prices is that it was due to i n f l a t i o n .468 However, 
unless explained by a time lag , the inflationary explanation is not entirely 
satisfactory. The major rates of increases in inflation took place much 
earlier. The 1968 inflation rate was as low as 1.7 percent. By 1980 it had 
increased eight-fold to 13.8 percent. The rate of increase of the inflation 
rate actually tailed off in the early 1980s.
The Econom ic Advisory Council (1986) identified  governm ent 
spending on land in the early 1980s as one of the main causes of inflation in
4 6 8 ibid
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land prices as it .exerted an extra pressure on dem and for land. The 
governm ent bought considerable quantities o f land in areas next to 
bantustans as part o f their plans to consolidate the bantustan areas in 
fulfillment of the black land quota decreed in the 1936 Land Act. After 1980 
ex-Rhodesian settlers from Zimbabwe also bought farm land; adding to 
inflationary land prices.
Figure 7.1. RSA. Nominal Land Prices: Rand per Hectare-average
L 400
1960 1970 Year ’980 1990
Source: RSA. Central Statistical Service, "Transfers of Rural Immovable Property'
Various Years
The increase in interest rates of the Land Bank raised the cost of 
borrowing for land purchase to the extent that in 1982 the real interest rate 
became positive for the first time in this period. The Land Bank nominal
lending rate changed only two percentage points in the first ten years. But 
between 1980 and 1982 the increase almost doubled from 7.75 percent to 
15.09 percent. An increase in the interest rate effectively increases the cost 
of borrowing and the conditions of profitability . If  farm ing is less
profitable a drop in land prices is a reasonable expectation. M oreover 
increased interest rates result in an increased debt burden and existing
loans may no longer be s e r v i c e a b l e  from farming income; w idespread 
bankruptcies, loss of confidence could cause an exodus and deflate the land 
market. The nominal figures themselves indicate a lean period in land
price increases in the mid-eighties (compared to the rate of inflation and
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deflated by the consumer price index) and a drop in real land prices.
However, it is also true that profitability is variable in the different
farming sectors and that changes in land prices in agricultural regions
reflect this. These aspects are examined in further detail as well as 
government measures on debt relief and debt w rite-off which bolsters the 
land price.
7.1.(ii)$ectoral land price changes.
Farm ing s tra tif ic a tio n  is an on-going  phenom enon. But the 
distinctive feature of stratification (especially since the 1980s) has been 
the contrast between different farming sectors. Table 7.2. presents indices 
of comparative changes in land prices of differing agronomic regions. The 
prices of land in summer rain areas increased 250% since 1980 in
comparison to the five-fold increase of land in the winter rainfall areas. 
Summer rain areas produce dryland grain crops and these farmers have 
faced the worst conditions.
Table 7.2. Indices of Land Prices According to Agronomic Region.
Y ea r S u m m er W in te r C attle N atal S h eep Comb
r a i n r a i n g ra z in g G raz in g In d e x
re g io n r e g io n re g io n s R eg io n s
1967/68 32 48 25 n .a . 35 33
1968/69 35 52 25 n .a . 32 33
1969/70 34 59 30 n .a . 36 36
1970/71 35 42 28 40 31 33
1971/72 39 55 29 46 34 37
1972/73 40 54 37 43 34 39
1973/74 43 58 44 55 34 44
1974/75 50 68 51 67 40 51
1975/76 63 86 72 72 46 65
1976/77 62 88 81 70 46 67
1977/78 76 104 85 90 49 77
1978/79 74 101 71 67 63 73
1979/80 81 99 75 74. 71 78
1980/81 100 100 100 100 100 100
1981/82 133 137 108 121 109 125
1982/83 153 171 136 116 89 143
1983/84 168 223 156 166 116 160
1984/85 181 272 147 155 142 177
1985/86 184 326 171 167 154 191
1986/87 185 309 208 172 173 201
1987/88 199 389 184 193 189 213
1988/89 209 383 227 196 209 230
1989/90 222 454 263 237 241 257
1990/91 249 545 322 299 283 301
S o u r c e : A b s t r a c t  o f A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  1 992 , T a b l e  96 . p I 0 2 .
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There have been regional changes in the both the level of farmer
indebtedness and the relative amount of gross income which farmers use to 
service their loan. The level of farming debt increased as m odernisation 
proceeded and the rate of interest has altered significantly for farm ers 
especially as most of their short term credit is now on terms approximating 
to market rates. Table 7.3 gives a regional breakdown of farming units, 
their gross income per hectare, expenditure per hectare and the state of
debt in each region. These adm inistrative regions d iffer from  the 
agronomic production regions indicated above, but approximations can bé 
made which make comparisons helpful. For example, summer rain areas 
include the Orange Free State and Western Transvaal, Sheep grazing areas 
are principally the Eastern Cape and N orthern Cape but also include 
districts from the Western Cape (Sutherland, Calvinia).
Ta.bJ^_7,, 3. Farm Data according to Administrative Region.
Region Farming Total Ha. ; Average! Gross ! Gross : Total Ex ; Farming ! Debt as %
Units 000 Ha lUnit Sizei Income ; Income ipenditire ;Oebt (Rm)i of Gross
i R/Ha ' Rm 1/Ha ; Income
A 10 480 21 105 : 2 014! 155i 3 275i 1501 2 2731 69.4
6 7 230 ■21 940 i  3 0351 381 8431 341 1 0101 1 19,8
C 10 890 11 351 ! 1 0421 212! 2 4031 2101 2 367} 9 8 ,5
D 6 680 10 371 1 5531 1091 1 127! 102! 9781 8 6 ,8
E 6 240 3 958 634i 537' 2 1271 552! 1 3071 6 1 ,4
F 6 080 4 530 745: 4681 2 1 18! 455! 1 628! 76 ,9
G 5 080 5 086 1 001: 184: 936! 193! 8051 86 ,0
H 3 230 1 101 341' 832; 916! 8771 7221 78 ,8
1 6 140 ■ 3 446 561! 321: 1 1041 2861 1 086! 9 8 ,4
TOTAL 62 050 82 884 ■ 1 336! 179: 14 8491 1761 12 1761 82 ,0
Source: The Central Statistical Service’s (CSS) Agricultural Survey. Most data (eg. 
Abstract of Agricultural Statistics are drawn up by the Ministry of Agriculture's
Division of Agricultural Economic Trends.(DAET) The CSS collect a ten per cent
sample. There are some substantial differences which cannot be simply explained as
sampling and scaling-up errors. As pointed out in Effective Farming' January 1991,
"There is a discrepancy of almost R5 billion between the two farming debt figures. The 
DAET came to a figure of RlTbn by asking the banks and institutions what they were 
owed by farmers. The CSS arrived at Rl2bn by asking farmers what they owned."
The Orange Free State (QFS) and Western Transvaal show the second 
and third highest levels of debt as a percentage of gross income. These are 
the rain-fed grain areas whose land prices reflect least increase. The 
Northern Cape farmers are extensive livestock producers whose grazing 
conditions have deteriorated and who have faced a drop in the level of 
international wool prices. Western Cape (winter rain) and Natal are by far
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the least burdened by debt but land prices have increased at a different
pace. The winter rain areas produce wines and deciduous fruit for export.
They have benefitted  m ost from  the fa lling  value o f the rand
internationally. Natal land prices need a much more localised treatment as 
in the areas w here com panies have been buying land for tim ber
plantations, land prices have increased five hundred to a thousand percent.
The im portance o f varia tion  betw een farm ing sectors requires
emphasis if policy formulation is to draw up a balance correctly between
national considera tion  and farm ing  secto r dem ands. H attingh  and
Hertzberg indicate the extent to which nationally aggregated data obscures
differing trends between farming sectors. They compare national data on
farming returns per hundred rand on investment with those obtained from 
a regional study of the North W estern Transvaal bushveld. They also
compare increases in net farming income with increases in land prices.
According to their figures, between 1959 and 1979 land prices increased at 
an annual rate of 7.15 percent whereas farmers' net income increased at an
annual rate of 11.42 percent. However, they draw attention to a rate of 
change within the longer term trend toward a new a d ifferent trend
emerging. The data from 1973-1979, considered separately, show net income
increasing by only 7.94 per year compared to an average land price income 
of 11.34. Further data^^Q on the North Western Transvaal Bushveld show
extremely low returns per RlOO of capital investment, indicating regional
differentiation. Hattingh and Herztberg conclude that if the rate of interest 
continues to increase resulting in a rate of increase in debt repaym ent
which outstrips their rate of increase in net income it ,w ill be difficult for 
owner-occupiers to pay off their mortgage bonds.
7.1.(iii) Change in average real land prices
Earlier work on land price analysis concluded that increases in 
agricultural land value reflected adequate returns for investment in land as 
a capital asset. This conclusion rested on a fairly small sample and a short 
data period (1977-79) when ag ricu ltu ra l p ro fitab ility  was generally  
b u o y a n t . 4 7 0  (see Chapter 4) In this section I take a longer view of increases
in nominal land prices, deflate them to determine increases in real terms 
and examine differences in the rate of c h a n g e . 4 7 1
46^ Hattingh. H. S. & Hertzberg, A. 1980 , Table 5
470 Nieuwoudt, W.L. (1980)
471 The general Consumer Price Index (CP!) was used as the deflator to calculate real
land prices. While the GNP may be considered as a better indicator to use , the South
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In the neoclassical sense, land, considered as a capital asset and an 
investm ent option, is expected to increase in real value as capital
appreciation takes place. Agricultural e c o n o m i s t s , 4 7 2  expect farm land value 
(and its resale price) within a capitalist context to be substantially 
influenced by its earning capacity. Profits per hectare per year are
considered together with the competitive long term annual rate of return
on i n v e s t m e n t . 4 7 3  For example, if there are no barriers to buying and
selling land, a hectare of land from which the owner expects to earn R90
pure profit per year (when the average profit on other capital investments
is 10 percent) will be valued at (R90 X 10) = R900 per hectare. While land
prices may alter in response to profitability  conditions there is an
expectation that land prices will rise as more land improvements take place.
But a distinction has to be made between the effects of productivity 
gains on short term profitability and land prices and longer term trends in
profitab ility . Econom ic theory of land prices (both neoclassical and
Marxian) suggests that within a capitalist organisation o f production the 
average rate of profitability will affect land prices and should there be 
productivity improvement due to technical innovation these improvements 
will be capitalised into the land price. This appears to have been true for
the South African maize producing sector for the period examined 1968 to 
1990.
Chapter 4 exam ined the m odernisation process and Appendix B 
presents a case study of the transform ation of maize farm ing in the
Transvaal. Table 7.4 deflates nominal prices and presents the real changes 
in land prices in the Transvaal since the modernisation process b e g a n . 4 7 4
Real land prices rose sharply in the early 1970s from R78.3/ha. to an all
time high in 1975 of R205/ha. This period of increase coincided with the
period of most favourable terms of trade, two exceptionally good harvest
years and machine purchases which offered potential economies of scale.
African agricultural economic literature anti presentation of statistics consistently 
use the CPI as deflator and I' have kept to this in order to compare like with like.
472 for example Hasbargen's review. (1980) 'Land prices: why so high'?'
473 Nieuwoudt.W.L. and De Jong, 1985
474 Nominal land price data is deflated by the Consumer Price Index
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Table 7.4. RSA and Transvaal Land Prices in nominal and real terms.
Year RSA R / H a < CPI RSA R/Ha !Tvl R/HaiTvl R/H«
nominal Real nominal Real
19681 50.01 58.91 84.91 46.11 7 8 . 3
19691 54.51 60.61 89.91 64 .7 ! 1 0 6 . 8
1970! 68 .7 ! 63.81 107.71 76.51 1 19 .9
19711 82.01 67.71 121.11 8 8 .  11 130 .1
19721 8 6 .  11 72.11 1 19.41 103.81 1 4 4 . 0
19731 8 9 . 5i 78.91 1 13.41 123.51 1 5 6 . 5
19741 9 6 . 7 8 8 .  ll 109.81 147.91 1 6 7 .9
1975Î 103 .6 , 100.01 1 0 3 . 6i 205.01 2 0 5 . 0
19761 136.01 111. 1i 122.41 210.11 189.1
1977! 122.51 1 2 3 .7 99.01 1 9 3 .7 1 5 6 .6
19761 1 3 7 . 5i 137 .2 ! 100 .2! 2 0 6 . 8 1 5 0 . 7
19791 134.41 155.31 86.51 1 8 6 .0 1 19 .8
19801 1 4 5 .7 176 .7 ! 82.51 2 1 4 . 8 1 2 1 . 6
19811 199-7' 203.51 9 8 .  li 2 0 4 . 9 1 4 0 . 0
1982! 237.11 233.51 101.51 3 2 8 . 7 1 4 0 . 8
19831 258.61 2 6 2 .2 ! 98.61 3 8 4 . 4 1 4 6 . 6
19841 3 3 6 . 7 292.81 1 15.01 5 1 2 . 2 1 7 4 .9
19851 3 6 1 . 6 , 340 .31 106.3: 6 0 0 . 0 1 7 6 . 5
19861 3 6 4 .4 ! 403.71 9 0  31 6 0 8 . 6 1 5 0 . 8
1 9 8 7 3 7 5 . 0 4 6 8 . 7 80.01 6 2 2 .1 1 3 2 . 7
19881 427.81 528.81 8 0 .7 ' 7 0 0 . 5 1 3 2 . 5
19891 4 9 6  5 6 4 4 . 4 , 77.01 7 9 2 . 5 1 2 2 .9
19901 6 1 4 .4 ! 7 3 7 .5 ! 83.31 9 8 5 . 7 1 3 3 .6
1991 7 9 8 .1 8 5 7 . 0 9 3 .  1! 1 2 7 3 . 5 1 4 8 . 6
Source: Central Statistical Service, (CSS) 'Transfers of Rural Immovable Property', 
various years. Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics 
1990, Table 90.
The decline in real prices is at a much slower pace and coincided with 
the terms of trade becoming less favourable to farmers. But contrary to the 
indications of nationally aggregated data, real land prices in this farming 
area never fall to or below their earlier price. Rather the decline was 
halted  in 1979 and the land p rices in real term s level off in 1980/81. In die 
1980s the average real price was R 146/ha an 86 per cent increase over the 
price in the late 1960s. In this case the long term higher average land price 
would appear to reflect the real increases achieved in land productivity as a 
result of the modernisation process. However, it is possible that this longer 
term achievem ent of an increase in real land price will eventually be 
whittled away by deteriorating profitability conditions. The type of high 
technology farming approach which was capitalised into the land price is 
itself less and less economically viable; the area of grain farming is being 
reduced and land is being used differentlv.
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But generally speaking, the remarkable feature of actual trends in
real land prices compared to nominal land prices in South Africa is their 
long-term constancy. The aggregate real change of purchase price per
hectare is calculated and recorded in Column 3 Table 7.4. The changes in
nominal and real values are graphically contrasted in Figure 7.2. The start 
and end points over the 22 year period are alm ost equal. There are 
apparently moderate increases in real land prices in earlier years but in
recent years real prices have fallen below the 1968 values.
Figure 7.2. RSA Land: Nominal and Real Prices. 
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Figure 7.3 separates out the data on real land prices allowing a closer 
exam ination of variations which took place. The time series data are
smoothed. Each data value was replaced by the median of three values; the
value itself and the two values adjacent in time. The smoothed curve
represents twice repeated median s m o o t h i n g . B e t w e e n  1968 and 1971 
there was a steep rise in real land prices. Between 1971 and 1977 real land 
prices declined linearly with 1976 as a clear outlier. The decline continues
until 1980. From 1981 to 1986 real land prices began to increase in real value 
and a rising trend appeared to have been reestablished but it ended with
real land prices in 1987 and 1988 falling below their initial value of more 
than twenty years previously.
The contextual situation in the agricultural economy was far from 
constant during this period. It is probable that different reasons are
responsible for the various changes. For example the reasons for land price 
increases in the early 1980s may be quite different tfom those taking place
in the early 1970s. The following conjectures, based on a consideration of 
changes in the agricultural economy described earlier, would appear to 
explain some of the changes.
The late sixties and early seventies, signalled the advent of rapid
m echanisation in agricu ltu re . Farm ers could take best advantage of
potential economies of scale through enlarging their farms. The tendency
for farmers to buy additional land for farm enlargement received political 
and financial support trom the state. In the case of maize farming the data
on costs, technology and size suggested (See Chapter 4) that small farms 
using hand technology with low yield per hectare (a low cost input/low
output production system) was competitive at that level. It was thus possible 
for small farmers to continue especially given the price support system
which was criticised during this period for the very reason that small scale, 
less productive farmers could afford to stay in agriculture. The increase in
the real land prices, however, could offer a better option: opt out o f
tarming, sell the land and collect the capital. Hence an increase in real land 
prices where there are possible economies of scale can be a vehicle to
propel cen tralisation .
In Figure 7.3. the first period of land price increases up to 1971
declines at a much slower rate. The much higher 1976 land price appears as
an anomaly. A possible explanation is the availability of funds after two
.Vlarsh, C. (1988) pp. 164 -166
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bumper harvests in 1974 and 1975. The lowest points of the late seventies 
land prices follow on sharp reduction in terms of trade (Table 4.5)^^^ which
will have s ign ifican tly  in fluenced  farm ers expec ta tions o f  fu tu re
profitability conditions in farm ing, if farmers have adaptive expectations 
with a high coefficient of adjustment.
Real land price increases in the 1980s may have been the result of
several pressures including government purchase, ex-Rhodesian purchases 
and cash liquidity after a best ever maize harvest in 1981/82. The demand 
for additional land from expanding farmers may have added to the upward 
pressure oh land prices. After 1980 the Land Bank nominal interest rate 
rose as steeply as that of commercial banks. Government also lowered the
subsidies on fertilisers and pesticides. Devaluation of the rand effectively
increased the purchase price of imported machinery and equipment. The 
terms of trade declined sharply after 1975 (= 100), The average index of
terms of trade for the first five years of the 1980s was only 86 and only an 
average of 76 from 1984-1987. These changes created a cost squeeze situation 
for farmers. Their options were to sell up and leave the farming industry or
to try to reduce per unit production costs on their farms or to try to spread 
their fixed costs on an expanded base of production. For those staying in 
types of farming where economies of scale existed one way o f spreading
costs and maintain farming income was to buy additional land.
There is an apparent disjuncture between the reality o f substantial 
short terms changes in land prices and the theory that land prices are the
capitalised value of (long term) expected future rents. The South African
land m arket appears quite reactive; two bum per harvests appear to
contribute to a 20 percent real increase in price from one year to another, a
sharp decline in terms of trade is followed by a 20 per cent drop in real land 
prices, a further farm enlargem ent thrust accom panied by governm ent
purchases and arrival of Rhodesian settlers contributes to a 32 per cent 
increase in real land prices between 1980 and 1984. Gently rising and
falling land price curves reflecting longer term expectations are a far cry
from the volatile jaggedness indicated by this analysis. Perhaps South
A frica 's  volatile  p o litica l situation  has con tribu ted  to short term
perspectives dominating over long term forecasts. One farmer who has
greatly expanded his farm in Natal over the last thirty five years said he
■*76 Chapter 4,Table 4.5, Terms of Trade. 1975 = 100 index, 1976 = 94.9, 1977 = 90.1, 
1978 = 88.5,
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first bought in 1961 after Sharpeville, then again in 1977 after the Soweto 
uprising and again in 1985 during the state of emergency.^77
Long term expectations in South African white agriculture up to the 
mid 1980s must have been that if the restructuring process were to continue 
unabated the number of farm units would decline. One could have expected
a continued exodus from  farm ing. Forty thousand farm ing  units
am algam ated with other farms in the thirty years since 1960. O f the 
remaining 60 000 it is estimated that approximately 18 000 units are highly 
productive. One could have expected the less productive 42 000 units to have- 
been am algam ated in the next thirty years. However deterio ra ting  
economic conditions have resulted in owners with more than one unit 
selling land in order to alleviate debt. In addition conservative farm er 
resistance to the political changes have led the government to renege on its
Stated free-m arket policy.
The government's stated policy is that market forces will ensure a 
com petitive and efficient agricultural sector even if this were to mean 
fewer farmers and lower land prices.^78 While there has been some debt 
re lie f from governm ent, sequestrations were anticipated. The follow ing
benefits were expected as a result of market forces being allowed to take 
free rein: the debt burden would be legally w ritten off, unproductive
farm ers would quit the industry, newcomers to agriculture would obtain
land at lower prices, financing institutions would be able to apply stricter
discipline regarding finance to agriculture, agricultural resources would 
be managed more appropriately, agriculture would increasingly operate
according to free-market principles and individual merit would be the . basis
of assistance.^79
However, since 1990 the governm ent has been increasingly  
reluctant to take a hard line with indebted farmers and the drought has now 
given an excuse not to do so. In May 1992 it approved a drought relief
package (partially described in Chapter 4) of which the minor component 
appears to he direct drought relief and the major component includes not
only subsidies on interest paym ents but also capital write off. This
**77 Hanekun D, Land Affairs Desk, ANC's Department of Economic Policy, personal 
communication.
478 See the reference in Chapter 4 to R900 million as state guarantees and R400 
million to prevent sequestration
479 RSA. (1992) Department of Agricultural Development. p5.
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component of "relief will cost R3,25 billion.'^^O over the next four years. 
An NGO has pointed out that the government's action is a racial commitment 
to securing  the property  o f w hite farm ers thus pu rchasing  the 
conservative vote."^®^ The state is in this manner sabotaging the very
restructuring process to which it committed itself more than a decade ago. 
Moreover the government's intervention supports land prices and commits 
a future democratic government to double state expenditure to pay off R3.25 
billion over the period 1992-1996. As land prices are being bolstered 
through this action it can be assumed that land prices for redistribution
will be higher than should have been expected. Defending its decision (and 
taking cognisance o f the contradiction with the stated com m itm ent to 
letting market forces provide a com petitative and effective agricultural
sector) the Ministry of Agriculture said that without the "drought "(i.e. 
debt) relief package, "(1) thousands of farmers will be sequestrated, (2) A 
sharp decrease in land prices could follow the mass auctioning of farms In 
single districts within a short period of time, in turn eroding the collateral 
security of remaining farmers and therefore their ability to obtain credit 
for production purposes, (4) farm ers who cannot continue their farm ing 
activ ities w ill lay o ff w orkers and will add to the already severe 
unemployment problem. . .(6) the rural economy will be disrupted by the 
sequestration o f business en terprises dependent on agriculture. A
critical view o f government includes the accusation that "the state is 
attempting to entrench the status quo of the ownership of land for years to
come, and to preclude (or make very expensive) restructuring through the
market by future governments . . . leaving structural problems intact. . . 
.(moreover) there is no evidence that the state has considered the exciting
possibility of using the crisis to regenerate the rural economy through a 
red istribu tion  process.
7 .2 .T he D ebate over P ro d u c tiv ity -V a lu a tio n  an d  M ark e t P rice
In the past a major government concern has been over the ever-
widening discrepancy between an assessm ent of the productive value of
ibid., p7. debt relief payments will be scheduled as follows: 1992/93 Interest on 
outstanding balance R426 million. In 1993/94 Interest: R284 million and Capital 
payment R800 million. In 1994/95 Interest R142 million and R800 million Capital 
payment, In 1995/96 a Capital Payment of R800 million.
Farmworkers' Resource and Research Project (FRPP) 1992, p4.
RSA (1992). Department of Agricultural Development, p5.
483 FRPP (1992) p5.
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land and its market value (see Figure 7.6.). A governm ent com mission 
defined "production value" as:
"the income yielding capacity of the specific agricultural land, 
against the ruling price levels of agricultural products under conditions of 
land-use which will assure the conservation o f production resources and 
which will be best adapted to the environment."
Figure 7.4. "Changes in the Market and Productive Values of Ldnd.
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■Report of an Investigation Into the Restructuring of Agiculture. Appendix C, Graph 2
South A fricas  S tandard Bank agrees with this defin ition  and
alternatively describes it as "the income capitalisation approach (which)
provides the best economic base for determining the present value of land.
By determ ining present worth o f net income produced under typical
farming and management conditions on a property . . . the valuer's task is to 
convert the earning ability or income of a farm into a value estimate.
If the net income per hectare is below the amortisation rate for that 
hectare then farmers become susceptible to bankruptcy. A great deal will 
depend on the individual circumstance of the farmer. If the land is owned 
and there is no debt to pay off, a low net income affects lifestyle. But if the 
land is bonded the net income and cash flow are more important than any 
long term income that the farmer might gain from selling the land and 
benefitting from non-taxable capital gains. But land price increases are
RSA Government (1970), p83.
Standard Bank, 1990.p2.
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irrelevant to the farmer who has no intention of selling the land whereas 
changes in the economic conditions which alter the debt burden, and/or
profitability are of paramount importance. The debt burden may increase
or decrease as interest rates change; price rises in inputs may in turn 
increase the quantity of short term lending of seasonal inputs. With the 
adoption of hi-tech, high cost farming the debt burden per hectare has 
increased because of reliance on short term loans with higher interest
rates to secure the necessary inputs.
Economists'®^ have identified several reasons why there is an 
increasing gap between the productivity value assessm ent of farm land on 
transfer and the market price of the actual transaction.
(a) Horizontal expansion of existing units is no longer possible once 
the limitations to the land frontier have been fully reached. The expansion 
of production must be achieved through more intensive production. This 
could lead to more competition for better quality lands on which the returns 
to capital inputs are higher.
(b) Several farmers may bid for a piece o f land coming onto the 
market which is adjacent or in near proximity to their existing farms. Each
farmer may see the purchase of the additional land as essential to their 
drive to lower unit costs of production by spreading fixed costs. The
competition between farmers may result in a purchase price which is above
the productivity value estimate. The farmer who expects to spread fixed
costs can afford  to pay a m arket price which is higher than the
productivity value estimate.
(c) Farmers who are consistently able to make above average profits
will he able to aft'ord to pay more for land than average farmers.
(d) Land prices may also increase because of demand for land 
purchase from persons, companies, institutions possessing surplus funds, 
interested in diversifying their investments and prepared to wait for 
delayed investment returns years later when the land is resold. South 
Africa tax laws provide an incentive to such investors as expenditures on 
land improvements are deducted from taxable income.
(e) Land prices may increase as with bids by large scale capital for
land for business purposes in which the actual rate of return on the land
Krause and Kyle, 1970 Heady et al., 1965 Ward. 1959.
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purchase is a secondary consideration. For a vertically integrated business 
it is possible that a 'loss' on farming operations can be used as a tax
advantage when com bined with the profits of another sector of the
business. For instance a poultry business which owns maize farming land 
will firstly find it advantageous to be able to supply maize to itself at cost 
price rather than buying it at the commercial market price. In addition the
lower profitability or even loss can be used advantageously in a combined 
accounting procedure to lower the general level of taxable income.
(f) Land buyers may also be prepared to pay more than the assessed
productivity value o f land because of subjective considerations such as
amenity value and the ethos of family property.
S tru c tu ra l p o lic ies  p rom oting  farm  en largem en t are  w idely 
supported and are not just a South African phenomenon. The 'Roots of the
farm problem'^®^ defines the issue as the need to increase farming incomes 
on a par with rising urban incomes in a situation of production growth. The 
situation of farmers is regarded as precarious because, in accordance with 
Engels' law, the demand for agricultural produce is income inelastic' so
consumers tend to spend relatively less of their income on food as their real 
incomes increase. A further problem is one of generally declining terms of 
trade for agricu ltu re ; industrial p rices increase more rap id ly  than
agricu ltura l output prices. Farm ers' real incom e therefore deteriorates 
unless they are able to maintain it either through expanding their farm 
operation or through intensifying their production activities. \
Many governm ents therefo re  actively  support ag rarian  reform  
whose aim is farm enlargement. The objective is for fewer farmers on 
larger farms achieving a socially acceptable farm income levels in a
situa tion  o f increased  earnings in o ther econom ic sectors. Farm  
enlargem ent is often perceived as allow ing farm ers to benefit from  
economies o f scale but farming (as reviewed in the first part of this 
chapter) actually has few scale economies to offer; the real benefit of farm 
enlargement to the entrepreneur is the physical expansion of his or her 
income base. A ttem pts by farm ers to increase net income through
increasing productivity may be problematic. Chapter 4 indicated that the
increased capital intensity of production through mechanisation and high-
tech biotechnology leads to an increase in gearing and in econom ic 
vulnerability because of the increased volatility in harvest outcomes.
Heady et ai, 1965, pp 1-15.
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7.3. South Africa's neoclassical debate over land prices.
South Ati’ican neoclassical economists do not have common views on
land prices. The debate as to whether the price o f land is 'high' is 
controversial. Van Wyk is critical of market prices which are above the 
income capitalisation/production valuation. He finds they will act against 
owner-occupiers who want to make a living and pay off their mortgage 
from agricultural production. Nieuwoudt's concern is to measure whether 
land rentals reflect a m arket-related  rate o f return  on land as an
investment; he concludes that the rental rate of return is adequate and 
therefore has no problem with the prevailing market value o f land prices. 
He and Brand both criticise market distortion which arise from government
intervention, they welcome the advent of non-agricultural capital into the 
agrarian economy and Brand proposed that land in the bantustans be
brought into the open land m arket to enhance the po ten tia l for 
development corporations to operate more successfully.^®® The origins of
their d ifferen t approaches, outlined in more detail below, relates to 
d iffe ren t concerns over the evolving stru c tu re  o f ow nership  o f 
agricultural land and farming resources.
Van Wyk's position is that 'the establishm ent of sound economic
farming policy is closely related to trends in land values coupled with debt 
ratios.' ^®  ^ He asserts that a potential farm purchaser will examine the
proposed land value of the farm in the light of potential profits realisable
within foreseeable economic conditions. A potential owner occupier will 
consider what income the farming unit will generate and the standard of 
living that this will support.
Van Wyk concedes that the basis of evaluation of land value can vary. 
Items such as estate duty, income tax or whether it is bought by the state 
will influence the value. However Van Wyk's preoccupation is to examine 
the land market and compare actual transfer prices with land valuations of 
the 'true economic farming value.' The Land and Agricultural Bank of South 
Africa uses this method in accordance with the Land Bank Act,
The Land Bank Act provides that the value of properties shall be
determined according to their fair value for agriculture and stock farming 
purposes, which is based on the actual production capacity of the property 
as a farming enterprise, in addition, this valuation is related to the period of
*^®® Brand, S.S. 1983 
*^ ®9 Van Wyk, C>G> 1967
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repayment, which normally extends over a long period viz. up to 35 years
and is not based on transitory or temporary factors which are caused by
in flated  values resu lting  from  speculation , personal in terests or a 
fluctuating demand for particular products.
Van Wyk supports the underlying intention of the legislation to
enable farmers, with a modicum of working capital and ability, to earn a
reasonable living for their families while securely paying o ff their debt
over an extended period of time. This view was the basis of an argum ent. in
favour of low mortgage rates for land purchase irrespective o f trends in 
market interest rates. The Land Bank adheres to this valuation principle. 
Any difference between the Land Bank valuation and actual purchase price 
is not taken into account when a mortgage is granted. The Land Bank loan is 
limited according to its own valuation. If the market price differs farmers 
must seek alternative credit sources to make up the difference.
Van Wyk compares Land Bank Valuations and actual transfer prices
for the period 1912 to 1965. Except for two years, 1914 and 1935 the Land 
Bank valuation is lower than the market price. In the post second world war 
period the gap between the two values widens; there is an increasing
disparity between the Land Bank's approach and the price the purchasers
are prepared to pay.
Van Wyk is highly critical of this trend. He calls this sharp price
increase and widening gap economically unjustified*. The phenomenon is 
attributed to the ready availability of credit and scarcity of agricultural 
land. He blames creditors other than the Land Bank for accepting 
divergent norms of evaluation of farm properties which have resulted in 
unrealistic rises in land value' and an 'attendant debt ratio* which he
predicts will be the cause of financial problems.
Nieuwoudt takes issue with Van Wyk et al who use this particular 
method of productivity valuation* which leads them to assert (mistakenly
he thinks) that farm land is overpriced. Whereas Nieuwoudt agrees that the 
value of a fixed asset can be expressed as the present value of a future rent 
stream generated by the asset, he insists that other factors have to be 
included such as allowance for technological advance, inflation rates as 
well as a subjective discount due to any apprehension about political 
uncertainties. Nieuwoudt's m odification of an algebraic constant growth
490 ibid.
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model as a method of assessing the return on farm land in relation to its
price was briefly reviewed in Chapter 2.
Using a survey of 843 farms Nieuwoudt calculates the percent rate of 
return on the rentals as an average 5.4 percent. Then taking into account
the nominal rate of growth of farm income at 8 percent he estimates that
the return on investment in farm real estate is actually 13.8 percent. This is 
a higher investm ent yield than on stock m arket investm ent which 
Nieuwoudt sees as fully justified in light of the relative immobility of 
financial resources tied up in land. Mortgage rates for the same period of
the study (1977-1979) were 7 percent for land Bank loans and 9.72 percent 
from commercial banks while the inflation rate was an average 11.8 for the
same period.
Bank loans with bond rates which are lower than the inflation rate  
are conducive to increased demand for investment in land. A subsidised 
interest rate thus increases demand, exerts an upward pressure on prices
and the subsidised interest is capitalised into the new price. The whole
purpose o f the subsidy is defeated. Nieuwoudt ironically comments, 'It has 
even been suggested that land prices should be controlled because of 
negative side effects o f high land prices, which is an example of where one
form o f intervention in the form of subsidised credit calls for more control.
Brand sympathised with this evaluation of the shortcomings of state
intervention in his paper Structuring of the South African Agriculture in 
a Free Market e c o n o m y . A s  he understands it, governments may have 
several objectives they want to achieve: food security a n d . so on;
m aintaining the numbers of ow ner-occupiers on the land is included. 
Government pursues these objectives through intervention in production
conditions, marketing and finance. He agrees with Nieuwoudt that some of 
the financial intervention may work against the original intention. He 
writes that the conditions of agricultural finance together with aspects of
the tax system and pricing arrangements could possibly have contributed to
a greater degree of mechanisation in agriculture, to a more rapid increase 
in the debt burden of the agricultural sector and to a higher concentration
of agricultural assets than may otherwise have been the case.'
He advocates revising the arrangem ents to bring them more in
keeping with free market principles,' especially in relation to agricultural 
financing. Brand is at this point in time one of the few economists who
- 9^1 Brand.S.S.. 1983, p.5
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addresses the integration o f black and white agricu lture in a unitary 
market system In this respect Brand makes specific reference to the 
absence of a land market in the bantustans' which he refers to as the 
national states'. In his view the "agricultural financing function is closely
related to the system of land occupation in agriculture and the prevailing 
(again so called) traditional systems of land occupation provide no or little
provision for the functioning of a market in agricultural land.' This is 
regarded as yet another unfree m arket im pedim ent which is to the
detrim ent of capitalist agricultural development. Brand suggests that the 
rules of land occupation' in the national states' should be changed. Among 
other things this would permit development corporations to operate more 
su ccess fu lly .
The complaint that land prices are too high' and that 'prices are
higher' 'than the land is worth"*^^ appears to be rooted in support for 
ow ner occupancy o f fam ily -based  businesses. The p ro tagon ists  are 
therefore critical o f rising land prices, rising needs in the levels of 
working capital which increase the minimum level of start-up capital and 
hinder or make im possible the entry of many would-be new farmers, 
hastening the exodus of others, contributing to the decline of numbers of
farmers on the land - their place being taken by non-agricultural capital.
Support of ow ner-occupancy was previously  fostered  by the 
government Commission of Enquiry into Agriculture"^^^; 'the participation 
in agriculture of companies that are strangers to agriculture, has in recent 
years increased to such an extent as to cause concern and therefore 
deserves serious attention.'
This stance has been fairly and squarely criticised.^^^ If  there is
indeed such an increase in land-ownership by non-agricultural companies, 
it should rather be welcomed from the point of view of alternative 
financing of capital investments. If non-agricultural companies can farm 
more economically and more scientifically than private farmers, it is surely
not economically rational to discriminate against them.'
Land price data reflect prices at which transfers are taking place. It 
indicates the price which successful bidders are prepared (or have the 
ability) to pay. It appears there are four categories of land buyers; (a)
Van Renshurg, 1984, p 
RSA 1970
Joubert & Groenewald, 1974
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existing farmers who are buying additional land to expand their faming 
base, (ii) new individual entrants who have acquired capital from non-
agricultural sources and (iii) the state purchasing land to make up black 
land holdings to 13 percent especially in areas adjacent to existing
bantustan boundaries and (iv) companies purchasing land selectively, land 
for timber and land in vineyard areas being particularly favoured.
One regional analysis of farmland purchase indicates that in the first 
half of the 1970s the overall increase in average farm size in the region was 
the result of farms being bought out by neighbouring better-off farmers. 
But since 1984, the increase in the number of farming units indicates that a 
subdivision process is num erically outw eighing the farm  enlargem ent 
process. Government purchases and ex-Rhodesian settlers also contributed 
to some pressure on prices in the early 1980s. The role of agribusiness in 
farming has increased in recent decades, In 1963 only 1.1 percent , o f the
total number of farm units were owned by registered companies covering
2.8 percent of the total available area.^^^ 20 years later registered 
companies owned 9.6 percent of the units, a much greater percentage of
resources and earned a more than proportionate share of the income.
Companies such as SAPPI and Mondi have indicated that they do not 
expect to make capital gains Irom land value increases. They are buying the
land to diversify their investments and make a profit on the farming 
operation. If land prices increase only on a par with inflation they will be 
sa tisfied .
In the Stellenbosch vineyard area in 1990, union officials report^*®
that the Anglo American Corporation bought vineyards at an average cost 
per hectare of R20 000. Neil's study of the Stellenbosch area between 1977 
and 1985 indicated that transfers of farm land involving reg istered
com panies accounted for more than half the total area of farm land 
transferred and resulted in a net increase of company ownership.
Ignoring capital gains from land may be economically possible for
large com panies. For prospective individual ow ner-occupiers who have
only modest amounts o f  in v e s t m e n t  cap i ta l  a v a i l a b l e ,  it would seem 
increasingly difficult to buy farming land. Mackenzie of the DBS A estimates
RSA, 1972.Commission of Inquiry... . (2nd Report) pp25-26.
Cooper, D. 1987, citing Hattingh's 1983 study published in 1986.
497 Personal conununication with Peter Derman of CORD, Natal and David Cooper. 
Environment Development Agency. Johannesburg.
49® Field interview with FAWU official,Stellenbosch, June 1990
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that individual owner-occupiers in the livestock sector need to be able to 
cover 80 percent of the land investment and working capital in order for 
the income to cover the annual debt repaym ent and perm it a modest 
standard of l i v i n g . T h e  implications for a market orientated land reform 
whose intended beneficiaries do not have capital are obvious.
7.4. The L and M ark e t and  Im p lica tions fo r L and  R ed is tr ib u tio n
The deteriorating profitability conditions in farming, the bolstered 
land price and the gap between the market price and the estim ated 
productive value deserve fu rther considera tion  in re la tio n  to land 
redistribution prospects. In this section I examine the implications o f the 
land market in relation to a land redistribution programme and explore the 
possible consequences and limitations of an affirm ative action programme 
which offers access to land at subsidised prices.
There have been fairly volatile changes in the prices of commercial 
farming land as the result o f changing profit levels, availability of funds 
after exceptional harvests or debts incurred by droughts. In an economy
with high inflation rates, land prices may increase more rapidly than the 
inflation rate as those with money want to buy material, resaleable, items
instead of keeping their paper money in the bank. Changes in political 
systems may also affect land prices because of the expectation of policy 
changes. But whatever the variability of agricultural land price, its very 
existence and its level create a barrier to entry into farming, and would 
need to be fundamentally addressed in any new policy seeking to redress
the historical national land grievance.
The differential between the Land Bank valuation and its purchase 
price present further difficulties. Extending credit policies to black farmers
may simply be untenable. The current high rates of interest on nominally 
high land prices result in a high level of debt servicing on any newly 
purchased land. For example a piece of maize land bought at R700 per 
hectare^®® with a bond interest rate of 20 percent per annum requires a 
R140 payment. The average estimated maize yield per hectare was 1.98 tons 
in 1988, and the average cost for the production and marketing of maize was 
calculated at R341 per ton or R675 per hectare but this calculation does not
4^^ personal conimunication
Statistical News Release PI 141 (1989), p2. Average price per hectare of land for 
transactions in Transvaal in the 1988/89 farming season.
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appear to include a management fee.^®^ The net producer price for best
grade white maize was R258 per ton in the same year, and R246 per ton for 
best grade yellow maize.^®^ In an average production year, producing only 
best grade maize a farmer would have received R675 and paid out R341 in
costs, R140 for the bond payment, thus rem aining with R194 to cover 
management and saving for future investment. In a drought year when 
production falls as low as 1.1 tons per hectare^®^ gross income would be
reduced to R275. Even the immediate production and marketing costs would
not be covered (1.1 tons at R341 per ton equals R 375). The farmer is left
with carry over debts on operational expenses, and unpaid mortgage bond
and no living income. At prevailing free m arket land prices, rates of 
interest and declining terms of trade, and crop unpredictability it is likely 
that black farmers without start up capital would probably suffer debt
servicing problem s.
South A frican agricu ltu ra l land prices have been vola tile  and
extrem ely vulnerable to the swings and roundabouts of the capitalist 
economy. The last thirty years in the history o f white com m ercial
agriculture are marked by a strong centralisation process which has 
fundam entally altered the structure of the farm ing economy. Prevailing 
land prices and state policies favour large scale farm ing units. The
econom ic non-viability of a substantial num ber o f w hite farm ers is
testimony to this. If there is to be a realisable potential for a different
agricu ltura l economy which supports long term , econom ically viable,
environm entally sustainable, rural com munities of sm aller scale farm ers
(w hether black or white) it is not simply the racial land-ow nership
structure which would need to change.
7.5. E xam ining the p roposa l of subsid ised  access to land .
Blacks demand that land should be returned as part of a reparation 
and restitution process. However land redistribution must also contemplate
not only the return of lost lands but also the need to respond to the present 
and future needs of the landless. The state may acquire and make it
available to beneficiaries on different terms. The focus of this section
considers only one proposal, i.e.. subsidised access to land, discusses possible
Ortmaim, G.F. & Rask, N. (1988) Appendix 2, p23. and they did their calculation 
in USD. I have used 2.7 Rand to the US dollar as a rough conversion rate to their 
calculation.
This excludes prices of bags.
503 The 1982 average was as low as 1.01 tons per hectare. .
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shortcom ings and highlights the need for institutional arrangem ents to 
sustain an enduring land redistribution.
C urrently  there is no regu la tion  o f the exchange price o f 
agricultural land. Up to 1990 the free market in land effectively only
operated in the "white" agricultural areas. Black tenancy and black land 
purchase in former "white-only" areas are now permitted. In so-called 
black areas the continued "communal status" im peded the m arketability
process. However black access to "white" land through the free market is 
meaningless for the millions of landless blacks who do not have capital. In
fact the capital requirements to maintain solvency status are high for
entrepreneurial farmers. DBS A employees have commented that producers, 
(as a rough and ready yardstick measure) need to have 70-80 percent of 
their capital investment paid up in order for production profits to finance 
the bond repayments of the remaining 30 percent.
The cash flow crisis of farmers, their inability to borrow funds for
land purchase and generate cash for repayment from production activities, 
is extremely pertinent to the land reform debate. W hereas the lending
practice on the housing market offers high percentage bonds according to
income, this is not feasible in relation to the agricultural land market if
repayment depends on productive income of farming activities on the very 
same land.
In Sweden this type of problem emerging from the gap between the
market and productive valuation of the land has been avoided. Government
r e g u la tio n s ^ ® ^  conditions of access (controlling who had the right to
buy) were further extended to regulate the price at which land changed
owners. The price agreed upon between the seller and potential buyer was 
subject to state scrutiny. The state's concern was to avoid speculation in the
agricultural land m arket and also to check that the land price was 
economically viable' in keeping with the land's productive value. In this 
way the new owner would be able to cover bond repayments through 
average production levels. Sender points out that productivity valuation,
although conventionally used, is a m i s n o m e r . M o r e  correctly  the
valuation is a cash flow calculation, the capitalised value of land according 
to farming income distinct from physical yield.
504 Tjjg Land Acquisition Act, SFS 1979:230, Sweden, is of great interest for the terms 
its sets out on who has a right to acquire land and at what price.
Professor John Sender, Economic department Witwatersrand university, 
Johannesburg, South Africa, participant observation notes, ANC/DBSA discussion on 
regulated land markets. August 1991.
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One response to the lack of capital and market price/productive value
gap problem is to reaffirm  that South Africa's eventual popularly elected 
government must undertake responsibility to redistribute land in the form 
of grants. In the absence of widespread expropriation, the speed of a
redistribution process will depend on the availability of funds. The new 
South African state might also acquire land for redistribution in the form of 
land grants and/or act as a facilitator of transfers (possibly on special credit 
terms). Furthermore a regulated land market^®^ would promote longer term 
rural community stability and economic viability; a complementary taxation 
package could help to make sure that easy land access is tempered by 
measures to secure a responsible use of resources.
Some South A frican agricu ltura l econom ists argue that m arket 
regulation is not necessary.^®^ They maintain that the agricultural land
market has not worked in the sense of market prices being relative to 
productive value because of a series of factors (such as subsidies) which 
were politically  m otivated. Recently, follow ing the lifting o f many 
subsidies, prices have fallen significantly, as much as thirty percent in 
Eastern Cape. Hence the gap is narrowing. They forecast a continued 
narrowing of the gap and disappearance of the problem posed: the logical 
conjecture i s . that farm ers will in future be able to finance the bond 
repayment on agricultural land purchase through productive activity.
If this does not happen very quickly it is suggested that an 
affirm ative action program m e might include making land available to 
blacks at a subsidised price.^®® It has been suggested that land should be 
made available to blacks at a price reflecting the productive value of the 
land (i.e.. that which can be amortised from the income yield of the average 
production o f that land). However the outgoing (white) farm er should 
receive the full free market value of the land. It is proposed that the state 
sh ou ld  pay the difference between the price payable by the subsidised 
beneficiary and the m arket price dem anded by the farmer.^®^ The
^®  ^ ANC Land C o m m is s io n . 1990. The ANC has called for the need for communal, tenure 
to be respected where "communities" decide democratically that they do not want 
privatisation. Their proposal for a mixed economy should permit such mixed property 
forms. They note the need for innovative credit arrangements for producers on 
communal lands.
^®  ^ Vink, N. Deputy Manager, Policy Analysis Unit, Development Bank of Southern • 
.Africa, seminar discussion 1991.
D®8 T h g  government 1991 Land Reform bills proposed special credit facilities.
®^*^  DBSA employees have proposed that government foot the bill for the difference 
between productive valuation and market price.
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underlying assumption of this proposal is that the free market value of 
land should continue to operate irrespective o f its divergence from 
"productive valuation" This divergence is seen as something of the past; 
expectations are that the gap will narrow. Past divergence is attributed to 
government intervention through subsidies, interest rates, taxes and price 
fixing. Land prices were said to have fallen in various farming sectors 
recen tly  re flec tin g  changes in p ro fitab ility  conditions. H ow ever the 
governm ent drought/debt relief package is, in part, intended to bolster 
land prices. Furthermore we should take into account the influence o f a 
"sellers market" as black demand for land combined with state assistance in 
the interest o f affirmative action will tend to push up the asking price.
But irrespective of this conundrum there are some even harder 
questions to be addressed on the issue of an integrated non racial land 
market. A unitary South Africa implies a dissolution of borders with 
implications in terms of non racial transferability. The issue raised so far 
relates to access to land, and if people are going to pay, its price. The 
problem raised refers to the racial inequality of access to capital. As pointed 
out, white farmers need to be able to put down seventy percent of capital 
outlay for production activities to cover a thirty percent bond. The proposal 
of access at a subsidised price tries to overcome this problem. It is a partial 
adoption o f the principles o f Sweden's regulated land m arket where 
exchange price is regulated by profitability and pay back considerations. 
However my contention is (leaving aside a prior argument about whether 
beneficiaries should pay anything) that this proposal has longer term 
implications which will defeat its original objectives.
Sw eden's regu la ted  land m arket hinged on the p rincip le  o f 
identifying socially average production norms. Swedish land valuers of 
County A gricultural Boards work with a book o f production tables 
indicating production norms. Land in a certain area, of a certain rainfall 
type and on a certain gradient with a certain rainfall will achieve a 
average yield X of product Y. The above average farmer can be expected to 
produce X+ 0,5 tons and so on. The point is that the Swedes can identify a 
"socially average production norm" and consequently they can also 
identify the expected social norm of profitability on a farming operation 
which they use as a guide to their market regulation.
But even if South Africa devoted the time energy and skills to 
produce sufficient work on land grading it would be impossible to adopt the 
Swedish regulatory mechanism as a general tool. Quite sim ply, the
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apartheid legacy has ensured that no one such "socially average production 
norm" exists. It may be possible to try out the principle on white farms - 
but essentially - the idea of a norm is class based and not racially based. An 
extension of the discussion in Chapter 4 on differing production functions 
among Indian peasantry determ ined by availability o f land and capital 
suggests that perhaps one could identify an average norm for West Bengal
poor peasant and sim ilarly a different average norm for its middle 
peasants, again different to that of its rich peasantry and so on. In South
Africa the co-existence of differing production functions is circumscribed 
by the institutional barriers to land marketability. In the absence of such 
barriers the different production functions on which white and black 
farmers now operate could have fostered land transfers from blacks to 
w h ite s .
Awareness of differing production functions, provides a framework 
in which to consider some of the im plications o f affirm ative action 
proposais. One case study which provides a basis for reflection is the Taung 
C om m unity.^ The W estern  T ra n sv a a l, hosts a sm all portion  o f
Bophutatswana. Taung d istric t is the Bophutatsw ana portion o f the 
Valhaartz irrigation scheme built in the 1930s. Some 2000 black families 
used to have 1.7 hectare plots but in the mid seventies the state's ambition to 
foster a black entrepreneurial farming class resulted in 411 farmers being
given access to between 7-10 hectares. The state funded agency Agricor 
provides a plan to each farmer through the intermediary adm inistrative 
body known as Lesedi cooperative. Agricor also provides supervisory 
extension assistance through secondment of its employees to Lesedi. Land is 
tractor ploughed by contractors and the farm er's account at Lesedi is 
debited. Herbicides are aerially sprayed- again on debit to each farmer. It is 
obligatory for all output to be marketed through formal channels.^  ^  ^ There 
is little  opportun ity  to dem onstra te  e n tre p ren eu ria l ab ility  and 
productivity extremely low. The project now has an accumulated debt of 
R37 million of which the farmers say they will accept responsibility for 
only 20 per cent.
Taung Irrigation project is now on the threshold of its third 
restructuring. Consultants, who engaged in extensive discussion with the 
farm ers (but not with the rem ainder of Taung's landless community), 
suggest that further restructuring should select only the best farmers to
Author's notes taken trom work on Taung project.
 ^1 - But the consultants note that informal marketing has reached "unacceptable 
levels" thus indicating some entrepreneurial spirit exists after all!
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operate on a truly entrepreneurial basis including the transform ation of 
their land access to saleable freehold status. Landholding should be 
determined according to demonstrated ability and future developments can 
be accommodated by sale or rental transactions. Current estimates indicate 
that according to demonstrated production ability these farmers might in
future manage to earn R725 per hectare annum but only R170 per annum
per hectare if only 80% of targeted yields are achieved. The longer term
financial prospects for the scheme are generally precarious. The pivot 
system cannot be replaced by new pivot equipment at the end of its current 
life because the above income levels do not permit savings for replacement.
M eanw hile the w hite V alhaartz  farm ers operate  a d iffe re n t 
production function especially in relation to m anagerial capacity. They 
pursue a three crop per two year farming plan. They pay better wages rates
than the Taung farmers to make sure they have workers at the most optimal
time. The land price in Valhaartz is R6000 per hectare or R500 per year's
lease.
The consultants assum ed that restructu ring  should begin from  
within the group of 411 farmers (while acknowledging that there is some 
dormant unresolved issues about dispossession which occurred during the 
last restructuring) Most of the 411 farmers wish to stay in the scheme.
They would be looking a gift horse in the mouth if they decided not to stay
given the conditions. They are being offered a probable big debt write off,
a special deal on land purchase and rents, and privatisation of land (in
their favour as existing land users) which will allow them privileges in the 
fu tu re .
A subsidised purchase price is under discussion. Whereas Vaalhartz 
land sells for about R6000 per hectare and rents are about R500 per annum, 
it is argued that Taung prices should be reduced, considering affirm ative 
action and economies of scale, to R1200 and R150 for purchase and rentals 
r e s p e c t iv e ly .^ B u t  leaving aside any debate about the prices indicated, the
general principle being argued Is that in the interest of affirmative action 
there should he special economic conditions for land acquisition by blacks.
One of the main problems with a price subsidy which makes land 
available at lower than market price, is the issue of marketability in the
subsequent non racial free market. For example if Shepard Kujane were to
"economies ot scale" are asserted rather than demonstrated by any data.
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buy his ten hectares now at R1200 there seems to be nothing to prevent his 
enjoying a superb windfall in two years time when he may sell at R6000.
If the issue of affirmative action (implying land access at a lower 
than market market value price) is to be pursued there needs to be some 
forward thinking on conditions of resale. The following facts would have to 
be taken into account:
(a) Blacks are  h isto rically  d isadvantaged. A rgum ents can be 
advanced in favour of affirm ative action in term s of land acquisition
training and so on. And this would take time.
(b) Technically, black farmers, for some time, may experience some 
difficulties achieving the same production function as white farm ers (at 
present even if capital access were to be equalised the technical training
and managerial skills are uneven)
(c) If the land market is transformed to one of free exchange within 
a unitary, non-racial. South Africa then the possible outcome of (a)
together with (b) is that blacks may then find that their best economic
options is to rent or sell their land (to whites) and enjoy a windfall.
(d) If whites buy this land (and it is this group which for historical 
reasons has the capital) the implication is that in a few years time the racial 
land division could in fact be worse than the current 87:13 division.
A protective time period or locked-in ownership scheme will be 
required to ensure that historically privileged white farm ers operating a 
superior production function cannot, in the short term, buy out blacks who 
have acquired subsidised access to land through land reform. Jersey and 
Switzerland provide examples of dual land markets which were created in 
order to protect nationals' access to land and housing trom the unfettered 
dem ands o f fo reigners. B rita in 's council housing schem e, H arare 's 
subsidised home-owner construction scheme^ offer other exam ples o f 
state protected lease and purchase schemes which operate in parallel to the 
private capital market.
As an overall conclusion it can be said that agricultural land prices 
in South Africa are unstable; there are short term responses for such 
diverse reasons as bumper harvests and political upheaval. In the last
Potts, D, 1991.
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decade the overall tendency of real land prices was to fall, but government
interventions on debt write off are presently supporting the land market. 
In fact the governing National Party is currently commiting the future 
government to a double state expenditure (a) it has committed public funds 
to d eb t,w rite  off in the period 1992-1996 and (b) government purchase of
land for redistribution may be expected to take place at higher prices than 
if market forces had been left to play themselves out and therefore the gap 
is likely to widen again.
In rela tion  to the beneficiaries, I have em phasised that class 
stratification, which has a racial character in South Africa, implies that
producers operate on widely differing production functions even under the 
same agronom ic conditions. Furtherm ore my earlie r analysis clearly
indicates that some expectant beneficiaries cannot afford any purchase of
land under any terms. For them, the main purpose of land use is to ensure 
their physical survival through the production o f food or crop sales whose
income will provide other basic necessities. This analysis indicates the need 
for different systems to operate in parallel to one another as part o f an
overall development strategy.
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Chapter 8. The Case for Land and Agrarian Reform: a development 
strategy supported by state intervention.
Rural social disintegration is a fact in South Africa. The rural population 
lives off wages to buy food; they do not produce it. Employment dynamics are, 
therefore, the determining factor in preventing poverty. None of the political 
interest groups has yet presented views o f agricultural restructuring which 
discuss the role of agriculture in the economy, its possible contribution to 
reducing poverty levels and its backward and forw ard linkages with other 
economic sectors.
Rural poverty may continue unabated with m arginalised com m unities 
requiring social welfare expenditure creamed off from surpluses generated in 
other sectors. I submit, however, that there is an alternative socio-economic 
growth strategy in which rural communities could participate and contribute 
to a macro-economic growth path. The investment balance between sectors is a 
matter for serious debate. Resources required for the development o f rural 
areas will be in severe competition with resources required by the urban based 
m anufacturing industries which are regarded as the driving force o f a 
growing economy. However, econom ies which have successfully used the 
development of manufacturing as a growth strategy have only done so while 
developing agriculture to secure a domestic market for their nascent industry, 
to supply inputs and make a contribution to securing foreign exchange needed 
for m anufacturing  restru c tu rin g . In this case the sm all ag ricu ltu ra l
commodity producers are no longer a residual factor in a growth plan but an
integral part of a strategy to achieve such a plan.
Black and White farm ing history in South A frica provides sound 
testimony for the effectiveness of state intervention in pursuit of a designed 
policy. The profile o f the current agrarian economy is remarkably different 
from that which would have emerged within the framework of a free market. 
But if free market principle were to be adopted now, the inheritance of
inequitable racial access to capital and skills, would entrench the status quo in 
land ownership and market power. The history of tenure systems also provides 
a rich and diversified practice; these should be considered carefully and their 
operational flexibility identified as a strength to be built on. The denigration 
of community based tenure systems by the National Party government and its
proposal to "upgrade" these systems to a freehold basis fails to appreciate both
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the social and agronomical benefits which may accrue to these systems and 
which should be further explored and encouraged.
B lack South A frican ru ra l com m unities at p resen t are neither
economically nor ecologically sustainable. Farming is problem atic too for a 
large proportion o f the sixty thousand white commercial farmers. It is obvious 
that a long term reorganisation o f agriculture is required, one that makes 
more sense in terms of land base and rainfall, people's needs for work and an 
econom ically viable and sustainable rural life as well as considerations of 
linkages with the m anufacturing industry.
While a free market economy cannot achieve a reversal of the 
apartheid legacy, nationalisation also has severe limitations. The state's most 
effective role is to facilitate; it can set in place legal and econom ic 
m echanism s, training program m es etc. which favour transform ation in a
certain direction. But again the most appropriate laws and available benefits
can becom e com pletely ineffectual unless there is strong ru ral political 
organisation which is aware, and makes use, of the legal and economic tools to 
im plem ent land reform  in p ractice. This final chapter rev iew s some 
possibilities for (1) state facilitation to provide a legal fram ework and a 
taxation model which favours land redistribution and (2) the need for flexible 
policies in relation to tenure and land marketability to respond not only to 
d ifferen t indivdual aspirations and needs but to also prom ote a viable, 
sustainable agrarian economy.
8.1. Legislation and Taxation Policies to favour land redistribution
S J j LD Lfi&i.sla|ifl.n
In many countries land enjoys a special economic and political status 
and is not viewed as equivalent to financial and other capital. In Canada for
example land is excluded from the general protection o f private property 
clauses in the constitution. The proposals advanced by lawyers and activists 
with a long history of involvement in South African land struggles are
innovative and take special countenance of inherited r e a l i t y .^^4
^^4 Budlender G and J Latksy (1990), Claassens A (1991)
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It has been proposed that land should be given a special status in the
constitution. Of special importance in relation to new legislation which may
accompany the forthcoming repeal of the Land Acts, is a proposal which is not 
wholly based on current legal title but will lead to a legal recognition of de 
facto land rights. Many black South Africans in bantustans have certificates of 
occupation', or are labour tenants who have farm ed land for generations.
These categories have no title deed claim to land but, in any case, for many
victims of forced removals such deeds did not provide security. It has been
suggested that one component of a land reform  programme should be the 
recognition of de facto rights. This requires laws which recognise land rights 
based on factors such as birthright, inheritance rights, and rights based on 
occupation and productive use of land.^^^ The ANC favours a Land Claims 
procedure to adjudicate conflicting claims.
Further leg isla tive changes are required. The law pruhibiting sub
division o f farms is now inappropriate. And much more stringent laws are 
required to control land use to ensure the best, safest, and most sustainable use 
of land; at present prime land is being put into forestry with negative 
consequences in terms of job loss and water availability in neighbouring 
farming areas. Erosion is a grave problem and there has been serious chemical
abuse by farmers which affects people, land and water.
The issue of abuse involves a w ider consideration o f land 
expropriation according to predefined public interest criteria.^ This must 
include criteria in a Land A cquisition bill containing ground rules for 
compensation and the identification of beneficiaries. Public interest criteria 
are sometime limited to land needed for provision of public infrastructure i.e. 
roads, hospitals, - airports. In some countries public interest criteria  have 
included land ceilings i.e. a rule that one person should only be allowed to hold 
a limited land area. Under-utilisation of land may be used as another criteria 
for com pulsory acquisition. Failure to comply with land regulations on 
environm ent or subdivision provide further criteria . Corporate or foreign 
ownership may be also be subject to censure. An innovative suggestion for
ANC Land Commission Discussion Document, February 1991 and Land Claims Comt 
Working Group. 1992.
^ A  more detailed exposition of public interest criteria and the experience of their 
application in various land reforms is to be found in Doiny H & H Klug forthcoming, "Legal 
Support and Economic Regulation for an Effective Land Reform." South African Review 6, 
1992. Ravan Press. Johannesburg.
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South Africa, has been the inclusion of the criteria of failure to comply with 
labour laws as a reason for expropriation. This is prom pted by horrific
incidents of labour abuse. However, apart from cases such as South Korea
where the imposition o f land ceilings greatly affected land redistribution, the
more common experience is that land acquisition according to public interest 
criteria is generally not so significant; the ability o f the landed classes for
evasion has, more often than not, rendered the provision ineffective.
8.1(ii) Taxation
There are three tax innovations which could be introduced into the 
South A frican tax system which would assist the objectives of a labour
absorbing red istribu tive land reform . A progressive land tax could be
introduced; the more land owned the higher the tax rate to be paid. Those who
defend the use of a progressive land tax in a free land market system argue 
that the price of land would drop because of the tax. Furthermore if the tax 
increased steeply according to the size of the landholding, owners would more 
readily consider selling a portion of their land. By extension, the increase in 
marketed supply should (the demand curve remaining equal) cause land prices 
to fall. The World Bank supports the land tax as a major land reform tool in
Zimbabwe. A land tax has been proposed as the main avenue for Philippine 
land reform; Brazil has a progressive land tax in place.
The real question is, "Would the land price fall low enough so that poor
people would be able to buy land at the new price levels?" Binswanger and 
Elgin^^^ consider that the truly poor are unlikely to benefit from price falls 
due to a land tax; they would still need equity to buy land, equity which they do 
not have. Their prediction is that a land tax alone only benefits the middle 
strata. They refer to Brazil as an example of farmer ability to avoid taxes. Thus 
land taxation as part of a land reform strategy has not yet been a success.
Nieuwoudt of University of Natal is fairly dismissive of the introduction 
of a land tax in South Africa;^ a major objection is the administration cost On 
the other hand Nieuwoudt points out that a positive feature of a land tax is that, 
unlike a profit tax, it is fixed whatever the production and profit levels and does 
not provide a disincentive to produce more.
Binswanger. H. and M Elgin. (1988) 
Nieuwoudt W L, (1987)
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In my view in spite of possible evasion, land taxation may be a helpful
component of a land reform strategy. Its purpose would not be to bring down
land prices^ (as these would hopefully be regulated) but (i) to generate state
income to finance land reform and (ii) to encourage large landholders to put
land up for sale. This is an important alternative to a system of retention
ceilings. Even if large land holders show great efficiency, the political
objective of redistribution may require that the criterion of efficiency is not 
the only consideration.
Progressive taxes on the transfer of farm ing property are usually
discussed within the context of capital gains. Capital gains would hardly occur 
if there were market regulation to ensure that land prices adhere to the
estimated productive value of the land. Current tax regulations are extremely
favourable to the intergenerational transfer of capital and wealth; the Margo
Com m ission's recom m endations, which were accepted, in princip le by the
government, are even more favourable to the rich than in the past.^^®
Land redistribution can be assisted by a progressive scale of death duties 
which encourages the heirs of large estates to sell a portion. This method of
encouraging a wider landownership has been implemented with some degree
of success in the United Kingdom. I would propose the adoption of this policy
in South Africa as a practical and inexpensive component of a land reform 
p ro g ra m m e .
With regard to taxing capital goods in agriculture the Margo Commission
argued that" . . .  a country such as South Africa, where capital is a scarce 
production factor and labour is plentiful, is justified in taxing the use of 
capital quite h e a v i ly ,  However the tax laws operating in South Africa for 
many years, contrary to the logic of the above statem ent, have actually
lowered the cost of purchase of capital goods especially in agriculture and
mining. In both these sectors, the writing o ff of 100 per cent o f capital
expenditure was allowed i.e. profits used to purchase any capital goods
Any projected land price reduction in South Africa if a free land market were to
remain is possibly offset by the Repeal of the Land Acts is can be predicted to shift the
demand curve as black South Africans act to satisfy their land hunger.
^2® Margo Report (1988) p25 introduces the idea of a uniform flat rate of 15%. "The 
proposed change holds great advantages for estates with a high value. The tax in the case of 
a man leaving a wife and two children and an estate of R5 million, thus, would fall from RI
508 000 to R712 500, or by more than 50 per cent.
RSA 1988, Margo Report, p i 2.
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expenditure were exempt from tax. The Margo recom m endation is that a 
depreciation allowance should operate which allows the asset to be written off 
over three years at a rate of 50%, 30% and 20%.
The tax laws and fuel rebates cheapened farmer's mechanisation costs. A 
shadow costing of this choice which reflected the cost to society would have to 
include not only the elements of low import tariffs, tax relief and subsidised 
fuel but also the costs of the displaced labour. Displaced labour was not entitled 
to unemployment benefit so there was no direct government w elfare bill. 
Nevertheless the costs of supporting the unem ployed which fall particularly
on the wage earning members of the working class would also have to be taken 
into account. The Margo Commission's observation about the justifiability  of 
taxing capital goods heavily where the labour supply is plentiful requires a 
practical interpretation. This requires further research but fi’om my earlier
discussion on choice of technology the logical conclusion would be that capital
goods should be taxed selectively. Those capital goods which raise productivity 
and fall into a labour absorbing technological strategy should be exempt firom 
tax.
8.2 .Diverse Beneficiaries: Tenure and .Marketability.
G eograph ical popu la tion  eng ineering , se ttlem en t and b e tte rm en t 
programm es have an unpopular record in South A frica. The underlying 
principle of any land redistribution programme is that it must be completely 
voluntary. A "demand-led" reform  must operate in which the governm ent 
would commit itself to making additional land available to those who suffer
from land shortage, or to facilitate the entry into farming of those who wish to 
farm but have no access to land. Although the exact geographic, demographic 
and quantitative implications of this demand are not known, this approach will 
ensure a process for channeling the state's available resources to those most 
committed, and in need of access to land for the purpose of agricultural 
p ro d u c tio n .
Criteria will need to he developed for the category of land and the area 
which should be made available according to the intended use by the 
beneficiaries. Additional land would be wanted by most but for different 
reasons; full-tim e agriculture, part-tim e agriculture, a rural hom estead to
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maintain a preferred way o f life or a retirem ent place for old age.^^^ To 
maintain the best use of resources, good agricultural land should be conserved
for effective producers. A great deal of attention in the future is required to 
develop farm ing system s which are both econom ically and ecologically
sustainable. Old resettlement models which try to identify the quantity of land
necessary for a household to farm viably on a full time commercial basis 
(replicating the technological practice of large scale commercial farmers) are
outdated; they imitate generally unsound farm ing systems and fail to take 
cognisance of the urban-rural linkage and part-tim e farming where off-farm  
income dominates and is an essential input into making possible the best use of 
rural resources as well.
Tenure flexibility is advocated to accommodate differing and changing 
land ethics. Studies o f the influence of ethnicity on the operation of tenure 
systems illustrate the complexity of the tenure issue in South Africa, (see 
review in Chapter 3.) The strength of the kinship system and the extent to
which commoditisation of land has begun to occur will help determine the
degree of consultation on tenure decisions. Conflicts and insecurities have
emerged particularly when state interfered with the community status quo as
happened when the apartheid state defined certain "native reserves" to be 
politically "ruled" by a specific ethnic group irrespective of who settled first,
or who is in the m a jo r i ty .^^3 There are many unwritten regulations about the 
manner in which land tenure is ordered in different parts of the country. 
Indeed many of the actual tenure systems ore "unofficial"; they are de facto  
practical modifications of what the state de jure  tried to impose. The ethics 
w ithin indigenous tenure  system s dem and that ind ividual rights are
circum scribed by social considerations even when the prior right of first 
settlers is respected. Chapter 3 also referred to the fact that land is more than 
an economic asset; a right of access once conferred also grants a civic status 
and hence the right to participate politically in community affairs.
In summary (see Chapter 3) the basic principles of land and resource 
management in a black rural community were: access to an individual piece of 
arable land, access to common pasture, common access to reeds, water, house
This exercise was carried out without very satisfactory results in Namibia. Personal 
Communication with O Callear, 1992, a former employee of the Namibian Economic Policy 
Research Unit (NEPRU)
^^^James describes conflict in u Lcbowa cooperative and the differing ethnic reactions 
which have been influenced by state intervention into ethnic politics.
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building m ateria ls (irrespective  on whose plot they m ight occur) the
transformation of a long term land lease into a de facto  ownership right, thé 
greater importance given to short term social needs over long term ecological 
concerns. Attitudes towards land are changing leading to its commoditisation
not only in the peri-urban areas but also in the resource poor hinterland. But
change takes place with an uneven pace in different communities. There are 
criticisms o f over hasty attempts to impose freehold, (as epitomised by the
government's 1991 Land Reform bills) There ia a need for flexibility and co­
existence of tenure systems.^^^ Land is considered to be a part of a manifest set 
of social relations in a community, not merely an economic asset. The degree of 
community consultation which currently takes place around land very much 
depends on the practice o f the government appointed chiefly authority. Some 
démocratisation of local government is required if the future tenure choice is 
to reflect majority preference.
But tenure flex ib ility  should also  be p rom oted  fo r techn ica l 
considerations. South A frica's agronomic clim ate is relatively poor; it is 
predom inantly a low rainfall area. Arable cultivation should therefore be
undertaken selectively to avoid risk. But a g reat deal o f land which,
agronomically speaking, would have always been best suited for pasture, was 
ploughed up for grain cultivation. Certain subsidy policies, interest rates,
pricing policies, (reviewed in Chapter 3) made it worthwhile to take risks for
short term economic gains. But arable, high input production systems are 
proving both econom ically and ecologically unsustainable. A large part of
South Africa is best suited to pastoral or agro-pastoral farming requiring a 
careful livestock management together with arable cultivation where possible.
The physiological land base must be taken into serious account in 
fostering a programme of affirm ative action and land redistribution. Analysis
of the emerging shift in land use indicates greater recognition of the need for 
mixed farming systems to reflect a more rationale use of natural r e s o u r c e s .^ 2 5  
There is a reduction of grain cultivation in drier areas.
In relation a debate on production systems and land reform implications 
it may be instructive to consider, for example, a (not atypical) hilly pastoral
Cross C, 1991.
Vink N and J Van Rooyen ot the DBSA : Participant observation notes ANC/DBSA 
Consultation meeting November 1990.
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area with a minor water resource running through a vailey.^^^ If this were a
thousand hectares in the eastern Orange Free State then it is probable that one
or two hundred hectares o f lower lying land might have been ploughed up in
the years when grain prices and terms of trade w ere more favourable.
However the depletion of land fertility, the rising real cost, of fertiliser have 
caused the farmer to reduce the arable area to thirty hectares in the lower
lying valley land near the water source and to plant the remainder of the
formerly cultivated land with improved pasture.
Land redistribution, in the above example, could occur through various 
options with different class and employment implications. One options would
be subdivision for prospective (black) new farm ing entrants; perhaps two, 
three, five , seven farms might be created. The best thirty hectares o f arable 
land would probably fall within the confines of just one of these farms- the 
white farmer, might even decide not to sell this part of the farm but to continue 
to farm  this portion. The rem aining farms will have relatively poor land 
though some of it will have improved pasture. Alternatively, a community land
management programm e might contem plate twenty five -thirty fam ilies or
more on the basis o f an integrated agro-pastoral production system. Each
family could get access to an arable area and some (communal) grazing.
The institu tional arrangem ent for such a com m unity based land
management programm e could be through the creation o f a Community
Development or Land Trust (CDTs) or (CLT). A CDT would take on the land
m anagem ent (having received  it e ither as an endow m ent or through
purchase). CDTs offer more advantages than state leaseholds as the land
becomes a community asset. A trust provides the potential for democracy to
emerge and in the form of engendering participation in decision making
together with accountability.
Land redistribution policies must however cater for differing needs and 
aspirations. Beneficiaries will come from different classes or strata o f classes.
There will be demands for land as reparation for dispossession or forced sale. 
Some farm workers may wish to become self employed on their own land or 
farm cooperatively. Another source of demand may be from the landless
unemployed whether based In South Africa's urban industrial centres or the 
bantustan closer settlem ents. These groups are unevenly skilled. They
Farms in the Ficksburg area provide the reference point here.
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constitute neither an independent rich or m iddle peasantry nor are they 
tenants waiting to emerge and expand their production opportunities through 
access to land. A partheid  effectively  succeeded  in e lim inating  m ost 
independent commodity producers in South A frica's bantustan areas. Most 
rural producers are dependent on wage rem ittances to finance agricultural 
production. Their capacity to exploit fully any additional land resource will 
depend on the availability of labour and finance to purchase inputs. For the 
landless unem ployed a successful entry into agricu ltura l production will 
depend on train ing  p o ssib ilitie s , support serv ices and  a m anageable 
technology. Cooper has pointed out that part o f the production and financial 
crisis faced by com mercial farm ers has been the lack of availability of 
different t e c h n o l o g i e s . F o r  example farmers cannot find older strains of 
hybrid seeds on the market. They are forced to buy new cultivars which cost 
twice as much. Many farmers, however, cannot use them effectively to raise 
their productivity any higher than when they used the older type hybrids. 
This observation has important implications for a land reform: it will require a 
technology and m anagem ent package otherw ise there may be very poor 
returns to the land reform.
Broadly speaking, land tenure systems and conditions of marketability 
should respond to the three main groups identified in Chapter 5 (1) the 
m arg inalised  "peasan tariat ", (2) estab lished  and asp iran t sm all scale
commodity producers, (3) entrepreneurs. The m arginalised categories w ithin 
this group cannot afford to pay for land whatever the conditions. Group 2 
might be able to pay off a subsidised loan - but in general they have little
capital available. It is this group which may possibly take most advantage of a 
subsidised access to land respecting all the conditionalities of resale. It is also 
this group which might make the best use o f community based options 
described below, who within the Iramework of a Community Land Trust etc are 
able to gain access to land (as their own share and through additional
borrowing or rental) in order to realise their full potential as significant
commodity producers. Group 3 are the entrepreneurs, the commercial farmers. 
A case has been made in favour of promoting emergent black entrepreneurs 
as part of an affirmative action programme. But this group is obviously less
needy of that support than Groups 1 or 2.
^27 d BSA/ANC Consultation meeting, November 1990.
Buttel F (1990) provides an expanded analysis on the issue of biotechnology and 
agricultural development in the third world.
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Institu tional arrangem ents must also m eet the needs o f tenurial
flexibility and technical land management considerations. There is a range of 
possibilities to complement existing communal and freehold systems. Among
these are (a) Community Development Trusts, (b) Employee Share Ownership 
Schemes and Joint Ventures (c) Community Ownership with Sectional Title (d) 
Community Land Trusts (e) state leaseholds.
(a) Community Development Trusts: Some farm workers have stated that
they are not interested in land redistribution. They want an end to racist
management practices in terms of equal pay for equal work. They want the 
acceptance of and compliance with the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. 
They want security of housing, and a right to stay in the locality, which is 
independent of the job. The idea of Community Development Trusts includes 
incentives fur the current owners to plough back some o f the profits into
social infrastructure. The Rural Forum in Stellenbosch has considered setting 
up farm villages within this context.
(b) Employee Share ownership Schem es/ Joint Ventures: W hile state 
farm could offer the best potential for a radical transformation of relations of
production and redistribution, there are h istorical reasons for a cautious 
approach. The development of managerial capacity o f farm  workers is a
prerequisite for the effective operation of state farms. But race discrimination
policies have deprived people of education and skills training. It is possible 
that prematurely created state farms would neither realise productivity goals 
nor the transformation o f the relations of production. Therefore the creation 
of employee share ownership schemes or jo in t ventures offers a possible 
alternative in which workers receive intensive training to enable them to 
participate in farm management. ^^9
(c) Community Ownership with Sectional Title: This proposal stems from
a recent innovative experience in Natal province. A new owner purchased a 
farm which had on it labour tenants who had farmed part of the land as their
own for generations. He refused to expel the tenants. As a new incumbent he
was not legally obliged to respect any contracts made with the former owners.
He offered the labour tenants the option of staying on the land if they would 
purchase it from him which they did. There may be justifiable outrage at the
529 Pqj. more extensive discussion on forms of production see Dolny, H, 1990, p i9.
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fact that the labour tenants with a birthright to the land had to pay for it.
However, for them, this was for them a better solution than expulsion. The 
DBSA has suggested that this strategy should be encouraged but that the labour 
tenants should receive a land grant from the state to pay for the legal title.^^^
Furthermore to implement such a strategy it would be necessary to repeal the 
sub division act.
(d) Another possibility is the creation of non-governm ental, locally based
Community Land T r u s t s . T h e  trusts (which could be called Cominunity Lane 
Banks) could obtain  land as an endow m ent or th rough specia l purchase
arrangements. The trusts could then develop a land management plan which migh- 
involve zoning land for different uses, housing, vegetable gardens, arable land anc
grazing areas. The trust could then sell or rent land to interested parties who fulfil!
criteria developed by the trust (for example: residency, farming ability, householc 
income level). A principal aim of the trust could be to m aintain land in the 
possession of the community in the long term. Therefore if  a lessee or land ownei
decides to terminate their lease or sell the land the trust should have first option tc
buy back the land or facilitate its transfer to another qualifying applicant.
Community Land Trusts offer the possibility of (a) a Board of trustees
w hich com bines com m unity  and in s titu tio n a l rep re sen ta tio n ^ ^ ^  w ith  
professional expertise (b) a land endowment of a geographically defined area,
(c) a land use plan drawn up through consultation with beneficiaries, (d) an 
incom e through rents or sale to secure rep roduction , expansion  or
d iversification , (e) re ta in ing  the assets w ithin the com m unity through 
conditionality  o f resale (f) the developm ent o f qualify ing crite ria  for 
b e n e f ic ia r ie s .
For example in the case of Taung, the "community" comprises a wide
range of residents some with access to land but the majority without. Many 
family members are employed outside of Taung but send remittances to the
residual family. A wider consultation using a "resolution o f conflicts of
Personal communication with N. Vink, Senior Policy analyst, DBSA, February 1992.
Warburton and Wilcox, 1988, p , after considerable researching define development 
trusts as " independent, not-for-profit organisations which take action to renew an area 
physically, socially and in spirit. They bring together public/private and voluntary 
sectors to obtain financial and other resources. They encourage substantial involvement by 
local people and aim to sustain their operation by generating revenue."
The inclusion of chiefs on boards governing new institutional arrangements for land 
was a transitional approach used in Botswana. It ensured that chiefs felt they still had a 
role - but effectively this role was weakened through its incorporation into a body with a 
wider group of interests.
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interest" approach combined with some professional advice should allow for a 
design of a viable and broadly acceptable land management/access scheme for 
which the community takes some responsibility to implement and monitor. The
professional advisory role w ithin the trust should ensure that the scheme 
meets land use regulations and lends itself to good conservation practice. The 
effective operation of the trust would be enhanced by démocratisation of local
government. It would combine the space to assert individual rights within a
w ider participatory and accountable fram ew ork and also com bine social
objectives with revenue generation.
(e) A nother in stitu tional "affirm ative action" arrangem ent w ould
involve the state acting as a facilitator to secure affordable leaseholds to 
capital scarce tenants. This is the option pursued for some tim e in
Saskatchew an.^^^ For ten years (1972-1982) the p rov incial governm ent 
uperated the "Saskatchewan Land Bank" (SLB) to assist affordable leaseholds
and land purchase especially to assist in tergenerational transfer.^^^ The
operation of the scheme ran into several problems which should be considered 
in any redesign and re-im plem entation of a like-minded proposal. Firstly the 
provincial government faced an escalating debt burden; it borrowed money 
from commercial banks at a time when interest rates were low and were
thereafter ensnared by the rising interest rates. The provincial government's 
need to raise rents to cover bond repayments contradicted the intended policy 
of creating affordable leaseholds in accordance with production income. 
Secondly the scheme caused frustration because it raised expectations but was 
never able to fully satisfy demand; there were ten applicants for every farm
acquired for the scheme. Thirdly the scheme aroused considerable political 
hostility. Large landholders, corporate business and legal firm s opposed the 
scheme either because they saw it as impeding their own chances for farm
enlargement or as leading to a loss of income due to less frequent open market
It is not a new idea in South Africa. The second Commission of Enquiry into 
Agriculture in the early 1960s proposed this very idea (See Chapter 3) as a means to 
enable young, able, white farmers without capital to get into farming.The idea was never 
pursued because it basically contradicts the primary objective which was to induce farm 
enlargem ent.
A major rural Canadian problem in the post II World War period has been the increase 
in life expectancy of the population. Old farmers now wish to retire but are tied to their 
land both for an income and residency. If they wish to move to town their only option to 
buy another home and be able to top up meagre state pension is through selling the farm. 
Ideally they would like to keep the farm in the family but the younger generation has no 
funds to buy out the parents. The SLB was designed to respond, in part, to this social 
c r is is .
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land transfers. The scheme was also alleged to be communistic - a back door
method of nationalisation. In reality the SLB supported a strata o f the less 
powerful land owning interests. The scheme included a purchase option and 
depended on resale of land to create a ro tating fund to assist more
(intergenerational) transfers. The scheme came to an end after the election of
a new provincial government.^^^
A fraction o f the p rairie  farm ers continue to lobby governm ent
assistance to indebted farmers and the possible creation of a new land bank. 
Their proposals are relevant to many of South A frica's com mercial farmers.
They propose (a) that there should no government assistance to farm ers to 
subsidise loan payments to the banks which they see as an incentive to the
banks not to lower interest rates, (b) The provincial government should rather
give equity assistance to farmers to lower the capital principal that they are
repaying (c) the government should raise special funds (offering tax breaks) 
to raise funds for purchase (d) rentals should be fixed according to a formula
based on output and net income, (e) the banks should share in the market place 
risks- if the price of land drops so should the bank share in the loss and adjust 
the principal and amortisation rates accordingly. This demand derives from the 
1980s experience: land prices dropped by a third. Banks reviewed their clients' 
loans, declared many as now "undersecured" and called in the loans.
My own preference is against the creation  of state adm inistered
leaseholds as created by the SLB because o f the potential for corruption, 
nepotism and cost. The current Zimbabwean state leasehold system has been 
described as "w him sical", with a fam ily 's access to land depending on
maintaining good relations with a state bureaucrat. Perhaps this option has 
betterchances of functioning well where civil society is better developed than 
is the case in Southern Africa.
C o n c lu d in g  R em ark s
In South A frica the most im portant issue is the restructuring  o f 
agriculture to offer viable and sustainable econom ic futures for the rural
population. C urrently  diverse tenure forms co-exist and rac ia l farm ing 
stratification must have produced one of the sharpest g in i-coefficients in
Author's notes from recorded interviews with Saskatchewan farmers and social 
researchers. November 1989.
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relation to distribution o f farm income in the world. And yet the low-income 
population will continue to inhabit the rural areas depending on remittances.
On both practical and political grounds I have argued against the
transform ation of currently diverse tenure form s into one unitary freehold 
system. I would however support a process of form al titling o f communal 
usufruct rights in spite of this being an expensive undertaking. Usufruct
rights have proved fragile in neighbouring states hence titling might offer
greater security in a situation of political flux.^^^ Titling need not necessarily 
be an ind iv idual ex erc ise ; com m unity re g is tra tio n  is an a lte rn a tiv e
p o ss ib ility .
Communal tenure, where socially secure, has proved that it is not in 
itself an impediment to increasing production (eg. the proven capacity of
Zimbabwe's middle and rich peasant strata to take advantage o f the new
conditions after independence.) Communal tenure is an im pedim ent to the 
emergent entrepreneur whose access to land becomes severely limited.^^® But 
within the proposed mixed economy such black aspirant entrepreneurs will 
lobby for and probably succeed in getting subsidised access to land. If so, I 
have argued for conditionalities of resale.
I have also cited the case for a protected land pool where individuals get
state leasehold if they satisfy certain criteria. But my own preference is for the
major thrust o f land red istribu tion  to take place through Com m unity
^^^My support for a titling exercise stems from fieldwork observation in Mozambique: one 
Manicalahd group of peasantry first lost its usufruct fertile valley land through -colonial 
dispossession. After independence the notion of restitution was over ruled in favour of 
creating state farms and cooperatives. In this specific Manicaland area a state farm began 
but then abandoned because it was judged to be too small. The peasantly moved back on to 
the land repossessing land according to social recognised usufruct rights. Since then the 
government has offered part of the valley land for foreign leasehold. Well placed civil 
servants are taking most advantage of a titling process which began for the remainder of 
the land so it is probable that the prior right of the first usufruct land holders will be 
passed over once again. Locally based political organisation together with some formal 
legal registration of usufruct might have enabled this group of peasantry to more 
effectively resist dispossession.
557 Yiig National Land Committee has suggested this approach for protection of individual 
rights to communal land areas. Currently much of the administration of land in bantustans 
is in the power of collaborating chiefs- and community titling is part of the process of 
necessary disempowerraent.
538 Additional land may be loaned from neighbours; outright purchase is impeded by the 
communal process.
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Developm ent Trusts offering the possibility  o f a more dem ocratic and
accountable process.
A land reform  carried out with the above legal, econom ic, land
management and marketing considerations should lead to a heterogeneous 
transformation process. The role of the state is that of facilitator to assist the
realisation  o f po litical dem ands supported by iden tifiab le  constituencies. 
Emergent entrepreneurs may lobby for subsidised access to land; if this is 
effected then I have argued for the imposition o f conditionalities on resale. 
Individuals or groups of individuals may argue for a land endowment for small 
scale household based agriculture. Here I would advocate the introduction of 
locally governed developm ent trusts which com bine both opportunities for
individuals but which also harness individual rights tem pering them with 
social accountability.
The process outlined implies flexibility and visible fruition of the policy 
design over a period of time. It may be difficult to envisage the radical 
challenge to white agrarian interests. But, as previously emphasised, effective 
land reform  requires rurally based political organisation which exerts its
challenge to the status quo through the dém ocratisation of local government. 
Land reform  legislation has proved fairly  ineffective unless the intended 
beneficiaries are sufficiently well organised to take advantage o f the reform
f r a m e w o r k . R a d i c a l  challenge through the creation o f state farm s and
cooperatives has proved unsustainable where there is no rural political base. 
So whereas the socialisation of agriculture may offer social and economic 
advantages, it should emerge as the result of political organisation and as a
chosen preference. The state's role is to facilitate an enduring redistribution 
process through the adoption of a conducive legal process, provision of flexible 
tenure alternatives and a clear economic strategy. The fram ework should 
enable d ifferen t categories o f ex isting  p roducers and /or land reform  
beneficiaries to realise their productive potential with a consideration for long 
term, wider community concerns.
Brazil has a land reform framework which is most beneficial to the rural middle class 
who are most organised to take advantage. In India, West Bengal's success in carrying out 
some effective land redistribution is ascribed to the prior démocratisation of local 
government and the replacement of traditional (religious) power structures with 
democratically elected bodies.
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Appendix 1. Strategising for Transformation: A Simulation
E x er c ise ^
"Conflicts of Interest: Maize Farming in Western Transvaal,
O bjectives.
^Identify differing sets o f interests which m ust be considered in the 
formulation of new agrarian policy in the future South Africa.
^Examine how a particular set of interests shapes peoples' actions and the 
alliances they form.
* Analyse the consequences of different land use policies (who benefits, 
how, under what conditions, with what costs) of different land use policies.
P r o c e s s .
Begin with an introduction to the simulation exercise. The finale will 
be to role play a consultation meeting in a town hall where different 
interest groups arrange to meet to present their positions and discuss them. 
The facilitators distribute the "scenario" for reading. Participants are then 
allocated to different roles among the identified key players. It may be 
advisable to carefully choose which participants assume which roles ie. 
people with legal and economics backgrounds are useful to have in the 
banking role, people with an activist, leadership, union background can be 
assigned to the roles which favour land redistribution. The groups do not 
have to have equal numbers-weight them as you wish. There are six role 
groups: (1) the transitional government, (2) perm anent farm w orkers, (3) 
seasonal farmworkers (4) unemployed farm workers, (5) the banks and (6) 
white farm ers.
There are three preparatory phases to the exercise, followed by a 
"live" enactm ent of a d istric t consultation m eeting , follow ed by a 
d e b r ie f in g .
There are instruction to hand out at the beginning of each o f the 
three preparatory sessions. In the first preparatory phase, the role groups 
define their own specific self interest and the needs of their group. In the 
second preparatory phase the role groups are asked to identify possible 
short and long term allies among the other groups. This phase should 
produce a lively in teraction  as groups attem pt to receive advance 
information on the positions of other groups as well as form alliances to 
further their own in terests. The role groups then spend the their 
preparatory session in preparing their arguments for presentation to the 
town hall meeting.
1 For a full record of the response provoked by this exercise in the ANC 
exiles workshop, February 1990, See "Breaking New Ground" 1990 a 'Report 
on an ANC in-house workshop on the Political, Economic and Social Issues of 
South Africa’s Rural Areas." ANC Research Department, Lusaka.
2 The structure and process is based on a simulation exercise designed to 
provoke strategic thinking in local community on race relations in schools
in Toronto -elaborated by Barbara Thomas working for the Ontario Schools.
Board, Canada
."his exercise was drafted by Helena Dolny, February 1990 and revised in 
consultation with Barbara Thomas and Bongiwe Njobe. The version
reproduced here has been further revised by Dolny in February 1992.
I l l
The group assum ing the role o f the transitional governm ent is
requested to organise the meeting as they would wish it to take place:
seating arrangements, controls o f time allocation to speakers and so on. 
After one hour the "simulation " is called to a halt and all participants 
discuss the political dynamics of what happened.
The entire sim ulation exercise needs four hours: 15 m inutes
introduction, 40 minutes for each of the three preparatory phases, 60 
minutes for the simulation and 45 minutes for the debriefing. Using an 
afternoon for preparation and running the meeting after supper can work
well in a residential workshop.
Interest Groups.
1. Representatives of the new transitional governments coming to
power in a united, democratic, non racial South Africa.
2. Full time farmworkers resident on the commercial farms of this 
region. They are mostly men -they are not unanimous in their outlook:
(a) some can trace their family history back to the time when the
land belonged to their families. They wish to claim ancestral rights to the
la n d .
3. Casual Workers, mostly women and children employed at weeding 
and harvesting time. A few are the wives of the full time workmen, most of 
them come from Bophutatswana.
4. Unemployed men and women who share a varied history-some
have been relocated from so called "black spots"; others retrenched from 
industrial employment, others are former farm workers from the Western 
Transvaal areas who have lost their jobs due to mechanisation.
5. White farm owners.
6. The Bankers.
S c e n a r i o
The Western Transvaal is a maize farm area. In the 1970s the white
com mercial farmers responded to state incentives to increase both their
land and labour productivity. Investm ents in w idespread m echanisation 
caused a huge loss of jobs in the area and ex- farm resident workers found 
themselves expelled to rural closer settlements in Boputatswana. The casual 
labour jobs which became available in the weeding and harvesting season 
are now mostly done by women and children. The governm ent's fixed 
pricing policy encourages farmers to produce as much maize as they can; 
farm ers monocropping practices are now causing soil erosion problems. 
The export of maize earns foreign currency but the domestic price price
has been consistently higher than the international trading price so these
exports have been subsidised. In an effort to reduce the level o f 
government expenditure on subsidies a system has been introduced to pay 
farmers not to grow maize on all their land. In spite of government support 
many white grain farmers have big bank debts - they were hard hit in the
early eighties as interest rates and prices of farming inputs rose faster than
the price grain and to make the problem worse farmers had poor harvests 
due to drought.
The new government has committed Itself to a mixed economic policy 
where private businesses will co-exist with some government intervention 
to redistribute wealth and promote diverse forms of production. It is 
committed to the Freedom Charter which states that "our people have been
robbed of their birthright to land " that "the people shall share in the
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country's wealth" and that the "land shall be shared by those who work it". 
The new government is considering a variety o f possibilities o f how 
production might be reorganised in the interest o f the people but there is 
also concern that there should be a transitional approach to change to 
ensure that production is maintained and that food supplies are secure. The 
farming options they are considering range from state farms, production 
cooperatives, household farm s, jo in t ventures or the continuation of 
com m ercial farm ing  en terp rises  w ith im proved  w ages and liv ing  
c o n d itio n s .
For the W estern Transvaal region the transitional governm ent has 
rece ived  "RECOM M ENDATIONS" from  the M inistry  o f A gricu ltu re  
technicians that the investm ents made to achieve large scale high 
productivity farming should not be lost but that some reorganisation of 
cropping patterns is advisable in the interests o f improved land care. This 
would mean that monocropping of maize would stop but that the current 
levels of mechanisation would be maintained. The technicians have also 
recommended that some of the less productive farms should be taken over 
and the land redistributed to Africans who have farming skills and proven 
en trep ren eu ria l capacity .
The new government is highly sensitive to the regional differences 
and is aware that any action it takes will be controversial. It is concerned 
not to make decisions in Pretoria without prior consultation. The new 
government has initiated a process of local level consultations to take place 
in the differing farm ing regions to hear representations from different 
interest groups and to present its own concerns.
PROCESS INSTRUCTIONS
The preparation sessions will culminate in a session enacting a consultative 
public meeting which all the interested parties attend.
Each role group is to give a five minute presentation to the public meeting 
which reflects the position which the role group arrives at during the 
preparation  sessions.
PLANNING PERIOD:PHASE 1. IDENTIFICATION OF GROUP SELF INTERESTS.
(Time: 40 minutes)
The purpose of this planning period is to determ ine the specific self 
interest and needs of your group. Defining self interests and needs is the 
first step in dealing with change. Having a goal and a focus will assist your 
group to define and protect its interests. During this task, assume that it is 
important to be self concerned and to know what you what to happen. Be 
a s se r tiv e .
In this round, complete the following tasks.
1. Discuss w h a t. self interests and needs of the members of your role group 
do you want to promote at this meeting?
2. ' Agree un the rule gruup's Self interests and priorities.
3. Develop a plan to gather any additional information you would like to 
have .
4. Decide who can help you get what you want.
5. What are your resources to use to make sure you get what you want.
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PLANNING PERIOD. PHASE 2. IDENTIFICATION OF SELF-INTERESTS OF OTHER 
GROUPS.
(Time: 40 minutes)
In this phase you should get to know the other group in order to assess their 
self interest and the resources which they have to defend their position. It 
is only by doing this that you can identify the short term and long term
allies in ng what your own group wants.
Your tasks in this phase are to:
1. Identify who has an interest in the recom m endations made by the
Ministry of Agriculture's technical advisers to the new government.
2. What are their positions on the recommendations made by the Ministry 
o ff ic ia ls?
3. W hat resources do they have to influence any changes to the
re c o m m e n d a tio n s?
4. What alliances should you make, and with whom, to increase you own
influence on the recommendations.
PLANNING PERIOD:PHASE 3. DEVELOPMENT OF GROUP STRATEGY.
(Time: 40 minutes)
Decide which strategy/strategies your group will undertake and what you 
want to say at the meeting.
As a resource to you strategising and planning you might want to look at
and consider different kinds of strategies. See "Strategic Procedures"
ROLE BRIEFS.
Each role group was given, separately and only a brief of the role assigned 
to them. It is an aid tool to help the role group develop its character 
including a description of what the particular concerns and interests of 
this role group might be.
Role Group: "The Transitional Government"
You have called the meeting because you are very concerned with the 
im plem entation of a new agrarian policy which is satisfactory to rural 
com munities. You are well aware of the failures o f state farm s and 
cooperatives in neighbouring countries. You are also aware of political 
dissent possibly leading to destabilisation in the long term if the demands of 
the majority of the people are not responded to. You are walking a social, 
political and economic tightrope. There is massive unemployment -yet these 
farms are mechanised. Agricultural exports are important especially ad the 
country as a debt repayment schedule to fulfill. You are aware that racial 
capitalism  and gender oppression has deprived w orkers o f technical 
knowledge and managerial skills. You are aware that the white farmers will 
demand compensation if they are to leave their farms - but a compensation 
debt will exacerbate the budget deficit and simply add to the economic 
problems of the economy. You are wary of a right wing back lash and 
economic sabotage of the kind experienced in Chile in the 1970s.
From this meeting you want to win support for the recommendations made 
by the M inistry of A griculture technicians -if  the farm ers agree to
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fu lfilling  workers' dem ands for im proved w ages, working and living 
conditions. On the farms to be taken over you want to hear the different 
interests and take decisions accordingly.
You are running this consultation meeting. You want to win support for 
your own position and at the same time must ensure that the positions of all 
the role groups are duly considered.
Role: The Banks.
Several hundred farmers in this region are heavily indebted to the bank. 
These farms are not profitable under the present farming system. These 
farms could have been declared bankrupt some years ago but there was 
government pressure on your bank to favour the white rural constituency. 
Your bank does not want to call in their loans and end up with these farms- 
and then have to organise new buyers or set up new economic ventures. 
You want to get back the money lent out plus profit. You know that there 
are a lot of African businessmen who are anxious to buy farmland. You see 
the possibility of future profitability on your loan.
You are w orried that the more radical elem ents in the transitional 
government will win support for their proposals which include the state 
getting hold of land without paying out the market price for it. I f  this 
proposal were to go through you might not get your money back. Also you
do not know what system of land tenure will be followed. If there is not a 
system o f saleable leaseholds- against what security are you as a bank
expected to make loans?
Y our in te re s t is in defend ing  non ra c ia l, p riv a te , m ark e tab le  
la n d o w n e rsh ip . ^
Role:The Full-time Farmworkers.
At the moment you are full-time farmworkers. The job goes with a house for 
your family. If the farm is taken over by another farmer, you expect to lose 
your job, your house, your right to be in the area. This is what has been 
happening to dozens of families you know in the last twenty five years 
since the mechanisation push began.
Many years ago the families in this region used to work this land. Then 
when the whites came and claimed formal land ownership your family
became sharecroppers. You farmed the landowner's land and he took a
share of the crop from you as his "rent" for your using his land. Over the 
years this system has fallen away and now you work as wage workers.
When you, as a group of full-time farmworkers have discussed the Freedom
Charter and its clause "the land shall belong to those who work it" -you find
that you do not have a united position.
*some of you want back the very same land that you know your
family originally farmed. You know where the graves are and you want to
live there again. You expect government assistance to re-establish your 
farm ing activ ities.
* some of you no longer want to own land -but you want better
conditions as farmworkers -wages, housing, health and schooling.
* some of you no longer want to own your own piece of land -but you 
do not want to work for the white "baas" -you think the government should 
take over these farms and turn them into state farms-or allow workers to
turn them into producer cooperatives.
Role: Seasonal Workers (male and female)
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Some of you come from Bophutatswana, others form the Transkei, 
others are part of labour teams recruited in the Orange Free State. When the 
men among you think back twenty years you think of a time when nearly 
all the seasonal workers were men and a lot of the work was heavy lifting. 
But now most of you seasonal workers are women and children- the bosses 
say that women and children are strong enough to do the "lighter jobs" of 
clearing weeds missed by mechanical weeding and gleaning the grain left 
by the combine harvester.
As men, as seasonal workers you are worried that "land to those who 
work it" might only be understood as those who are resident farmworkers. 
You reject this idea as members of your family have been farmworkers in 
this region for generations. You don't expect to find a permanent job, you 
don't expect to find a job in the city, you don't have any savings -but you 
would like some land of your own, or a plot of arable land with communal 
tenure or at least a share of a cooperative farm.
As women, as seasonal workers you are worried how your demands 
can be put forward. You know that in other countries women have not won 
rights to own land in their own name. You also know that in wage work 
systems the skilled jobs are always taken by men. Some of you want secure 
skilled work on the farms with a house and a vegetable garden, others of 
you want a piece of land to farm as your own. At the moment you go from 
temporary job on one farm to temporary job on another farm -so you don't 
really mind where you are offered land either on the farm where you are 
now working, or near the homestead you go to in when you have no work 
Bophutatswana. Instead of seasonal work you want to be able to develop 
household farming activities and sell some produce -but you are also 
worried about where you would get money from for inputs - and if you did 
borrow money - but had a bad harvest or ate all the produce -then how 
would you pay back your loan?
Role:The Unemployed.
Some of you living in the bantustans are from former "blackspots", 
freehold land which you owned in so called white areas form which you 
have been relocated. You would like your farming area back again and to 
own the land you occupied before.
Others of you are members o f fam ilies who had been resident 
farmworkers on the land of this region for decades. When farmers bought 
machines you lost your jobs. You want to work but don't expect to find an 
industrial job. You think the new government should not allow so many 
machines which take away people's jobs -but you also rem em ber the 
backbreaking work when there were no machines.
Some of you are "redundant" industrial workers. You have been 
removed, in the early 1980s from the urban areas as "surplus people". You 
have never farmed- you have only heard stories from your elders of how 
they used to farm in such and such a place. You would like to work -your 
spirit is down from not having a job, not bringing home money. You don't 
know what to expect from the new government -you don't know what will 
happen to people like you.
Rule: White Farm-owners.
As white farm -owners you want land as private property. You 
recognise that whites own 87% of the land in South Africa but you also feel 
that generations of whites have invested their capital into the land and 
developed it from a "bundu" into technologically advanced farms. You 
understand that some of the settlers may not have been "fair" in their land 
deals - but that is history. You had to buy your farm borrowing money from
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the bank and year by year you had to worry about repaying the bank loans.
On your farm you think it would be better to accept some minimal demands
for improved workers' conditions. You think the government should seek 
foreign aid in the form of direct assistance to white farms to achieve some
of these improved conditions (as you know has been done through UNICEF 
assistance in Zimbabwe).
You know that blacks want more land. But if the government wants to 
help blacks this is the government's problem and it should buy land for 
redistribution. Personally you don't think the government should buy too 
much land because you know in the end it'll be paid for out of your taxes 
and you don;t want to pay any extra. Besides which you don't think there 
are too many blacks who know how to farm and look afrer land.
You basically m istrust the new government and any statem ent o f
theirs which supports the recommendations which you know the Ministry
of Agriculture technicians have made -as you fear that in the end the voice 
of reason will not win out. You are scared of the radical elements in the 
transitional government. You fear they will take the land back where and 
as they choose, refuse to pay market prices and take their time to pay
whatever they decide to pay.
You want what happened in Zimbabwe -that there should be willing
sellers and willing buyers with the government having the first option on 
any land that comes up for sale. You don't want any strings attached to the 
money you'll get paid out for your farm- you've heard that in other 
countries land owners got governm ent bonds, to invest in industries 
redeemable after only so many years. You want cash up front- and as in the 
long term you're not sure that you'd want to stay in South Africa anyway
under black majority rule - than you'd like your cash to be convertible - 
you want to be able to have the whole amount in foreign exchange so that 
you can either emigrate or invest abroad.
SUMMARY of the outcome of the Simulation Exercise as enacted at an "ANC 
workshop on the Political, Economic and Social Issues o f South Africa's 
Rural Areas." February 5th-9th 1990 - pp 19-25.
Each interest group made its presentation summarised as follows:
1. Opening Remarks of the Transitional Government.
* welcome to the meeting
* announcement that all racial legislation was to be immediately repealed,
^overview of present rural issues and concerns:
-disparity in both land ownership and land use, unsatisfactory
working and living conditions, wages and social services, 
-acknow ledgem ent that people are inform ally taking possession o f
lan d .
-warning of tensions and that many farmers possess arms, 
^announcem ent of further measures which the transitional governm ent
intends to implement immediately:
-all underutlised land to be appropriated
-compensation on the basis of land improvements valuation
-redistribution of land for collectives o f workers and seasonal 
workers and unemployed to provide work and social security.
-extensive state support to be made available including credit with 
low rates of interest, training and marketing advice,
-special affirm ative actions to be available to women, children and 
the elderly,
-the opening of land claims offices for where people were removed 
by thé apartheid regime can present their title deeds for consideration.
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-nationalisation of certain large agribusiness estates 
-creation of job opportunities for redundant industrial workers 
-revenue to finance these proposals to be raised through a tax
system .
* invitation to each interest group to now give their views respecting a five
minute limit due to time constraints.
2. Seasonal farmworkers presentation;
* complaint on shortness of time allowed for presentation,
* complaint that transitional government said they were coming to listen
yet now presenting new proposals,
* overview of their situation of seasonal workers of generations of families
working the land,
* presentation of general demands which they see as common to all
w o rk e rs :
1. full time work including illegalisation of seasonal work,
2. job security and skills training (technical and managerial)
3. access to adequate health services,
4. access to training regardless of gender differences,
5. secure, safe and affordable housing,
6. access to free and universal education for our children
7. a living wage which we negotiate.
The group had placed themselves in the situation of a specific farm in the 
case smdy and went on to sketch out their demands for their own future.
What we want specifically in relation to our future co-op:
1. Financial security from the state in case of drought and crop failure,
2. Certificate of temporary ownership and legal security in terms of future
use and occupation of the land regardless of gender,
3. Access to financial support and an interest free loan if necessary- to be
mediated with the bank,
4. Security of existing capital assets or secure new capital assets,
5. Market security and control of foreign produced food produce. Price 
controls in our favour.
What we think in response to the Ministry of Agriculture proposal:
We want to continue with monocrop production of maize in the short term
b ecau se :
1. We do not have the skills, finances or know-how to diversify immediately,
2. Maize is a staple crop and will remain an important part of the national 
diet for the foreseeable future,
3. We need to know what the national food reserves are and whether the
new government will change the national food production policy:
a) will maize continue to be a major export crop;
b) what industrial uses can maize be put to
4. We will put inio practice environmental control measures if there is any 
evidence of soil erosion due to moncropping.
5. We would like to acquire more production and management skills to be 
able to successfully implement mixed cropping in the future
6. We are skilled in the production of maize and this is what we know best,
"We would like you to give us a chance. We have been landless for
three, four, five generations and now we have it we hope you will allow us
to stay on the land, so that we can work it." (APPLAUSE)
3. Permanent Farmworkers Presentation.
1. We are farmworkers (permanent) on Van Zyl Slabbert's 500 ha. maize
farm in this, the Western Transvaal region.
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2. According to a recent government report, this is a less productive farm 
which "should be taken over and the land distributed to Africans who have 
skills and proven entrepreneurial capacity.
3. It has come to our knowledge that this farm is close to bankruptcy,
because the present owner has incurred heavy debts from banks who want 
to repossess farm machinery.
4. We are not happy about the government proposal that less productive
farms should only be redistributed to "Africans who have skills and proven 
en trep reneu ria l capacity ."
5. We believe that the more productive and fertile farm land should be taken 
and given to Africans "who work the land"
6. We permanent farmworkers meet all the conditions of government in as 
far as taking the farm over is concerned.
Our specific demands are as follows:
1. We have decided to take over this farm, its land and all assets;
2. This is in accordance with the Freedom Charter that, "the land shall be 
shared by those who work it."
3. It is also in agreement with the new condition set by government that 
skilled and proven farmworkers must take the land over.
4. We however differ with government on breaking and distributing this
"less productive" land.
5. We have instead agreed to maintain the present status of a single unit.
6. We shall work it together under the co-operative system o f social
p ro d u c tio n .
7. It is our belief that we are in full agreement with government policy 
which encourages the creation of co-operative production by those "who 
work the land."
8. We have decided to introduce a diversified form o f production because the 
previous m ono-production has ruined the land, vegetation and w ater 
systems of our environment, including our own health and general quality
of life.
9. We assure government and our people as a whole that we shall meet the 
national demand of increased agricultural production of food security and a
clean environm ent.
10. At this moment we hereby extend a hand of invitation to our former 
boss. We request him to join us as fellow co-operative producers.
11. Together we shall help in forming and join a National Co-operative 
Union of Agricultural Producers.
12. We are certain that with the firm support and encouragement from 
government and all fraternal forces, especially in m atters relating * to: 
appropriate legislative measures. Training and Research, Extension Service, 
social and economic infrastructure, financial and credit facilities - - we 
shall realise our set objectives with speed and ease."
The Bankers' Presentation
We are YOUR bankers and have met to consider the new situation. We
have noted the government's statement and will consult with our lawyers
on the legal implications of the changes.
We welcome this opportunity to participate in the transformation to a
non-racial, non-sexist, democratic country. We are ready to co-operate with
the new government to seek stability in the economy, harmony between all 
social groups and to encourage full productive employment for all those 
with legal title to the land. We believe that producers, bankers, services,
workers and all in gainful employment share a common interest with us in 
hard work for the development of the country.
We are friends of all groups not least the commercial farmers whose
interests we share in the growth and the development of their enterprises. 
We have long serviced them with loans and other financial facilities and
will continue to do so and hope to extend this service to all entrepreneurs.
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Our approach is positive. As bankers we w ill provide capital 
(naturally subject to a certain rate of interest) in order to increase and 
consolidate agricultural units and to protect their interests.
We will encourage investment in enterprises that will help diversify 
cropping; preserve the soil; develop afforestation and provide credit for 
mechanisation to sustain and extend present productive capacity and make 
work for all.
We wish to encourage productivity for export and for the home 
market at economic prices. We will extend opportunities for agribusiness to 
stimulate employment, to improve our yields and increase the national 
p ro d u c t.
To the unem ployed, the seasonal workers, and perm anent farm 
workers we will ensure the capital investment for development and growth. 
Our ffee-market position offers jobs, mobility of labour, freedom of choice, 
freedom to bargain and above all opportunities for all those who wish to 
a c c u m u la te .
Our contribution to this great social transform ation will extend to
encourage loans and give our expertise for important social projects such
as clean water, sanitation, prim ary health clinics, housing, schools and 
w e lfa re .
In conclusion we stress the value o f free enterprise, a plural
econom y and the im portance o f a m ark e t-o rien ta ted  hard-w ork ing  
community. Out slogan is, "Time is money! Money is development.'
W hite Farmers' Presentation.
"Dear Sirs and Madams,
This region has a proud history of com mercial farming which has 
provided food and valuable foreign exchange and is prepared to continue to 
do so. We provide a large amount of employment, both perm anent and
seasonal. To continue this tradition it requires that we maintain stability 
and build confidence to ensure continued investment by us in our land and
the high level of productivity that results. This can be secured by clearly 
zoning this region as a large scale individual commercial farming region. 
In this regard we would be pleased to see the government adopt the 
M inistry o f Agriculture's recom m endations including;
1) support for the movement away from m onoculture, but m aintaining
levels of high food production by a slow transition with full structural
support from government;
2) maintaining levels of mechanisation and the subsidies required to ensure 
this. We would be pleased to see the government give aid to individual 
African com m ercial farm ers, however it is necessary to ensure local 
confidence that any take-over' of a farm is done on a willing seller, willing 
buyer basis..
Stability is ensured by good labour relations, in this regard we hope the
government will look to the example of Zimbabwe where the government 
got outside funding to improve the condition of permanent workers in these 
a rea s :
1) wages we feel have to keep us with the cost of living but any minimum 
wage must not be unreasonable as it will price people out of the market and 
result in the loss of jobs;
2) orderly unionisation is not rejected by us. We particularly welcome a 
locally based workers' association which understands the area and the
customs of our local Tswana people;
3) we welcome government support for the development of some local small 
agricultural industries to relieve unemployment and boost the marketing of 
farming products for example, the construction of a local mill.
4) we would encourage government support for transport subsidies to our 
seasonal workers to ensure that their time on each farm is kept to the 
minimum so that they can obtain further em ployment on neighbouring 
fa rm s .
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We welcome the government's positive attitude to farming in our region. 
Guarantees that no land will be taken away without just com pensation
brings confidence to our community for the future.
This governm ent's  com m itm ent to basic ind iv idual hum an righ ts, 
particularly to the protection of our property; our land and homes, is a
sound foundation for the future. Threats o f expropriation or damage to 
productive property will undermine our productivity and threaten the food
security of our new nation.
This confidence will be ensured by guaranteeing in our country's new bill
of rights the free transferability of property, particularly the productive
land which we farm. Thankyou. "
The Presentation from the Unemployed.
"We are a group formed of (1) victims of forced removals (2) farmworkers 
who have lost our jobs due to mechanisation, (3) industrial workers who 
have been made redundant.
We all want to work and our fundamental premise is -jobs for all adults. At
the same time we do not want the productivity of the economy.
We therefore realise that white commercial farm s and private enterprise
will continue to be major employers under the future government, our 
proposals are as follows:
1. Repossession of the land from which we were forcibly removed.
2. Allocation of additional land -the land was disproportionately distributed, 
in particu lar occupation o f land owned by absentee landlords and 
unproductive land.
3. Compensation for years of lost capital accumulation. This should take the 
form o f taxation on capital of white com m ercial farm ers and private 
industria l en terprises.
4. Legislation to protect the rights of workers including trade union rights
(trade unions should negotiate working conditions)
5. Legislation for job sharing and our proposal would be that a government
commission look into this with the possibility o f legislating a six hour 
working day to guarantee a job to all adults.
6) On the land allocated to us we intend forming co-operatives (in which 
there will also be a six hour working day). We will use funds allocated from 
compensation and will seek credit to finance our operations.
7) We would like to propose that all new investment in industrialisation in
both urban and rural areas be subject to co-operative legislation. 
Government should promote industrialisation to generate jobs.
8. Social services should receive immediate attention of government, ie.
priority should be given to education, health and housing.
We have noted the views of government. We would like to put it to the 
government that we do not believe that they have gone far enough in their
views on transformation in our society. Our demands have all along been
the nationalisation of land and industries.
Nothing has been said which guarantees the improvement of the lot of the
six million unemployed in our country.
We do not have title deed to the land from which some of us were forcibly
removed and there is no guarantee that jobs will be generated for us or for
the seasonal workers who now and again swell our ranks.
There is also no guarantee of job security for our brothers and sisters with 
permanent jobs in the farms and factories, our ranks are continuously 
being swelled by . workers made redundant in the urban areas and losing 
their jobs on the farms due to mechanisation."
ANALYSING OUR SIMULATION EXERCISE ROLE-PLAY MEETING:
After the presentation there began a question and answer session. We had
agreed to stop the simulation after one hour and then do a debriefing on
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what points were emerging from the experience. F irst groups responded to 
these questions:
(a) Did you get across what you wanted to?
(b) Do you feel you made your point adequately?
(c) Do you feel you were heard at the meeting?
The major issue which arose for the group as a whole was that of
consultative dem ocracy. Groups had understood tha t the governm ent
representatives were to come to hear their views and then to consider them. 
It was therefore felt that the m anner in which the governm ent opened the 
meeting with a presentation of its position prior to hearing the groups was 
politically  incorrect, a lienating  and disem pow ering. M ore specifically  
participants raised two issues addressing the feeling that they were "not 
heard" by the government.
(a) the need for government to run a democratic meeting so that
people feel they were heard. The group considered it was essential that 
government should not preem pt discussion. If  the government wanted the
groups to consider its proposal then they should have given time for the 
groups to give the proposal their consideration. Feeling that preem ption 
disempowers, particularly the less powerful groups in the society, pointed 
out that the government declared the actions of its allies illegal.
(b) There was debate over whether prior consultation with different 
interest groups impedes or assists democratic process. Participants could not 
agree on this, with some people arguing that it allowed the government to 
preempt and thus led to undemocratic practices, while others pointed out 
that in the real world there is a continuous process o f consultation and 
negotiation between interest groups, particularly more pow erful interests 
and the government.
Simulation Exercise Analysis: Further Points of Reflection:
(1) CQmpsnsaiion.
A commentary was passed that the proposal that compensation should be 
given on the basis of land improvements was an area requiring more
deliberation. In Zambia land is held as a national asset, land is not bought 
and sold, but land improvements are bought and sold. The valuation process, 
ascribing value to every ditch dug or tree planted, results in high market
exchange values for "improved" land assuring that access to com mercial 
farmlands is retained by the capital endowed elite.
(2) Alliances
It was observed that our analysis on "alliances" required rethinking, that 
there can be contradictions within alliances. In our earlier discussion, the 
seasonal workers, unemployed, and permanent workers were often grouped 
together as "natural allies". In fact, in our simulation exercised, this at least 
was not internalised- the three groups had not come as a coalition block. 
The facilitators noted that the participants had been unevenly distributed 
into roles: 3 governm ent represen tatives, three bankers, fou r white
farmers with the 20 remaining participants comprising the three groups. A 
comment was made that our simulation had reproduced what they had heard 
of in Nicaragua: ie. that the permanent farmworkers had looked after their 
own immediate interests to claim the land they were working on to turn it 
into a cooperative for themselves with little heed to the place of the 
seasonal workers and less heed to the plight of the landless unemployed. 
The issue of conflict of material interest needs to be addressed. We group
perm anent farm w orkers, seasonal farm workers and rural unem ployed as 
forces for change in the countryside- but in terms of land claims and their
own perceived future role we can expect the need for conflict resolution 
between the groups.
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(3) Land Claims. .
A further comment of dismay was the feeling that the transitional 
government in our simulation had entered into a conciliatory alliance with 
"capital" as represented by the banks and white farm ers. This was 
contrasted to the transitional governm ent's approach to declaring land 
seizure illegal which was seen as adopting a conflictual approach. The case 
of Zimbabwe was cited where during the liberation wars land seizure had 
been laudably looked upon as part of the resistance struggle whereas now 
"squatters" were physically removed as the government states that "orderly 
development" is required. The design o f a responsive process for land 
claims was paramount importance.
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